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Introduction  
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the 
central Mississippi Valley has been known for 200 
years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Awareness 
of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has 
increased in the last decades. In the last two 
decades identification of an independent tectonic 
process occurring in the Wabash River Valley has 
implications for the seismic risk of the State of 
Indiana from what has recently been defined as the 
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a 
strong earthquake in these seismic zones or in 
Indiana or the neighboring states due to other not 
so well understood tectonic processes, as has 
occurred in the past, has serious implications for 
the State Transportation System. The definition of 
Earthquake Emergency Routes for the state is a 
priority for the Indiana Department of 
Transportation. The identification of Emergency 
Routes takes into account issues related to 
transportation including coverage of population and 
area and travel time along these routes.  
 
This study formulates a multicommodity maximal 
covering network design problem (MCNDP) for 
identifying critical routes, for earthquake response 
and to seismically retrofit bridges. The MCNDP 
seeks routes that minimize the total travel time over 
the selected routes and maximizes the total 
population covered, subject to a budget constraint 
on bridge retrofitting costs on the selected routes. 
The problem is formulated as a two-objective 
integer programming model and solved using the 
branch-and-cut module in the CPLEX optimizer. 
The model performance was analyzed using the 
transportation network of a seismically-prone 
region in southwest Indiana. Thereby, the search 
for the critical routes for an origin-destination (O-
D) pair is confined to a limited geographical region 
around it.  
 
A Geographical Information System (GIS) system 
was developed for evaluation of seismic 
vulnerability of the proposed Indiana Emergency 
Routes. The GIS based implementation of the 
technical information developed in this project 
through FEMA HAZUS-MH software was 
conducted in collaboration with the Polis Center in 
Indianapolis, nationally recognized and FEMA 
authorized HAZUS implementation facility. 
HAZUS software may be used for mitigation of 
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a strong 
earthquake in southwestern Indiana. It uses 
information from the Indiana Department of 
Transportation (INdot) maintenance database and 
selected structural and geotechnical information 
from the bridge drawings data base. Vulnerability 
assessment was performed using the general 
information from maintenance and final calibration 
was performed using a series of cases based on 
bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions 
contained in these drawings. 
Findings  
Computational experiments were conducted to 
investigate the effects of varying the budget and the 
relative weights of the two objectives. A set of 
critical routes was obtained. Seismic retrofit planning 
plays an important role in determining the 
effectiveness of the operational stage of earthquake 
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response management. At a strategic level, it is 
dependent on the routes critical for effective 
emergency response. However, past studies have not 
addressed the identification of critical routes under 
budget constraints. This is a very important practical 
problem for emergency response planners as it 
involves identifying effective transportation routes 
while accounting for bridge structural conditions and 
budget limitations. It implies the identification of 
bridges to retrofit under earthquake response 
planning. This study develops a network-level 
methodology to assist decision-makers in identifying 
an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of 
a network.  
 
This study formally defines the Multicommodity 
Maximal Covering Network Design Problem 
(MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge, 
it represents the first attempt to incorporate the 
coverage objective in a generic network model, 
leading to a new class of models with significant 
practical implications. Past work has used the 
coverage criterion in identifying a path, tree or 
tour on a network by considering either the 
routing or the fixed cost, while the proposed 
model simultaneously considers the routing and 
fixed costs subject to a budget constraint. That 
is, none of the existing models consider routing 
costs, fixed costs and coverage criterion in a 
single framework.   
 
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution 
of this study is its ability to address planning 
problems faced by emergency response agencies 
vis-à-vis disaster management. The specific 
problem addressed here relates to earthquake 
response management. Under budget constraints, 
there is a need to determine an effective retrofit 
plan for the bridges in a seismically-prone 
region. Most studies in the literature have 
adopted a local perspective to solving this 
problem, and do not consider the effect of 
potential bridge failures on the transportation 
system performance. The few methodologies 
that use a systems approach do not consider the 
influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of 
the associated routes vis-à-vis effective 
earthquake response. The proposed model fills 
this critical gap by considering the total travel 
time for the key O-D pairs in the network and 
the total population covered by them as the 
criteria for determining the critical routes. The 
budget limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs 
for the links constituting the critical routes is 
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence, 
this methodology simultaneously determines the 
set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and 
the routes that serve as focal points for 
earthquake response. 
 
The evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge 
design requirements contained in the AASHTO 
Specifications and the existence of a proposed 
draft seismic design specification being 
discussed have significant implications in the 
assessment of the existing vulnerability, its 
mitigation, and the design of new bridges along 
the Emergency Routes. Along with this 
development, the USGS assessment of the 
seismic risk of southwestern Indiana and a 
change of format of the definition of the 
earthquake design ground motion that is integral 
part of the proposed draft seismic design 
specification also has important implications on 
the assessment of the operational capabilities of 
the Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana. 
The effects of the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake 
that occurred in the State of Washington gave 
invaluable insight on the expected situation for 
the State of Indiana due to a comparable bridge 
inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel 
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both 
regions over the last decades.  
 
Using the information collected in this study, the 
GIS implementation through FEMA-HAZUS-
MH software may be used for mitigation of 
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a 
strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana. 
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels 
of ground acceleration in order to obtain 
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using 
these results, seismic behavior patterns were 
obtained for bridges located in southwestern 
Indiana included in the INdot Vincennes District 
maintenance data base. Soil amplification and 
liquefaction potential were evaluated for the 
cases having reported SPT measurements from 
borings. Based on this process, information 
critical for the identification of upgrade needs 
for the transportation structures part of the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes is made available 
to the INdot. 
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Implementation  
The findings and developments of this research 
project are presented next in the form of 
suggested implementation steps by the Indiana 
Department of Transportation. 
 
1. Formal adoption of the selected 
emergency routes or some variation of 
the same by the state is a necessary 
step. Such routes adopted and 
maintained by INdot will be affected by 
issues and policies outside the scope of 
those considered in this study. For 
instance, policy decisions, budgetary 
constraints, new projects, i.e. 
continuation of I-69, will likely affect 
the formal adoption of a set of 
emergency routes and will continue to 
impose changes in the future. The 
methodology developed in this study 
and the information implemented in 
HAZUS-MH should be of assistance to 
state decision makers in the future.  
 
2. Future implementation strategies can be 
studied through simulation studies 
using appropriately updated information 
for different earthquake scenarios 
including earthquake ground motion 
defined in current AASHTO Standard 
Specifications, proposed Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or 
other. These simulations will provide 
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for 
the proposed routes or alternative 
definitions.  
 
3. The information in the maintenance 
database should be periodically 
evaluated and should include 
information currently available only in 
the bridge drawings (see Section 7.5 of 
the final report). This will improve the 
vulnerability assessment of the bridges 
refining the mitigation policies to adopt 
in the future. This expansion of the 
maintenance database can be extended 
to other counties and districts not 
covered in this research project.  
 
4. Establish a program for assessing the 
liquefaction, soil spread, and 
embankment failure potential along the 
routes at locations other than bridge 
sites by providing a consistent 
evaluation methodology supported with 
the information developed in this study. 
This implementation will require a soil 
exploration program to obtain 
geotechnical properties of sites where 
no information exists or where such 
information was obtained years ago 
with different objectives than 
liquefaction evaluation. In the research 
conducted in this study, liquefaction 
evaluations were made using solely 
boring information contained in 
selected bridge drawings.  
 
5. To establish procedures for emergency 
response under different earthquake 
occurrence scenarios.  
 
6. INdot should consider the formal 
adoption of HAZUS-MH software for 
scenario management, mitigation and 
vulnerability studies and to train 
appropriate personnel. An important 
feature in this implementation step is 
the engagement of the Polis Center in 
the training of INdot personnel on the 
use of HAZUS-MH software. The Polis 
Center is a nationally recognized 
HAZUS implementation facility. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Earthquakes can significantly disrupt societal functioning, cause ecological damage, 
and lead to loss of human lives and property, warranting a coordinated and efficient 
response to mitigate their negative impacts. Past experience with earthquakes has 
demonstrated the vulnerability of the critical infrastructural lifelines and the need for 
mitigation strategies as well as emergency response planning. For example, the bridge 
failures under the 1989 Loma Prieta and the 1994 Northridge earthquakes resulted in 
substantial losses to the regional economies [Chang and Nojima, 2001].   
Highway transportation systems are vital to the normal functioning of a society and 
can be even more so under disasters. Under disasters, emergency response agencies need 
to transport various commodities, including food, clothing, medicine, medical supplies, 
machinery and personnel from different points of origin to different locations in the 
disaster areas in an efficient manner [Haghani and Sei-Chang, 1996]. Damage to the 
highway system can seriously affect emergency response, recovery operations and 
disrupt the regional economy; hence the functionality of these systems is critical for post-
disaster response. Gordon et al. [1998] estimate that twenty percent of the $6.5 billion in 
losses due to the Northridge earthquake resulted from damage to the transportation 
system. This highlights the need for countermeasures to mitigate the possible risk of 
damage to the highways and the associated consequences.    
Bridges typically represent the elements of a highway system that are most 
susceptible to failure under earthquakes. Hence, the seismic vulnerability of bridges has 
been extensively studied [Buckle et al. 1994]. As a consequence, seismic retrofitting of 
bridges has been the most preferred solution adopted in the pre-disaster strategic planning 
stage so as to minimize the risk of unacceptable damage to highways in earthquake-prone 
regions. Due to the significant effort and cost involved in strengthening existing bridges 
to seismic design standards it is not practical to retrofit every bridge in an earthquake-
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prone region, and even if it were possible, retrofitting cannot be done simultaneously 
across all bridges. Also, seismic risk can vary across bridges due to their physical 
characteristics, age, and current structural condition. Hence, a key problem faced by 
earthquake response planners is the identification of the set of bridges for seismic 
retrofitting. This implies prioritization given budget limitations and the effort involved.  
The bridge prioritization problem, that is, the selection of bridges for seismic 
retrofitting, can be viewed from structural and transportation domains vis-à-vis 
performance. From a structural perspective, the risk/vulnerability of a bridge to seismic 
failure is the predominant factor that influences prioritization. In the transportation 
context, the focus is on ensuring the survival of links (and the bridges on those links) that 
minimize emergency response times and maximize the population that can be reached, by 
retaining a network-level perspective. The existing literature predominantly addresses the 
prioritization problem from a structural perspective. The dominant approach is the use of 
multi-attribute utility theory [Nojima, 1999] to determine the risk for each bridge in the 
highway network. This is done by weighing the values of the various attributes to 
generate a measure of risk. For example, one study [Osaka Municipal Government 
Report, 1998] uses attributes on seismic capacity (or vulnerability) and importance (or 
criticality). Seismic capacity, an indicator of the structural sufficiency of a bridge with 
regard to an anticipated earthquake, is based on the bridge type, structural condition, 
service life, and geotechnical and seismic hazards. The importance criterion indicates the 
criticality of the bridge to post-disaster relief operations based on the traffic flow on the 
associated link, economic impacts due to its failure, and the connectivity with crossroads.  
While the seismic capacity criterion has been well-studied in the literature, the 
importance criterion has not been adequately addressed [Chang and Nojima, 2001]. This 
is because bridge importance is not readily quantifiable, implying subjectivity in its 
determination. The issue of accessibility across the transportation network vis-à-vis 
earthquake response can be influenced by political, social and economic factors in 
addition to the engineering solutions. Hence, only a few retrofitting schemes exist in 
practice, and are primarily based on engineering judgment [Buckle, 1994], indicating 
methodological gaps in the state of knowledge to address this problem. The intuitive 
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solution to the earthquake response planning problem is the retrofitting of every bridge in 
the shortest path between the selected origin-destination (O-D) pairs in the network. 
However, this is typically cost prohibitive. This implies the need for a network level 
perspective to address the problem which considers the interactions between the failure of 
a bridge and its influence on the network-level system performance [Werner et al., 1997, 
Chang and Nojima, 2001]. The Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering 
Research (MCEER) Bulletin (1994) suggests that the system performance considerations 
be addressed before performing the seismic capacity evaluation of bridges.   
Few studies consider network-level transportation system performance in determining 
prioritization schemes. Basoz and Kiremidjian [1994] develop a network-level procedure 
to quantify the importance of bridges. It determines the bridges that constitute minimal 
cuts in a transportation network and ranks the individual bridges within the set. The 
minimal cut for a given O-D node pair in a network is the minimum number of links 
whose failure disconnects the two nodes. Performance was tied to the connectivity 
between critical destinations under disasters. Wakabayashi [1997] performs an 
importance analysis of the Kobe highway network based on several network realizations. 
The travel time between Osaka and Kobe represented the performance criterion. The 
structural vulnerability of the links was not considered.     
Nojima [1999] proposed a performance based prioritization method for upgrading 
network components with limited resources. The performance measure was the reliability 
of system flow capacity, defined as the maximum flow between a specified O-D pair in 
the network. The study rank-orders links based on their ability to improve the reliability 
measure. Chang and Nojima [2001] develop performance measures based on the total 
length of the surviving network and the accessibility provided by it.  
The overview of the past work indicates that several studies exist that address the 
bridge seismic retrofit aspects of the earthquake response planning problem. Hence, the 
problem has been addressed primarily in the structural engineering domain. Different 
criteria have been used to evaluate the bridges in the network. Some of them are ad-hoc 
in nature and involve considerable subjectivity. Only a few studies exist that address the 
seismic retrofit problem from a transportation systems perspective. Among those, there 
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are very few studies that analyze the problem at a network-level. Those that do are 
primarily concerned with the effect of retrofit decisions on vehicular flow performance 
measures for the surviving network. Studies addressed from the perspective of earthquake 
response are sparse, and typically consider a single criterion such as connectivity between 
O-D node pairs, travel time for a single O-D pair, or accessibility to population. None of 
these studies explicitly consider budget constraints in the planning problem. This 
significantly increases the problem complexity due to the dependence of the surviving 
network under an earthquake on the budget investment decisions. This key gap, 
significant from a practical standpoint, motivates the development of a new class of 
models that can aid planners in developing an effective budget allocation scheme to 
prioritize retrofit decisions. The proposed research addresses this by developing the 
MCNDP model.            
  
1.2 Study Objectives  
The primary study objective is to develop a methodology to address the strategic 
planning problem at a network-level for earthquake response. This methodology enables 
the decision-makers to identify an effective seismic retrofit scheme vis-à-vis earthquake 
response for the bridges of a network. The proposed methodology is motivated by the 
need to consider the key factors for effective earthquake response in a single framework. 
This is done by first defining the concept of “critical routes”. The critical routes of a 
transportation network are the set of routes whose functionality is critical to the 
effectiveness of earthquake response. The associated problem is labeled the critical routes 
problem. The specific tasks to address the study objective are:  
1. Identification of criteria for selection of critical routes. These criteria are based on 
factors that directly affect the effectiveness of earthquake response.   
2. Formally define the critical routes problem. This involves the description of the 
problem context, its constraints and the criteria used to solve the problem.   
3. Development of a model to address the critical routes problem. A mathematical 
formulation is developed that seeks to optimize the response criteria under budget 
 
 5
limitations and other constraints. This generates the critical routes for the study region of 
interest.  
4. Application of the model to a case study. Sensitivity analyses are conducted with 
respect to the model parameters to derive insights that assist decision-makers. This is 
done primarily by identifying a non-inferior frontier, which provides an intuitive practical 
tool for decision-making. The region of interest in this study is the earthquake-prone 
southwest region of Indiana. Figure 1.1 depicts the seismic map of the region.  
 
1.3 Organization of the Report  
This report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature in network design and coverage. Chapter 3 defines the critical routes problem 
and formulates it. It further proves that the problem is NP-hard, and identifies valid 
inequalities to enhance solution efficiency. Chapter 4 discusses the application of the 
formulation to a case study in the southwest Indiana region, and provides the 
implementation details. Chapter 5 reports the results from experiments conducted and 
derives insights. Chapter 6 reports the results from experiments conducted after 
incorporating the recommendations of the Study Advisory Committee in terms of 
“required” routes as part of the critical routes subnetwork. Chapter 7 provides some 






















CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This chapter provides a brief review of the methodological approaches relevant to the 
problem addressed in this research. As the focus is on network-level transportation-
related planning for disaster response, especially under earthquakes, most of the relevant 
literature is in the urban operations research domain as applied to network models. For 
the sake of exposition, we first define the two types of link costs that are typically 
encountered in network design problems, namely fixed costs and routing costs. The fixed 
cost of a link is a one-time cost incurred with choosing that link for routing commodity 
flows and is independent of the quantity routed through it. The routing cost of a link is 
defined as the cost incurred in transporting a unit commodity across that link. For 
example, in an earthquake response planning context, bridge seismic retrofit costs would 
represent fixed costs for that link, and the time to traverse that link would correspond to 
the routing costs.    
   
2.1 Network Design 
A broad range of practical network optimization problems occur in the context of 
transportation, distribution planning, emergency response, telecommunications and 
computer networking. A specific class of these, labeled as network design problems, 
arises primarily in the capital investment phase of engineering problems. The network 
design problem generally seeks to determine a network configuration that minimizes the 
sum of the fixed costs of the links chosen and the cost of routing different commodities 
through the network defined by these links. Due to its usefulness in the aforementioned 
applications, the fixed charge network design problem has been well studied. Magnanti 
and Wong [1984] provide a comprehensive survey of integer programming-based 
methods to address network design problems. They develop a generic discrete choice 
network design formulation that unifies the different types of network design models. 
Well-known problems in combinatorial optimization, including the shortest path, 
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minimum spanning tree, Steiner tree and traveling salesman problem have been shown to 
be special cases of the generic network design model. However, these models have 
focused primarily on cost minimization and do not consider other important criteria like 
population coverage, environmental impacts and revenues.  
 
2.2 Network Coverage           
Current and Min [1986] emphasize the potential for multiple objectives in 
transportation planning problems and highlight the conflicting nature of such objectives 
in the context of public sector decision-making. For example, the shortest path network 
across O-D pairs may not maximize the accessibility to the population in the region. To 
overcome these limitations, Current et al. [1985] introduce the notion of coverage to the 
network design problem by formulating the maximum covering shortest path problem for 
a single O-D pair with two objectives: (i) to minimize the path cost for that O-D pair, and 
(ii) to maximize the total population covered by that path. They associate some fraction 
of the population with each node, which is labeled as the demand of that node. They 
define a demand node as covered if the path includes the node or passes through another 
node that is within a pre-specified distance from that node. They also formulate a 
variation of this problem for hazmat routing applications, called the minimum covering 
shortest path problem [Current at al., 1988], in which the demand covered is minimized.    
Hutson and Revelle [1989] extend the concept of coverage to tree networks by 
considering two types of coverages: direct and indirect. A demand node is directly 
covered if there is a link in the tree incident upon it. Indirect coverage is assumed if the 
demand node is within a prescribed distance from a link in the tree. The maximal direct 
covering tree problem seeks to minimize the cost of the subtree and maximize the total 
demand covered by it. Hutson and Revelle [1993] extend the approach to develop the 
maximal indirect covering tree problem. They suggest the use of these models for 
problems involving road network construction in sparsely populated areas under resource 
constraints.  
Kim et al. [1989] introduce the subtree r-cover problem which seeks a connected 
subgraph covering every demand node with minimum total length for a given network. A 
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cover radius is associated with each demand node. It is used to ensure that the distance 
between the demand node and the closest point in the subgraph does not exceed a 
threshold value. The formulation is applied to position troops in a war situation to ensure 
that troops protect/cover the various demand nodes within pre-specified threshold 
response times. Kim et al. [1990] consider a special case in which the given network is a 
tree.              
Current and Schilling [1989] adapt the coverage concept to the traveling salesman 
problem by formulating the covering salesman problem. The problem aims to identify a 
minimum cost subtour in a network such that every demand node is within a specified 
distance from a node on the subtour. They extend this model to develop the maximal 
covering tour problem [1994], in which the objectives are to minimize the total tour 
length and maximize the demand covered by the tour, subject to a requirement on the 
number of nodes in the subtour. Suggested application domains include rural health care 
and overnight delivery systems. Gendreau et al. [1997] solve a variant of the maximal 
covering tour problem in which a given set of nodes must always be present in a tour, and 
propose its application to the location of post boxes and the design of collection routes. 
They also propose classes of valid inequalities for use in a branch-and-cut algorithm to 
solve large problem instances in a reasonable amount of time.   
 
2.3 Discussion 
The overview of the literature indicates that the coverage criterion has been 
successfully applied to identify a path, tree or tour, all of which are special network 
structures. This research extends the coverage criterion to a network problem with 
multiple O-D pairs, labeled the multicommodity maximal covering network design 
problem (MCNDP). Its objectives are to minimize the routing costs over all O-D pairs 
and maximize the total demand covered, subject to a budget constraint based on the fixed 
costs incurred on the chosen links. To our knowledge, there exist no prior studies that 
consider budgetary limitations, routing costs and coverage criteria in a single model with 
multiple O-D pairs. Such a model is essential for strategic planners to make long-term 
budget allocation decisions that factor in system-wide impacts of budgetary decisions 
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over time vis-à-vis performance. Potential applications of the MCNDP other than the 
problem addressed in this study include the design of regional transit systems and the 
planning of truck shipment routes. With modifications, the MCNDP can be used to 
design electric power networks to build high voltage lines for new power plants or to 






CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter develops the methodology to address the critical routes problem using 
the MCNDP. Section 3.1 illustrates the applicability of the MCNDP to the “critical 
routes problem”. Section 3.2 states the MCNDP. Section 3.3 presents the mathematical 
model. Notation and parameters are introduced in Section 3.3.1, the decision variables are 
defined in Section 3.3.2, and the formulation is illustrated in Section 3.3.3. Section 3.4 
examines the computational complexity of the MCNDP. Section 3.5 presents valid 
inequalities for the formulation.  
 
3.1 The Critical Routes Problem  
Network-level disaster management planning is vital for effectively responding to 
natural calamities and security-related problems. For example, the availability of the 
transportation network is critical to emergency response [Haghani and Oh, 1996] under 
earthquakes. It entails the identification of “critical routes” in a planning context that 
remain functional following an earthquake, to enable the response operators to access as 
much population as possible in a minimum amount of time. This implies two objectives 
for the selection of the critical routes: (i) minimizing the total travel time on the routes 
between the O-D pairs, and (ii) maximizing the total population that can be covered by 
these routes. The functionality or survivability of a route, implying its availability under 
an earthquake, is governed significantly by its weakest elements, the bridges. The seismic 
retrofitting [Cooper et al., 2001] of bridges can enhance the survivability of the 
associated routes under earthquakes. However, as discussed earlier, due to the significant 
cost and effort involved in retrofitting, it is impractical to retrofit every bridge in an 
earthquake-prone region, especially with limited budgets. Hence, the budget serves as a 
constraint in the determination of the critical routes. Therefore, the critical routes problem 
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can be viewed as a budget-constrained covering network design problem which seeks low 
cost routes that cover the maximum population while satisfying budget constraints 
introduced by the need to retrofit bridges on the critical routes.  
  
3.2 Problem Statement  
We formulate the MCNDP generically here, and apply it to the critical routes 
problem in the next chapter. We are given the locations of demand centers of a region 
and its associated undirected network. The network links have a fixed cost for their usage 
and a routing cost. There is a budget constraint on the total fixed cost incurred. The 
MCNDP seeks to allocate a limited budget to links such that the total routing costs for a 
set of O-D pairs is minimized and the total demand covered by the routes connecting 
them is maximized. The demand of a center is covered if a link in one of the selected 
routes provides access to it. 
 
3.3 Mathematical Model  
This section first introduces the notation, parameters and decision variables, and then 
proposes an integer programming formulation for the MCNDP. 
 
3.3.1 Notation and Parameters 
Let G(N, E) denote an undirected network with node set N and link set E. The indices 
i and j denote a node in the network, i, j ∈ N and E ⊆ N×N, where [i, j] denotes an 
undirected link between nodes i and j with a nonnegative fixed cost fij. Let B to denote 
the available budget. Each O-D pair in the network is represented as a unique commodity 
type. Let k represent the commodity type index, k ∈ K, where K denotes the set of all 
commodities. One unit of flow of commodity k must be transported over the network 
from its origin O(k) to its destination D(k). To differentiate the direction of flow of a 
commodity, we consider two directed links (i, j) and (j, i) corresponding to each original 
undirected link [i, j]. Let A denote the set of the directed links; all links are uncapacitated. 
Let kijc  be the nonnegative routing cost for a unit of commodity k on link (i, j), and m 
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demand the demand center index, m ∈ M, the set of demand centers in the region. Let rm 
represent the demand associated with demand center m, and Em the set of links that are 
eligible to cover it. We treat the demand centers separately from the nodes in the 
network, whereas past studies assign demand centers to a node in the network which is a 
more restrictive approach.   
 
3.3.2 Decision Variables  
The formulation contains three types of variables: (i) the arc flow variables denoted 
by the vector x = { kijx }, which define the flow of different commodities in each of the 
selected links, (ii) the design variables denoted by the vector y = { ijy }, which define the 
links selected for the network design, and (iii) the coverage variables denoted by the 
vector z = { mz }, which define whether or not a demand center is covered. They are 
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3.3.3 The MCNDP Formulation   
The MCNDP formulation has two objectives: Z1, the total routing cost, and Z2, the 
total demand covered where, 
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The integer programming formulation for the MCNDP is expressed as follows:     
 MCNDP:  
                                             Minimize Z   =  [Z1, Z2]                                                        (1)      
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 subject to                  
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ji yx ≤                                         ∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E               (5) 
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1                                           ∀ i, k                            (7) 





1                                          ∀ k,  j = D(k)                 (8) 





ij |Q|x                      ∀ k, Q ⊆ N, 2 ≤ |Q| ≤ |N|-2    (9)      
                                       kji
k
ij x,x  = 0 or 1                                  ∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E                (10) 
 
                                        yij   = 0 or 1                                       ∀ [i, j] ∈ E                     (11) 
 
                                       zm    = 0 or 1                                        ∀ m ∈ M                       (12) 
 
                                           x  ∈  S                                                                                   (13)  
In multiobjective programming, there may never exist a single solution that optimizes 
all the objectives. Thus, the notion of an optimal solution is not relevant here and is 
replaced by the concept of a noninferior solution set from which the decision-maker 
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selects the most preferred solution. A solution to the above formulation is said to be 
noninferior if there exists no other feasible solution that improves one objective without 
degrading the other. There are two popular solution approaches to multiobjective 
programming: preference based techniques and generating techniques [Cohon, 1978]. 
The latter approach, which has been commonly employed due to its simplicity, generates 
the entire noninferior solution set or an approximation of it. We adopt this approach. An 
approximation of the set can be obtained by using a single objective function formed by 
different convex combinations of the objective functions. Our objective function 
becomes:  
                                        Z(w1,w2) = w1Z1 + w2Z2                                                        (14) 
where w1 + w2 = 1, and w1, w2 ≥ 0.   
The use of the weight pair (w1,w2) reflects the explicit tradeoffs between the total 
routing cost and the demand that can be covered. Due to the discrete nature of the 
MCNDP solution set, the above weighting method is incapable of identifying noninferior 
solutions that lie in the duality gap of the convex hull of the set. Figure 3.1 illustrates an 
example of a noninferior frontier which is a discrete set of points. The boundary of its 
convex hull is obtained by joining its exterior points. However, there can be non-
dominated solutions that lie within the convex hull. For example, point B represents such 
an instance in the figure. Hence, point B is said to lie in the duality gap of the convex 
hull. Solving a constrained version to enable such identification entails a substantial 
increase in the computational effort. Also, the number of noninferior solutions is large, 
though finite, for even small-size discrete optimization problems and in the worst case 
increases exponentially with problem size. Hence, it is not practical to generate the entire 
noninferior set. Instead, it is appropriate to focus on generating an approximation to the 
noninferior solution set.   
Constraints 2 denote the network flow conservation constraints that require x to 
describe a simple path from the origin to the destination for all commodities. Constraints 
3 represent the coverage constraints, which imply that a demand center is covered only 
when at least one of the links providing accessibility to the center is in a flow path. 
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Constraint sets 4 and 5 are the forcing constraints; they state that no flow is allowed in 
either direction of link [i, j] unless the associated fixed cost is incurred. The MCNDP can 
be formulated in an alternative way by expressing the forcing constraints in an 
aggregated form:  
                                         






ij yKx ||                    ∀ [i, j] ∈ E                        (15) 






ji y|K|x                    ∀ [i, j] ∈ E                        (16) 
Using constraint sets 15 and 16 instead of 4 and 5, respectively, significantly reduces the 
number of constraints in the formulation, and consequently the problem size. However, 
past efforts suggest that the generic network design models with the less efficient 
disaggregate formulation perform computationally much better than the more efficient 
aggregate formulation [Magnanti and Wong, 1984]. This is because the disaggregate 
version of the forcing constraints better approximates the convex hull of the set of 
feasible integer solutions of the MCNDP, and hence, yields tighter lowerbounds for the 
linear programming (LP) relaxation of the formulation.   
Constraint 6 is the budget constraint; it states that the sum of the fixed costs of the 
links in any solution should not exceed B.  
Due to constraint set 3, any solution can entail looping paths of the kind C1 and C2, 
as shown in Figure 3.2, for one or more commodities as loops help to achieve extra 
population coverage. We seek loopless paths and this is enabled through constraint sets 7 
and 8. Constraints 7 state that the maximum flow of any commodity type exiting any 
node in the network should not exceed unity. Constraints 8 prevent the occurrence of 
loops at destination nodes (similar to C2), which is not precluded by 7.  
The coverage constraints can also lead to isolated subtours such as ST (as shown in 
Figure 3.2) that do not share any link with the corresponding commodity flow paths in 
the solution. These subtours are prevented by adding subtour elimination constraints 9, in  
which Q denotes the nodes in a subtour. Since, |Q| can potentially take several values 
between 2 and |N|-2, there are potentially an exponential number of such constraints.     
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Constraint sets 10, 11 and 12 restrict the flow, design, and coverage variables, 
respectively, to 0-1 values.  
Constraint 13 restricts the flow variables to the set S which represents a restricted 
solution domain S in which some flow variables are fixed a priori. As discussed in the 
next chapter, this is necessary to restrict the geographical region within which the search 
is performed to enable computational time savings. Presumably, the commodity paths to 
be determined would be confined to a subnetwork surrounding the O-D pair, and not 
circuitous. Hence, it models the topological restrictions upon the commodity flows in the 
network.  
The MCNDP is a linear integer program with (2|K||E|+|E|+|M|) integer variables and 
comprises of (|K||N|+|M|+2|K||E|+1+|N||K|+|K|) constraints and an exponential number 
(O(2|E|)) of subtour elimination constraints.  
 
3.4 Computational Complexity of MCNDP        
Lemma: The MCNDP is NP-hard.    
Proof: We prove it by restriction. Consider the instance MCNDPR of problem MCNDP:  
|M| = 0, that is, there are no demand centers and the objective function is just the total 
routing cost of the various commodities. The coverage constraints 3 cannot be imposed as 
there are no demand centers. Also, the constraints sets 7, 8 and 9 are redundant in the new 
formulation and can be ignored. Solving this instance, which has only one objective, is 
equivalent to solving a budget design problem which is known to be NP-hard [Johnson et 
al., 1978]. Therefore, the MCNDP generalizes the budget design problem. It follows that 
the MCNDP is NP-hard.  
Hence, the MCNDP is rather intractable, implying that the solution approach is 
typically an enumeration-type procedure.  
 
3.5 Valid Inequalities  
Typically, integer programming formulations are solved using branch-and-bound type 
methods that solve linear programs at the nodes of the branch-and-bound tree. The 
computational time for such procedures is dependent on the number of tree nodes 
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enumerated to obtain the solution, as well as the time required to solve the formulation at 
each enumerated node. The number of nodes to be enumerated is dependent on the 
quality of the bounds generated by associated LP relaxations. Valid inequalities, which 
are constraints based on the problem characteristics, are useful in this context. They are 
redundant in an integer programming formulation but can eliminate non-integer solutions 
that are optimal for the LP relaxations. Hence, they improve the lower bounds computed 
by the solution algorithms, thereby generating computational time savings. Valid 
inequalities can be appended to the MCNDP to enhance the formulation.  
Proposition 1. The constraint           




ij yxx ≤+                       ∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E                               (17) 
is a valid inequality for the MCNDP.  
Proof: In any feasible design, a link [i, j] is either chosen or not. Consider the case where 
link [i, j] is selected, which implies yij = 1. Then, the corresponding set of inequalities for 
that link in constraints 17 are its subtour elimination constraints for |Q| = 2. If that link is 
not selected, it implies yij = 0. Then, the forcing constraints imply that kijx = 0,∀ k, and the 
corresponding constraints in 17 are valid. This completes the proof.   
This valid inequality is a virtual constraint vis-à-vis the problem as it is not a direct 
representation of a physical reality or a logical characteristic. However, it can replace 
constraints 4 and 5, and part of constraints 9 (that is, for |Q| = 2). Hence, it can be used to 
generate some computational time savings by reducing the problem size. 
                                     
Proposition 2. The following constraints are valid for the MCNDP.                             
                                              mij zy ≤                         ∀ m, [i, j] ∈ Em                            (18) 
                                              m
k
ij zx ≤                         ∀ m, k, [i, j] ∈ Em                        (19)        




ij zxx ≤+                        ∀ m, k, [i, j] ∈ Em                         (20) 
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Proof:  If kijx  = 1 for some k and [i, j] ∈ Em then yij assumes the value 1, and the demand 
center m is covered implying zm = 1. If kijx = 0 ∀ k, [i, j] ∈ Em then no fixed cost is 
incurred for the ∀ [i, j] ∈ Em and the demand center m is not covered. This completes the 
proof of constraints 18. The proof of constraints 19 follows directly from the forcing 
constraints, and the result just proved. Constraint set 18 is redundant in the MCNDP 
formulation and directly follows from constraints 17 and 18.      
These valid inequalities imply that if a demand center m is not chosen, then links in 
Em do not appear in the solution. This simplifies the budget constraint and network flow 
conservation constraints, leading to potential computational efficiencies. 
 
Proposition 3. Let m1 and m2 be two demand centers such that Em1 ⊆ Em2, then the 
following relation holds. 
                                           2m1m zz ≤                                                                             (21) 
Proof: Suppose demand center m1 is covered by flow of some commodity k in arc (i, j), 
this flow also covers demand center m2. If demand center m1 is not covered, constraint 
21 reduces to the nonegativity constraint for the variable zm2. The proof is complete.  
This valid inequality can potentially reduce computations by exploiting the problem 
characteristic that if a demand center is covered by a link (i, j), it is redundant to search 
other links to cover this demand center. 
In summary, the MCNDP is a NP-hard integer programming formulation. It is 
exacerbated by the need for subtour and looping elimination constraints. In addition, 
valid inequalities can be proposed to increase computational efficiency by exploiting the 
problem structure. The next chapter discusses the application of the MCNDP to the 























































































This chapter discusses the application of the MCNDP formulation to the 
determination of critical routes for earthquake response in southwest Indiana. It first 
describes the details of the case study, followed by a summary of the solution procedure 
and its implementation. A problem reduction strategy is proposed to reduce 
computational times.  
 
4.1 Case Study  
The MCNDP is used to determine the critical routes under earthquakes for a network 
representing southwest Indiana, as shown in Figure 4.1. It consists of 184 nodes, 307 
links, and 93 population centers. The demand of a center is set equal to its population as 
obtained from the US Census 2000 Data [US Census Bureau, 2000]. Fifteen centers have 
a population greater than 5000 and are denoted as major population centers. The 
remaining 78 have a population between 3000-5000, and are labeled minor population 
centers. O-D node pairs, which represent the commodities (that is each O-D pair 
represents one commodity), are chosen so as to ensure connectivity between the major 
population centers. From Figure 4.1, the 15 major population centers can be viewed to lie 
in five different layers from top to bottom: 3 centers each in the first three levels, 2 in the 
fourth level, and 4 in the fifth level. To enable connectivity across the region it is 
reasonable to choose O-D node pairs that connect major population centers between 
adjacent layers, as also those within each layer. Note that the network topology 
constituted by any feasible set of critical routes is connected. This approach generated 33 
O-D node pairs. Using engineering judgment, the paths of 5 O-D pairs are pre-
determined. The fixed cost of a link is the total retrofit area of all the bridges on that link. 
The link routing costs are their free-flow travel times, implying that link capacity is 
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ignored. This is because the problem addresses the planning stage of earthquake 
emergency response. The link travel times are assumed to be symmetric. The links that 
can potentially cover a population center are those that are within some pre-specified 
threshold distance of it. They were identified by observing its location and the proximity 
of roads (interstates, US roads and state roads) to it using the geographical map of the 
region.    
 
4.2 Solving the MCNDP  
       
4.2.1 Solution Procedure 
The MCNDP is solved using the branch-and-cut algorithm in CPLEX [ILOG CPLEX 
7.1, 2001]. It is a search technique that uses the tree structure in which CPLEX 
dynamically adds cut constraints at the tree nodes to reduce the tree size. The solution 
procedure has two primary computational aspects. The first is the number of the tree 
nodes searched in the branch-and-cut method since each requires the solution of a linear 
program (that is, the LP relaxation of the MCNDP formulation). The LP relaxation 
represents the formulation obtained by allowing the integer decision variables to assume 
continuous values in the range within their upper and lower limits. The optimal value of 
this formulation provides a lower bound for the MCNDP formulation as it is less 
restrictive than the original formulation. Thereby, larger the number of tree nodes 
searched, the greater the computational time. This highlights the critical importance of 
the second computational aspect, the MCNDP formulation size, which depends on the 
number of constraints. In this context, computational savings can be generated by using 
valid inequalities, and/or by including or excluding the subtour elimination constraints. 
The solution procedure first excludes most of the subtour elimination constraints to make 
the problem computationally tractable. The only ones included are those for |Q|=2 
implying link subtours. This is because there are only a few constraints with |Q|=2, and 
preliminary analysis indicates that the associated subtours can occur frequently in the 
solution if they are not precluded. Next, the solution procedure identifies subtours in the 
solution obtained from CPLEX using this relaxed formulation. If subtours exist, it adds 
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the necessary subtour elimination constraint(s) and reoptimizes the new formulation. This 
step is repeated until no more subtours are encountered in the solution. 
The best-known integer solution, which is the upper bound to the optimal solution, is 
the final solution obtained from CPLEX. The lower bound to the optimal solution is the 
best objective function value across all LP relaxation solutions of the branch-and-cut 
nodes. They are used to determine the percentage optimality gap, which is a measure of 
the quality of the solution. The percentage optimality gap is defined as [(upper bound – 
lower bound)*100]/lower bound, where the bounds are obtained from CPLEX. It 
indicates how close the best-known integer solution is to the optimal solution. 
 
4.2.2 Implementation Details  
The computing environment consists of a Sun Ultra Enterprise server E6500 with 26 
400Mhz UltraSparc II processors under the multi-user Solaris 7 operating environment 
with 23GB RAM, 131GB swap space and 8MB cache. A C++ program was implemented 
to solve the problem and was compiled using GNU, g++ v2.95.3. It invokes subroutines 
from the CPLEX Callable Library version 7.1 to construct the formulation and solve it 
with the in-built mixed integer programming (MIP) optimizer that provides a customized 
branch-and-cut procedure. Experiments are performed by excluding and including the 
valid inequalities in the formulation.  
A preliminary analysis was performed to calibrate the CPLEX parameter settings for 
different experimental scenarios in terms of the budgets and the relative weights of the 
two objectives, and for different % optimality gaps. A trial and error approach was 
adopted in order to determine a good choice for the optimality tolerance level to solve an 
instance to the maximal permissible closeness to optimality as possible within a 
reasonable computational time. Our test runs indicated that for very low values w2 (≤ 
0.005), default settings yielded good computational performance. However, some 
analysis was required to arrive at a good setting for higher values of w2. It was based on 
aggressive probing, best estimate search for the node selection strategy, and variable 
branching using pseudo reduced costs. The CPLEX preprocessor was set to on, as it was 
able to achieve reduction in the MIP problem size leading to faster solution times. Also, 
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based on our preliminary analysis a priority order was assigned to the variables in which 
branching would be performed first on the x variables, then on the y variables and finally 
on the z variables. Each instance was solved under exactly identical parameter settings for 
the set of experiments with or without valid inequalities to compare the performance of 
the two cases.  
 
4.2.3 Problem Reduction Strategy  
The preliminary runs indicated the intractable nature of the MCNDP; an instance 
with budget B = 3.33 million sqft and weight pair (w1,w2) = (0.99,0.01) required over 5 
days to solve to a 1% optimality gap. To generate significant computational time savings, 
a strategy to reduce the search domain was incorporated based on the notion that the 
solution for an O-D pair would lie within some restricted geographical area around it. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the path for an O-D pair is confined to a 
subnetwork around it rather than including circuitous components that are geographically 
further away. This enables us to set the commodity flow variables to zero for the rest of 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS FROM COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS  
 
 
This chapter reports the results and derives insights from the computational 
experiments conducted using the case study. The primary objective of the experiments is 
to analyze model sensitivity for different budgets and relative weights for the two 
objectives. We make a few comments on the computational performance. Subsequently 
we seek to develop noninferior frontiers that illustrate the trade-offs between the 
conflicting objectives for different budgets to provide practical insights to decision-
makers.  
 
5.1 Model Sensitivity and Computational Performance 
An effective problem reduction strategy was sought to be identified based on 
computational efficiency of the test runs conducted. In the runs all the valid inequalities 
were included for computational efficiency. A strategy which sets 83.46% of the total 
number of flow variables to zero a priori, performed in a robust manner. Hence, further 
experiments were conducted using this strategy. The formulation was solved for the 
following weight pairs: (0.999,0.001), (0.99,0.01), (0.95,0.05) and (0.9,0.1) for the 
budget range 1.43 million sqft to 3.33 million sqft. The value 1.43 million sqft is the 
minimum budget required for a feasible solution to the formulation. Table 5.1 illustrates 
the total travel time and the total population covered for the instances solved. The 
computational times were higher for larger w2 values because of the need to search more 
routes due to the increased importance of population coverage in the objective function. 
When w2 is smaller, the problem approaches the budget design problem where the 
network structure can be favorably exploited to yield better computational performance. 
For low budgets, the problems are more difficult to solve due to interactions between 
commodities caused by the need to share links in the final solution. This was also 
observed by Dionne and Florian [1979]. In our experiments, subtours occur in the 
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intermediate solutions for all budgets with weight pairs (0.95,0.05) and (0.9,0.1), and 
only for two instances in (0.99,0.01). This is because a larger weight for population 
coverage leads to physically meaningless isolated subtours in an effort to improve the 
objective function value.  
 
5.2 Noninferior Frontiers: Travel Time-Population Coverage Trade-offs      
Figure 5.1 displays the noninferior solution set for the budget range 1.43 million sqft 
to 3.33 million sqft. In the figure, the solutions towards the left of the graph for any 
budget correspond to lower w2 values; for example, the leftmost points correspond to w2 
= 0.001. 
In general, for a budget, higher values of w2 lead to greater population coverage at the 
expense of increased system travel time. This plot provides flexibility [Hall, 1985] to the 
decision-maker by generating a range of solutions. Noninferior solution sets, like the ones 
shown here, can be very useful to the decision-maker as they highlight the tradeoffs 
between conflicting objectives. They also aid decision-makers to compare the additional 
benefits accrued in terms of system travel time savings and extra population coverage due 
to additional budget. For example, the marginal benefits that could be realized from a 
budget of 2 million sqft instead of 1.67 million sqft would be higher than those under 
2.33 million sqft instead of 2 million sqft.  
Figures 5.2a-g depict the critical routes for seven of the instances solved above. For 
the lowest budget, 1.43 million sqft., the subnetwork formed by the critical routes is 
sparse, but still covers approximately 90% of the total population of the region. For the 
critical route networks shown in these figures, the travel times and the population covered 
are higher as the weight for population is increased, keeping the budget fixed. This is 






























































 Figure 5.2d Critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2 million sqft 
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Table 5.1 Objective function values for the instances solved 
Budget  
(million sqft) (w1,w2) 




% of Total 
population covered 
(0.999,0.001) 1656.67 409572 89.46 
(0.99,0.01) 1670.96 412062 90.00 
(0.95,0.05) 1670.96 412062 90.00 1.43 
(0.9,0.1) 1686.42 412354 90.06 
     
(0.999,0.001) 1442.33 415148 90.68 
(0.99,0.01) 1510.70 430861 94.11 
(0.95,0.05) 1758.24 437885 95.64 1.67 
(0.9,0.1) 1766.11 438561 95.79 
     
(0.999,0.001) 1350.84 423192 92.44 
(0.99,0.01) 1454.16 441712 96.48 
(0.95,0.05) 1639.79 450129 98.32 2.00 
(0.9,0.1) 1903.84 449489 98.18 
     
(0.999,0.001) 1342.47 433975 94.79 
(0.99,0.01) 1428.82 448727 98.01 
(0.95,0.05) 1601.52 452715 98.88 2.33 
(0.9,0.1) 1809.39 455482 99.49 
     
(0.999,0.001) 1335.77 436682 95.38 
(0.99,0.01) 1407.88 450804 98.47 
(0.95,0.05) 1620.63 456039 99.61 2.67 
(0.9,0.1) 1786.13 455953 99.59 
      
(0.999,0.001) 1335.77 436682 95.38 
(0.99,0.01) 1409.15 452018 98.73 
(0.95,0.05) 1561.31 455904 99.581 3.00 
(0.9,0.1) 1713.74 457111 99.85 
      
(0.999,0.001) 1335.77 436682 95.38 
(0.99,0.01) 1409.15 452018 98.73 
(0.95,0.05) 1584.22 456184 99.64 3.33 
(0.9,0.1) 1635.3 456448 99.70 







CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ROUTES CONSISTENT WITH INDOT 
(SAC) NEEDS  
 
 
This chapter reports the results from the computational experiments conducted using 
the case study after incorporating the recommendations of the Study Advisory Committee 
based on the critical route subnetworks identified in Chapter 5. Section 6.1 states the 
recommendations briefly and discusses them. Section 6.2 discusses the critical routes 
obtained by incorporating the recommendations.  
 
6.1 Feedback from Study Advisory Committee and Emergency Response Operators 
Based on the feedback from the SAC, the following recommendations were proposed 
for the critical routes: 
1) Inclusion of the section of I-64 that passes through the study region.  
2) Provision of connectivity of the critical routes to adjacent states, namely, Illinois 
and Kentucky.         
The first recommendation attempts to address the omission of I-64 in the critical 
routes shown in Chapter 5. Since I-64 is a freeway, it would potentially provide an 
efficient critical route subnetwork component due to the superior structural and 
maintenance characteristics of freeways; that is, it would need minimal budgetary 
investments to ensure seismic tolerance. Hence, it would seem natural for it to be a part 
of at least some of the critical routes. To analyze the reasons for its omission in the 
critical route subnetworks suggested in Chapter 5, we revisit the model presented in 
chapter 3 that determines the critical routes. This model trades off three factors, namely 
total travel time, population covered and budget. Observing the figures (figures 5.2a-g) 
shown in Chapter 5, we note that the population centers close to I-64 that are not covered 
in most critical routes are Griffin, Elberfield and Lynnville. Their populations are 160, 
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636 and 781, respectively. Hence, together they constitute only 0.34% of the total 
population of the study region. Due to the budgetary constraints, the benefits of higher 
population coverage achievable through the routes other than I-64 are greater than the 
lower total travel time achieved due to its inclusion. Hence, the model excludes I-64 from 
the critical routes shown in Chapter 5. 
Routes that provide connectivity to adjacent states are important. They aid in the 
coordination of response plans with adjacent states and also enable the response operators 
in Indiana to utilize the assistance offered by their counterparts in the adjacent states in 
the event of an earthquake primarily causing damage in Indiana. This potentially 
increases response effectiveness.       
Both sets of recommendations were incorporated into the determination of the critical 
routes by adding the associated constraints into the original MCNDP formulation. This 
also means that the new formulation has a more restricted solution set compared to the 
original one. Therefore, the new objective function value (denoting the optimal solution 
for the more-constrained problem) incorporating these additional constraints can never be 
better than that of the original formulation corresponding to the results in Chapter 5. 
   
6.2 Characteristics of the Recommended Critical Routes      
After the addition of constraints to incorporate the SAC recommendations, the 
minimum budget required for a feasible solution increased to 1.67 million sqft. The 
critical routes were solved for budgets ranging from 1.67 million sqft. to 3.33 million 
sqft. Table 6.1 shows the total travel time and the total population covered for the various 
instances solved. Figure 6.1 depicts the noninferior solution frontier obtained. It 
illustrates that the marginal benefits realizable from a 2 million sqft. budget compared to 
the 1.67 million sqft. case are higher than those corresponding to the noninferior frontiers 
illustrated in Chapter 5 for the same budgets. The results (Figures 6.2a-f) suggest that the 
critical routes identified in Chapter 5 do not differ perceptibly from those computed here. 
For identical problem parameters, in most cases, the total travel time and the total 
population covered have worsened due to the recommendations. This is because the 
addition of new constraints leads to a more restricted solution set.  
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It may be noted that, in some instances, the results in Table 6.1 seem better than those 
shown in Table 5.1. This is not because the solution is inherently better in the restricted 
case. As just stated, the restricted optimal solution will always be worse. However, due 
the problem complexity (NP-hard problem) discussed in Chapter 3, neither of these two 
cases is solved to optimality, but only to a certain optimality tolerance level. Hence, when 
more variables are fixed (as is done in Chapter 6), the problem can in many instances be 
solved much closer to optimality though the problem is more constrained.  
Connectivity was provided at three sections with Illinois and two sections with 







































































































Table 6.1 Objective function values for the instances solved 
Budget  
(million sqft) (w1,w2) 




% of Total 
population covered 
(0.999,0.001) 1662.63 408422 89.21 
(0.99,0.01) 1685.59 410802 89.73 
(0.95,0.05) 1686.69 410802 89.73 1.67 
(0.9,0.1) 1715.19 411855 89.96 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1391.75 413091 90.23 
(0.99,0.01) 1466.27 429665 93.85 
(0.95,0.05) 1646.53 434609 94.93 2.00 
(0.9,0.1) 1755.28 434461 94.90 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1346.02 427829 93.45 
(0.99,0.01) 1398.75 445473 97.30 
(0.95,0.05) 1584.67 449826 98.25 2.33 
(0.9,0.1) 1778.19 450736 98.45 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1337.33 435301 95.08 
(0.99,0.01) 1425.29 450589 98.42 
(0.95,0.05) 1599.52 453614 99.08 2.67 
(0.9,0.1) 1695.34 455026 99.39 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1328.15 436562 95.36 
(0.99,0.01) 1411.76 451015 98.51 
(0.95,0.05) 1592.24 455519 99.50 3.00 
(0.9,0.1) 1689.16 456991 99.82 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1323.77 436682 95.38 
(0.99,0.01) 1407.76 452018 98.73 
(0.95,0.05) 1516.12 456048 99.61 3.33 
(0.9,0.1) 1614.49 457661 99.97 









CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
This chapter summarizes the study and highlights its contributions.     
 
7.1 Summary  
Seismic retrofit planning plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of 
the operational stage of earthquake response management. At a strategic level, it is 
dependent on the routes critical for effective emergency response. However, past studies 
have not addressed the identification of critical routes under budget constraints. This is a 
very important practical problem for emergency response planners as it involves 
identifying effective transportation routes while accounting for bridge structural 
conditions and budget limitations. It implies the identification of bridges to retrofit under 
earthquake response planning. This study develops a network-level methodology to assist 
decision-makers in identifying an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of a 
network. It introduces the MCNDP, which seeks routes that minimize the total routing 
costs over the selected routes and maximizes the total demand covered, subject to a 
budget constraint. An integer programming formulation of the problem is presented, and 
is shown to be NP-hard. The problem characteristics are exploited to develop some valid 
inequalities.  
In general, the MCNDP model is useful in addressing network-level disaster 
management planning. The MCNDP is applied to generate critical routes for earthquake 
response planning in southwest Indiana, which is part of a seismically active region that 
includes parts of Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri as well. The branch-and-cut procedure 
of the CPLEX MIP optimizer is used to solve the problem. A problem reduction strategy 
is proposed to reduce computational time while ensuring that the resulting solution is 
close to or equal to the optimal solution. Noninferior frontiers are generated using convex 
 
 50
combinations of the two objectives so as to provide practical insights for decision-
makers. These frontiers assist the decision-maker in analyzing the trade-offs among 
various objectives and making budget allocation decisions.  
A new set of critical routes were developed based on the SAC feedback for the first 
set of critical routes identified. The SAC recommendations were to include the section of 
I-64 passing through the study region, and to provide connectivity to the adjacent states 
(Illinois and Kentucky) to ensure seamless inter-state coordination and cooperation in the 
event of an actual earthquake. These recommendations were incorporated to generate a 
new set of critical routes through the addition of constraints to the MCNDP formulation. 
The updated critical routes do not differ perceptibly from those obtained from the 
experiments prior to the SAC recommendations.    
 
7.2 Contributions of the Study 
This study formally defines the Multicommodity Maximal Covering Network Design 
Problem (MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge, it represents the first attempt to 
incorporate the coverage objective in a generic network model, leading to a new class of 
models with significant practical implications. Past work has used the coverage criterion 
in identifying a path, tree or tour on a network by considering either the routing or the 
fixed cost, while the proposed model simultaneously considers the routing and fixed costs 
subject to a budget constraint. That is, none of the existing models consider routing costs, 
fixed costs and coverage criterion in a single framework.   
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution of this study is its ability to address 
planning problems faced by emergency response agencies vis-à-vis disaster management. 
The specific problem addressed here relates to earthquake response management. Under 
budget constraints, there is a need to determine an effective retrofit plan for the bridges in 
a seismically-prone region. Most studies in the literature have adopted a local perspective 
to solving this problem, and do not consider the effect of potential bridge failures on the 
transportation system performance. The few methodologies that use a systems approach 
do not consider the influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of the associated routes 
vis-à-vis effective earthquake response. The proposed model fills this critical gap by 
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considering the total travel time for the key O-D pairs in the network and the total 
population covered by them as the criteria for determining the critical routes. The budget 
limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs for the links constituting the critical routes is 
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence, this methodology simultaneously 
determines the set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and the routes that serve as 
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Introduction  
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the 
central Mississippi Valley has been known for 200 
years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Awareness 
of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has 
increased in the last decades. In the last two 
decades identification of an independent tectonic 
process occurring in the Wabash River Valley has 
implications for the seismic risk of the State of 
Indiana from what has recently been defined as the 
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a 
strong earthquake in these seismic zones or in 
Indiana or the neighboring states due to other not 
so well understood tectonic processes, as has 
occurred in the past, has serious implications for 
the State Transportation System. The definition of 
Earthquake Emergency Routes for the state is a 
priority for the Indiana Department of 
Transportation. The identification of Emergency 
Routes takes into account issues related to 
transportation including coverage of population and 
area and travel time along these routes.  
 
This study formulates a multicommodity maximal 
covering network design problem (MCNDP) for 
identifying critical routes, for earthquake response 
and to seismically retrofit bridges. The MCNDP 
seeks routes that minimize the total travel time over 
the selected routes and maximizes the total 
population covered, subject to a budget constraint 
on bridge retrofitting costs on the selected routes. 
The problem is formulated as a two-objective 
integer programming model and solved using the 
branch-and-cut module in the CPLEX optimizer. 
The model performance was analyzed using the 
transportation network of a seismically-prone 
region in southwest Indiana. Thereby, the search 
for the critical routes for an origin-destination (O-
D) pair is confined to a limited geographical region 
around it.  
 
A Geographical Information System (GIS) system 
was developed for evaluation of seismic 
vulnerability of the proposed Indiana Emergency 
Routes. The GIS based implementation of the 
technical information developed in this project 
through FEMA HAZUS-MH software was 
conducted in collaboration with the Polis Center in 
Indianapolis, nationally recognized and FEMA 
authorized HAZUS implementation facility. 
HAZUS software may be used for mitigation of 
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a strong 
earthquake in southwestern Indiana. It uses 
information from the Indiana Department of 
Transportation (INdot) maintenance database and 
selected structural and geotechnical information 
from the bridge drawings data base. Vulnerability 
assessment was performed using the general 
information from maintenance and final calibration 
was performed using a series of cases based on 
bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions 
contained in these drawings. 
Findings  
Computational experiments were conducted to 
investigate the effects of varying the budget and the 
relative weights of the two objectives. A set of 
critical routes was obtained. Seismic retrofit planning 
plays an important role in determining the 
effectiveness of the operational stage of earthquake 
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response management. At a strategic level, it is 
dependent on the routes critical for effective 
emergency response. However, past studies have not 
addressed the identification of critical routes under 
budget constraints. This is a very important practical 
problem for emergency response planners as it 
involves identifying effective transportation routes 
while accounting for bridge structural conditions and 
budget limitations. It implies the identification of 
bridges to retrofit under earthquake response 
planning. This study develops a network-level 
methodology to assist decision-makers in identifying 
an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of 
a network.  
 
This study formally defines the Multicommodity 
Maximal Covering Network Design Problem 
(MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge, 
it represents the first attempt to incorporate the 
coverage objective in a generic network model, 
leading to a new class of models with significant 
practical implications. Past work has used the 
coverage criterion in identifying a path, tree or 
tour on a network by considering either the 
routing or the fixed cost, while the proposed 
model simultaneously considers the routing and 
fixed costs subject to a budget constraint. That 
is, none of the existing models consider routing 
costs, fixed costs and coverage criterion in a 
single framework.   
 
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution 
of this study is its ability to address planning 
problems faced by emergency response agencies 
vis-à-vis disaster management. The specific 
problem addressed here relates to earthquake 
response management. Under budget constraints, 
there is a need to determine an effective retrofit 
plan for the bridges in a seismically-prone 
region. Most studies in the literature have 
adopted a local perspective to solving this 
problem, and do not consider the effect of 
potential bridge failures on the transportation 
system performance. The few methodologies 
that use a systems approach do not consider the 
influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of 
the associated routes vis-à-vis effective 
earthquake response. The proposed model fills 
this critical gap by considering the total travel 
time for the key O-D pairs in the network and 
the total population covered by them as the 
criteria for determining the critical routes. The 
budget limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs 
for the links constituting the critical routes is 
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence, 
this methodology simultaneously determines the 
set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and 
the routes that serve as focal points for 
earthquake response. 
 
The evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge 
design requirements contained in the AASHTO 
Specifications and the existence of a proposed 
draft seismic design specification being 
discussed have significant implications in the 
assessment of the existing vulnerability, its 
mitigation, and the design of new bridges along 
the Emergency Routes. Along with this 
development, the USGS assessment of the 
seismic risk of southwestern Indiana and a 
change of format of the definition of the 
earthquake design ground motion that is integral 
part of the proposed draft seismic design 
specification also has important implications on 
the assessment of the operational capabilities of 
the Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana. 
The effects of the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake 
that occurred in the State of Washington gave 
invaluable insight on the expected situation for 
the State of Indiana due to a comparable bridge 
inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel 
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both 
regions over the last decades.  
 
Using the information collected in this study, the 
GIS implementation through FEMA-HAZUS-
MH software may be used for mitigation of 
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a 
strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana. 
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels 
of ground acceleration in order to obtain 
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using 
these results, seismic behavior patterns were 
obtained for bridges located in southwestern 
Indiana included in the INdot Vincennes District 
maintenance data base. Soil amplification and 
liquefaction potential were evaluated for the 
cases having reported SPT measurements from 
borings. Based on this process, information 
critical for the identification of upgrade needs 
for the transportation structures part of the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes is made available 
to the INdot. 
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Implementation  
The findings and developments of this research 
project are presented next in the form of 
suggested implementation steps by the Indiana 
Department of Transportation. 
 
1. Formal adoption of the selected 
emergency routes or some variation of 
the same by the state is a necessary 
step. Such routes adopted and 
maintained by INdot will be affected by 
issues and policies outside the scope of 
those considered in this study. For 
instance, policy decisions, budgetary 
constraints, new projects, i.e. 
continuation of I-69, will likely affect 
the formal adoption of a set of 
emergency routes and will continue to 
impose changes in the future. The 
methodology developed in this study 
and the information implemented in 
HAZUS-MH should be of assistance to 
state decision makers in the future.  
 
2. Future implementation strategies can be 
studied through simulation studies 
using appropriately updated information 
for different earthquake scenarios 
including earthquake ground motion 
defined in current AASHTO Standard 
Specifications, proposed Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or 
other. These simulations will provide 
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for 
the proposed routes or alternative 
definitions.  
 
3. The information in the maintenance 
database should be periodically 
evaluated and should include 
information currently available only in 
the bridge drawings (see Section 7.5 of 
the final report). This will improve the 
vulnerability assessment of the bridges 
refining the mitigation policies to adopt 
in the future. This expansion of the 
maintenance database can be extended 
to other counties and districts not 
covered in this research project.  
 
4. Establish a program for assessing the 
liquefaction, soil spread, and 
embankment failure potential along the 
routes at locations other than bridge 
sites by providing a consistent 
evaluation methodology supported with 
the information developed in this study. 
This implementation will require a soil 
exploration program to obtain 
geotechnical properties of sites where 
no information exists or where such 
information was obtained years ago 
with different objectives than 
liquefaction evaluation. In the research 
conducted in this study, liquefaction 
evaluations were made using solely 
boring information contained in 
selected bridge drawings.  
 
5. To establish procedures for emergency 
response under different earthquake 
occurrence scenarios.  
 
6. INdot should consider the formal 
adoption of HAZUS-MH software for 
scenario management, mitigation and 
vulnerability studies and to train 
appropriate personnel. An important 
feature in this implementation step is 
the engagement of the Polis Center in 
the training of INdot personnel on the 
use of HAZUS-MH software. The Polis 
Center is a nationally recognized 
HAZUS implementation facility. 
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Awareness of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has increased in the last decades. 
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the central Mississippi Valley has been 
known for 200 years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. In the last two decades 
identification of an independent tectonic process occurring in the Wabash River Valley 
has implications for the seismic risk of the State of Indiana from what has recently been 
defined as the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a strong earthquake in 
these seismic zones, or in Indiana, or in the neighboring states due to other not so well 
understood tectonic processes as has occurred in the past, has serious implications for the 
State Transportation System. The definition of Earthquake Emergency Routes for the 
State of Indiana became a priority for the Indiana Department of Transportation. The 
definition of these Emergency Routes takes into account issues related to transportation 
including coverage of population and area and travel time along these routes, and issues 
related to structural and geotechnical seismic vulnerability of the transportation structures 
along these routes. The transportation related issues are presented in Part I of this Report, 
and the structural and geotechnical seismic related issues are presented in Part II. 
Previous experience in the United States and elsewhere in the world with bridge damage 
during strong earthquakes has influenced the bridge earthquake resistant specifications 
and mitigation procedures. The effects of the Nisqually Earthquake that occurred in the 
State of Washington in 2001 give insight on the expected situation for the State of 
Indiana due to a comparable bridge inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel 
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both regions over the last decades. The 
evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge design requirements contained in the 
AASHTO Specifications and the existence of a proposed draft seismic design 
specification being discussed have significant implications in the assessment of the 
existing vulnerability, its mitigation, and the design of new bridges along the Emergency 
 
xvi 
Routes. Along with this development, the USGS assessment of the seismic risk of 
southwestern Indiana and a change of format of the definition of the earthquake design 
ground motion that is an integral part of the proposed draft seismic design specification 
also has important implications on the assessment of the operativeness of the Earthquake 
Emergency Routes of Indiana.  
 
Vulnerability assessment was performed using the general information from 
inspection and maintenance, and final calibration was performed using a series of cases 
based on bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions contained in these drawings. 
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels of ground acceleration in order to obtain 
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using these results, seismic behavior patterns were 
obtained for bridges located in southwestern Indiana included in the Indot Vincennes 
District Inspection and Maintenance Database. Soil amplification and liquefaction 
potential were evaluated for the cases having reported SPT measurements from borings. 
Based on this process, information, upgrade needs for the transportation structures part of 
the Earthquake Emergency Routes were obtained. With this information, it is possible to 
perform simulations that will help Indot in devising mitigation policies, perform 
simulations for different earthquake occurrence scenarios, and establish, evaluate, and 
implement alternatives for response strategies using the Earthquake Emergency Routes.  
 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed HAZUS-MH, 
a GIS-based software tool that empowers communities with the ability to assess risk from 
earthquakes, flood, and wind related disasters.  While HAZUS-MH can be used to assess 
risk with the significant default inventory that it includes, it is possible to integrate local 
data into the HAZUS-MH analysis in order to produce more realistic loss estimates.   As 
a component of the research work conducted in this project and with the approval of the 
Study Advisory Committee, The Polis Center from Indianapolis was tasked with the 
integration of bridge and soils data into HAZUS-MH for the purpose of using that tool to 
conduct earthquake risk analysis.   The Polis Center is a FEMA authorized HAZUS-MH 
earthquake and flood service provider and is thus able to support the goals of INDOT in 
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this instance.  The GIS implementation through FEMA HAZUS-MH software conducted 
during this study uses information from the Indiana Department of Transportation (Indot) 
Inspection and Maintenance Database and structural and geotechnical information from 











The purpose of the project was to propose Earthquake Emergency Routes for the 
State of Indiana with emphasis in the southwestern part of the State, to review the 
selected routes for earthquake hazards identifying conditions related to the structures 
along those routes that may affect their functioning in case of occurrence of a strong 
earthquake in the region, and to propose procedures for mitigation, evaluation and 
maintenance of their status as emergency routes. 
 
1.2 Scope 
1. To recommend Earthquake Emergency Routes for the Vincennes District of the 
Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT), located in the southwestern 
corner of the State, based on travel times and scope of retrofit work necessary to 
implement these routes with the final decision of which routes to select resting 
with INDOT (see Part I of this report).  
2. To develop a tool based on geographical information systems technology (GIS) 
that INDOT engineering may use for identifying and maintaining the Earthquake 
Emergency Routes network of Indiana and for establishing policies for mitigation 
of earthquake hazard on these routes, to perform simulations for different 
earthquake scenarios, and to help in the response to an actual emergency caused 
by the occurrence of a strong earthquake in the region.  
3. To assess the seismic vulnerability of selected bridges belonging to the Vincennes 
INDOT District based on detailed information, and to correlate this vulnerability 
assessment with one obtained using just the information currently contained in the 
INDOT Inspection and Maintenance Database. To recommend items relevant to 
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the vulnerability of the routes to be added to the Inspection and Maintenance 
Database.  
4. To give guidance on how to prioritize the mitigation of the vulnerability of 
existing bridges according to the analyses performed and their importance in 
keeping the transportation network system functional with emphasis in the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes selected. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the project, the methodology used took 
advantage of the most advanced resources of each discipline. The methodology 
corresponding to each of the components is described in detail along this report at the 
pertinent locations, with Chapter 4 of this report presenting a summary of the 
vulnerability assessment methodology used.  
 
1.4 Participants 
Joint Transportation Research Program – JTRP  
 Kumares C. Sinha, Director 
Study Advisory Committee  
Indiana Earthquake Preparedness Committee 
 J. Thompson, Chairman  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 K. Dughaish, Secretary  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 W. Dittelberger  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 B. Dittrich  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 S. Garrison  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 J. R. Hill  (Indiana Geological Survey) 
 K. Hoernschemeyer  (Federal Highway Administration) 
 D. Leonard  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 T. McClellan  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 J. McCrary (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 T. Nantung  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 C. Schum  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 G. Snyder  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 J. Steel  (Indiana State Emergency Management Agency) 
 L. Vaughan  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 M. Wood  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 





Earthquake Engineering and Structural Engineering: 
Mete A. Sozen, Investigator, Kettelhut Distinguished Professor of Civil 
Engineering 
Julio A. Ramirez, Co-Principal Investigator, Professor of Civil 
Engineering 
Luis E. Garcia, Research Engineer, Visiting Professor of Civil 
Engineering (Professor of Civil Engineering, Universidad de los 
Andes, Bogotá, Colombia) 
Laura Jones Metzger, Graduate Research Assistant 
 
Geotechnical: 
Antonio Bobet, Co-Principal Investigator, Associate Professor of Civil 
Engineering 
Dimitri Loukidis, Graduate Research Assistant 
 
Transportation: 
Srinivas Peeta, Co-Principal Investigator, Associate Professor of Civil 
Engineering 
Kannan Viswanath, Graduate Research Assistant 
 
1.5 Organization of the report 
This report is presented in two volumes; the first one – Part I – deals with 
Transportation issues related to definition of the selected Earthquake Emergency Routes; 
this second volume – Part II – is organized in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 presents background on seismic vulnerability of transportation networks. It 
includes the reasons behind the need of defining earthquake emergency routes. Discusses 
the seismic vulnerability issues linked to transportation structures. A summary of the 
performance of transportation networks in past earthquakes is presented. Finally, it 
presents and discusses the development of the specifications that govern their design 
including associated geotechnical issues.  
Chapter 3 discusses the tectonic setting of the southwestern corner of Indiana and 
how it fits within the two main regional seismogenic structures – the New Madrid 
Seismic Zones and the Wabash River Faulting System – commenting on the earthquakes 
that have affected the region. The earthquake mean return period is presented and the 
importance of its definition for earthquake resistant design of structures is brought into 
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perspective by describing the values being used in current and proposed earthquake 
resistant bridge design specifications. The implications of adopting a draft seismic design 
specification by AASHTO are discussed.  
Chapter 4 presents the methodology for evaluation of seismic vulnerability of the 
selected Indiana Emergency Routes, the available information, the Geographical 
Information System (GIS) implementation and its use for mitigation of vulnerability, 
simulation, and response to a strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to geotechnical sources of vulnerability for transportation 
structures in general and, in particular, the approach used in defining and assessing these 
sources of vulnerability for the Earthquake Emergency Routes of the State of Indiana.  
Chapter 6 parallels the previous chapter, with the focus on bridges. The methodology 
used and its application is discussed in detail.  
Chapter 7 defines the upgrade needs for the transportation structures part of the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes.  
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study.  






CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter describes previous background information related to earthquake 
emergency routes and performance during earthquakes of highway systems, 
transportation facilities, and structures with special reference to the State of Indiana. This 
background information has been divided in information related to highway systems, 
bridges, and issues associated with geotechnical aspects. 
 
2.1 Transportation systems 
The Federal Response Plan (FRP) of the United States [FEMA, 2003] created under 
the auspices of the Robert T. Stafford Act, which is the enabling legislation for 
emergency response in the United States, provides the legal mandate, the resources, and 
the mechanisms for an integrated emergency response after the declaration of any disaster 
by the President. The Federal Response Plan establishes 12 Emergency Support 
Functions (ESF) to facilitate the implementation and coordination of a broad spectrum of 
integrated emergency response activities after natural and technological disasters. 
 ESF No. 1 is “Transportation” and is defined as access to the disaster area. It is based 
on the assumptions that the transportation infrastructure in the area will sustain damage, 
which will influence the means and accessibility of relief services and supplies to protect 
people and property. The disaster responses requiring transportation capacity will be 
difficult to coordinate effectively during the immediate post-disaster period. Clearing of 
debris and completion of repairs will be gradual, in spite of best efforts, disrupting access 
routes for a significant period. 
Transportation systems in the Central U.S. – including highways, bridges, railways, 
waterways, ports, and airports – are vulnerable to the effects of a damaging earthquake in 
the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) [CUSEC, 2000]. Furthermore, damages to 
transportation systems may extend to several states, which present transportation officials 
in government and the private sector with unique problems and challenges. 
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The Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) is a nonprofit organization, 
funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is dedicated to reducing 
deaths, injuries, damage to property and economic losses resulting from earthquakes 
occurring in the Central United States. Its members are the seven states that are most 
vulnerable to earthquakes in this region: Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee. 
 
Fig. 2-1 – Map showing hypothetical maximum intensities for a magnitude 7.6 




The document [CUSEC, 2000] discusses the transportation system vulnerability and 
the earthquake risk in the Central United States taking into account the multi-state impact 
of future damaging earthquakes in the region including associated problems with 
earthquake induced hazards such as faulting, liquefaction, slope instability, dam or levee 
failure, and hazardous materials spills. The effects of earthquakes on the transportation 
system including: highway, railroad, waterway, and air transportation and liquid fuel 
transport; the steps that must be taken for mitigation of vulnerability of transportation 
systems in the region; and response and recovery policies are discussed in this important 
document. It assigns the following consequences of failure in a transportation system due 
to an earthquake or other natural disaster: 
• Direct loss of life due to collapse or structural failure of the lifeline. 
• Indirect loss of life due to an inability to respond to secondary catastrophes, 
such as fires, and/or provide emergency medical aid. 
• Delayed recovery operations. 
• Release of hazardous products (e.g., losses from tank cars derailed by track 
failure, gas leaks from ruptured utility lines) and environmental impacts. 
• Direct loss of property and utility service (e.g., the collapse of a bridge 
carrying utilities). 
• Losses due to interruption of access (e.g., export losses due to port damage). 
• Disruption of economic activity across the region and nation as well as in the 
community directly affected. 
The [CUSEC, 2000] document proposes a New Madrid Transportation Plan and 
Strategy, which would be the product of an intergovernmental-private sector planning 
process, aimed at addressing the following: 
1. Loss estimates and functionality assessments for selected earthquake scenarios. 
2. Common set of planning assumptions for federal, state, and local governments. 
3. Criteria for decisions on establishing field operations in a multi-state, multiple 
region disaster. 
4. Proper allocation of resources to multiple impacted areas. 
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5. State versus Federal roles in determining priorities and planning for infrastructure 
repair. 
6. Procedures and criteria for conflict resolution in meeting requests for resources. 
7. Pre-disaster determination of conditions that must be present before federal 
transportation support is withdrawn. 
Similar tasks have been studied in other regions of the U.S., but there has been none 
requiring such a broad coordination between different States and the Federal 
Government. The role played by CUSEC and the State Departments of Transportation in 
implementing this plan can not be underestimated. At present, CUSEC has compiled the 
Emergency Routes shown in Fig. 2-2.  
 
Fig. 2-2 – Earthquake Emergency Routes and staging facilities of the  




These routes are currently under study individually by each State. Detailed literature 
review on transportation issues is presented in Part I of this report. 
 
2.2 Bridges 
2.2.1 Bridge performance during earthquakes 
In general, the likelihood of bridge damage increases if the ground motion is 
particularly intense, the soils are soft, the bridge was constructed before modern codes 
were implemented, or the bridge configuration is irregular [Moehle and Eberhard, 2000]. 
Depending on theses conditions, bridge damage could be grouped in the following 
general categories: 
1. Unseating of the superstructure — Short seat lengths at span hinges or simple 
supports permit the partial or total collapse of the superstructure if the 
displacements caused by the ground motion exceed the support length. Curved 
bridges are especially vulnerable for this condition. Restrainers have been 
used for several years to mitigate this problem; although, there were cases in 
which they were not effective during the Northridge Earthquake [EERI, 
1995a]. 
2. Column failure — Lack of adequate confining transverse reinforcement leads 
to brittle modes of failure of reinforced concrete columns and piers. Short lap 
splices or inadequate embedment length of anchorage at the foundation of 
vertical reinforcement has led to numerous failures. For steel columns, local 
buckling may allow damage leading to collapse. 
3. Damage to abutments — The abutment is affected by the underlying soil 
conditions, the type of foundation, and the demands imposed by the 
superstructure movement. Usually, abutments are elements where it is 
difficult to provide ductility and toughness.  
4. Damage to bearings — Bearings used in bridges designed only for gravity 
effect are especially prone to failure under horizontal displacement of the 
superstructure transverse to the direction of thermal expansion.  
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5. Structural configuration — Unique complex structures with curved or 
significant skew geometry, or bridges having unique features or details, are 
more susceptible to damage induced by ground motion. 
6. Age, Modifications and Maintenance — Bridge design specifications have 
changed in recent years as a result of experience from earthquakes and 
structural research. The correlation between bad behavior and old bridges is 
high as observed in many recent earthquakes. Changes introduced after 
original construction sometimes affect behavior. Numerous cases in which 
protection barriers or walls reduce the clear height of columns have led to 
failures under earthquake ground motions. Deterioration of the bridge due to 
corrosion and other causes has had an influence in the observed behavior.  
7. Geotechnical conditions — Liquefaction, soil spread, slope instability, 
proximity to the fault, approach settlement, and other causes of distress 
influence the response, and damage of the bridge. 
The following publications describe extensively bridge behavior and damage during 
earthquakes [ACI, 1999], [Moehle and Eberhard, 2000], [Penzien, 2000], and [Priestley 
et al., 1996]. Reports from earthquakes were damage to bridges is specially described are: 
San Fernando, California, 1971 Earthquake [Lew et al., 1971]; Chile 1985 Earthquake 
[EERI, 1986]; Whittier Narrows, California, 1987 Earthquake [EERI, 1988]; Loma 
Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake [EERI, 1990] and [NRC, 1994]; Costa Rica 1991 
Earthquake [EERI, 1991]; Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake [EERI, 1995a] and 
[CRSI, 1994], the Kobe, Japan, 1995 Earthquake [EERI, 1995b]; the Turkish 
Earthquakes of 1999 [EERI, 2000]; the Taiwan Earthquake of 1999 [EERI, 2001], and 
the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake [Ranf et al., 2001], and [Nisqually EQ 
Clearinghouse Group, 2001]. Just a summary will be presented limiting it to cases of 
bridges designed using U.S. or comparable specifications. Direct reference is made to the 
relevant U.S. earthquakes. Even with these limitations, several things have to be kept in 
mind in translating this information for application in the State of Indiana. These issues 
will be discussed after the performance information is presented. 
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Although there is record of previous damage to bridges both in the U.S. and abroad, 
the February 9, 1971, San Fernando, California, Earthquake constitutes the first case on 
intense damage to bridges of modern design that belonged to the Interstate system [Lew 
et al., 1971]. The 1971 San Fernando Earthquake affected the greater Los Angeles area 
and specially the northern San Fernando Valley. Post-earthquake reports by the 
California State Highway Commission indicated that the earthquake damaged 
approximately 11 miles of multilane freeways and 6 miles of conventional state 
highways, in addition to numerous city and county streets. Approximately 1/5 of the total 
damage cost to transportation infrastructure was represented in damage to sixty bridges. 
Several of these bridges either collapsed or were severely damaged to the point of having 
to be replaced. Considerable disruption of traffic was caused by the bridge damage. The 
heavily traveled Interstate 5 was reopened to traffic using emergency detours within five 
days of the earthquake occurrence. Approximately 80% of the bridge damage cost was 
concentrated in 4 miles of highway at the intersection of I-5, I-210, and State Road 14. It 
is interesting to note that one of the collapsed curved bridges rebuilt after the San 
Fernando Earthquake collapsed during the Northridge 1994 Earthquake. 
 
 




The Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake [EERI, 1990] provided insight on the 
influence of geotechnical conditions on bridge behavior by the preponderance of damage 
in the perimeter of San Francisco Bay where relatively deep and soft soil deposits 
amplified the ground motion. The collapsed portions of the two-story Cypress Street 
viaduct (see Fig. 2-4) coincide with the soft soil sites. Soil conditions may have played a 




Fig. 2-4 – Collapse of the Cypress Street Viaduct during the  
Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake 
 
Loma Prieta Earthquake also highlighted the vulnerability of adjacent short and long 
spans imposing differential deformation demands and producing the collapse of the short 
span next to a large span (see Fig. 2-5). During this earthquake there were five bridge 
collapses (counting the extensive Cypress Viaduct as one) and four other bridges 





Fig. 2-5 – Collapse of a span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge  
during the Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake 
 
The Costa Rica 1991 Earthquake [EERI, 1991] confirmed the influence of soil 
conditions on bridge behavior especially in abutment failures, embankment settlement, 
and liquefaction. Collapses caused by unseating of skewed spans were also observed. 
The 1994 Northridge Earthquake, [EERI, 1995a] and [CRSI, 1994], produced high 
accelerations throughout the Los Angeles metropolitan area where the California 
Department of Transportation owns and maintains approximately 2,200 bridges. 
Approximately 1,200 were located in zones that experienced horizontal accelerations 
more than 0.25g and several hundred bridges were subjected to accelerations more than 
0.5g [ACI, 1999].  
Five bridges presented partial or complete collapse. All these structures were of 
reinforced and/or prestressed concrete, with construction completion dates ranging from 
1964 through 1976. Several had been retrofitted with hinge restrainers following the 1971 
San Fernando Earthquake. Collapse causes in all cases appear to involve column flexural 
or shear failures (see Fig. 2-6), or unseating at in-span or abutment hinges (see Fig. 2-7). 
Three reinforced and/or prestressed concrete bridges sustained major to moderate damage 
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to their columns but did not collapse. There was damage to bridge abutments throughout 
the epicentral region.  
 
 
Fig. 2-6 – Failure of flared column in the Route 118, Mission Gothic Undercrossing 
during the Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake 
 
The observed abutment damage included shear key cracking and failure, spalling or 
failure of abutment backwalls and wingwalls, approach settlement, and approach slab 
buckling. Damage in steel bridges comprised pounding damage between adjacent 
elements, buckling of cross bracing, bending of cross-brace gussets, bearing damage 
including anchor bolt and restrainer fractures, and damage to supporting abutments and 
pier walls.  
 
The epicentral region contained 132 bridges that had been retrofitted using post San 
Fernando, 1971, details (Caltrans Phase I), and 63 with post Loma Prieta retrofit details 
(Caltrans Phase II). Retrofit consisted in hinge restrainers and/or column jackets. Most of 
the retrofitted bridges performed adequately although, in some cases, hinge restrainers 
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presented problems. Column jackets, whether made of steel or fiberglass, performed well 
in all cases.  
 
 
Fig. 2-7 – Collapse of the Gavin Canyon Undercrossing during the  
Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake 
 
The Los Angeles County Department of Public Works reported serious damage in 
only four out of 1,500 bridges on the county system. The City of Los Angeles reported 
that 62 out of a total of 800 spans were damaged, and two required closure due to column 
damage in one case, and fill settlement in the other. Other damage to city bridges 
consisted of approach-fill settlement, pavement cracking, shear key damage, 
superstructure rotation, rocker bearing damage, and architectural damage. 
Several important observations were made regarding the performance of the 
transportation system [EERI, 1995a].  
• In this earthquake, all bridge collapses were associated with poor performance of 
older columns with inadequate transverse reinforcement and short seat widths, 
both of which have been identified as sources of vulnerability in previous 
earthquakes. The progress in knowledge and design practice was evident in the 
good performance of bridges constructed or retrofitted to current standards.  
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• Architectural column flares affected the pier behavior. Earlier design practice 
assumed that flares spalled off, whereas actually they act as an integral part of the 
column.  
• Current and older design procedures may not adequately represent the distribution 
of design forces in long, multiframe bridges. Failure and damage in end frames 
indicates that the stiffer end frames may attract larger forces than anticipated in 
design.  
• As with other construction forms, structural changes can occur during 
construction and maintenance that invalidate the design assumptions. It is 
important to verify that as-built conditions are consistent with design 
assumptions, and not just the design drawings. Improved documentation of design 
assumptions may be desirable.  
• Caltrans Phase I hinge restrainer retrofits had mixed performance. There were 
many examples of restrainer unit failure (cable fracture, fitting failure, and 
diaphragm punching).  
• Older bridges with 6-inch and 8-inch seats should be reevaluated, even if 
retrofitted with restrainers.  
• Caltrans Phase II retrofits appeared to perform well in all instances. (Its focus was 
on retrofitting columns in single-column bridges because of the perception that 
they were more vulnerable than multicolumn bridges.) 
• Several skewed bridges collapsed. An apparent cause was torsional response 
associated with skewed geometries. Methods are needed for improved design of 
skewed bridges, possibly including elimination of the skew where feasible, 
elimination of in-span hinges, and lengthening of seats.  
• Damage to abutments and approaches was widespread. Considering the extent of 
this damage for a moderate earthquake, it seems that the current design strategy to 
accept abutment damage should be reevaluated.  
• Major damage and collapse in multicolumn bridges indicates that the increased 
reliability associated with redundancy of multicolumn bents is not necessarily 
sufficient to avoid collapse. Retrofit priorities given to multicolumn bridges and 
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high-traffic-volume bridges may need to be reconsidered. Furthermore, damage 
and collapse required closure of bridges that usually carry heavy traffic volume.  
• Modern traffic management techniques were effective in managing traffic 
following the earthquake. Furthermore, emergency procedures, including strong 
incentive and disincentive clauses, were effective in achieving rapid 
reconstruction of the freeways.  
The February 28, 2001, Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake affected the Seattle, 
Tacoma, Olympia region [Ranf et al., 2001], and [Nisqually EQ Clearinghouse Group, 
2001]. No bridge collapses were observed during this earthquake. In total, 78 bridges 
were damaged. A total of 10 bridges sustained moderate damage, 16 had mild damage, 
and 52 bridges had minor damage. The event had a moment magnitude of 6.8 and a depth 
of focus of 52 km on the Juan de Fuca Plate. The distance from the hypocenter to Seattle 
was 78 km, 57 km to Tacoma, and 54 km to Olympia.  
 
Fig. 2-8 – Damage to the I-5 Holgate Street overpass, Seattle, during the  




The Nisqually Earthquake caused moderate ground motion throughout the Puget 
Sound region. Of the 31 stations for which preliminary information was available, only 
13 showed peak ground accelerations more than 10%g and only 2 stations recorded 
values more than 25%g. Several correlations of damage with bridge characteristics and 
ground motion intensity were made [Ranf et al., 2001]. For 72 bridges that were damaged 
(6 movable bridges were excluded because of their unusual characteristics) types of 
damage were: 48 with damage to concrete, 6 with damage to steel, 11 with damage to 
beams, restrainers or joints, and 7 with damage due to settlement.  
In order to help interpret the correlation of damage with age of the bridge, Figure 2-9 
shows the age of construction of the total bridge inventory in the region. The number of 
bridges built increased from the beginning of the 1950’s and then decreased at the 
beginning of the 1980’s coinciding with the construction of the interstate highway 
system. Figure 2-10 shows the correlation of age of construction with damage observed. 




Fig. 2-9 – Age of the total bridge inventory affected by the  
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake 
 
Figure 2-11 shows the spectral accelerations in percentage of g (T = 0.3 s) for each 
bridge site for the total bridge inventory in the area and Fig. 2-12 correlates the damage 
observed with the spectral acceleration. Correlation of spectral acceleration and bridge 




Fig. 2-10 – Percentage of damaged bridges by decade of construction for the  
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake 
 
 
Fig. 2-11 – Spectral acceleration (%g at T = 0.3 s) at the bridge site for  
the total bridge inventory affected by the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake 
 
 
Fig. 2-12 – Percentage of bridge damaged for different values of spectral acceleration 





The bridge behavior observed during the Nisqually Earthquake is relevant because it 
may be similar to what would be expected in southwestern Indiana for a large earthquake 
in the New Madrid zone. The accelerations expected are of the same order of magnitude 
of those recorded during Nisqually Earthquake. The bridge inventory has similar 
characteristic with respect to age and type of bridges. Awareness of the seismic risk in the 
Pacific Northwest evolved about the same time as that for awareness of the seismic risk 
in the Central U.S. Earthquake resistant design of new bridges started about the same 
time in Central U.S. and Pacific NW. 
 
2.2.2 Bridge seismic design criteria evolution 
The early days 
In 1931 the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) published 
the first edition of the Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges [AASHO, 1931]. 
These specifications were – and still are – for ordinary bridges having span lengths less 
than 500 feet. No reference to considering earthquake effects on bridges was made in the 
Standard Specifications until the fifth edition (1949) in which a statement requiring that 
earthquake effects should be considered was included without guidance on how to 
account for them. The same statement was kept in the sixth (1953) and seventh (1957) 
editions.  
The eighth edition (1961) of the Standard Specifications [AASHO, 1961] was the 
first to specify an earthquake loading for design (EQ) to be applied statically in any 
horizontal direction as part of Group VII load combination which included along with 
earthquake effects: dead loads, earth pressure, buoyancy, and stream flow effects. This 
load combination was to be used in the working stress design (WSD) procedure with a 1/3 
increase in allowable stress permitted for occasional loads. The earthquake load was 
defined using a seismic coefficient (C) that multiplied the dead load (D): 
 
 EQ C D= ⋅  (2-1) 
 
Values of C were 0.02 for structures supported on spread footings where the soil 
bearing capacity was rated to be greater than 4 t/ft2, 0.04 for structures supported on 
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spread footings where the soil bearing capacity was rated to be less than 4 t/ft2, and 0.06 
for structures founded on piles. No seismic zone factors or seismic zoning map was 
provided, leaving to the State Bridge Commissioner or the State Highway Department the 
decision of considering the State, or regions within the State, as seismic. These seismic 
provisions were an extension of the lateral force requirements for buildings developed 
prior to 1961 by the Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC). The 
seismic loading provisions of the eighth (1961) edition of the Standard Specifications 
were kept, without modification, in the ninth (1965), tenth (1969) and eleventh (1973) 
editions. 
 
The 1975 AASHTO Interim 
As a result of the 1971 San Fernando, California, Earthquake, during which many 
highway bridges were severely damaged and some even collapsed – as described 
previously – the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) issued, in 1973, a 
new seismic design procedure for bridges which formed the basis of the 1975 AASHTO 
Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges [AASHTO, 1975]. This document specified 
an equivalent static lateral force: 
 
 EQ C F W= ⋅ ⋅  (2-2) 
 
The procedure was restricted to bridges having supporting members of approximately 
equal lateral stiffness. The equivalent static lateral force was to be applied in any 
horizontal direction as part of the same Group VII load combination used in the eighth 
(1961) Standard Specifications edition in a working stress design procedure permitting a 
1/3 increase in allowable stress. In Eq. (2-2), W represents dead load, F is a framing 
factor assigned the values of 1.0 for single columns and 0.8 for moment resisting frames 
with the horizontal force acting along the frame, and C was a combined response 
coefficient expressed by: 
 A R SC
Z
⋅ ⋅




in which A denotes the maximum expected peak ground acceleration (PGA) associated 
with each seismic risk zone of the map of the United States shown in Fig. 2-13, R is a 
normalized (PGA = 1g) acceleration response spectral value for a rock site, S is a soil 
amplification factor, and Z is a force reduction factor depending upon structural-
component type which accounts for the allowance of inelastic deformations. 
The numerical values specified for A were 0.09g, 0.22g, and 0.50g in seismic zones 
numbered 1, 2, and 3 respectively in the map of Fig. 2-13. 
 
Fig. 2-13 – Seismic Risk Map contained in the 
 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges 
 
Numerical values for R, S, and Z were not provided in the 1975 AASHTO Interim 
Specifications for Highway Bridges; instead four plots of C as a function of period T were 
given for different values of A. Each of these plots represents a different depth range of 
alluvium to rock-like material. The ranges were 0-10 ft, 11-80 ft, 81-150 ft, and greater 
than 150 ft. Figure 2-14 shows the response coefficient C values as a function of period T 
for 81 to 150 ft depth of alluvium. Minimum values for C were set at 0.10 for values of A 




Fig. 2-14 – Response coefficient C for 81-150 ft depth of alluvium contained in the 
 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges 
 




=  (2-4) 
 
in which P was equal to the total uniform static load required to cause a 1-inch lateral 
deflection of the whole structure. For complex or irregular structures the 1975 Interim 
Specifications required use of the modal response spectrum analysis method to obtain 
design loads. For structures adjacent to active faults, sites with unusual geologic 
conditions, unusual structures, and structures having a fundamental period greater than 3 
seconds it required that the design should be made using current seismicity, soil response, 
and dynamic analysis techniques. The 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway 
Bridges also included a procedure for design of restraining features to limit the 
displacement of the superstructure including hinges, ties, and shear blocks. 
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The seismic design criteria contained in the 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications 
were kept in the twelfth (1977), thirteenth (1983), and fourteenth (1989) editions of 
AASHTO’s Standard Specifications. The only modification was to allow the use of load-
factor design (LFD) or ultimate strength design (USD). For WSD the same Group VII 
load combination was specified with a 1/3 allowable stress increase – see Eq. (2-5) –. 




Group VII (LFD) D E
D E B SF EQ
D E B SF EQγ β β
= + + + +
= ⋅ + ⋅ + + +
 (2-5) 
 
where D denotes dead load; E earth pressure; B buoyancy; and SF stream flow; γ = 1.3; 
βD = 0.75 when checking columns for minimum axial load and maximum moment or 
eccentricity, βD = 1.0 when checking columns for maximum axial load and minimum 
moment, and βD = 1.0 for flexure and tension members; and βE = 1.3 for lateral earth 
pressure and βE = 0.5 for positive moment in rigid frames. 
Although the introduction of these requirements for computing seismic forces and 
their use in design was an improvement with respect to previous practice, no 
corresponding changes were introduced in the detailing requirements for the structural 
materials within the Standard Specifications. Seen from a more recent perspective, the 
lack of requirements to introduce toughness to the structural elements as was being 
required at the same time for the earthquake resistant design of buildings [ACI, 1977] 
would turn later to be one of the major sources of seismic vulnerability for transportations 
structures designed and built during this era.  
 
The ATC 6 and Division I-A of AASHTO Standard Specifications 
In the aftermath of the February 9, 1971, San Fernando, California, Earthquake the 
Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC) established the Applied 
Technology Council (ATC), an independent, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation for the 
purpose of implementing current technological developments into active structural 
engineering practice. Their initial efforts were aimed at earthquake resistant design of 
buildings. In the late 1970’s with the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation and 
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the National Bureau of Standards the Applied Technology Council published document 
ATC-3-06 [ATC, 1978] devoted to building earthquake resistant design. This document 
was the draft of what was to become current Model Code seismic requirements in the 
United States and many countries. In 1981 ATC, with the sponsorship of the Federal 
Highway Administration, Department of Transportation, published document ATC-6 
Seismic Design Guidelines for Bridges [ATC, 1981]. These guidelines with minor 
revision made by the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER) in 
Buffalo, NY, under the sponsorship of the National Cooperative Highway Research 
Program (NCHRP), were adopted as the earthquake resistant design requirements for 
bridges in the fifteenth (1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications. These 
requirements were kept without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and in the current 
seventeenth (2002) edition [AASHTO, 2002] as Division I-A Seismic Design. 
Under the requirements of Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of 
the Standard Specifications the acceleration coefficient A for the bridge site must be 
obtained from the acceleration contour maps provided. The northern Midwest portion of 
the map of horizontal acceleration A (expressed as a percent of gravity) in rock with 90 
percent probability of not being exceeded in 50 years – mean return period 475 years – is 
shown in Fig. 2-15. This map was prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for 
the 1988 edition of the NEHRP Recommended Provisions for the Development of Seismic 
Regulations for New Buildings [NEHRP, 1988]. Although the values of A in this map do 
not differ in the order of magnitude from those contained in the original ATC-6 1981 
report for the same geographical regions, the 1988 map uses a finer resolution by 
assigning values of A in a county by county basis and presenting them in smaller 
acceleration increments. 
Once the acceleration coefficient is obtained, the bride structure must be classified as 
either “Essential” or “Other” in accordance with given guidelines. An importance 
classification (IC= I) shall be given to Essential bridges and (IC=II) shall be given to 
ordinary bridges. The classification of “Essential” must be given to all bridges located in 
zones where the value of A is greater than 0.29g and on the basis of social, survival, 
security, or defense requirements. Guidance is given in the commentary of ATC-6 for 
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including bridges in either importance group. The bridge also must be assigned to a 
Seismic Performance Category (SPC) A, B, C or D as a function of the acceleration 
coefficient A as defined in Table 2-1.  
 
 
Fig. 2-15 – Northern Midwest portion of the map of horizontal acceleration A (g) in rock 
with 90 percent probability of not being exceeded in 50 years (Division I-A Seismic 
Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications) 
 
Table 2-1 – Seismic Performance Categories (SPC) Division I-A Seismic Design  
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications 
Bridge Classification Acceleration Coefficient Essential Other 
A ≤ 0.09g A A 
0.09g < A ≤ 0.19g B B 
0.19g < A ≤ 0.29g C C 




The effects of site conditions on bridge response are determined from a Site 
Coefficient (S) based on soil profile types summarized in Fig. 2-16. 
 
Soil Profile Type I - S = 1.0 
  
Soil Profile Type II - S = 1.2 
 
Soil Profile Type III - S = 1.5 
 
Soil Profile Type IV - S = 2.0 
 
Fig. 2-16 – Soil Profile Types  
(Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications) 
 
No dynamic analysis is required in Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th 
Edition of the Standard Specifications for bridges having single spans, regardless of the 
value of the site acceleration coefficient A, and for all bridges in SPC A. All other 
bridges, regular or irregular, having two or more spans must be analyzed by at least one 
of two dynamic analysis procedures, namely, the single-mode spectral method (SMSM) 
or the multi-mode spectral method (MMSM). The SMSM is specified as minimum for 
More than 40 feet of soft 
clays or silts with shear wave 




More than 30 feet of soft 




More than 200 feet of stiff 




Less than 200 feet of stiff 
sand or gravel, or stiff clays< 200 ft
Rock 
Surface 
Rock with shear wave 






regular bridges in SPC B, C, and D; while the MMSM is specified as minimum for 
irregular bridges in these same categories. An "irregular" bridge is defined as one having 
abrupt or unusual changes in mass, stiffness, and/or geometry from abutment to 
abutment; a "regular" bridge is one not meeting the definition of an "irregular" bridge. 
The seismic input in any horizontal direction to be used in each of these minimum 
dynamic analysis procedures is specified in terms of an elastic seismic response 
coefficient, Cs, as expressed for the single-mode spectral SMSM method for a bridge 







=  (2-6) 
 
The value of Cs need not exceed 2.5⋅A. For sites with soil profile types III and IV in 
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Fig. 2-17 – Seismic response coefficient Cs for different soil profiles normalized with 
respect to acceleration coefficient A (Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th 
Edition of the Standard Specifications) 
 
For the multi-mode spectral method (MMSM) the same relationship for Cs is used 
and for each individual vibration mode “m” the mode period Tm must be used in Eq. (2-6) 
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as T. In this case a reduction of Cs is allowed for modes other than the fundamental and 
periods shorter than 0.3 sec, with the value of Cs tending to the value of A at a period 
equal to zero. For long periods greater than 4 sec a minimum value of Cs is required.  
Deformations in the nonlinear range of response of the bridge elements are expected 
to occur when subjected to the earthquake design ground motion prescribed in the 
Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications. 
Response modification factors (R) are prescribed for the cases listed in Table 2-2. 
 
Table 2-2 – Response Modification Factors (R) Division I-A Seismic Design of the 
current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications 
Substructure R Connections R 
Wall-Type Pier 2 Superstructure to abutment 0.8 
Reinforced concrete pile bents 
a. Vertical piles only 




Expansion joints within a 
span of the superstructure 
0.8 
Single columns 3 Columns, piers, or pile bents 
to cap beam or superstructure 
1.0 
Steel or composite & steel 
concrete pile bents 
a. Vertical piles only 





Columns or piers to 
foundation 
1.0 
Multiple-column bent 5   
 
In a great departure from the earthquake resistant design of buildings in which the 
response modification factor is assigned for the structure as a whole by dividing the 
design forces by R before performing the analysis; in the ATC-6 document the analysis, 
static or dynamic, is performed for the bridge without reducing the design forces by the 
response modification factor. Here it is used at the element level by dividing the design 
forces by R just when computing modified values (EQM) that replace values of (EQ) in 
Eq. (2-5). This form of use for the response modification factor in bridges has been kept 
up to Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard 
Specifications.  
Other major departure from previous bridge design practice introduced by the ACT-6 
document was to assign differential detailing requirements depending on the Seismic 
Performance Categories (SPC). This leads to increased structural toughness from 
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category A to D, with category A corresponding to the Standard Specifications 
requirements without any seismic provisions beyond using seismic forces in analysis and 
design and no special detailing. The reinforced concrete requirements for SPC B to D 
were based on corresponding requirements of the ACI 318 Code [ACI, 1977] for 
buildings. This may be considered a landmark in improved expected performance of 
transportations structures subjected to strong earthquake ground motion. 
Other significant improvement with respect to previous practice was the introduction 
of dimension of minimum support-width length to be used at expansion ends of girders in 
all bridges; regardless of seismic performance category and number of spans (see Fig. 2-
18). Prescribed minimum support lengths depend on angle of skew of the support, 
distance between expansion joints, pier height, and seismic performance category.  
 
 
Fig. 2-18 – Minimum support length definition (Division I-A Seismic Design  
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications) 
 
AASHTO LRFD 
Reinforced concrete design departed from the working-stress design (WSD) 
philosophy in the mid 1950’s and by the early 1970’s had moved completely into 
ultimate strength design (USD) philosophy. Other materials lagged but by the mid 1980’s 
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a push for probabilistic design methods coined a new term for USD as load and resistance 
factor design (LRFD) which was adopted especially by the steel industry and later by 
AASHTO. Between 1988 and 1993 with the sponsorship of the Federal Highway 
Administration under the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) 
developed and published in 1994 the first edition of AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design 
Specifications, reviewed later for a second edition in 1998 [AASHTO, 1998], and 
recently in a third edition in 2004 [AASHTO, 2004]. 
The AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications, First (1994), Second (1998), and 
Third (2004) Editions, requires that each bridge component and connection satisfy all 
limit states in accordance with the relation  
 
 ( )i i nQ Rη γ φ⋅ ≤ ⋅∑  (2-7) 
 
in which η is a factor related to a ductility factor ηD, a redundancy factor ηR, and an 
operational importance factor ηi in accordance with η = ηD⋅ηR⋅ηi; γi is a statistically-
based load factor applied to force effect Qi; and φ is a statistically-based resistance factor 
applied to the nominal resistance Rn. The numerical values to be used for these factors 
can be found in the LRFD Specifications (AASHTO LRFD, 1994, 1998, and 2004). 
The value of Qi for the value of i representing an extreme seismic event, designated 
EQ, is found using the same procedure described above for Standard Specifications, 
Fifteenth (1992), Sixteenth (1996), and seventeenth (2002) Editions. 
An additional bridge classification, "Critical," has been added to the LRFD 
Specifications; and the number of substructure response modification factors R, have 
been increased and made different in all three classifications, "Critical," "Essential," and 
"Other" as indicated in Table 2-3. The response modification factors for connections 
remained the same in the LRFD Specifications than in the Standard Specifications.  
Although, at first glance it may look that the impact of adoption of AASHTO LRFD 
Specification to replace the AASHTO Standard Specifications with respect to seismic 
design is minor because they are based on the same requirements, this is not true for 
bridges in the “Critical” and “Essential” categories where seismic design forces described 
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by EQM (EQ/R) increase by a factors ranging from 1.33 to 3.33 for “Critical” bridges and 
from 1.33 to 1.5 for “Essential” bridges. 
 
Table 2-3 – Response Modification Factors (R) in AASHTO LRFD Specifications 
 
Importance Category Substructure Critical Essential Other 
Wall-type piers-larger 
dimension 
1.5 1.5 2.0 
Reinforced concrete pile bents 
• Vertical piles only 










Single columns 1.5 2.0 3.0 
Steel or composite & steel 
concrete pile bents 
• Vertical piles only 













Multiple-column bent 1.5 3.5 5.0 
 
The presented material describes current AASHTO Specifications both Standard and 
LRFD. Notwithstanding, several important changes on seismic bridge specifications are 
being discussed in the corresponding drafting committees and it is important to be aware 
of their implications, if approved. These changes come basically from three sources:  
• the first one corresponds to changes in the California Department of 
Transportation (Caltrans) seismic design criteria,  
• the second one from changes in the way to define the design ground motion 
both in the description of the movement at rock by the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS) that is discussed in Chapter 3, and  
• the third in the way to assess the amplification caused by the soil profile by 
the Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC) as part of the National 
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) for incorporation in the 
NEHRP Recommended Provision for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings 
that is discussed in 2.3.1.  
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Some of these new trends have already been adopted as regulations in the corresponding 
earthquake resistant design requirements for new buildings. A brief description of these 
trends follows. 
 
Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria 
In the aftermath of the Loma Prieta Earthquake of 1989, the California Department of 
Transportation (Caltrans) decided to sponsor a project to conduct a critical review and to 
recommend changes where needed in the seismic design part of the Caltrans Bridge 
Design Specifications (BDS) also known as the California Seismic Design Criteria 
(SDC). The result of this project was presented in document ATC-32 [ATC, 1996] which 
provided a number of recommended improvements to seismic bridge design practice in 
California. The project focused on issues related to seismic loading, structural response 
analysis, and component design. Special attention was given to design issues related to 
reinforced concrete components, steel components, foundations, and conventional 
bearings. In addition, the specifications were revised to give a bigger role to the 
evaluation of displacement and to use it as a tool to define performance criteria. Although 
a new definition of the design ground motion was contained, the production of new 
seismic risk maps was considered then outside the scope of the project.  
The ATC-32 was, as the title indicated, a recommendation. It took some time for 
Caltrans to update the Caltrans SDC. In July 1999 Version 1.1 of the Caltrans SDC was 
published [Caltrans, 1999], with Version 1.2 in December of 2001 [Caltrans, 2001], and 
Version 1.3 in February 2004 [Caltrans, 2004].  
The Caltrans SDC adopts a performance-based approach specifying minimum levels 
of structural system performance, component performance, analysis, and design practices 
for ordinary standard bridges. For bridges with non-standard features or operational 
requirements above and beyond the ordinary standard bridge a greater degree of attention 
than specified by the SDC is required. Many of the methodologies contained in the SDC 
evolved from the seismic retrofit program and some of the procedures are major 
departures from previous practice while others are slight modifications to current 
practice. The most significant change in design philosophy for new bridges is a shift from 
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a force-based assessment of seismic demand to a displacement-based assessment of 
demand and capacity. The displacement approach is based on comparing the elastic 
displacement demand to the inelastic displacement capacity of the primary structural 
components while insuring a minimum level of inelastic capacity at all potential plastic 
hinge locations.  
The SDC document [Caltrans, 2004] warns about its applicability in places different 
from California: “This document is intended for use on bridges designed by and for the 
California Department of Transportation. It reflects the current state of practice at 
Caltrans. This document contains references specific and unique to Caltrans and may not 
be applicable to other parties either institutional or private.” One important aspect that 
makes its direct applicability elsewhere difficult is the way the earthquake design ground 
motion is defined. California has unique tectonic characteristics with a relatively thin 
earth’s crust producing predominantly shallow earthquakes. The fault mapping of 
California is comprehensive; leading to definition of design ground motion supported on 
relatively well-known faults that lend themselves to establish earthquake mean recurrence 
periods with somewhat less uncertainty than in other places in the U.S. (this will be 
discussed latter in Chapter 3 with respect to the implication for the State of Indiana). This 
means that the design ground motion proposed by Caltrans SDC is particular for the 
tectonic setting and the types of soil profiles common in California. Other important 
aspect is that the Caltrans SDC is focused on concrete bridges. The Caltrans SDC 
specifies target ductility demands, defined as the ratio of the estimated global frame 
displacement demand to the yield displacement of the subsystem from its initial position 
to the formation of plastic hinge, for different structural components. For instance, for 
multi-column bents a value of 5 is prescribed while for wall piers in the strong direction a 
value of unity (= 1) is given. The structure must be designed to resist the internal forces 
generated when the structure reaches its Collapse Limit State. The Collapse Limit State is 
defined as the condition when a sufficient number of plastic hinges have formed within 
the structure to create a local or global collapse mechanism.  
The local displacement capacity of a member is based on its rotation capacity (see 
Fig. 2-19 for cantilever column and Fig. 2-20 framed columns), which in turn is based on 
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its curvature capacity. The curvature capacity must be determined from a moment-
curvature (M-φ) analysis. Each ductile member shall have a minimum local displacement 
ductility capacity of 3 to ensure dependable rotational capacity in the plastic hinge 
regions regardless of the displacement demand imparted to that member. 
 
 
Fig. 2-19 – Local displacement capacity – cantilever column with fixed base  
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2004]) 
 
 
Fig. 2-20 – Local displacement capacity – framed column assumed as fixed-fixed  
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2004]) 
 
Caltrans SDC defines how the expected material properties can be obtained, how to 
compute the plastic moment capacity for ductile concrete members, how to perform the 
moment curvature (M-φ) analysis, and how to obtain the shear capacity of the 
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components. The designer is required to check that the nominal capacity of the 
superstructure longitudinally and of the bent cap transversely are sufficient to ensure that 
the columns respond in the nonlinear range prior to the superstructure or bent cap 
reaching its expected nominal strength. Caltrans SDC requires assessing the force and 
deformation demands and capacities on the structural system, and its individual 
components, using analysis. The document prescribes for ordinary standard bridges the 
use of equivalent static analysis and linear elastic dynamic analysis for estimating the 
displacement demands, and inelastic static analysis (push-over) for establishing the 
displacement capacities. The Caltrans SDC document gives guidance with respect to the 
use of appropriate cracked sections for each type of analysis. 
The geotechnical engineer is required to provide the following information relative to 
the bridge site: seismicity, fault distance, earthquake magnitude, peak rock acceleration, 
soil profile type, liquefaction potential, and foundation stiffness or the soil parameters 
necessary for determining the force deformation characteristics of the foundation. The 
document contains standard acceleration response spectra for preliminary design, but in 
general requires a site specific spectrum for design. The standard acceleration and 
displacement response spectra provided are function of soil profile type and design 
earthquake magnitude. Magnitude ranges from 6.5 to 8, and envisioned peak ground 
accelerations in rock as high as 0.7g are presented. Acceleration amplification caused by 
the soil profile follows latest BSSC and NEHRP recommendations (see 2.3.1). The 
foundation subsystem response must be evaluated based on the quality of the surrounding 
soil. Soils are classified as competent, poor, or marginal. 
In the Caltrans SDC the bridge designer is required to maintain the ratio of effective 
stiffness between any two bents within a frame or between any two columns within a 
bent within prescribed limits. Hinge seat width are prescribed to accommodate the 
anticipated thermal movement, prestress shortening, creep, shrinkage, and the relative 
longitudinal earthquake displacement demand between adjacent frames. As a rule 
adequate seat width must be provided to prevent unseating as a primary requirement. 
Hinge restrainers are considered secondary members to prevent unseating. Moment 
resisting connections between the superstructure and the column must be designed to 
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transmit the maximum forces produced when the column has reached its flexural and 
shear overstrength capacity. Caltrans SDC considers bearings as sacrificial elements for 
ordinary standard bridges. Typically bearings must be designed and detailed for service 
loads. However, bearings must be checked to insure their capacity and mode of failure 
are consistent with the assumptions made in the seismic analysis. The designer must 
detail bearings so they can be easily inspected for damage and replaced or repaired after 
an earthquake. Columns flares require special treatment to insure proper behavior of the 
column. At the foundation, the size and number of piles and the pile group layout must be 
designed to resist service level moments, shears, and axial loads and the moment demand 
induced by the column plastic hinging mechanism. The linear elastic demand analysis 
model must include an effective abutment stiffness that accounts for expansion gaps, and 
incorporates realistic values of the embankment fill response. Seat type abutments must 
be designed to resist elastically all transverse service load and moderate earthquake 
demands. 
 
Draft AASHTO LRFD Update 
The Caltrans SDC imposed a trend that was picked up by the National Cooperative 
Highway Research Program (NCHRP) for incorporation in an update of the AASHTO 
LRFD Specifications. A research project sponsored by AASHTO in cooperation with the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) produced a draft update of the AASHTO 
LRFD Specifications that is summarized and described in NCHRP Report 472 [NCHRP, 
2002] and presented in final form in four reports published by the Applied Technology 
Council: “Recommended LRFD guidelines for the seismic design of highway bridges – 
Part I: Specifications” [ATC/MCEER, 2003a], “Recommended LRFD guidelines for the 
seismic design of highway bridges – Part II: Commentary and Appendices” 
[ATC/MCEER, 2003b], “Liquefaction Study Report for Recommended LRFD guidelines 
for the seismic design of highway bridges” [ATC/MCEER, 2003c], and “Design 
Examples for Recommended LRFD guidelines for the seismic design of highway 
bridges” [ATC/MCEER, 2003d],. The research was performed by a joint venture of the 
Applied Technology Council (ATC) and the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake 
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Engineering Research (MCEER), Buffalo, NY. The project purpose was to develop new 
specifications for the seismic design of bridges, considering all aspects of the design 
process. These aspects include the following: (1) design philosophy and performance 
criteria, (2) seismic loads and site effects, (3) analysis and modeling, and (4) design 
requirements. The new specification should be nationally applicable with provisions for 
all seismic zones. The emphasis was on design of new bridges rather than on retrofit of 
existing ones. The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) contains a 
number of new concepts and additions, as well as some major modifications to existing 
provisions. These are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
The definition of the design earthquake has been moving away from the 10% 
probability of exceedance in a 50-year life span of the structure towards a definition of a 
maximum considered earthquake with a lower (3%) probability of exceedance and 
sometimes a longer life span (75 years). On the other hand, the use of effective peak 
ground acceleration as the mapped parameter to define the design ground motion has 
been substituted in the specifications for design of new buildings for a direct definition of 
the design response spectrum including the site effects. The USGS has developed maps 
for these new definitions as will be explained in Chapter 3 of this report. The Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) uses these new definitions and 
maps.  
The proposed provisions provide performance objectives and damage states for two 
design earthquakes with explicit design checks to ensure that the performance objectives 
are met (see Table 2-4). 
In Table 2-4 the upper-level event, termed the “rare” or Maximum Considered 
Earthquake (MCE), describes ground motion that, for most locations, is defined 
probabilistically and has a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (approximately 
2500-year mean return period). The frequent or expected earthquake has a probability of 
exceedance of 50% in 75 years (approximately 100-year mean return period). For the 
service level: “Immediate” means full access to normal traffic and the bridge must be 
available for traffic after an inspection, and “Significant Disruption” means limited 
access (reduced lanes, light emergency traffic) may be possible after shoring but the 
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bridge may need to be replaced. Detailed geometric constraints on service level are 
presented in the draft. For the damage levels: “None” means evidence of movement may 
be present but no notable damage; “Minimal” means some visible signs of damage 
produced by minor nonlinear response (narrow flexural cracking), no permanent 
deformations, and repair can be performed under non-emergency conditions, 
“Significant” means no collapse, but permanent offsets, cracking, reinforcement yielding, 
and major spalling of concrete may require closure for repairs. Partial or complete 
replacement of columns may be required in some cases.  
 
Table 2-4 – Design Earthquakes and Seismic Performance Objectives in the Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Performance level Probability of exceedance for 
design earthquake ground motion 
 
Life Safety Operational 
Service Significant Disruption Immediate Rare earthquake (MCE)  
3% in 75 years Damage Significant Disruption Minimal 
Service Immediate Immediate  Frequent or expected earthquake 
50% in 75 years 
 Damage Minimal Minimal to none 
 
The design ground motion in Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 
12-49) is described through a design response spectrum that can be obtained from the 
general procedure or from a site-specific study. The site-specific study is required if the 
bridge is considered a major or very important structure, when the site is located within 
10 km of an active fault, or when the site has a Type F soil profile (see 2.3.1) with peats 
or highly organic soils, high plasticity clays, or very thick deposits of soft to medium stiff 
clays.  
The general procedure defines response spectra for the rare MCE earthquake and for 
the frequent earthquake based on maps produced (or being produced in the case of the 
frequent earthquake) by the USGS. The acceleration spectrum for 5% of critical damping 
is obtained using a two point procedure. The spectral design acceleration at 0.2-second 
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period, SDS, and at 1-second period, SD1, are obtained from Equations (2-8) and (2-9) 
respectively. 
 DS a SS F S= ⋅  (2-8) 
 1 1D vS F S= ⋅  (2-9) 
 
where SS and S1 are the 0.2-second and 1-second period spectral accelerations on rock 
(Class B site, see 2.3.1) from ground motion maps and Fa and Fv are site coefficients 
associated with the site class and mapped acceleration value. The maps for the Maximum 
Considered Earthquake contained in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions 
(NCHRP 12-49) are the same maps produced by the USGS for BSSC to be included in 
the 1997 NEHRP recommendations for new buildings [NEHRP, 1997]. These maps are 
presented and discussed in Chapter 3. For the frequent earthquake there were no maps 
available when the draft was produced and the draft suggests obtaining them by 
interpolation from the hazard curves produced by the USGS compatible with the maps 
for the MCE. The design spectrum is obtained from the values given by Equations (2-8) 
and (2-9). Two control periods are given: Ts and T0 defined in Equations (2-10) and 






=  (2-10) 
 0 0.2 sT T= ⋅  (2-11) 
 
For periods less than or equal to T0, the design response spectral acceleration is 
defined by Eq. (2-12). Note that as T tends to T = 0 seconds, the resulting value of Sa is 







= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅  (2-12) 
 
For periods greater than or equal to T0 and less than or equal to Ts, the design 
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=  (2-14) 
 
Fig. 2-21 – Design Response Spectrum – Probabilistic general procedure  
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)) 
 
When a site-specific response spectrum is used, a probabilistically based spectrum 
must be obtained using a characterization of the seismic sources and ground motion 
attenuation that includes current scientific interpretations, including uncertainties in 
seismic source and ground motion models and parameter values. If the spectrum obtained 
this way exceeds the limits shown in Fig. 2-22, a deterministic spectrum may be used. 
The deterministic design response spectrum may be used in regions having known 
active faults if the deterministic spectrum ordinates are less than those of the probabilistic 
spectrum. The deterministic spectrum must be the median-plus-standard-deviation 
spectrum calculated for characteristic maximum magnitude earthquakes on known active 
faults (the corresponding building requirements require 150% instead of the 184% for 
bridges), but must not be less than the spectrum shown in Fig. 2-22. If there is more than 
one active fault in the site region, the deterministic spectrum must be computed as the 
Period, T (sec) 
Sa 
 (g) 













T0 = 0.2 ⋅ Ts 
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envelope of spectra for the different faults. Alternatively a deterministic spectrum may be 
computed for each fault, and each spectrum, or the spectrum that govern bridge response, 
may be used for the analysis of the bridge. When the design response spectrum is 
determined from a site-specific study, the spectrum ordinates must not be less than 2/3 of 
the ordinates of the probabilistic spectrum obtained following the general procedure. The 
draft permits also the use of acceleration time histories instead of a design response 
spectrum and provides guidance on how to define them. Design for vertical acceleration 
effects are prescribed in detail for bridges located less than 50 km from an active fault.  
 
 
Fig. 2-22 – Minimum Deterministic Design Response Spectrum  
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)) 
 
The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) defines a Seismic 
Hazard Level (SHL) classification into four groups (I to IV). The bridge must be assigned 
in the larger SHL obtained from Table 2-5 or 2-6. 
Table 2-5 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FvS1  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Seismic Hazard Level Value of FvS1 
I Fv S1 ≤ 0.15g 
II 0.15g < FvS1 ≤ 0.25g 
III 0.25g < FvS1 ≤ 0.40g 
IV 0.40g < FvS1 
 
Period, T (sec) 
Sa = 1.5 ⋅ Fa 







Table 2-6 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FaSS  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Seismic Hazard Level Value of FaSS 
I FaSS ≤ 0.15g 
II 0.15g < FaSS ≤ 0.35g 
III 0.35g < FaSS ≤ 0.60g 
IV 0.60g < FaSS 
 
The Seismic Design Level is used, in turn, to define the Seismic Design and Analysis 
Procedure (SDAP) and the Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR). Table 2-7 defines the 
Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure. 
Table 2-7 – Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP)  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Seismic Hazard Level Life Safety Operational 
I A1 A2 
II A2 C/D/E 
III B/C/D/E C/D/E 
IV C/D/E C/D/E 
 
Brief description of the different Seismic Design and Analysis Procedures (SDAP): 
• SDAP A — Observance of minimum seat widths, checking of connection 
design forces for bearings, and use of minimum shear reinforcement in 
concrete piles are the only requirements. The horizontal connection design 
force in the restrained direction must be 10% of the vertical reaction for 
SDAP A1 and 25% for SDAP A2. No rigorous analysis is required instead 
these default values are used as design forces. 
• SDAP B — Does not require a seismic demand analysis. Capacity design 
principles and minimum design detailing are required. There are certain 
restrictions to use SDAP B associated with span length (maximum 80 feet), 
skewness of the bridge (maximum 30°), bent stiffness, and element cross-
section dimension and reinforcement, and other.  
• SDAP C — Requires the use of the capacity design spectrum approach. This 
procedure applies only to bridges that behave and can be modeled as a single-
 
44 
degree-of-freedom system. The procedure is also restricted to bridges with a 
very regular configuration, bridges not having more than six spans, spans not 
greater than 60 feet, maximum skewness of 30°, and other. 
• SDAP D — Requires the use of the elastic response spectrum method. 
Cracked sections are required. The procedure is divided into a single-mode 
equivalent lateral load procedure, and a multimode dynamic analysis 
procedure.  
• SDAP E — Consist in an elastic response spectrum analysis used for design 
plus a displacement capacity verification performed afterwards.  
Response modification factor, RB, to be used in SDAP D and E are presented in Table 
2-8 for the substructure. Response modification factor for connections are all R = 0.8 but 
are not intended for cases where the design of the connection is made using capacity 
design principles.  
Table 2-8 – Base Response Modification Factors, RB, for the substructure  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Performance Objective 








Wall pier – larger dimension 2 3 1 1.5 
Columns – Single and multiple 
Ductile detailing 4 6 1.5 2.5 
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles – 
above ground 4 6 1.5 2.5 
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles – 
2 diameters below ground level – no owner’s 
approval required 
1 1.5 1 1 
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles – 
in ground – owner’s approval required N/A 2.5 N/A 1.5 
Pile bents with batter piles N/A 2 N/A 1.5 
Seismically isolated structures 1.5 1.5 1 1.5 
Steel braced frame – ductile 3 4.5 1 1.5 
Steel braced frame – Nominally ductile 1.5 2 1 1 
All elements for frequent or expected 
earthquake 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.9 
 




 ( ) *1 1B B
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T
= + − ⋅ ≤  (2-15) 
 
where T* = 1.25 Ts and Ts is defined in Eq. (2-10). 
Table 2-9 defines the Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR) for each Seismic 
Hazard Level (SHL) and Table 2-10 defines the component detailing requirements for 
each SDR. 
Table 2-9 – Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR)  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Seismic Hazard Level Life Safety Operational 
I 1 2 
II 2 3 
III 3 4 
IV 5 6 
 
Minimum seat width must not be less than 1.5 times the displacement of the 
superstructure at the seat including P-Δ effects, Δm, obtained using Eq. (2-16), but can not 
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Δ  = displacement demand from the seismic analysis 
Δm  = nonlinear displacement demand  
Rd  = displacement amplification factor 
L  = distance between joints in m 
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H  = height of the tallest pier between the joints in m 
B  = width of the superstructure in m 
α  = skew angle 
In Eq. (2-17) the ratio B/L need not be taken greater than 3/8. 
The proposed LRFD design provisions contain an incentive from a design and 
construction perspective for performing a more sophisticated “pushover analysis” 
[NCHRP, 2002]. The response modification factor (R) increases approximately 50 
percent when a pushover analysis is performed, primarily because the analysis results 
will provide a greater understanding of the demands on the seismic resisting elements. 
The analysis results are assessed using additional plastic rotation limits on the 
deformation of the substructure elements to ensure adequate performance. 
The proposed LRFD provisions provide a mechanism to permit the use of some 
seismic resisting systems and elements –– termed earthquake resisting systems (ERS) and 
earthquake resisting elements (ERE) –– that are not permitted in current AASHTO 
provisions. Selection of an appropriate ERS is fundamental to achieving adequate seismic 
performance. The classification of ERS and ERE into three categories: permissible, 
permissible with owner’s approval, and not recommended, is done to trigger due 
consideration of seismic performance that leads to the most desirable outcome. 
The state of the art in earthquake resistant bridge design has been presented. The 
more recent changes in mandatory and proposed specifications derive from behavior 
experiences during recent earthquakes; from the intensive seismic retrofit programs in 




Table 2-10 – Component Detailing Requirements for SDR’s — Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Component SDR 1 SDR 2 SDR 3 SDR 4 SDR 5 SDR 6 
Seat width Use Eq. (2-17) 
Conventional 0.10 ⋅ DL 0.25 ⋅ DL Capacity design procedure or elastic forces with R = 0.8 Bearing Isolation Detailed and tested for 1.1 times 5% in 75-years forces and displacements 
Flexure Non-seismic requirements 
SDAP B and C – non-seismic or minimum steel or P-Δ or 50% in 75-years 
forces for C. 
SDAP D and E – Moment demand divided by R or minimum steel or P-Δ Column 
Shear Non-seismic requirements 
Minimum shear 
reinforcement From capacity design procedures or elastic forces with R = 0.67 
Connection of column to 






Design forces from capacity design using over-strength ratios of 1.5 and 1.4 
for concrete and steel respectively 
Concrete N/A 
Piles top 3D 
minimum 
reinforcement 
Soil and pile 
aspects of 
foundation 





factor of 1.0 
Design forces from capacity design and overstrength 
factor of 1.5 and 1.4 for concrete and steel respectively. 
Minimum shear reinforcement apply 
Concrete N/A 
Min. shear reinf. 
down to 10D 
below surface Pile bents 
Steel N/A N/A 
Design forces from capacity design using over strength ratio of 1.5 and 1.4 
for concrete and steel respectively. Minimum shear reinforcement as per 
SDR 2. 
Abutments N/A N/A 
SDAP B and C – 
non-seismic req. 
SDAP D and E – 
Detailed req. 
Detailed requirements 
Liquefaction Only if requested by owner 
If Mw < 6 not 
required. If >6 
full procedure 
Full procedure 
ESR/ERE N/A N/A Use procedure System requiring owner’s approval not permitted 





The leader in seismic retrofit programs has been the State of California. There are 
more than 12,000 bridges in the California State Highway system, plus an additional 
12,000 city and county bridges. Since the 1971 San Fernando earthquake struck the Los 
Angeles area Caltrans has been engaged in an ongoing bridge retrofit program. Initially, 
Caltrans Seismic Retrofit program consisted of restraining sections of 1,262 bridges with 
steel cables. The Seismic Retrofit program now involves strengthening the columns of 
existing bridges by encircling certain columns with a steel casing or, in a few instances, 
an advanced woven fiber casing. In addition to the column casing, some of the bridge 
footings are made bigger and given more support by placing additional pilings in the 
ground or by using steel tie-down rods to better anchor the footings to the ground. In a 
few projects bridge abutments are made larger and the existing restrainer units are made 
stronger because encasing the columns make them stiffer and can change the way forces 
are transmitted within the bridge. Many Seismic Retrofits involve "hinge seat extensions" 
which enlarge the size of the hinges that connect sections of bridge decks and helps 
prevent them from separating during severe ground movement.  
The Seismic Retrofit program was divided into Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 included 
1,039 bridges identified for strengthening after the Loma Prieta quake. Phase 2 identified 
an additional 1,364 bridges for strengthening following the January 1994 Northridge 
earthquake. Currently the state's bridge earthquake strengthening program will involve 
approximately 2,200 additional structures, including the state's toll bridges. In addition a 
total of 1,114 city and county-owned bridges have been identified as candidates for 
seismic strengthening.  
Washington Sate has carried similar programs. Between 1999 and 2001 more than 
350 bridges were retrofitted statewide. After the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, 
Earthquake the scope of the retrofit program was expanded. 
Since 1983 the Federal Highway Administration has published three documents on 
seismic retrofit of highway bridges [FHWA, 1983, 1987, and 1995]. The latest, 1995 
document, is compatible with current Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard 
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Specifications [AASHTO, 2002]. This document covers procedures for preliminary 
screening of the bridges, detailed evaluation, and design of retrofit measures.  
 
 
Fig. 2-23 – Caltrans Seismic Retrofit Program Poster 
 
The preliminary screening – Chapter 2 – emphasizes the need of developing an 
inventory of bridge seismic information accompanied by a seismic rating system, and 
gives guidance for establishing them. Using the vulnerability rating a priority index of 
retrofit is computed.  
The detailed evaluation guidelines – Chapter 3 – define the different evaluation 
methods starting with the analysis procedures: analysis procedures for capacity/demand 
method, and analysis procedure for lateral strength method. Then, gives detailed 
requirements for performing a capacity/demand evaluation of the bridge, and establishes 
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the principles for applying the lateral strength method. Using the results of the two 
procedures an overall assessment of the bridge components is described including 
assessment of: bearings and expansion joints; columns, walls, and footings; abutments; 
and the possibility of liquefaction. Potential retrofit measures are discusses for each of the 
assessed components. 
The rest of the document [FHWA, 1995] is devoted to detailed retrofit measures for 
the assessed components including: Chapter 4 – discuses seismic retrofit strategies 
including conventional and innovative earthquake protective systems; Chapter 5 – deals 
with the retrofit of bearings, seats, and expansion joints; Chapter 6 – covers retrofit of 
columns, cap beams, and joints; Chapter 7 – discusses the retrofit measures for 
foundations including footings and abutments; Chapter 8 – covers retrofit measures for 
bridges on hazardous sites including bridges across or near active faults and bridges on 
liquefiable soils discussing potential remedial solutions for these cases ; and Chapter 9 – 
discusses protective measures using seismic isolation. The appendices cover: (A) detailed 
indication for obtaining capacity/demand ratios for bridge components, (B) the 
assessment of members strength and deformation capacity, and (C, D, and E) worked 
examples for two bridges and the use of cable restrainers. 
Although this document was developed a few years ago, it covers all the basic 
procedures. This document [FHWA, 1995] combined with some of the detailed concepts 
covered by the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 
2002] makes an excellent seismic bridge retrofit guide that is totally up-to-date. 
 
2.3 Geotechnical issues 
In the previous section when discussing the evolution of the bridge seismic design 
criteria the parameters associated with geotechnical issues were presented without 
explaining and discussing their background. The following sections present the 
corresponding background and relevant information that that will be needed for the 
assessment for geotechnical issues of the earthquake emergency routes of Indiana as 




2.3.1 Ground motion amplification due to soil profile characteristics 
Association of earthquake damage with poor soil conditions have been known for 
many years. Early approach to the problem was manifest in seismic codes through a 
difference in seismic design forces associated with bearing capacity used in foundation 
design (see 2.2.2). With the increase deployment of strong ground motion accelerometers 
from the 1950’s on, instrumental evidence of the influence of the underlying soil profile 
permitted interpretations of earthquake damage in several events such as the 1957 San 
Francisco, California, Earthquake; the 1957 Mexico City Earthquake; the 1964 
Anchorage, Alaska, Earthquake; and the 1967 Caracas, Venezuela, Earthquake.  
From the mid 1970’s on, a clearer picture emerged and different approaches were 
adopted to account for the effect of amplification by the soil profile. For the first time in 
the 1974 SEAOC Blue Book Lateral Force Requirements for Buildings [SEAOC, 1974] 
included a coefficient S, called then Coefficient for Site-Structure Resonance having 
values between 1.0 and 1.5 depending on the ratio between the fundamental period of the 
structure, T, and a characteristic site period Ts. The 1974 SEAOC Requirements included 
an Appendix for obtaining a range of values for the soil deposit characteristic period. 
This procedure was adopted by the 1976 Uniform Building Code and was kept for several 
issues of this Code. 
Studies conducted for moderate magnitude events in the western U.S. [Seed et al., 
1976a] permitted grouping different soil profiles into broad categories [Seed et al., 
1976b]. This type of soil profiles and the corresponding amplifications were combined 
with studies of spectral shapes and were included in the ATC-3-06 project [ATC, 1978] 
for incorporation in model building earthquake resistant regulations. This classification 
comprised three types of soil profiles namely: Type 1 – Stiff soils and rock, Type 2 – 
Deep cohesionless or stiff clay soils, and Type 3 – Soft to medium clays and sands. As 
part of the requirements a soil coefficient, S, was introduced. This coefficient amplified 
the medium to long period part of the acceleration spectrum in rock to model the effects 
of the soil according to the soil profile type by factors of 1.0, 1.2, and 1.5 respectively. 
This is the same soil profile classification that was used in the seismic bridge design 
recommendation ATC-6 project [ATC, 1981].  
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During the 1985 Mexico City Earthquake very large soil amplifications were 
recorded. This brought the introduction of an additional soil profile type for deep soft 
clay deposits that was termed Type 4 and was assigned a soil coefficient S = 2. With this 
addition this corresponds to the soil profile classification used when the ATC-6 
requirements were modified to be adopted as Division I-A Seismic Design of the fifteenth 
(1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications. These requirements have been kept 
without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and in the current seventeenth (2002) edition 
[AASHTO, 2002] of the AASHTO Standard Specifications. The soil profile definition 
and soil factor, S, were shown previously in Fig. 2-16. 
Information mainly from the 1989 Loma Prieta, California, Earthquake, and the 1985 
Mexico City event, in addition to data from other cases in other parts of the world 
permitted in the early 1990’s to restudy the ground motion amplification due to soil 
profile characteristics and to propose a new classification of soil profile types and soil 
amplification factors [Whitman, 1992]. These new procedures take into account the level 
of shaking, rock stiffness, and soil type, and the stiffness and depth effect on the 
amplification of ground motions at short and long periods. These new soil profile types 
and soil amplification factors were incorporated into the 1994 NEHRP Provisions 
[NEHRP, 1994]. Among the more important changes are larger amplification factors for 
lower levels of acceleration caused by the soil responding in the linear range with less 
damping as compared with larger amplitude movement responding in the nonlinear range 
and inducing greater damping. Some adjustments were introduced in the 1997 NEHRP 
Provisions [NEHRP, 1997] with the change of the definition of the design ground motion 
introduced then, and were kept in the 2000 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 2000]. 
The soil site must be assigned into one of six soil profile classes labeled A to F. The 
definition of the soil profile is based on averaged soil properties for the upper 100 feet 
(30 m) of soil profile. The properties used for this definition are: average shear wave 
velocity ( sv ), average standard penetration resistance ( N ), average standard penetration 
resistance for the cohesionless soils only ( chN ), and average undrained shear strength in 
case of cohesive soils ( us ). These averages are weighted with respect to each layer 




Table 2-11 – Site Classification [NEHRP, 2000] 
 














2500 to 5000 ft/s 







Very dense soil or 
soft rock 
 
1200 to 2500 ft/s 
(360 to 760 m/s) 
 
> 50 
> 2000 psf 





600 to 1200 ft/s 
(180 to 360 m/s) 
 
 
15 to 50 
 
1000 to 2000 psf 
(50 to 100 kPa) 
 
 
< 600 ft/s 





< 1000 psf 





Any profile with more than 10 ft (3 m) of soil having 
• Plasticity Index PI > 20, 
• Moisture content ω ≥ 40%, and 






1. Soils vulnerable to potential failure or collapse (liquefiable, 
quick- or highly-sensitive clays, collapsible weakly 
cemented soils). 
2. More than 10 ft (3 m) of peat and/or highly organic clays. 
3. More than 25 ft (7.5 m) of very high plasticity clays  
(PI > 75). 
4. More than 120 ft (37 m) of soft to medium clays. 
 
 N/A =Not applicable. 
 
Figure 2-24 shows the values of the coefficient Fa as a function of the site class and the 
short period maximum considered earthquake spectral acceleration SS. Figure 2-25 shows 
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the values of the coefficient Fv as a function of the site class and the 1-second period 
maximum considered earthquake spectral acceleration S1. For sites class F a site-specific 
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Fig. 2-24 – Values of Fa [NEHRP, 2000] 
 
It is important to note that the reference accelerations for obtaining Fa and Fv, as 
shown in Figure 2-24 and 2-25, were changed in the 1997 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 
1997] from what was presented originally in the 1994 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 
1994]. In the 1994 Edition the abscissa of Figures 2-24 and 2-25 were mapped values of 
effective peak ground acceleration Aa (EPA) and acceleration Av derived from effective 
peak ground velocity (EPV), respectively, based on a 10% probability of being exceeded 
in a 50-year life span of the structure — 475 years mean return period —. In the 1997 
Edition the definition of the design ground motion was changed to the spectral values of 
the maximum considered earthquake — 2500 years mean return period — described 
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Fig. 2-25 – Values of Fv [NEHRP, 2000] 
 
Although this methodology for evaluation of site effects was originally introduced in 
documents for earthquake resistant building design, it is as well applicable to bridge 
design, as recognized in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
[NCHRP, 2002]. This last document requires a site-specific evaluation for Site Class F 
soils, when the bridge is considered a major or very important structure requiring a higher 
degree of confidence of meeting the seismic performance objectives, or when the site if 
within 10 km of an active fault. The Draft document includes Appendix 3A containing 
guidelines for conducting site-specific geotechnical investigations and dynamic response 
analyses. Appendix 3A gives guidance on the site-specific geotechnical investigation to 
be performed, the modeling of the soil profile, the selection of the ground motion at 




Liquefaction is a process caused by the earthquake ground motion vibration by which 
sediments below the water table temporarily lose strength and behave as a viscous liquid 
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rather than a solid. The type of sediments most susceptible are clay-free deposits of sand 
and silts; occasionally, gravel liquefies [Seed and Idriss, 1982]. Seismic waves, primarily 
shear waves, passing through saturated granular layers, distort the granular structure, and 
cause loosely packed groups of particles to readjust. This readjustment increases the 
pore-water pressure between particles if drainage cannot occur. It the pore-water pressure 
raises to a level approaching the weight of the overlying soil, the granular layer 
temporarily behaves as a viscous liquid producing what is called liquefaction of the soil. 
In the liquefied condition, soil may deform with little shear resistance. Deformations 
large enough to cause damage to structures are called ground failures. The ease with 
which a soil can be liquefied depends primarily on the looseness of the soil, the amount 
of cementing or clay between particles, and the amount of drainage restriction. The 
amount of soil deformation following liquefaction depends on the looseness of the 
material, the depth, thickness, and extension measured in area of the liquefied layer, the 
ground slope, and the distribution of loads applied by the structure. 
 
 
Fig. 2-26 – Damage due to liquefaction on Bridge 002/6s-w 
2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake 
 
Liquefaction is restricted to certain geologic and hydrologic environments primarily 
recent deposited sand and silt in areas with high ground water levels. Generally, the 
younger and looser the sediment and the higher the water table, the more susceptible the 
soil is to liquefaction. Sediments most susceptible to liquefaction include Holocene (less 
than 10,000-year-old) delta, river channel, flood plain, and aeolian deposit, and poorly 
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compacted fills. Liquefaction has been most abundant in areas where ground water lies 
close — generally within 30 ft — to the ground surface; few instances of liquefaction 
have occurred in areas with ground water deeper than 60 ft. Dense soils, including well-
compacted fills, have low susceptibility to liquefaction. 
Only when liquefaction is accompanied by some form of ground displacement or 
ground failure it is destructive to the built environment. For engineering purposes, it is 
not the occurrence of liquefaction that is of prime importance, but its severity or its 
capability to cause damage. Adverse effects of liquefaction can take many forms. These 
include: flow failures; lateral spreads; ground oscillations; lose of bearing strength; 
settlement; and increased pressure on retaining walls. 
Flow failures — Is evident by lateral displacement of large masses of soil. Flows may 
consist on completely liquefied soil or blocks of intact material riding on a layer of 
liquefied soil. It occurs on sites having loose saturated sands or silts lying on steep slopes. 
 
 
Fig. 2-27 – Turnagain Heights, Anchorage, a sector approximately 2,600 m by 270 m slid 
21 m toward Cook Inlet. Sand lenses liquefied and moved down slope. Slope failure 




Lateral spread — Lateral spreads involve lateral displacement of large, surficial 
blocks of soil as a result of liquefaction of a subsurface layer. Displacement occurs in 
response to the combination of gravitational forces and inertial forces generated by an 
earthquake. Lateral spreads generally develop on gentle slopes (most commonly less than 
3 degrees) and move toward a free face such as an incised river channel. Horizontal 
displacements commonly range up to several meters. The displaced ground usually 
breaks up internally, causing fissures, scarps, horsts, and grabens to form on the failure 
surface. Damage caused by lateral spreads is severely disruptive. For example, during the 
1964 Alaska Earthquake, more than 200 bridges were damaged or destroyed by spreading 
of floodplain deposits toward river channels. The spreading compressed the 
superstructures, buckled decks, thrust stringers over abutments, and shifted and tilted 
abutments and piers [NAS, 1973]. 
 
 
Fig. 2-28 – Damage caused by lateral spreading at Sunset Lake trailer park  
in Tumwater – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake 
 
Loss of Bearing Strength — When the soil supporting the structure liquefies and loses 
strength, large deformations can occur within the soil which may allow the structure to 
settle and tip. Conversely, buried tanks and piles may rise buoyantly through the liquefied 
soil. For example, many buildings settled and tipped during the 1964 Niigata, Japan, 
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Earthquake. The most spectacular bearing failures during that event were in an apartment 
complex where several four-story buildings tipped as much as 60 degrees. Apparently, 
liquefaction first developed in a sand layer several meters below ground surface and then 
propagated upward through overlying sand layers. The rising wave of liquefaction 
weakened the soil supporting the buildings and allowed the structures to slowly settle and 
tip. In many cases, the weight of a structure will not be great enough to cause the large 
settlements associated with soil bearing capacity failures. However, smaller settlements 
may occur as soil pore-water pressures dissipate and the soil consolidates after the 
earthquake. The eruption of sand boils (fountains of water and sediment emanating from 
the pressurized, liquefied sand) is a common manifestation of liquefaction that can also 
lead to localized differential settlements. 
 
 
Fig. 2-29 – Settlement of pile cap in liquefied soil beneath industrial building south of 
downtown Seattle – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake 
 
Increased Lateral Pressure on Retaining Walls — If the soil behind a retaining wall 
liquefies, the lateral pressures on the wall may greatly increase. As a result, retaining 
walls maybe laterally displaced, tilt, or structurally fail, as has been observed for 
waterfront walls retaining loose saturated sand in a number of earthquakes. 
Now we turn our attention to the evolution of the engineering procedures to evaluate 
the liquefaction potential. The number of variables that should be taken into account to 
properly evaluate the liquefaction potential can be grouped into three broad groups [Seed 
and Idriss, 1982]: soil properties (dynamic shear modulus, damping characteristics, unit 
 
60 
weight, grain characteristics, relative density, and soil structure), environmental factors 
(procedure of soil formation, seismic history, geologic history – aging, cementation –, 
lateral earth pressure coefficient, depth of water table, and effective confining pressure), 
and earthquake characteristics (intensity of ground shaking, and duration of ground 
shaking). A combination of in-situ test and laboratory tests of undisturbed samples may 
be used to obtain properties that can be used to define the liquefaction potential using 
engineering judgment to properly account for the large intrinsic variability of the 
measured properties — because of the difficulty of retrieving and testing really 
undisturbed samples — and unknown or difficult to estimate parameters, specially those 
associated with the earthquake ground motion.  
Because of the noted reasons, since the mid 1970’s a methodology termed the 
“simplified procedure” has evolved to be the accepted standard of practice for evaluating 
liquefaction resistance of soils. This procedure is based on regressions of data from field 
observations and laboratory measurements. Recently an update of the procedures 
involved was made by a panel of experts under the sponsorship of the National Center for 
Earthquake Engineering and the National Science Foundation [Youd and Idriss, 2001]. 
The proposed updated procedure constitutes the method of choice in which an all-
encompassing procedure is not employed.  
The procedure requires the computation of two variables that describe the seismic 
demand on a soil layer — cyclic stress ratio (CSR) — and the capacity of the soil layer to 
resist liquefaction — cyclic resistance ratio (CRR) — respectively. The factor of safety to 
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The cyclic stress ratio, CSR, is obtained from: 
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where amax = peak ground acceleration at the ground surface generated by the earthquake; 
g = acceleration of gravity; voσ  and voσ ′  are total and effective overburden stresses, 
respectively; τav = induced shear stress; and rd = stress reduction coefficient accounting 
for flexibility of the soil profile. 
For a depth below ground surface z in m, rd can be obtained from:  
 
 
1.0 0.00765 for 9.15m
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Four field tests are recommended for routine evaluation of liquefaction resistance 
CRR: the cone penetration test (CPT), the standard penetration test (SPT), shear-wave 
velocity (Vs) measurements, and for gravelly sites the Becker penetration test (BPT). 
Each test has its advantages and limitations with the CPT providing the most detailed soil 
stratigraphy and robust field-data based liquefaction resistance curves now available. 
CPT testing should always be accompanied by soil sampling for validation of soil type 
identification. The SPT has a longer record of application and provides disturbed soil 
samples from which fines content and other grain characteristics can be determined. 
Measured shear-wave velocities provide fundamental information on small-strain soil 
behavior that is useful beyond analyses of liquefaction resistance. Vs is also applicable at 
sites, such as landfills and gravelly sediments, where CPT and SPT soundings may not be 
possible or reliable. The BPT test is recommended only for gravelly sites and requires use 
of rough correlations between BPT and SPT, making the results less certain than other 
tests. Where possible, two or more test procedures should be applied to assure adequate 
definition of soil stratigraphy and a consistent evaluation of liquefaction resistance. 
When using the standard penetration test (SPT) the blow count must be normalized to 
take into account the overburden pressure and the hammer energy. This is done by 
adjusting the blow count values, N, to a normalized value termed (N1)60 that corresponds 
to an overburden pressure, Po, of approximately 100 kPa (2 kip/sq ft) and a hammer 
efficiency of 60%. The cyclic resistance ratio (CRR) is first defined for an ideal clean-
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Equation (2-21) is valid for (N1)60 values less than 30. For greater values clean 
granular soils are too dense to liquefy and are classified as non-liquefiable. A series of 
adjustments must be made to CRR7.5, as follows: 
Fines content adjustment — CRR increase with soil fines content (FC) by adjusting 
(N1)60 to an equivalent clean sand value (N1)60cs. This is performed using the following 
empirical equation: 
 
 ( ) ( )1 160 60csN Nα β= + ⋅  (2-22) 
 









































Other corrections to SPT — Several corrections in addition to the fines content 
influence SPT results. They are incorporated by: 
 




where Nm = measured SPT blows; CN = factor to take into account the overburden stress; 
CE = factor to take into account hammer energy ratio; CB = factor to take into account the 
borehole diameter; CR = factor to take into account the rod length; and CS = correction for 
samplers with or without liners. Table 2-12 lists the values for these corrections factors. 
 
Table 2-12 – Corrections to SPT [Youd and Idriss, 2001] 
 
Factor Equipment variable Term Correction 
Overburden pressure — CN ( )0.5/o voP σ ′  
Overburden pressure — CN  CN ≤ 1.7 
Energy ratio Donut hammer CE 0.5 – 1.0 
Energy ratio Safety hammer CE 0.7 – 1.2 
Energy ratio Automatic trip Donut CE 0.8 – 1.3 
Borehole diameter 65-115 mm CB 1.0 
Borehole diameter 150 mm CB 1.05 
Borehole diameter 200 mm CB 1.15 
Rod length < 3 m CR 0.75 
Rod length 3 – 4 m CR 0.8 
Rod length 4 – 6 m CR 0.85 
Rod length 6 – 10 m CR 0.95 
Rod length 10 – 30 m CR 1.0 
Sampling method Standard sampler CS 1.0 
Sampling method Sampler w/o liners CS 1.1 – 1.3 
 
The recommended procedure [Youd and Idriss, 2001] presents procedures to obtain 
CRR based on cone penetration test (CPT) and on shear wave velocity (Vs). They were 
not used in present research due to lack of CPT and Vs information for bridge sites in 
Indiana with few exceptions [Bobet et al., 2001]. The interested reader is referred to 
[Youd and Idriss, 2001]. 
Magnitude correction — An earthquake magnitude scaling factor (MSF) must also be 
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The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 
2002] requires a liquefaction potential evaluation, as indicated in Table 2-10, for the 
different component detailing requirements (SDR). For SDR 1 and 2 no evaluation is 
required unless requested by the owner. For SDR 3 to 6 its must be performed unless 
requested by the owner or one of the conditions in Table 2-13 are met. 
 
Table 2-13 – Cases for SDR 3 to 6 for which liquefaction potential evaluation need not be 
performed in Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Magnitude for the 3% 
probability of exceedance 
75-year event 
Normalized SPT blow 
count, (N1)60 
Fa ⋅ SS 
Mw < 6.0 N/A N/A 
> 15 N/A 
> 10 0.375g > Fa ⋅ SS ≥ 0.25g 6.0 ≤ Mw < 6.4 
> 5 0.250g > Fa ⋅ SS 
 
Maps of mean earthquake magnitude are provided. These maps were prepared by the 
USGS using the maximum magnitude that can affect the site for all relevant seismic 
sources to produce the design ground motion with 3% of being exceeded in 75 years. If 
liquefaction potential must be evaluated, the procedures of Appendix 3B must be used. 
Appendix 3B is devoted to liquefaction and other geological hazards. It uses the same 
principles presented [Youd and Idriss, 2001], and gives guidance for making an in depth 
evaluation of liquefaction potential. The results of the liquefaction assessment are used to 
evaluate the potential severity of three liquefaction related hazards to the bridge: (1) flow 
failures involving large slope failures, (2) limited lateral spread, and (3) ground 
settlement. It permits to evaluate these hazards on the basis of safety factor for 
liquefaction. If the safety factor is less than 1.0 to 1.3 the potential related hazards must 
be evaluated following detailed guidelines for each one of them.  
In general the procedures included require improving the soil or locating the support 
foundation elements below the liquefiable layer and to design the bridge to meet the 
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performance objectives while being subjected to the settlements and/or lateral 
displacements imposed by the lateral spread. 
 
2.3.3 Fault rupture 
The morphology of rivers is associated with geological fault setting in many cases. 
The possibility of having a bridge located along the path of a geological fault is real. Two 
recent cases of bridge damage caused by the bridge crossing the fault path are shown in 
Figures 2-30 and 2-31. 
 
 
Fig. 2-30 – Collapse of Bei-Feng Bridge located on the earthquake causing fault  





Fig. 2-31 – Bolu Viaduct, crossed by the North Anatolian Fault 
November 12, 1999 Duzce, Turkey, Earthquake 
 
In many cases the fault existence and location is difficult to detect. The degree of 
activity of a fault is subjective and estimation the amount of displacements and 
recurrence period is difficult to forecast. There are very few acceleration records obtained 
very close to a fault and the expected ground motion is difficult to estimate. Design for 
theses circumstances is challenging and has a high degree of uncertainty in meeting any 
performance objective. The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 
12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] recommends avoiding bridge construction across faults. 
 
2.3.4 Embankment failure 
High embankments in bridge approaches may fail due to different type of problems. 
Liquefaction may cause lateral spread or settlement, leading to failure of the 
embankment. The ground motion, without liquefaction occurring, may cause the failure 
of the slopes. Techniques developed for embankment dams and slope stability may be 





Landslides present a significant hazard to roadways in seismically active areas and 
can pose a hazard for bridges. Damage can be in the form of ground movement either at 
the abutment or extending to the central piers of the bridge. Bridges located near steep 
slopes, or places with a history of rock falls, or avalanches. 
 
 
Fig. 2-32 – Landslide induced by the earthquake. A nearby bridge had major 
structural damage – Morgan Hill, California, Earthquake of April 24, 1984 
 
Design must include dynamic slope stability analysis or other procedures of stability 
assessment of nearby slopes, such as Newmark sliding block method. It is important to 






CHAPTER 3 SEISMIC RISK OF SOUTHWESTERN INDIANA 
 
 
3.1 Tectonic setting 
The great majority of the World’s seismic activity occurs at the tectonic plate 
boundaries. Continental U.S. is contained within the North American Plate with Indiana 
practically in the middle of it and far away from the plate boundaries. Notwithstanding, 
earthquakes have been felt in Indiana since colonization began by the French in 
Louisiana and from the east after the Louisiana Purchase. Intraplate earthquakes can be 
caused by a number of different kind of stresses — large scale glacial rebound (the slow 
flexure of the crust back up after a large sheet of ice is removed), for example, or the 
broad compresional stress caused within eastern North America by the compression 
forces from the mid-Atlantic spreading center. 
In recent decades, earth scientists have collected evidence that strong earthquakes in 
the central Mississippi Valley have occurred repeatedly in the geologic past. Small 
earthquakes happen in the region frequently. The area in which most of these quakes 
occur is referred to as the New Madrid seismic zone (NMSZ) which stretches from just 
west of Memphis, Tennessee, into southern Illinois. Several times in the past century, 
moderate earthquakes have been widely felt in southern Illinois and southwestern 
Indiana. In the last decade geologic evidence that the Wabash Valley faults, initially 
considered the northern portion of the New Madrid Seismic Zone, is a different system 
with its own tectonic setting has led to define it as an independent seismic zone that has 
been named the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ). 
The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) — Geologic structures related to earthquakes 
in the central Mississippi Valley region have been deeply buried over hundreds of 
millions of years by thick layers of sediment. Geophysical studies have revealed a major 
buried northeast-trending feature known as the Reelfoot Rift [Hildenbrand and 
Hendricks, 1995], which formed more than 500 million years ago by a process of 
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extension in the middle of the North American Plate. A rift structure is created when 
geologic forces begin to pull the Earth's crust apart. If this process continues long 
enough, the crust separates to form an ocean basin, as happened to form the Atlantic 
Ocean basin. The Reelfoot Rift is called a failed rift because the Earth's crust did not 
separate enough to create a new ocean basin. However, the crust was disturbed enough to 
form major faults that mark the axis and margins of the rift and now contribute to the 
occurrence of earthquakes in the NMSZ.  
 
 
Fig. 3-1 – The Reelfoot Rift in the New Madrid Region 
 
A sequence of powerful earthquakes struck the mid-Mississippi River Valley, central 
United States, in the winter of 1811-1812. The first one occurred December 16, 1811, 
Intermittent strong shaking continued through March 1812 and aftershocks strong enough 
to be felt occurred through the year 1817. The initial earthquake of December 16 was 
followed by two other principal shocks, one on January 23, 1812, and the other on 
February 7, 1812. Judging from newspaper accounts of damage to buildings, the 
February 7 earthquake was the biggest of the three. On the basis of the large area of 
damage (600,000 km2), the widespread area of perceptibility (5,000,000 km2), and the 
complex physiographic changes that occurred, the Mississippi River valley earthquakes 
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of 1811-1812 rank as some of the largest in the United States since its settlement by 
Europeans [Stover and Coffman, 1993]. The estimated magnitudes for these events vary 
considerably from different sources (7.2 to 8.8 depending on the parameters used to 
define the magnitude and the scale in which it is reported).  
 
 
Fig. 3-2 – Isoseismal map for the Arkansas earthquake of December 16, 1811, first of 
the 1811-1812 New Madrid series [Stover and Coffman, 1993] 
 
The association of the 1811-1812 earthquakes to a causing fault has been hindered by 
lack of information from a scarcely inhabited region at the time of occurrence. Since the 
early 1970´s a great amount of multidisciplinary research have been devoted to find and 
define characteristics of the events and the tectonic setting in order to understand the 
tectonic process taking place and validate seismic risk assessments for the region.  
From the information gathered from different sources it is accepted (with dissent) that 
the causing faults were those shown in Fig. 3-3. The USGS along with the Geological 
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Surveys of the CUSEC member States and several universities in the region have to a 
certain degree reached consensus on what is known with certainty and what needs more 
research to frame adequately the seismic risk assessment for the region. The primary 
types of evidence are geological — paleoseismological, stratigraphic, geomorphic, 




Fig. 3-3 – The New Madrid seismic zone showing the three faults that ruptured in 
1811-1812 and earthquakes recorded in recent years [Hough, 2002] 
 
Paleoliquefaction investigations have provided constraints on recurrence in the 
NMSZ and have been conducted at 44 sites. From these studies it is know that two pre-
1811 episodes of liquefaction comparable to that of 1811-1812 can be interpreted 
[Participants, 2000]. Best estimates of the dates of these events are 1450 and 900 (Fig. 
3-4), which leads to a median recurrence interval ranging between 267 and 644 years. 
The volume of sand mobilized at many of the liquefaction sites in the NMSZ implies they 
could not have been formed by local events of moderate magnitude. Further indication of 
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very strong shaking comes from geotechnical measurements at liquefaction sites in the 
NMSZ, which show the shallow sub-surface materials to be only moderately liquefiable. 
 
 
Fig. 3-4 – Estimated ages of paleoliquefaction features (vertical axis) arranged by site 
location, from north (left) to south (right), excluding the Current River sites. Vertical gray 
shaded segments indicate most probable ages, with brackets showing approximate two 
standard deviation uncertainties. Shaded horizontal bars indicate the inferred timing of 
paleoearthquakes. Dashed horizontal line is at 1811-1812. [Participants, 2000] 
 
The paleoliquefaction interpretations also suggest that recurrence rates for events with 
magnitude on the range of 5 and the largest earthquakes cannot be simply related. 
Magnitude regressions of the large events for the approximate periods of recurrence 
implied from the paleoliquefaction record indicate that the mean return period for the 
smaller magnitude events should be smaller (more frequent). Quoting from [Participants, 
2000]: “In short, the largest earthquakes occur much more frequently than the rate of 
smaller earthquakes would imply. Finally, the paleoliquefaction record suggests that the 
clustering of earthquakes that occurred in 1811-1812 also occurred in prior events. 
Multiple units of vented material are evident in many of the sandblows and have been 
interpreted as resulting from major events that occurred within weeks to months of each 
other. The lack of soil development, but evidence for bioturbation in materials between 
the units, constrains the timing between clustered events.”  
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The length of the active fault system and the lack of relative motion measured across 
the system make the use of models that work well for earthquakes occurring in plate-
boundary settings not appropriate. Models for intraplate tectonics have recently been 
proposed but their use is just being implemented in the NMSZ. Magnitude estimates of 
large New Madrid earthquakes rely on uncertain conversions of observations of their 
effects measured as Modified Mercalli intensities derived mainly from newspapers 
accounts. It is evident that the spread of intensity is much larger than for comparable 
events in the West Coast, as shown in Fig. 3-5. The magnitude conversion may be biased 
by different causes, but one that has been pointed out several times is that soil profile 
amplification may have increased the reported magnitudes because most towns at the 
time were settlements along rivers. 
 
Fig. 3-5 – Comparison of areas of damage from the New Madrid  
and San Francisco Earthquakes 
 
Slip rates for the known faults in the region estimated mainly using characteristics of 
secondary features show that three episodes of deformation are apparent in folded fluvial 
deposits overlying the Reelfoot fault with their ages close to the three major events 
evident in the paleoliquefaction record. The inferred rates of slip are compatible with the 
short recurrence interval for major earthquakes evident in the paleoseismic record. The 
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potential for currently classified as non-active faults within and beyond the NMSZ 
producing moderate-to-large earthquakes remains unknown, although Quaternary surface 
faulting has been documented on the periphery of the NMSZ [Participants, 2000]. 
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone — The Wabash Valley Fault System is about 90 km 
long and 50 km wide in southeastern Illinois, southwestern Indiana, and northwestern 
Kentucky near the deepest part of the Illinois Basin. The fault system consists of 
subparallel, high-angle normal faults that have vertical displacements as great as 150 m. 
The faults bound horsts and grabens, and commonly overlap one another. Major fault 
plains dip at angles ranging from 50 to 85 degrees. Individual fault blocks are only 
slightly tilted, and drag is generally absent or weakly expressed.  
 
 




In the past decade, there has been increasing awareness that the seismic hazard in this 
zone may be greater than the historical earthquake record would suggest. Numerous 
prehistoric large magnitude earthquakes have struck southern Indiana and Illinois; some 
may have been larger. Geologic evidence for these earthquakes in the form of sand-and-
gravel intrusions in river sediments has been discovered at more than 200 sites in the 
Wabash River Valley and along its tributaries in Indiana and Illinois. This information is 
the result of USGS studies done in cooperation with the Indiana Geological Survey, 
Indiana University, Illinois Department of Natural Resources-Illinois State Museum and 
the Illinois State Geological Survey. Clastic dikes filled with sand and gravel, interpreted 
to be the result of earthquake induced liquefaction, occur throughout much of southern 
Indiana and adjacent parts of Illinois. At least seven and probably eight prehistoric 
earthquakes have been documented during the Holocene, as well as, at least one during 
the latest Pleistocene (see Fig. 3-7) [Munson et al., 1997]. Nearly all of these liquefaction 
features originated from earthquakes centered in southern Indiana and Illinois, and not 
further south in the nearby source region of the great 1811-12 New Madrid earthquakes 
[Crone and Wheeler, 2000]. 
 
 
Fig. 3-7 – Map of southern two-thirds of Indiana showing sites where  
ancient sandblows have been found, and showing areas of liquefaction  
for six major prehistoric earthquakes. [Kirby, 2001] 
 
In the absence of well-determined data on the timing of paleoevents and the amount 
of tectonic slip associated with those events, it is impossible to estimate reliable or even 
meaningful Holocene or late Quaternary slip rates [Crone and Wheeler, 2000]. In 
summary the tectonics of the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone it not well understood at 
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present. No historical earthquakes in the Wabash Valley region have been strong enough 
to cause liquefaction. It is likely that numerous other magnitude 6 to 7 Holocene 
earthquakes have struck the region, but did not leave a record because of the lack of 
liquefiable deposits in large parts of the region. 
 
3.2 Earthquake history of Indiana 
Earthquakes originated within Indiana and from neighboring seismic zones have been 
felt in Indiana since the start of the colonization. Figure 3-8 shows the seismicity for the 
New Madrid and Wabash Valley Seismic Zones. The following description of the seismic 
history of Indiana was abridged from [Stover and Coffman, 1993]. 
 
 
Fig. 3-8 – Earthquakes in the New Madrid and Wabash Valley, red circles indicate 
earthquakes that occurred from 1974 to 2002 with magnitudes larger than 2.5, green 




The most damaging Indiana earthquake originating within the State occurred on 
September 27, 1909, near the Illinois border between Vincennes and Terre Haute. Some 
chimneys fell, several building walls were cracked, light connections were severed, and 
pictures were shaken off the walls. It was strong in Indianapolis and Oakland City. It was 
felt over an area of 80,000 km2 (see Fig. 3-9) including the southwestern half of Indiana, 




Fig. 3-9 – Isoseismal map for the Wabash River Valley, Indiana,  
Earthquake of September 27, 1909. 
 
The latest important earthquake originated within the State occurred June 18, 2002, 
with magnitude 4.6 (USGS, but mb = 5.0 according to other sources) near Evansville. 
There was very little damage. The location of the earthquake and its hypocentral depth 
(14-18 km) indicated ongoing deformation along reactivated Precambrian and Paleozoic 
basement structures, in a zone of recurring seismic activity, and in an area of possibly 
heightened neotectonic strain [Hamburger et al., 2002]. Figure 3-10 shows the intensity 
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Fig. 3-10 – Isoseismal map for the Evansville, Indiana,  
Earthquake of June 18, 2002 
 
Other damaging earthquakes originated in Indiana include the April 29, 1899, 
Earthquake with rated intensity VI to VII on the Modified Mercalli Scale. It was 
strongest at Jeffersonville and Shelbyville; at Vincennes, chimneys were thrown down 
and walls cracked. It was felt over an area of 110,000 km2.  
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In 1876, twin shocks fifteen minutes apart were felt over an area of 160,000 km2. A 
shock in 1887 centered near Vincennes was felt over 200,000 km2 and an 1891 shock 
damaged property and frightened people in church at Evansville.  
Indiana has also suffered from damage caused by earthquakes originating in 
neighboring States. The worst occurred on November 9, 1968, and centered near Dale in 
southern Illinois. The shock, a magnitude 5.3, was felt over 1,500,000 km2 and 23 States 
including all of Indiana. Intensity VII was reported from Cynthiana where chimneys were 
cracked, twisted, and toppled; at Fort Branch where groceries fell from shelves and a loud 
roaring noise was heard, and at Mount Vernon, New Harmony, Petersburg, Princeton, 
and Stewartsville, all of which had similar effects.  
Almost exactly ten years earlier on November 7, 1958, an earthquake originating near 
Mt. Carmel, Illinois, caused plaster to fall at Fort Branch. Roaring and whistling noises 
were heard at Central City and the residents of Evansville thought there had been an 
explosion or plane crash. It was felt over 90,000 km2 of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and 
Kentucky.  
On March 2, 1937, a shock centering near Anna, Ohio, threw objects from shelves at 
Fort Wayne and some plaster fell. Plaster was also cracked at Indianapolis. Six days later, 
another shock originating at Anna brought pictures crashing down and cracked plaster in 
Fort Wayne and was strongly felt at Lafayette.  
The great New Madrid earthquakes of 1811 and 1812 must have strongly affected the 
State, particularly the southwestern part, but there is little information available.  
 
3.3 Design earthquake return period 
For the foregoing discussion on the seismic risk of Indiana it is important to establish 
a common base for comparing the probability of exceedance of the design ground 
motion, the earthquake mean return period, and the lapse of exposure or life of the 
structure.  
The probability, q, of having ground motion that exceeds in one year a pre-fixed 
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The probability of not exceeding the value of ao in t years, under the assumption of 
statistical independence between events, is:  
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Then: 
 
  (1 )ttq q= −  (3-3)  
 
The probability, qo, of having at least one event with a value greater than ao in a time 
span of t years is:  
 
  1 1 (1 )to tq q q= − = − −  (3-4)  
 
The return period is defined as the mean time, in years, between events producing a 
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For example, if the design earthquake has been defined as an event that produces a 
value of the descriptive parameter having a probability of 3% of being exceeded in a 75 
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It follows that   1 1 0.999594 0.00040604
T
= − = , and the mean period of recurrence for 
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Table 3-1 – Design Ground Motion Mean Return period used in different documents 
 











AASHO Standard Specifications for 
Highway Bridges 5th Edition (1949) N/A N/A N/A 
AASHO Standard Specifications for 
Highway Bridges 8th Edition (1961) N/A N/A N/A 
AASHTO 1975 Interim Specifications 
for Highway Bridges [AASHTO, 
1975] 
N/A N/A N/A 
ATC-3-06 Recommendations for 
Buildings [ATC, 1978] 50 10% 475 
ATC-6 Design Guidelines for Bridges  
[ATC, 1981] 50 10% 475 
Division I-A of AASHTO Standard 
Specifications (15th to current 17th 
Edition) [AASHTO, 2002] 
50 10% 475 
AASHTO LRFD Specifications (1st,  
2nd, and 3rd Edition) [AASHTO, 1998] 50 10% 475 
Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria  
[Caltrans, 2001] N/A N/A N/A 
NEHRP Recommendations for New 
Buildings [NEHRP, 1997] – Maximum 
Considered Earthquake (see Note) 
50 2% 2475 
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic 
Provisions [NCHRP, 2002] – 
Maximum Considered Earthquake 
75 3% 2463 
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic 
Provisions [NCHRP, 2002] – Frequent 
Earthquake 
75 50% 109 
Note – In NEHRP 1997 the Design Ground Motion for buildings corresponds to 2/3 of the Maximum 
Considered Earthquake ground motion. This reduction is not used in the Draft AASHTO LRFD seismic 
provisions for bridges although the definition of the Maximum Considered Earthquake is practically the 
same. 
 
Figure 3-11 shows the sensitivity to the mean return period when changing the life 

































Fig. 3-11 – Mean return period as a function of the probability of  
exceedance and the life span of the structure in years 
 
3.4 Seismic risk assessment for bridge design in Indiana 
The awareness of the seismic risk associated with the New Madrid Seismic Zone and 
more recently the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone, as presented before, has been increasing 
in the last decades with the corresponding increase in the seismic forces and related 
requirements used in design of building structures and bridges. The following sections 
present the seismic risk parameters presented by the bridge specifications in the last 
decades in order to set a common frame of reference to be used in the vulnerability 
assessment of the transportation structures within the selected Earthquake Emergency 
Routes of Indiana.  
Figure 3-12 shows the 1949 revision of the seismic risk map developed by the U.S. 
Coast and Geodetic Survey [Housner, 1970]. Table 3-2 presents the peak ground 





Fig. 3-12 – U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Seismic Probability Map  
of the United States (Revised 1949)  
 
Table 3-2 – Maximum zonal acceleration to be used with  
map of Fig. 3-12 [Housner, 1970] 
 
 Maximum Acceleration  M 
Zone 3 (near a great fault) 0.50g 8.5 
Zone 3 (not near a great fault) 0.33g 7.0 
Zone 2 0.16g 5.75 
Zone 1 0.08g 4.75 
Zone 0 0.04g 4.25 
 
This map was developed before seismic zoning was introduced in the building or 
bridge design requirements. Although the map was referred as a seismic probability map 
it actually was based on Mercalli intensity and no guidance was given on the 
corresponding return period or probability of exceedance. Seen from a modern point of 
view this map contains features such a neighboring Zone 1 and 3 areas without a 
transition Zone 2 in between, and other that currently would be frowned at. 
Notwithstanding, the general location of the zones and envisioned peak ground 
acceleration do not differ much from more recent maps. In this map southwestern Indiana 
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is located in a Zone 2 corresponding to a maximum acceleration of 0.16g and a 
corresponding magnitude of 5.75 for the design event. The rest of Indiana, with the 
exception of a small Zone 2 bordering Ohio, was located in a Zone 1 (maximum expected 
acceleration of 0.08g and magnitude of 4.75 for the design event. No design response 
spectrum was defined. This map was never mandatory in Indiana for bridges or buildings. 
 
3.4.1 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges  
In Section 2.2.2 the 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975] were 
presented. Figure 3-13 shows the northern Midwest portion of the map including Indiana 
(the whole U.S. map is shown in Fig. 2-13). The seismic design criteria contained in the 
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications was included in the twelfth (1977), thirteenth 
(1983), and fourteenth (1989) editions of AASHTO’s Standard Specifications. 
 
 
Fig. 3-13 – Northern Midwest portion of the map included with the  
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975] 
 
No more detailed map was included with the 1975 Interim. The southwestern corner 
of Indiana containing Gibson, Posey and Vanderburgh counties was a Zone 3 with a peak 
ground acceleration A = 0.5g. A region south of an approximate line linking Terre Haute, 
Indianapolis and Fort Wayne was included in a Zone 2 (A = 0.22g PGA). The rest of the 








Table 3-3 – Maximum values for the Response Coefficient (C) in Indiana 
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975]  
 
Zone 1 (A = 0.09g) Zone 2 (A = 0.22g) Zone 3 (A = 0.50g) Depth of 
Alluvium C max T at peak C max T at peak C max T at peak 
0 – 10’ 0.060 - 0.072 0.30 s 0.163 0.30 s 
11’ – 80’ 0.066 0.40 s 0.120 0.35 s 0.203 0.30 s 
80’ – 150’ 0.080 0.60 s 0.110 0.55 s 0.155 0.50 s 
> 150’ 0.065 0.65 s 0.090 0.55 s 0.120 0.50 s 
 
3.4.2 ATC 6 and AASHTO Division I-A 
The ATC-6 [ATC, 1981] recommendations were modified to be incorporated in the 
fifteenth (1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications as Division I-A Seismic 
Design. These requirements were kept without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and 
in the current seventeenth (2002) edition [AASHTO, 2002]. The ATC-6 document used 
for peak ground acceleration in rock, A, the map of Av originally proposed for the ATC-3-
06 building requirements project.  
The ATC-3-06 requirements for buildings were taken over by the BSSC and became 
the NEHRP recommended provisions. By the time the ATC-6 proposed bridge 
requirements were incorporated into AASHTO Standard Specifications the maps had been 
updated in the 1988 NEHRP provisions [NEHRP, 1988] by the USGS [Algermissen et 
al., 1990]. The map included in the 15th Edition AASHTO Standard Specifications and 
still contained in the current 17th Edition correspond to the Av map as modified in 1988. 
Figure 3-14 shows the State of Indiana portion of this map. The values given correspond 
to peak ground acceleration in rock expressed as percentage of the acceleration of gravity 
for a probability of exceedance of 10 percent in 50 years, which is approximately equal to 
a 15 percent probability of exceedance in the 75-year design life now advocated for a 
typical highway bridge (see Fig. 3-11).  
The southwestern corner of Indiana is located within contours labeled for peak grouns 
acceleration of A = 0.075g and A = 0.10g; including totally (t) or partially (p) the 
following 20 counties: Brown (p), Clay (p), Daviess (t), Dubois (p), Gibson (t), Greene 
(t), Knox (t), Lawrence (p), Martin (t), Monroe (p), Morgan (p), Owen (t), Pike (t), Posey 
(t), Putnam (p), Spencer (p), Sullivan (t), Vanderburgh (t), Vigo (p), and Warrick (t).. 
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Section 3.2 of Division I-A Seismic Design indicates that “Local maxima (and minima) 
are given inside the highest (and lowest) contour for a particular region. Linear 
interpolation shall be used for sites located between contour lines and between a contour 
line and local maximum (or minimum).”  
The rest of the south half of the state is located within a contour line for peak ground 
acceleration A = 0.05g and local maxima labeled as A = 0.06g. This zone includes Terre 
Haute and Indianapolis. The northern half of the State, including the cities of Lafayette 
and Fort Wayne, located within the contour line for peak ground acceleration A = 0.05g 
and local maxima labeled as A = 0.04g.  
 
 
Fig. 3-14 – Values for peak ground acceleration for the State on Indiana in  
Division I-A Seismic Design of 17th Edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications 
[AASHTO, 2002] 
 
All editions of the AASHTO LRFD Specifications (1994, 1998, 2004) [AASHTO, 
2004] include the same map but contain variations in the design requirements that may 
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3.4.3 USGS 1996 Maps for the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions 
In 1993, the USGS embarked on a major project to prepare updated national 
earthquake ground motion maps. The result of that project was a set of probabilistic maps 
published in 1996 that cover several rock ground motion parameters (peak ground 
acceleration — PGA — and elastic response spectral accelerations for periods of 
vibration of 0.2, 0.3, and 1.0 sec) and three different probability levels or return periods 
(10% probability of exceedance in 50 years, 5% probability of exceedance in 50 years, 
and 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years – which is approximately equal to 3% 
probability of exceedance in 75 years). In addition to the maps, the ground motion values 
at any specified latitude and longitude can be obtained via the Internet.  
 
Fig. 3-15 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock  




These maps form the rock ground motion basis for seismic design using the Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002]. Figure 3-15 shows 
the 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock for a probability of exceedance 
of 10% in 50 years that although not used in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic 
Provisions, is given here for reference with previous requirements. 
 
Fig. 3-16 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock  
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in 50 years) 
 
The upper-level event, termed the “rare” or Maximum Considered Earthquake 
(MCE), describes ground motions that, for most locations, are defined probabilistically 
and have a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (mean return period 
approximately 2500 years). Figure 3-16 shows the 1996 USGS Map of peak ground 
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acceleration in rock for a probability of exceedance of 2% in 50 years (equivalent to 3% 
in 75 years as shown in Fig. 3-11) that although not used also in the Draft AASHTO 
LRFD Seismic Provisions, is given here for reference with previous requirements using a 
different return period. 
For locations close to highly active faults, the mapped Maximum Considered 
Earthquake ground motion was deterministically bounded so that the levels of ground 
motion did not become unreasonably high. Deterministic bounds on the ground motion 
were calculated by assuming the occurrence of maximum magnitude earthquakes on the 
highly active faults. It is equal to 150% of the median ground motion for the maximum 
magnitude earthquake, but not less than 1.5g for the short-period spectral acceleration 
plateau and 0.6g for 1.0-sec spectra acceleration (see Fig. 2-22). Deterministic bounds 
were applied in high-seismicity portions of the West Coast, Alaska, and Hawaii leading 
to a design ground motion lower than the ground motion for 3% probability of 
exceedance in 75 years. The Maximum Considered Earthquake governs the limits on the 
inelastic deformation in the substructures and the design displacements for the support of 
the superstructure. 
The lower level design event, termed the “expected” or “frequent” earthquake, 
defines a ground motion corresponding to 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years. 
This event ensures that essentially elastic response is achieved in the bridge substructure 
for the more frequent or expected earthquake. This design level is similar to the 100-year 
flood and has similar performance objectives. An explicit check on the strength capacity 
of the bridge substructure is required. Parameter studies made as part of the development 
of the draft provisions show that the lower level event will only impact the strength of 
columns in parts of the western United States. 
With respect to Indiana the USGS 1996 Maps used the then recently identified 
paleoearthquakes in southern Indiana and Illinois based on widespread paleoliquefaction 
features as described in 3.1. An areal zone with a higher Mmax of 7.5 to account for such 
large events was used. The Wabash Valley Mmax zone that was used in the maps was 






Fig. 3-17 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration SS in rock 
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in 
50 years) 
Fig. 3-18 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration S1 in rock 





The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions uses maps that define spectral 
ordinates at periods of 0.2 sec. (SS) and 1.0 sec. (S1) to be used as a two point procedure 
to obtain the design response spectrum (see Fig. 2-21). Figures 3-17 and 3-18 show the 
maps for SS and S1 in rock respectively for the Maximum Considered Earthquake having 
a 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years. 
No maps were developed by USGS for the expected frequent earthquake, defining a 
ground motion corresponding to 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years. The Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions suggests the values of SS and S1 for this earthquake 
may be obtained from interpolation from information provided by USGS either in the 
CD-ROM published with the maps or in the Internet by using latitude and longitude for 
the site or the ZIP code of the location. The web site to perform these operations is: 
http://eqint.cr.usgs.gov/eq/html/deaggint.html  
 
Fig. 3-19 – Results obtained for Vincennes, IN, for spectral acceleration SS  




Figure 3-19 show the results obtained for Vincennes for spectral acceleration SS in 
rock for 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years as required for the frequent 
earthquake. The values obtained were SS = 0.06g and S1 = 0.01g. 
 
3.4.4 2002 Update of the 1996 USGS Maps 
In 2002 changes were introduced by the USGS [Frankel et al., 2002] to the maps 
developed in 1996. Numerous changes were introduced with varying effects on the 
mapped values. Some of these changes affected the parameters used in the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone and the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. Among them the more important are 
changes in the mean recurrence time, the characteristic magnitude, and the spatial 
concentration of New Madrid sources of large earthquakes, and the incorporation of 
additional attenuation relations. Two versions of the maps exist one from January and the 
other from October. Only the later version maps are be presented here. 
The 2002 update uses a shorter mean recurrence time for characteristic earthquakes in 
New Madrid than was used in the 1996 maps, as well as a smaller median magnitude than 
that applied in 1996. The three equally weighted “fictitious sources” used in the 1996 
maps were substituted for three sources consisting in a fault trace matching recent micro-
earthquake activity and two adjacent sources that are situated near the borders of the 
Reelfoot Rift. It is important to note that the probabilistic ground motions for the 10% 
probability of exceedance level have increased markedly around the New Madrid area, 
compared to the 1996 maps. This is caused by the shorter mean return time of 500 years 
for characteristic earthquakes used in the 2002 maps. The Mmax 7.5 zone assigned to the 
Wabash Valley area was enlarged to include the most likely rupture zones from 
paleoearthquakes with magnitudes above about 7.0.  
Significant differences between the 1996 and 2002 maps are caused by the inclusion 
of additional attenuation relations in the 2002 maps. These changes affected mainly the 
Atlantic seaboard. There is little change for the probabilistic ground motions at 2% 
probability of exceedance in 50 years for most of the central U.S. During 2003, changes 






Fig. 3-20 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in 
rock with 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years 
Fig. 3-21 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in 






Fig. 3-22 – 2002 USGS Map for SS Spectral Acceleration in 
rock with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years (= to 2% in 
50 years) 
Fig. 3-23 – 2002 USGS Map for S1 Spectral Acceleration in 






In April 2004 the USGS included in their website the possibility of producing maps 
for latitude and magnitude pairs. The Indiana PGA map for 475-year return period is 
presented in Fig. 3-20 and for the 2500-year return period in Fig. 3-21, and the maps for 
SS and S1 for 2500-year return period in Figures 3-22 and 3-23 respectively. 
 
3.4.5 JTRP Project SPR 2812 – Analysis of Seismic Hazard Assessment for Indiana 
A Joint Transportation Research Program Project (SPR 2812) lead by Purdue 
Professors J. Haase and R. Nowack is currently working on an assessment of the seismic 
hazard in Indiana with specific application to transportation structures. The results of this 
research were not available to be used in the Emergency Routes Project but undoubtedly 
will have a large impact in the application of future bridge design specifications for the 
Indiana Department of Transportation and seismic rehabilitation policies to be used with 
existing bridges. Once the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) is 
adopted by AASHTO, and later by INDOT, the need for having an in-house State 
assessment of the seismic risk to be coordinated with the USGS will become very 
important. 
The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) includes in 
Commentary to Section 3.10.2.1 a clause that reads: “In lieu of using the national ground 
motion maps referenced in the Specification, ground motion response spectra may be 
constructed based on approved State ground motion maps. To be accepted the 
development of State maps should conform to the following: 
1. The definition of design ground motion should be the same as described in Article 
3.10.1.2 and Table 3.10.1-1. 
2. Ground motion maps should be based on a detailed analysis demonstrated to lead 
a quantification of ground motion at a regional scale that is as or more accurate 
than achieved at the scale of the national maps. The analysis should include: 
characterization of seismic sources and ground motion that incorporates current 
scientific knowledge; incorporation of uncertainty in seismic source and ground 
motion models and parameter values used in the analysis; detailed documentation 
of map development; detailed peer review. The peer review process should 
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preferably include one or mode individuals from the U.S. Geological Survey who 
participated in the development of the national maps.” 
 
3.4.6 Comments on the results from the different maps and bridge design requirements 
Mapped values for acceleration in rock in Bloomington, Evansville, Indianapolis, 
Jasper, New Albany, Terre Haute, and Vincennes (see Fig. 3-24 for location) are shown 






















Fig. 3-24 – Location where acceleration mapped values are compared for the different 
seismic risk map versions (see Table 3-4). Base map shows INDOT districts. 
 
In comparing the values shown in Table 3-4 is must be noticed that the values from 
the 1949 map developed by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey [Housner, 1970] and in 
the 1975 AASHTO Interim [AASHTO, 1975] are higher, as a rule, than the values for 
peak ground acceleration contained in Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th 
Edition of the AASHTO Standard Specifications AASHTO, 2002]. It may be argued than 
the values contained in Division I-A correspond to EPA (Effective Peak Ground 










the strong ground motion and are not directly comparable to the instrumental peak 
ground acceleration recoded in an accelerometer, in addition to the acceleration in the 
1949 and 1975 documents not being defined clearly with respect to mean return period.  
 
Table 3-4 – Seismic Zone definition and mapped values of acceleration for selected cities 






















































































2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1949  
USCGS  PGA 
 










0.22g 0.50g 0.22g 0.22g 0.22g 0.22g 0.22g 
AASHTO  
Div. I-A 
A (PGA)  
10% PE 50y 0.078g 0.085g 0.063g 0.075g 0.068g 0.070g 0.090g 
PGA  
10% PE 50y 0.045g 0.130g 0.032g 0.070g 0.039g 0.056g 0.110g 
PGA  
2% PE 50y 0.14g 0.49g 0.08g 0.20g 0.12g 0.08g 0.40g 
SS  





2% PE 50y 0.12g 0.30g 0.10g 0.16g 0.14g 0.14g 0.20g 
PGA  
10% PE 50y 0.046g 0.120g 0.034g 0.070g 0.043g 0.060g 0.100g 
PGA  
2% PE 50y 0.12g 0.40g 0.10g 0.20g 0.12g 0.16g 0.30g 
SS  





2% PE 50y 0.12g 0.20g 0.10g 0.16g 0.12g 0.12g 0.16g 
 
The maps in current bridge design requirements contained in Division I-A of the 
AASHTO Standard Specifications were developed by the USGS in the 1970’s and 
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updated in 1988 and they are comparable in respect of having the same mean return 
period with the 1996 and 2002 PGA USGS maps for 10% probability of exceedance in 
50 years (Figures 3-15 and 3-20). The impact of the knowledge that has been 
accumulated about the New Madrid and Wabash Valley Seismic Zones is evident in the 
more detailed acceleration values reported. The values of PGA for the same return period 
in the new 1996 and 2002 maps are lower for Bloomington, Indianapolis, Japer, New 
Albany and Terre Haute, and higher for Evansville and Vincennes. This is consistent with 
the reported new understanding of the tectonic process of the Wabash Valley Seismic 
Zone and if the new maps were made part of Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard 
Specification the impact on the design of new bridges in Indiana would be marginal if not 
less demanding in many cases.  
 In order to assess the impact of adopting the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic 
Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] as seen solely from the design acceleration 
point of view the following aspects come into play: (a) a change from a 475-year to a 
2500-year return period design earthquake, (b) a change from peak ground acceleration 
(effective or accelerographic reported) description of the design ground motion to be 
routinely converted into a design spectrum to a new direct definition of the design 
spectrum, (c) site effects that amplify design acceleration in a different way including 
now short period accelerations along with long period ones both of them specially 
affecting the low acceleration range where precisely Indiana sites are located, and (d) use 
of a “frequent” earthquake for serviceability assessment.  
The pertinent comments will follow in the same order listed. Although, the research 
presented in this report deals mainly with existing bridges — the reference for any bridge 
upgrade has been customarily related to current or in the process of being adopted 
requirements for new bridges — the approach adopted minimizes the dependence on the 
seismic risk assessment and focus on the expected behavior for increasingly severe 
ground motions without putting a tap on them. 
(a) Impact of change of design event return period — It is debatable that with a 
relatively short-timed documented record of events proper extrapolations can be 
performed. Extrapolation is common in other civil engineering disciplines with 
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acceptable results from the point of view of proper design parameters and public 
awareness of the problems involved in distinguishing between acceptable risk and 
forecast. Flood control is a good example of the differences involved and the 
acceptability of the design parameters involved. On the other hand, both extreme wind 
design and earthquake resistant design have come into public scrutiny because of the gap 
between code design parameters and reported measured values. This has brought a trend 
to define design parameters in the same order of magnitude of the reported measured 
values. The basis for this change is well documented in the related literature and the real 
impact on the design procedures has been moderate because the reference to actual 
behavior during catastrophic events is the judging parameter in most cases. The new 
seismic risk maps presented in the USGS 1996 and 2002 maps describe a Maximum 
Considered Earthquake (MCE) that is supposed to produce measurable parameters such 
as peak ground acceleration of the same order of magnitude of those that may be 
recorded in the occurrence of a catastrophic event. How these values are made 
compatible with acceptable design parameters — from the economic and code 
requirements perspectives — have been solved in different ways.  
The building design requirements were the first to adopt this approach [NEHRP, 
1997]. The MCE was accepted but the design ground motion was defined as 2/3 that 
produced by the MCE. The end result was design parameters that did not differ much 
from what was being used. The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions 
(NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] does not introduce the same reduction, although 
changes the accepted Response Modification Factors (R) to higher values that may bridge 
the difference (please compare values listed in Tables 2-3 and 2-8). Other subtle 
difference between the approach for buildings and for bridges is that in the case of site 
specific studies the building requirements require that the deterministic spectrum be 
obtained from 150% the mean of the spectra computed for characteristic maximum 
magnitude earthquakes while for bridges it requires the median-plus-one-standard-
deviation which leads to 184% of the mean spectrum. One important conclusion is that in 
the future the basic seismic risk design factors will be different for buildings and for 
bridges although based on the same seismic risk maps. 
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(b) Impact of change from PGA to spectral description — The description of the 
design ground motion through a response spectrum was formalized in the ATC 3-06 
project [ATC, 1978] based on the work of N. Newmark. The spectrum description was 
based on two parameters defined as Effective Peak Acceleration (EPA) and Effective 
Peak Velocity (EPV) that were related to the spectral ordinates as shown in Fig. 3-25 
with EPA made equal to parameter Aa and EPV proportional to Av. This procedure was 
the one adopted in ATC 6 for bridges and later in Division I-A of the Standard AASHTO 
Specification and is the basis of current 17th edition with the acceleration parameter A 
corresponding to the mapped value of Av of the 1988 maps[NEHRP, 1988] by the USGS 
[Algermissen et al., 1990]. 
 
Fig. 3-25 – EPA = Sa/2.5 and EPV = Sv/2.5 obtained from a response 
spectrum with 5% damping as prescribed by ATC 3-06 [ATC, 1978] 
  
The use of two different parameters to define the design response spectrum one based 
on acceleration and the other based on velocity was a wise decision because attenuation 
with distance for the two parameters is not the same. The 2.5 proportional constant was 
developed by Newmark based on the study of many accelerograms and their 
corresponding response spectrum and in general works well for most records but the 
commentary of the ATC-3-06 made it clear that effective peak acceleration and effective 
peak velocity were different from the peak acceleration in the accelerogram, and the peak 














The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions moves away from this 
definition of the design ground motion and directly states the design spectrum severing 
the link with the effective peak ground acceleration and velocity, although it states a way 
to obtain the peak ground acceleration as 0.4SDS as was shown in Fig. 2-21 thus 
apparently keeping the same 2.5 ratio. As shown in Table 3-4 for the seven Indiana sites, 
in the 2002 USGS maps the ratio between SS and PGA for the same return period reports 
ratios between 2 and 3 with a mean of 2.27. Although these ratios are not fixed and will 
probably change in the future as new versions of the maps appear, the impact of moving 
from a PGA definition to a directly defined spectrum as the description of the design 
ground motion is minor. 
Figures 3-26 and 3-27 show the combined impact of the change in return period and 
the spectral definition from the current Division I-A seismic design requirements response 
spectrum to the one required in the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements using 
the 2002 USGS maps. 
















Draft LRFD - Evansville
Draft LRFD - Jasper and Vincennes
Draft LRFD -  Bloomington




Fig. 3-26 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Bloomington, Evansville, Jasper, and 
Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements 
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Draft LRFD - New Albany
Draft LRFD - Terre Haute
Draft LRFD -  Indianapolis
 
Fig. 3-27 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Indianapolis, New Albany, and Terre Haute 
in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements 
 
Table 3-5 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana for the 






















































































(Essent./Other) A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A 
SHL II IV II III II III III 
SDAP 


















(Life S. /Oper.) 2/3 5/6 2/3 3/4 2/3 3/4 3/4 
 
Table 3-5 shows the implication from the point of view of the corresponding 
associated design analysis and detailing requirements presenting the Seismic 
Performance Category (SPC) (see Table 2-1) of the current requirements and for the 
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proposed Draft LRFD requirements the Seismic Hazard Level (SHL) (see Tables 2-5 and 
2-6), the Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP) (see Table 2-7), and Seismic 
Detailing Requirements (SDR) (see Tables 2-9 and 2-10). 
 (c) Impact of change of site effects evaluation procedure — The USGS 1996 and 
2002 maps are defined at the B-C soil profile type interface (see Table 2-11) which is the 
dividing line between rock and very dense soil or soft rock. The soil amplification factors 
are both Fa =1.0 and Fv = 1.0 for soil profiles type B. This is similar to the Soil Profile 
Type I of Division I-A of the current 17th Edition of the Standard AASHTO Specifications 
for which has a Site Coefficient S =1.0 (see Fig. 2-16). Up to this point the procedures are 
similar. When other soil profile types come into play, the difference is large because the 
proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] has 
soil amplification factors Fa that affects the short period part of the design spectrum. 
AASHTO current Standard Specifications does not have a comparable soil dependent 
factor. Both Fa and Fv are acceleration dependent with comparatively larger values for 
lower accelerations (see Figures 2-24 and 2-25). Just for comparison purposes a site, 
common in Indiana, with more than 30 ft of soft to medium stiff soil under current 
Division I-A requirements would be a Type III soil profile and would have a Site 
Coefficient S = 1.5 that amplify the medium to long period part of the design spectrum. 
The same soil would probably be classified as a Type D Stiff Soil when using the 
proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions. Table 3-6 shows the values obtained 
for the cases being use for comparison.  
 For the short period portion of the design spectrum under the proposed Draft Seismic 
Provisions the amplification caused by the soil profile would be 18% to 60% percent 
higher than the current requirements with no amplification required. For the medium to 
long period portion of the design spectrum the values under the proposed Draft Seismic 
Provisions the amplification caused by the soil profile would be 33% to 60% percent 
higher than the current requirements. The reason for this large impact is linked to Indiana 





Table 3-6 – Values of the site coefficient for a Type III soil profile under current Division 



















































































A (PGA)  
10% PE 50y 0.09g 0.09g 0.06g 0.09g 0.06g 0.06g 0.09g AASHTO  
Div. I-A Site Coefficient 
S 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
SS  
2% PE 50y 0.28g 0.80g 0.20g 0.60g 0.28g 0.36g 0.60g 
Soil Type D 
Factor Fa 
1.58 1.18 1.60 1.32 1.58 1.51 1.32 
S1  






Maps Soil Type D 
Factor Fv 
2.32 2.00 2.40 2.16 2.32 2.32 2.16 
 
Figures 3-28 and 3-29 show the combined impact of the change in return period, the 
spectral definition and the soil amplification requirements for a Type III soil profile from 
the current Division I-A seismic design requirements design spectrum to the one required 
in the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements for a Type D profile using the 2002 
USGS maps.  
Table 3-7 shows the implication from the point of view of the corresponding 
associated design analysis and detailing requirements presenting the Seismic 
Performance Category (SPC) (see Table 2-1) of the current requirements and for the 
proposed Draft LRFD requirements the Seismic Hazard Level (SHL) (see Tables 2-5 and 
2-6), the Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP) (see Table 2-7), and Seismic 





















Current Division I-A 
Bloomington, Evansville, 
Jasper, and Vincennes
Draft LRFD - Jasper and Vincennes
Draft LRFD - Evansville
Draft LRFD -  Bloomington
 
Fig. 3-28 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Bloomington, Evansville, Jasper, and 
Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements 













Current Division I-A 
Indianapolis, New Albany, 
and Terre Haute
Draft LRFD - New Albany
Draft LRFD - Terre Haute
Draft LRFD -  Indianapolis
 
Fig. 3-29 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Indianapolis, New Albany, and Terre Haute 




It is evident from the values presented for rock and for soil that the impact of the 
proposed Draft LRFD requirements is significant both for the design forces and for the 
analysis and detailing requirements. Under the current Division I-A requirements the 
analysis and detailing are the simplest (SPC-A) while for the proposed Draft LRFD the 
most strict covered (SHL-IV) are required for Evansville and Vincennes in both cases 
(rock and soil) studied and for Jasper in soil. In no case the simpler (SHL-I) is required. 
The implications from the point of view of complexity of design and cost of 
construction are significant. 
 
Table 3-7 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana for the 






















































































(Essent./Other) A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A 
SHL III IV II IV III III IV 
SDAP 


















(Life S. /Oper.) 3/4 5/6 2/3 5/6 3/4 3/4 5/6 
 
(d) Impact of use of “frequent” earthquake — The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD 
Seismic Provisions introduces a frequent earthquake to be used in verification of 
serviceability of the bridge. Figure 3-19 shows the value 0.06g obtained for SS at 
Vincennes for this earthquake based on results of the 1996 USGS maps. The impact of 







CHAPTER 4  METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATION OF SEISMIC 
VULNERABILITY OF THE INDIANA EMERGENCY ROUTES 
 
 
4.1 Route Alternatives 
U.S. Congress and the Federal Administration through the FHWA have defined 
priority and critical routes in different instances. One such example is the National Truck 
Network established in 1982 by the Surface Transportation Assistance Act in order to 
designate a national network of highways that would allow the passage of trucks of 
specified minimum dimensions and weight. Figure 4-1 shows the National Truck 
Network in southwestern Indiana. 
 
 




One more recent highway system definition is the National Highway System. The 
National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 selected 264,000 km of roadways as 
the National Highway System (NHS) including 4,750 km in Indiana. Figure 4-2 shows 
the whole National Highway System. 
 
 
Fig. 4-2 – National Highway System 
 
NHS consists of five parts. The first component is the Interstate Highway System, 
which accounts for almost 30 percent of NHS. The second component includes 21 
congressionally designated high-priority corridors (see Fig. 4-3), three of which include 
highways in Indiana as part of them. The third component is the non-interstate portion of 
the Strategic Highway Corridor Network identified by the Department of Defense in 
cooperation with the Department of Transportation. These corridors and the interstate 
highways are critical strategic links. The fourth component is major Strategic Highway 
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Corridor Network connectors linking major military installations and other defense-
related facilities to the Strategic corridors. The fifth component are important arterial 
highways that serve interstate and interregional travel and that provide connections to 
major ports, airports, public transportation facilities, and other intermodal facilities. 
 
 
Fig. 4-3 – Congressional High Priority Corridors 
 
The National Highway System and its role in determining geometric design of 
highways is discussed in Section 40-1.03 (01) of Chapter 40 "Basic Design Controls" of 
the Indiana Department of Transportation’s Design Manual.  
Figure 4-4 shows the highways designated in Indiana as part of the National Highway 
System. It includes in the north-south direction: SR-69 from I-64 to Mount Vernon in the 
Kentucky border (Ohio River), US 41 from Terre Haute to Evansville and across the 
Ohio River to Kentucky, I-164 from I-64 to Evansville, SR-57 from the intersection with 
SR-67/US-231 to I-64, US-231 from the intersection with SR-67 to Kentucky border 
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(Ohio River) south of Rockport, and SR-67 from Indianapolis to the intersection with SR-
57. In the east-west direction includes US-50 from the Ohio border to Vincennes in the 
Illinois border (Wabash River), I-64 for the Ohio border to Illinois border (Wabash 
River), SR-66 from Rockport on the Kentucky border (Ohio River) to Evansville, and 
SR-62 fro Evansville to Mount Vernon on the Kentucky border (Ohio River).  
 
 
Fig. 4-4 – Highways in Indiana designated as part of the National Highway System 
 
From the methodological point of view it is evident that the routes in southwestern 
Indiana contained in both the National Truck Network and the National Highway 




Part I of this report presents different alternatives for Earthquake Emergency Routes 
for the State of Indiana based on trade off of three parameters, namely total travel time, 
population covered, and number of square feet of bridge deck (as a parameter associated 
with eventual retrofit cost).  
The Indiana Department of Transportation provides maintenance within the State to 
Interstate Highways, U.S. Routes, and Indiana State Highways. County roads and city 
roads are excluded unless special agreements are in effect. The grid of routes presented in 
Fig. 4-5 corresponds to routes that belong to the National Truck Network, the National 
Highway System, and are within the domain of the Indiana Department of 




Fig. 4-5 – Selected grid of Earthquake Emergency Routes  




The grid of routes presented in Fig. 4-5 comprises the following: 
• US 41 from Terre Haute South to Evansville and the Kentucky border (Ohio 
River). 
• SR 67 from Freedom to SR 57 junction and SR 57 from SR 67 to I-64. 
• I-164 from I-64 to US 41. 
• US 231 from SR 54 at Bloomfield south to Rockport and to Kentucky border 
(Ohio River). 
• SR 37 from Bloomington south to SR 237 and SR 237 to Cannelton and the 
Kentucky border (Ohio River). 
• SR 154 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to US 41, and SR 54 from US 41 east 
to SR 45. 
• US 50 from Illinois border (Wabash River) at Vincennes east to SR 446 east of 
Bedford. 
• SR 64 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to Princeton to US 41. 
• I-64 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to SR 66 at Carefree. 
• SR 57 from US 41 past Evansville Airport to I-164. 
• SR 62 from Illinois border (Wabash River) thru Evansville to US 231 
• SR 66 from US 41 east to Rockport. 
 
4.2 Available Information 
The Indiana Department of Transportation has a very well organized data base where 
information for the purposes of present project was obtained. The information used was 
the following: 
• Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database – This database was modernized 
just before the initiation of the project. It consists in a MS Access database that 
contains records of all bridges being maintained by Indot. It follows Federal 
Highway Administration guidelines [FHWA, 1996] and contains additional 
information beyond the FHWA requirements. Only the portion related to bridges 
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in the Vincennes Indot District was used containing 827 bridges, distributed by 
Counties as shown in Table 4-1. See Fig. 4-6 for their location. 
 
Table 4-1 – Distribution by County of Vincennes District bridges  
contained in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database 
 























• Bridge Drawings – The bridge drawings at the Indot Vincennes District offices 
were consulted for bridges located on the selected Earthquake Emergency 
Routes. The drawings contain the original design plans, those corresponding to 
changes and modifications, and a description of the soil boring performed at the 
time of design of the bridge reporting SPT values in many cases. 
• GIS Information – Geographical Information System (GIS) related to the State of 
Indiana, and other information was supplied by Indot. This information can also 






Fig. 4-6 – Vincennes District bridges contained in Indot Inspection  
and Maintenance Database (those whose drawings were used in this  
research are marked as blue filled dots) 
 
4.3 GIS Implementation 
A two tier approach was developed for managing the information described in the 
previous section. The first stage consisted in developing tools for assessing the 
vulnerability condition of the studied Earthquake Emergency Routes. The second stage 
consisted in implementing the results in a dynamic database with Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS) capabilities. 
For the first stage a database was developed as a search-engine to allow the static and 
dynamic evaluation of the condition of the selected critical routes prior to and following 
an earthquake disaster. Several specialized software programs were developed to act as 
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independent units — all of them interacting with the database as needed — for evaluating 
the different sources of vulnerability along the Earthquake Emergency Routes.   
Three modules were developed, as shown in Fig. 4-7. The first module corresponds to 
a Data Management Module. This module handles the information related to the routes, 
and bridges. The information included is the one described in the previous section 










Fig. 4-7 – Organization of the GIS implementation 
 
The Pattern Recognition Module uses the information contained in the Data 
Management Module to process and obtain vulnerability assessment of bridge structures 
and geotechnical aspects of the bridges and routes and was used to feed information to 
the Scenario Management Module.  
The Scenario Management Module is implemented on the extraordinary capabilities 
of HAZUS software developed by the Federal Management Agency [FEMA, 2005] that 
is capable of accepting the feed-back of the results obtained from the Pattern Recognition 
Module. HAZUS is capable of obtaining vulnerability assessments for any case in 
particular for mitigation purposes, allows simulations for different earthquake occurrence 
scenarios, and will allow in the future to be used when online capabilities are 
implemented within Indot for monitoring response to an actual earthquake occurrence.  
FEMA
HAZUS





4.4 Vulnerability Assessment Approach 
The assessment of seismic vulnerability for a significant number of structures 
requires the use of identification of patterns of behavior of these structures to the 
envisioned earthquake ground motion. The approach used in comparable previous cases 
has been to define groups of structures having similar properties or configuration for 
which common behavior patterns can be defined. These behavior patterns have been 
referred in the literature as fragility curves relating probability of having a particular type 
of damage to a ground motion descriptor such as peak ground acceleration. 
For implementation in this project several shortcomings were identified in using this 
approach:  
• The inventory of bridges under study covers from bridges recently built to 
bridges built in the 1910’s and 1920’s. Figure 4-8 shows the year of construction 
of the Indot Vincennes District bridges. Establishing general fragility curves 
giving probability that a certain type of damage occurs for such a diverse 
inventory lead to many types of fragility curves and their use in establishing 
actual vulnerability may be questionable. 
• Many of the bridges have been rebuilt (except bridges built after 1990) at 
different moment. Figure 4-9 shows the percentage of the Vincennes District 
bridges that have been rebuilt, and the average year when the rebuilding took 
place. The influence of such a significant percentage of bridges having been 
rebuilt makes the fragility curve type of approach even more difficult to apply. 
• Associating the bridge vulnerability of a set value of seismic risk assessment as 
presented in a specific map, for example the one contained in Current 17th 
Edition of the Standard AASHTO Specifications, will require a new assessment 
if the map contained in the requirements changes. The adoption of new more 
modern specifications will surely take place in the near future, but the nature of 
the changes that will be introduced before adoption are unknown presently. The 
adoption of the proposed Draft LRFD Seismic Requirements has been voted 
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down by several states who have questioned the complexity and eventual 
unneeded extra cost that their adoption will bring.  
 







































Fig. 4-8 – Number of bridges built per decade (Vincennes District) 
 



































































Fig. 4-9 – Percentage of bridges rebuilt according to decade of construction and average 




Based on these limitations a different approach was implemented in this study. The 
approach used is based in selecting a number of bridges to study their seismic behavior 
under varying earthquake ground motion severity thus making the study independent of 
current requirements and making the results valid under mapped values having different 
return period or acceleration (peak ground or spectral) values. Using the results from the 
study of these bridges a procedure to extrapolate the results to the rest of the bridges in 
the Vincennes District was devised, requiring as information only that contained in the 
Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database. This establishes two levels of confidence on 
the vulnerability assessment. The first one is general and covers all bridges in the 
Inspection and Maintenance Database. The second one is more detailed because is based 
on the information contained in the bridge drawings. The advantage of this approach is 
that it permits to gage the vulnerability of the whole bridge inventory. It permits devising 
policies of general nature with respect to the selection, or variation in the future, of the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes. It also permits a more detailed assessment by supplying 
additional information to the GIS system data base, in case the detailed data is not already 
in the system. A detailed explanation of the procedure is given in Chapter 6. 
 
4.5 Mitigation and Simulation 
Vulnerability mitigation policies that cover the bridge inventory in southwestern 
Indiana are possible using the HAZUS GIS system. The assessment of the impact of a 
variation of the seismic risk maps or the simulation of occurrence of an earthquake with 
specific location and magnitude can be easily achieved by matching the new values to the 
already computed curves relating the bridge expected damage to the level of acceleration. 
If a bridge is retrofitted, the changes introduced to the bridge substructure or 










This chapter describes the methodology implemented for processing the geotechnical 
information available for the selected bridges and to be used, in the future, as the 
database is expanded by adding more information from drawings or from soil 
explorations. The Inspection and Maintenance Database does not contain geotechnical 
information; therefore, the approximate vulnerability assessment does not include 
evaluation of the geotechnical sources of vulnerability.  
Not all the studied bridge drawings contained soil exploration boring information. In 
the majority of cases studied the boring logs included in the drawings contained the soil 
description for each layer and reported the Standard Penetration Test (SPT) values at 
appropriate intervals. In rock sites many of the boring logs report the recovery percentage 
appropriately. In some instances the boring logs only report the soil classification for 
each layer without any SPT values. Textural description of the soil is the accepted 
practice for defining the soil classification in the field by the boring team to be reported 
in the boring log. In general, especially for older borings, the description is based on the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture textural classification chart [USDA, 1951] presented in 
Fig. 5-1. Percentages of sand, silt, and clay are established visually based only in the 
particle size. The soil classification description used corresponds to the one in the zone of 
the figure where the three percentage values meet. No laboratory procedures are involved 
in assigning the soil layer description. The AASHTO Soil Classification System or the 
Unified Soil Classification (ASTM D2487 — “Standard Classification of Soils for 
Engineering Purposes — Unified Soil Classification System”) require laboratory tests 





Fig. 5-1 – USDA Textural Soil Classification Chart [USDA, 1951] routinely  
used for soil classification by soil exploration boring teams 
 
The software implementation uses the soil exploration boring reports contained in the 
selected bridge drawings to study the geotechnical sources of vulnerability for each of the 
bridge sites. Other sites can be studied by adding information to the database in the 
future.  
Two evaluations are performed using the boring information: a soil profile 
amplification assessment and a liquefaction potential assessment. These evaluations are 
made for varying peak ground accelerations in rock to be consistent with the adopted 
approach in this research project of obtaining the vulnerability for different levels of 
ground motion at the site and not to depend on a unique description of ground motion as 
contained in a particular set of seismic risk maps. Soil profile amplification and 
liquefaction potential are acceleration dependent; therefore, the values obtained cover 
different seismic risk levels.  
The possibilities of evaluation are presented in the main screen of the software 




Fig. 5-2 – Main screen for the liquefaction evaluation module developed 
 
This module permits to enter, save, and retrieve boring information for any bridge site 
borings, and to process it to obtain the soil profile amplification potential, evaluate the 
liquefaction susceptibility, and to save to results for further analysis. 
 
5.2 Soil profile amplification 
The amplification potential of the soil profile is needed for the liquefaction evaluation 
and for the bridge vulnerability assessment; in the former case for estimating the ground 
motion acceleration at the surface and in the later case for defining the ground motion 
description for evaluation of the bridge. The methodology used is based on the procedure 
contained in the 2000 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 2000] as described in Section 2.3.1 
of this report.  
The first step is to define the site class (A to F) as presented in Table 2-11. The 
classification is made using average shear wave velocity ( sv ), average standard 
penetration resistance ( N ), average standard penetration resistance for the cohesionless 
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soils only ( chN ), and average undrained shear strength in case of cohesive soils ( us ). The 
software implementation is capable of using the more appropriate parameter from the soil 
exploration and laboratory reports. For the selected bridges because only Standard 
Penetration Test are reported the amplification potential is evaluated from the average 
standard penetration resistance ( N ) computed for the upper 100 ft (30 m) of the site 
profile using Eq. (5-1). Profiles containing distinctly different layers are subdivided into 




















where di is the thickness of any layer between 0 and 100 ft (30 m) and N is the Standard 
Penetration Resistance (SPT) not to exceed 100 blows/ft as directly measured in the field 
without corrections.  
Once the site is classified as being Class A to E (Class F requires a site specific 
evaluation) the curves presented in Figures 2-24 and 2-25 are used to obtain the 
amplification parameters Fa and Fv for the acceleration value under study. Spectral 
acceleration (Ss or S1) values are used directly to obtain Fa and Fv. If peak acceleration in 
rock is used (A) the value is multiplied by 2.5 to be used in Fig. 2-24 to obtain Fa and is 
used directly in Fig. 2-35 to obtain Fv.  
The values obtained were compared with results using the program SHAKE as 
described for several sites in Indiana in [Bobet et al., 2001] obtaining good correlations of 
the amplification levels obtained. 
Figure 5-3 shows the results obtained for a specific case. The figure reports that in 
this case (Bridge No. 41-42-04638) the bridge drawings included four borings. It also 
indicates that the procedure classified the soil profile in all borings as being Type E. The 
statistics shown in the screen indicate the number of borings that report a certain soil 
profile type. As opposed to buildings, where usually a single soil profile type is present, 
bridges by being extended structures may have different soil profile types under the 
abutments or at the bridge piers. This is specially true in alluvial plain sites, where many 
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of Indiana bridges are sited. Figure 5-3 also shows in graphic form the relationship 
between the horizontal acceleration in rock and the horizontal acceleration in surface for 
peak ground acceleration, or spectral ordinates (Ss and S1). 
 
 
Fig. 5-3 – Typical results for soil profile classification and amplification potential 
 
In total 182 bridge sites located on the defined Earthquake Emergency Routes were 
evaluated. This includes all the bridges located on the Emergency Routes whose 
drawings contained soil boring records shown as part of them. The information was used 
directly to define the soil profile type for each boring using the procedure described. 
When reporting the soil profile type that causes the maximum amplification the results 
shown in Fig. 5-4 are obtained indicating that for 159 bridges out of 182 (87%) the soil 
profile is classified as Type E (see Table 2-11 for description of the soil profiles). Soil 
profile Type D is obtained in 16 bridges (9%), soil profile types (B and C) just carry 7 
bridges (4%), and none are classified in soil profile Type A. These results are hardly 
surprising for the State of Indiana where very few rock type sites are found. 
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Notwithstanding, this situations has important implications from the point of view that 
mild earthquakes may produce moderate to high peak ground accelerations on surface 
due to the soil amplification caused by the intervening soil responding essentially in a 
elastic manner without the possibility of a decrease caused by the damping inherent in the 
nonlinear response of the soil ever occurring.   












Fig. 5-4 – Worse soil profile type at bridge site for 182 bridges  
on the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
 
5.3 Liquefaction 
The liquefaction potential is evaluated using the procedure described in Section 2.3.2 
of this report. The software implementation accepts information from field test in the 
form of cone penetration test (CPT), standard penetration test (SPT), or shear-wave 
velocity (Vs) measurements. The application of the procedure using the boring 
information available was restricted to evaluations using Standard Penetration Test 
values, but as more information is included in the database it is desirable to use more 
reliable field information such as CPT or shear wave velocity measurements for 
evaluations in the future.  
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For the selected bridge evaluation corrections, as described in Section 2.3.2, for fines 
content and earthquake magnitude were implemented. The corrections to SPT listed in 
Table 2-12 were implemented but not used (except overburden pressure and rod length 
corrections that were used in all cases) due to lack of information on the boring 
equipment and procedures as reported in the bridge drawings. As the database is 
expanded in the future the software implementation permits the use of these corrections if 
reported in the boring log.  
Fines content in a soil can have a significant influence in the liquefaction potential of 
a soil layer. The procedure to account for the presence of fines in the evaluation of the 
liquefaction potential is to adjust the value of the corrected blow count (N1)60 using Eq. 
(2-22) to an equivalent value for clean sand, (N1)60cs. The effect of the adjustment is an 
increase of the value of (N1)60 effectively used. It is considered [Youd and Idriss, 2001] 
that clean granular soils having a value of (N1)60 greater than 30 are too dense to liquefy 
and are classed as non-liquefiable. For most soil classification procedures, as shown in 
Fig. 5-5, fines are considered particles that can pass through a No. 200 sieve 
corresponding to a 0.08 mm size particle.  
 
 
Fig. 5-5 – Soil particle size according to several soil classification  




Boring reports as presented in bridge drawings do not include the results from the 
sieve analysis. In order to adjust the fine content of the soils as reported in the boring logs 
the percentage of silt and clay was determined from the soil classification reported in the 
borings using the chart presented in Fig. 5-1 or alternatively for some soil descriptions 
not contained there using the values suggested by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) classification as shown in Fig. 5-6. The implemented software permits editing the 
value of the fines content for any soil layer when needed.  
The influence of the fines content in the evaluation of the liquefaction potential 
cannot be underestimated and is recommendable that in the future, as more sites are 
included in the database, that fine content be reported from sieve analysis of the soil. 
 
Fig. 5-6 – FAA textural classification of soils [Winkerkorn and Fang, 1975] 
 
When evaluating liquefaction potential the expected number of cycles needed for the 
pore pressure increase development has been traditionally associated with the causing 
earthquake magnitude. The developers of the liquefaction evaluation procedure used the 
moment magnitude scale — Mw. Magnitude for the 1811-1812 New Madrid events has 
been estimated using different techniques, reporting values that range from a lower value 
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of 6 to an upper value of 9. The magnitude scale in which these values have been 
reported is uncertain and in some cases is not reported. 
The preference for moment magnitude is based on being the most consistent scale 
along a wide magnitude range, but it is the scale that requires more instrumental 
information to define its assigned value. Recent studies made by the USGS [Frankel et 
al., 2002] for the 2002 seismic risk maps update have set a maximum characteristic 
magnitude for the central and eastern U.S. for purposes of seismic risk assessment. The 
scale in which the characteristic magnitude is expressed is moment magnitude and has 
direct use in liquefaction potential evaluation.  
Figure 5-7 shows the maximum characteristic moment magnitude assessed for the 
central and eastern U.S. A value of Mw = 6.5 is given for all the state of Indiana, except 
the Wabash River Valley that is assigned a value Mw = 7.5. JTRP Project SPR 2812 on 
Analysis of Seismic Hazard Assessment for Indiana being currently conducted by Purdue 
Professors Haase and Nowack will surely give more insight on the values of Mw to be 
used and implemented in future liquefaction potential assessments. The software 
developed permits the variation of the magnitude to use. 
 




It is interesting to note that if the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD seismic 
requirements are adopted in Indiana, for the seven Indiana cities evaluated for 
comparison purposes in section 3.4.6 of this report any new bridge design would require 
liquefaction evaluation for the bridge site. Table 2-13 indicates the cases in which no 
liquefaction evaluation is needed for Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR) 3 to 6 that 
require in all cases magnitudes lower than 6.4. 
Typical results screens from the implemented software are shown in Figures 5-8 to 5-
10. In Fig. 5-8 the description of the boring is given reporting the soil layers and the 
Standard Penetration Test (SPT) values and the water table level. 
 
 




In Fig 5-9 the safety factor for liquefaction is given. The software first searches for 
the lowest surface ground acceleration that will produce liquefaction — in this case it is 
15% of the acceleration of gravity g — and reports the safety factor along the soil profile. 
In this case liquefaction occurs in a sand layer that reports a SPT value of 17 blows per 
foot at elevation 410. The peak ground acceleration in rock that produces the acceleration 
in surface leading to liquefaction corresponds in this case to 6% g. The soil profile 
reported by this boring is classified as being Type E and for a peak rock acceleration of 
6%g the amplification factor, Fa, has a value of 2.5 thus converting the 6% g acceleration 
in rock into 15% g acceleration in surface.  
 
 
Fig. 5-9 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for the lowest ground surface 
acceleration inducing liquefaction. In this case 15% g leads to a safety factor of 0.9 




Different peak ground accelerations in rock can be evaluated. Figure 5-10 shows the 
results in the liquefaction potential as described by the liquefaction safety factor for peak 
ground acceleration in rock of 4%g leading to a ground surface acceleration of 10%g the 
safety factor against liquefaction increases to a value of 1.4 thus reporting no 




Fig. 5-10 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for a different ground 
surface acceleration from the one shown in Fig. 5-9 not inducing liquefaction. In this case 
the lowest safety factor for 10% g surface acceleration is 1.4 
 
The factor of safety for liquefaction for a range of ground surface acceleration is 
stored in the database. This permits to handle different seismic risk scenarios without 
having to reprocess the boring information in each instance. 
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Bridge 050-42-06963 reported in the previous figures (Fig. 5-8 to Fig. 5-10) has 
description for four borings included in the drawings. Borings 1 and 3 are classified as 
being Soil Profile Type D while borings 2 and 4 are classified as Soil Profile Type E. The 
peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction obtained were 6% g for 
borings No. 1, 2, and 4 and 4% g for boring No. 3.   
The situation just described in present in many of the 182 bridges studied along the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes. The evaluation was performed for two values of Mw (Mw 
= 6.5 and Mw = 7.5). Table 5-1 presents a summary of the minimum peak ground 
acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction at bridge sites studied. The 
information is presented for the two moment magnitude studied.   
 
Table 5-1 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction 
on the 182 bridges sites studied along the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
 
No. of Bridges PGA rock (g) Mw=7.5 % Mw=6.5 % 
0.02 2 1.1%  0.0% 
0.03 27 14.8% 3 1.6% 
0.04 23 12.6% 18 9.9% 
0.05 10 5.5% 24 13.2% 
0.06 3 1.6% 10 5.5% 
0.07 2 1.1% 7 3.8% 
0.08 1 0.5% 2 1.1% 
0.09 4 2.2% 2 1.1% 
0.10 1 0.5% 1 0.5% 
0.11 2 1.1%  0.0% 
0.12 1 0.5% 1 0.5% 
0.13 1 0.5% 2 1.1% 
0.14  0.0% 2 1.1% 
0.15  0.0% 1 0.5% 
0.16  0.0%  0.0% 
0.17 1 0.5%  0.0% 
0.18 1 0.5% 2 1.1% 
0.28  0.0% 1 0.5% 
0.42  0.0% 1 0.5% 
0.48  0.0% 1 0.5% 
No liquefaction 103 56.6% 104 57.1% 




With the minimum peak ground acceleration in rock needed to produce liquefaction 
at the bridge site it is possible to have a general picture of the vulnerability caused by 
liquefaction for the bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes. This information is 
presented in Fig. 5-11. In this figure the percentage of bridge sites that may be affected 
by liquefaction when the peak ground acceleration in rock reaches a certain value may be 
obtained. At peak ground accelerations in rock of the order of 10% g the curve flattens, 
meaning that the number of bridges sites susceptible of liquefaction would remain 
essentially the same even for higher accelerations. At this level of acceleration in rock 
approximately 40% of the bridges located along the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
would have reported liquefaction. This acceleration is of the same order of magnitude of 
those contained in current Division I-A of AASHTO Standard Specifications. 























Fig. 5-11 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes that will not 
have liquefaction at the site for a given peak ground acceleration in rock computed using 
the minimum acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site 
 
Liquefaction potential was computed at all borings for each of the studied bridge 
sites. Only in few cases the minimum acceleration needed to produce liquefaction is the 
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same for all borings. If instead of reporting the minimum peak ground acceleration in 
rock the average acceleration for those borings reporting liquefaction is computed, the 
vulnerability situation changes. Figure 5-12 shows the information computed for the 
average peak ground acceleration in rock to produce liquefaction at the site. The curves 
shown flatten at a higher acceleration (15% g) but show a similar trend. Using the 
average peak ground acceleration in rock at the bridge site, the number of vulnerable 
bridges due to liquefaction at the level of acceleration of the current AASHTO Standard 
Specifications reduces to approximately 35% of the bridges on the Earthquake 
Emergency Routes. 























Fig. 5-12 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes that will not 
have liquefaction at the site for a given peak ground acceleration in rock computed using 
the average acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site 
 
The primary concern when interpreting the data just presented is related to the 
difference in peak ground acceleration in rock values for the same bridge site. If the 
difference between the minimum accelerations to produce liquefaction and the mean 
acceleration for the same bridge site is relatively large, it indicates significant variations 
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in the soil profile recorded in the soil exploration borings for the same bridge site. The 
ratio of mean to minimum peak ground acceleration producing liquefaction at the same 
bridge site has values that range from 1 to 6 with an average of the order of 1.4 for the 
bridge sites studied, indicating significant variations in the soil profiles.  
To emphasize the need for engineering judgment in interpreting the results presented, 
the following example brings out features found in many of the bridges located in the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes. Bridge 50-42-04625 on the Wabash River carries US 
Route 50 across the river to Illinois. The bridge drawings contain records of 24 soil 
borings made in 1960 all of them containing appropriate information (soil description and 
standard penetration test – SPT – logs) to evaluate the soil amplification potential and the 
liquefaction potential at each boring. The evaluation of the Soil Profile Type indicates 
that the profile at one boring would be Type B, at five borings Type D, and Type E at the 
remaining 18 borings. The general classification of the bridge site based on the softer 
profile would assign the bridge site as being Type E. The liquefaction evaluation for the 
borings report possibility of liquefaction in 11 out of the 24 borings for magnitude Mw = 
7.5. Table 5-2 presents the peak ground acceleration in rock required for producing 
liquefaction at each of the borings reporting liquefaction. In the same table the minimum 
and maximum peak ground acceleration obtained is reported as well as the mean and 
standard deviation for the acceleration. 
In order to interpret the liquefaction potential computation for the studied bridges 
besides the information presented, two other variables were studied: 
• Percentage of borings reporting liquefaction of the total number of borings. 
• Ratio of the range of peak ground acceleration in rock producing liquefaction 
to the mean peak ground acceleration. 
For Bridge 50-42-04625 the percentage of borings reporting liquefaction was 58% 
and the ratio of the range of peak ground acceleration in rock producing liquefaction to 
the mean peak ground acceleration was (0.36–0.05)/0.10 = 3.1. These values were 
computed for all bridges reporting liquefaction and based on the values obtained a 
recommendation was formulated dividing the bridges studied into four groups designated 
as: bridges having no liquefaction, bridges with a high probability of liquefaction, bridges 
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with an appreciable probability of liquefaction, and bridges having liquefaction but were 
a wide variability of the results is present that require additional soil exploration and a 
more in depth liquefaction study performed by geotechnical consultants.  
 
Table 5-2 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction 




Acceleration in Rock 
for liquefaction 
14 8% g 
15 8% g 
16 9% g 
17 7% g 
18 6% g 
19 6% g 
20 8% g 
21 36% g 
22 5% g 
23 7% g 
24 7% g 
Min. PGArock 5% g 
Max. PGArock 36% g 
Mean PGArock 10% g 
Standard Deviation 9% g 
 
Figure 5-13 presents the percentage of bridges studied that fall into the 
recommendation categories for the two moment magnitude studied.  
Other considerations that are beyond present study are related to issues related to 
variation of the soil profile as used in the evaluation that may have occurred during the 
years since the borings were performed. Other important consideration to take into 
account is related to the water table at the site. Liquefaction can only occur in relatively 
loose granular soils located under the water table. The potential for liquefaction studied 
and reported used the water table level reported in the borings. The possibility of 
variations of the water table level due to seasonal effect with respect to the moment the 
borings were performed can affect the results presented. This is specially important for 
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those cases not reporting liquefaction due to a depressed water table in cases were loose 


































Fig. 5-13 – Recommendation for bridges located along the Earthquake Emergency 
Routes  
 
Using has HAZUS-MH [FEMA, 2005] — a GIS-based software tool developed by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) — Indot bridge inventory was 
assessed for the liquefaction potential that was evaluated using the actual soil borings 
included in the bridge drawings, as described before.  The Indot bridge data base was 
integrated within HAZUS-MH and the GIS functions were activated. The liquefaction 
potential was evaluated using HAZUS-MH own liquefaction potential evaluation 
routines. This was performed for the Mw = 6.5 earthquake scenario obtaining comparable 
result.   
5.4 Soil spread 
For a soil spread situation to occur during earthquake liquefaction has to occur. The 
soil spread scenarios are difficult to state and requires analysis and studies beyond what 
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can be implemented in application software of the type implemented in this project. In a 
previous JTRP project [Bobet et al., 2001] soil spread scenarios and consequences were 
studied for several sites in southwestern Indiana indicating the possibility of their 
occurrence. The study also indicated that the Indiana Department of Transportation 
practice of using steel H piles and steel encased concrete (SEC) piles reduces 
significantly the potential damage to piles during earthquakes. This study recommends 
mitigation studies and implementations that should be adopted for all bridge structures 
located along the Indiana Emergency Routes. A warning should be issued when 
liquefaction may occur and the bridge is supported on footings. The same type of 
warning is given when possibility of liquefaction is identified bellow the tip of piles, 
situation that seldom occurs. 
 
5.5 Embankment stability 
The absence of information on embankment slope geometry and description of 
mechanical properties of the fill material both in the Inspection and Maintenance 
Database and the selected bridge drawings precludes the inclusion of test cases for the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes. Not withstanding, test cases studied for fill material 
commonly used in Indiana indicate that for embankments with slopes of 1 vertical to 2 
horizontal there is a low probability of instability in the embankment itself for ground 
accelerations up to the order of 15% g and embankment heights lower than 30 ft (10 m). 
The possibility of liquefaction or other type of ground failure under the embankment 
must be studied independently along the routes. Information on soil profile under the 
embankment and properties of the fill material probably would require soil exploration 










This chapter describes the methodology implemented for assessing the bridge seismic 
vulnerability by processing information available for all bridges located in the Vincennes 
District of the Indiana Department of Transportation and for selected bridges whose 
drawings were used. The information contained in the Indot Inspection and Maintenance 
Database was used directly for obtaining an approximate evaluation of the bridge seismic 
vulnerability. The drawings of selected bridges were used for obtaining a more reliable 
vulnerability assessment of each selected bridge. The results of the analysis of the bridges 
whose drawings were used to calibrate the approximate procedures based on the 
Inspection and Maintenance Database information.  
 
6.2 Information from the Inspection and Maintenance Database 
Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database is implemented in MS Access and 
contains information descriptive of the bridge that is relevant from the inspection and 
maintenance management point of view. Only part of the information contained in the 
database is related to structural information and although general in nature, lends itself to 
assign the bridge within broad seismic behavior categories.  
The information from the database that was used directly in the approximate 
vulnerability assessment can be grouped in the following general categories: for database 
indexing purposes, relative to location, road under or over the bridge, date of construction 
and repair, general bridge geometry, superstructure characteristics including deck 
information, substructure characteristics, and information on the approaches and 
abutments. Table 6-1 presents the database keys that were used for processing the 




Table 6-1 – Basic information from Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database  
that was included in the analysis 
 
Group Information 
Number of Records 
Total No. of Bridge Records Database 
Record No. 
National Bridge Inventory No. 









Road Number Over Road Data 
Road Number Under 
Year Built 
Structure Designation 
Year Reconstructed Age Data 
Sufficiency Rating 
Number of Intermediate Piers 




Minimum Vertical Clearance Over 
Minimum Vertical Clearance Under 
Total Horizontal Clearance Over 
Geometry Data 
Largest Vertical Distance 
Structure Type 
Length Maximum Span 
Number of Main Spans 
Deck Structure Type 
Deck Thickness 
Bearing Diaphragm 
Bridge Joint Type Interior 
Bridge Joint Type (N/E) 
Bridge Joint Type (S/W) 
Cross Bracing 
Hinge Pin Connection 
Intermediate Diaphragms 
Main Structure Type 
Number of Approach Spans 
Number of Beams 
Number of Floor Beams 
Number of Girders 
Number of Stringers 
Superstructure Data 
Redundancy Code 
Abutment Type (W/S) 
Abutment Type (E/N) 






6.3 Approximate vulnerability assessment methodology 
The approach to an approximate evaluation of vulnerability in many instances has 
been based just on the type of bridge. This methodological approach depends on general 
correlations for each bridge type, usually called fragility relationships, between 
probability of reaching a certain performance level (total collapse, partial collapse, 
reparable damage, or other) and expected ground acceleration at the bridge site. Results 
from this type of analysis are applicable, within the uncertainties inherent to this type of 
methodology, at a national or state level. As the size of the sample becomes smaller the 
results obtained are less reliable especially if diverse bridge types of varying age are 
present in the sample. In this research project it was considered that the information 
contained in the Inspection and Maintenance Database is appropriate to determine, in an 
approximate but more reliable manner, the relevant parameters that are needed to 
establish a vulnerability level. The relevant parameters considered are: 
• Mass of the bridge 
• Stiffness of the substructure 
• Toughness available for adequate nonlinear response 
• Strength of the lateral load resisting elements 
The Inspection and Maintenance Database contains information from which the 
values of the relevant parameters can be estimated as follows: 
The mass of the bridge is associated mainly with the mass of the superstructure and 
the deck is generally the main contributor. The Inspection and Maintenance Database 
lists the deck material, and deck width and thickness; thus permitting to obtain a good 
approximation of its mass. Allowances for wearing surface, barriers and, guard rails are 
also included. The number of girders, beams, and stringers; and the structural material is 
listed in the database. Their mass can be estimated as a function of a span dependent 
depth that is characteristic of each superstructure type. The contribution to mass of the 
diaphragms and bracing elements can also be estimated from the number and type as 
listed in the database. Having an estimative of the superstructure mass and geometry it is 
possible to establish minimum cross-sectional dimensions required to support the gravity 
effects for the bents based on the adjacent span lengths and structural type. Vertical 
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clearance indicates the height of the bents. Results from these estimates were compared 
with mass computed for the selected bridges whose drawings were used in the formal 
vulnerability assessment and with comparison of projects whose information was 
available in the literature. 
The lateral stiffness of the bridge depends on the substructure type whose minimum 
dimensions were established in the computation of mass. The Inspection and 
Maintenance Database does not describe if the bridge is supported on frame or wall type 
bents, thus the estimate of the lateral stiffness is approached from the low side. 
Adjustments are made to this estimate for live load allowance especially in short span 
bridges.  
Using the estimative of mass and lateral stiffness fundamental vibration periods for 
the transverse and longitudinal directions are computed taking into account the expansion 
joint and hinge pin connection descriptions contained in the database. Lateral force 
demand, longitudinal and transverse, is established for varying values of ground 
acceleration. Expected lateral deformation of the superstructure and base shear demand 
on the substructure is then estimated for each acceleration level. 
The level of toughness required for adequate nonlinear response of the substructure 
elements is associated directly with the date of construction of the bridge. Lateral load 
strength is associated directly with the estimated substructure dimensions.  
Bridge vulnerability is then established for each acceleration level based on excessive 
lateral deformations or lack of strength to resist the imposed base shear. For each 
acceleration level the bridge is red-tagged meaning vulnerable, yellow-tagged meaning 
marginal vulnerability, and green-tagged meaning not vulnerable. 
These computations are made for all bridges in the Vincennes district inventory. For 
selected bridges the results were compared to the results obtained using the actual 




6.4 Formal vulnerability assessment methodology 
The implemented software permits to include information from the bridge drawings 
in the vulnerability assessment database. This was performed for selected bridges as 
previously mentioned. The information covered is divided as shown in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6-2 – Basic information from bridge drawings needed for formal vulnerability 
assessment and included in the software implementation database 
 
Group Information Detail 
Database File management Same Information from Inspection and Maintenance Database 
Number of spans, bents, element types, units (US 
customary or metric SI) 
Number of vibration modes to use General Bridge Information 
Use of rigid zones in bents 
Deck width, thickness, additional mass,  
Span Information Deck and Span Information 
Deck expansion joints type and location 
Bridge 
Information 
Geotechnical Information Same as described in section 5.2 
Cross-section dimensions 
Material information Bent Column Information Modeling parameters (cracking, effective area, 
nonlinear characteristics) 
Cross-section dimensions 
Material information Bent Beam Information Modeling parameters (cracking, effective area, 
nonlinear characteristics) 





Piles dimensional properties Piles 
Piles material properties 
Footing Type 
Footing dimensional properties 
Footing material Properties Footings 
Piles geometrical distribution 
Abutment Type 
Abutment dimensional properties 




Piles geometrical distribution 
Geometry Bent Types Element type Bents 
Bent Location Location in bridge 
Spectrum From Bridge Specs 
Accelerogram From accelerogram database 
Spectrum computed from 
accelerogram 
Computation of spectrum from ground motion and 
smoothing possibilities Ground Motion 
Increasing ground motion 
definition 
Parameters to obtain performance patterns by 




The information gathering process for each bridge is initiated including the 
information contained in the Inspection and Maintenance Database. The rest of the data 
must be provided from information contained in the bridge drawings. 
Using this information several tasks were performed once a process is initiated. Some 
of these tasks are performed only once in the process — routine tasks — while others are 
performed repeatedly with each level of intensity of ground motion — ground motion 
intensity-dependent tasks—.  
 
6.4.1 Routine tasks 
Those processes that are not dependent on the ground motion intensity were 
performed first. They comprised the following tasks: 
• Computation of element section properties. 
• Computation of mass and stiffness properties for the superstructure and 
substructure elements. 
• Computation of transverse and longitudinal vibration periods and modal 
shapes.  
• Definition of strength in flexure and shear for all elements. For bent girders 
this was performed at sections where maximum stresses are expected under 
seismic effects. For bent piers and walls flexure-axial force interaction 
diagrams were computed. Reinforcement anchorage strength at joints was 
evaluated. 
• Collapse mechanisms were evaluated for all bents defining the maximum 
tributary base shear strength. Distinction was made between flexural and shear 
collapse mechanisms.  
• The lateral-load strength of bearings was evaluated. For bearings vulnerable to 
overturning or sliding under lateral load, the maximum transmitted shear 
before overturning or sliding was evaluated. Maximum available seat lengths 
were defined at non-fixed joints.  
• For abutments and foundation elements, stiffness and deformation properties 
were evaluated. Strength for shear and overturning were evaluated. 
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From the above computed information a path of least strength was defined. For 
example bent piers were evaluated for the possibility of reaching shear strength before 
flexural strength thus initiating a brittle failure mode. At pier-foundation or wall-
foundation joints the ability to transmit the forces developed when the pier reaches its 
maximum strength was evaluated, thus defining a weak link in the seismic load path. The 
maximum seismic ground-motion induced-forces that the structural system is capable of 
resisting were defined from the load path evaluation. These forces indicate the level of 
seismic base shear that may induce severe damage or collapse of the bridge.  
 
6.4.2 Ground motion intensity-dependent tasks 
The processes that depend on the ground motion intensity were performed for 
increasing levels of intensity of the ground motion. The ground motion intensity was 
defined in rock as peak ground acceleration, Aa. For a set value of peak ground 
acceleration in rock the following tasks (see Fig. 6-1) were performed in the order 
presented: 
1. From the geotechnical information the soil profile amplification was determined 
using the procedure described in Section 5.2. This permitted the computation of 
spectral ordinates that are comparable to those defined through parameters SS and 
S1 as described in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions. This fully 
described the response spectrum for which the rest of the vulnerability assessment 
for the set ground motion was made. 
2. The liquefaction potential was evaluated for the set acceleration value and 
reported. No further analysis on collateral potential of damage to the bridge 
caused by liquefaction was performed as explained in Section 5.4.  
3. Structural element internal forces were obtained using a linear modal spectral 
response procedure based on the vibration periods and modal shapes computed in 
the routine tasks and the response spectrum from Step 1. Strength demands were 
compared with the strength capacity levels obtained in the routine tasks. A similar 
comparison was performed for the displacement demand against the maximum 
allowable displacement obtained in the routine tasks. The bridge was deemed not 
vulnerable for the set intensity of seismic ground motion and green-tagged and no 
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further analysis was performed if: a) the strength demand in all the structural 
elements was not exceeded, b) the displacement demand was within the 
established tolerable limit, and c) displacements at the supports did not exceed the 
limits established previously in the routine tasks,. If any of the strength or 
displacements limits were exceeded tasks 4 to 7 were performed. 
4. If the shear strength level or the evaluation of reinforcement anchorage indicated 
possibility of a bond failure, the bridge was deemed vulnerable. The bridge was 
yellow-tagged or red-tagged depending on the level of expected damage and the 
spread of damage to the different elements.  
5. If the possibility of bearing element failure by overturning or excessive 
displacement at movable supports was detected, the bridge was deemed 
vulnerable. The bridge was yellow-tagged or red-tagged based on the amount of 
expected deformation and the magnitude of potential horizontal or vertical 
permanent displacements of the superstructure.  
6. The bridge was updated to red-tag if compound yellow-tagging was obtained both 
from the strength and the displacement checks. No further analysis was performed 
and the vulnerability level was reported for the set value of ground acceleration if 
steps 4, 5, or 6 yellow-tagged or red-tagged the bridge.  
7. If the flexural strength for any element was exceeded in the evaluation performed 
in step 3, a nonlinear response evaluation was made. A substitute-structure 
procedure [Shibata and Sozen, 1976] was performed by introducing damage 
ratios, μ, greater than unity to the elements where flexural strength was reached. 
A series of analyses were carried out for increasing values of the damage ratios to 
the elements until the base shear strength of the bridge as computed in the routine 
tasks was reached. The expected lateral displacement for the set value of ground 
motion intensity was the one obtained when the bridge reached the base shear 
strength. This procedure gives comparable results to those obtained by performing 
a push-over analysis. The stability of the structure was judged for the 
displacements obtained using displacement-based procedures. Based on these 
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Fig. 6-1 – Flow diagram for the formal vulnerability assessment implemented  
Set value of peak 
ground acceleration 
in rock, Aa 


















































The approach of developing and implementing a tool for studying the alternatives for 
defining the Indiana Earthquake Emergency Routes and the upgrade needs of the 
transportation structures along theses routes responds to the importance of two variables 
linked to the emergency routes selected, and the definition of the earthquake ground 
motion intensity for which the vulnerability of the current inventory of bridges should be 
gauged. The effect on the upgrade needs of these two variables is substantial. Variations 
of the road segments to be included within the emergency routes affect the travel times 
and the number of bridges that may need upgrading. Once a set of routes were defined, 
the envisioned earthquake ground motion intensity to be used in defining the 
vulnerability of the transportation structures affects directly the upgrade needs for these 
structures.  
7.2 Bridges studied 
Table 7-1 shows the distribution by bridge type of the inventory of bridges in the 
Indot Vincennes District. Currently there are 827 bridges that are located in the Interstate 
System, in US Routes, and in State Roads. The distribution by location in the different 
counties was presented in Table 4-1. A total of 230 of these bridges are located in the 
selected Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana, corresponding to 28% of the 
inventory. Table 7-1 also shows the distribution by bridge type of the 69 bridges that 
were studied in detail using the information contained in drawings. The sample was 
defined trying to maintain the bridge type percentages similar. 
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Table 7-1 – Distribution by bridge type in the Vincennes Indot District of the total bridge 
inventory, in the suggested emergency routes, and in the bridges studied in detail 
 
Bridge 





















































BT Bailey Truss 1 0.1%   
CCTB Continuous Concrete T - Beam 1 0.1% 1 0.4% 
CPCBB Continuous Prestressed Concrete Box Beam 23 2.8% 4 1.7% 
CPCIB Continuous Prestressed Concrete I - Beam 69 8.3% 22 9.6% 
CPCTB Continuous Prestressed Concrete T - Beam 5 0.6% 2 0.9% 
CRCB Continuous Reinforced Concrete Box 1 0.1%   
CRCG Continuous Reinforced Concrete Girder 27 3.3% 15 6.5% 
CRCRF Continuous Reinforced Concrete Rigid Frame 1 0.1% 1 0.4% 
CRCS Continuous Reinforced Concrete Slab 162 19.6% 53 23.0% 
CRPG Continuous Riveted Plate Girder 3 0.4% 2 0.9% 
CSB Continuous Steel Beam 89 10.8% 46 20.0% 
CSG Continuous Steel Girder 16 1.9% 10 4.3% 
CSTA Continuous Steel Tied Arch - Truss 2 0.2%   
KCSB Composite Continuous Steel Beam 51 6.2% 31 13.5% 
KCSBG Composite Continuous Steel Box Girder 1 0.1%   
KCSG Composite Continuous Steel Girder 56 6.8% 33 14.3% 
KSB Composite Steel Beam 10 1.2%   
KSG Composite Steel Girder 8 1.0%   
MPA Metal Pipe Arch 1 0.1%   
MPAUF Multi-Plate Arch - Underfill 23 2.8%   
PCAUF Precast Concrete Arch - Underfill 3 0.4%   
PCB Precast Concrete Beam 10 1.2% 2 0.9% 
PCBB Prestressed Concrete Box Beam 61 7.4% 2 0.9% 
PCIB Prestressed Concrete I - Beam 31 3.7% 1 0.4% 
PCS Precast Concrete Slab 1 0.1%   
PCSUF Precast Concrete Slab - Underfill 3 0.4%   
PTRCS Post-Tensioned Reinforced Concrete Slab 1 0.1%   
RCA Reinforced Concrete Arch 32 3.9%   
RCAOS Reinforced Concrete Arch - Open Spandrel 1 0.1%   
RCAUF Reinforced Concrete Arch - Underfill 17 2.1%   
RCBUF Reinforced Concrete Box - Underfill 16 1.9%   
RCG Reinforced Concrete Girder 51 6.2% 2 0.9% 
RCS Reinforced Concrete Slab 21 2.5% 1 0.4% 
RCSUF Reinforced Concrete Slab - Underfill 2 0.2%   
RPG Riveted Plate Girder 2 0.2%   
SB Steel Beam 6 0.7% 1 0.4% 
SPT Steel Pony Truss 6 0.7%   
STT Steel Thru Truss 9 1.1%   
UCA Unreinforced Concrete Arch 1 0.1%   
WSTG Welded Steel Thru Girder 3 0.4% 1 0.4% 




Figure 7-1 shows the distribution by bridge type on the Earthquake Emergency 
Routes. The most abundant type of bridge (23%) corresponds to Continuous Reinforced 
Concrete Slab bridge type both in the whole district and in the selected emergency routes. 
Continuous Steel Beam bridges (20%) and Composite Continuous Steel Girder (14.3%) 
correspond to the next largest groups. 
 






































Fig. 7-1 – Bridge type distribution on the Earthquake Emergency Routes  
 
 
7.3 Retrofit Needs 
The current inventory of bridges in the Vincennes Indot District was studied for 
varying degrees of earthquake ground motion intensity using an approximate 
vulnerability assessment methodology. The same approach of varying the intensity of the 
ground motion was performed for the selected bridges that were studied in detail.  
As expected, bridge vulnerability and liquefaction potential in some bridge sites 
increased with the ground acceleration level. The importance of the definition of the 
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ground motion intensity for which the vulnerability level is assessed is explained by the 
number of bridges that would be red-tagged — 7% of the total Vincennes District bridge 
inventory — when the envisioned design ground motion contained in current 17th Edition 
of the AASHTO Standard Specifications are used as compared with a 15% when the 
ground motion description contained in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Update.  
The vulnerability assessment indicates that the most frequent cause of concern is 
associated with unseating of the superstructure at supports (65% of bridges red-tagged) 
followed by shear failure of bent vertical elements (25% of bridges red-tagged). Other 
sources of vulnerability studied account for the rest of the red-tagged bridges. This figure 
is consistent for the whole inventory and for the selected bridges studies in detail. Bridge 
age correlates directly with vulnerability in the entire sample.   
Overturning of the widely used movable expansion support of the type shown in Fig. 
7-2 was found to be associated with many of the cases of unseating detected. In some 
instances peak ground accelerations in surface as low as 10%g would cause overturning. 
 





Liquefaction as a source of vulnerability was present in the sample studied using the 
bridge drawings that reported soil borings. 182 bridges out of 230 reported a geotechnical 
exploration that could be used for evaluating liquefaction with 43% of them reporting 
sand or sandy soil and a water table level above the material susceptible of liquefaction. 
Lowest peak ground acceleration in rock that would produce liquefaction was below 5% 
g in several sites. The average peak ground acceleration in rock to produce liquefaction 
for the 79 sites where potential for liquefaction was detected was found to be 
approximately 5% g for the Mw = 7.5 scenario and 8% g for the Mw = 6.5 scenario.  
The HAZUS-MH implementation produced comparable results indicating the 
approach of using the FEMA methodology is warranted.   
 
7.4 Improvement of the approximate vulnerability assessment 
The approximate seismic vulnerability assessment based on the information contained 
in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database can be improved in the future by including 
additional information in the database. This additional information already exists in each 
set of bridge drawings. Although the drawings are available in electronic form they were 
scanned from hard copies and this format is not amenable for automatic retrieval of the 
information thus requiring participation of an experienced engineer for collecting and 
adding the information to the vulnerability assessment database.  
There is a natural tradeoff between the effort of adding and maintaining this 
additional information and the degree of resolution sought in the approximate assessment 
procedure. The possibility of making a more detailed vulnerability analysis as 
implemented for selected bridges constitutes the upper limit of the additional information 
to be included. This may be unnecessary for a properly calibrated approximate procedure. 
The amount of additional information must be selected in a manner that maximizes the 
quality of the result and minimizes the data acquisition effort.  
Based on this, the minimum suggested set of additional information is the following: 
• Description of bent type and element dimension for all supports of the bridge. 




• Additional information on bearings more from the point of view of vulnerability 
to seismic effects.  
• Additional information on foundation types and soil profile. 
This additional information may be collected when the routine programmed 
inspections of the bridge are performed.  
The improvement in dependability on the approximate vulnerability analysis with just 











Different alternatives for Earthquake Emergency Routes for the Vincennes District of 
the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT), located in the southwestern corner of 
the State, were studied from the transportation point of view (Part I of this report) and the 
implications of seismic vulnerability of the transportation structures located in these 
roads were studied (Part II of this report). 
 
The Indot bridge inventory data and soils information were incorporated in a software 
tool based on geographical information systems technology (GIS) developed by FEMA  
(HAZUS-MH [FEMA, 2005]) for evaluation of the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
network of Indiana and for establishing policies for mitigation of earthquake hazard on 
these routes. This tool may be used to perform simulations for different earthquake 
scenarios, and to help in the response to an actual emergency caused by the occurrence of 
a strong earthquake in the region.   
 
The software tool is capable of performing a seismic vulnerability approximate 
assessment of the bridge inventory of the Vincennes Indot District using solely the 
information contained in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database. Using information 
from the bridge drawings the software tool developed allows performing a detailed 
seismic vulnerability assessment of selected bridges. The vulnerability assessment 
performed for the selected bridges was used to calibrate the approximate analysis 
procedure based only on Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database and to evaluate the 
vulnerability of the selected bridges for different levels of earthquake ground motion 




The reported research will help in the study and adoption of emergency response 
policies for different earthquake occurrence scenarios. These policies may be updated in 
the future as mitigation programs are implemented and their results incorporated in the 
bridge vulnerability assessment database.  
 
The reported comments on the current state of seismic risk evaluation for the 
southwestern region of Indiana will help the State of Indiana in making decisions related 
to the adoption of proposed bridge seismic design provisions or proposed seismic risk 





It is suggested that the findings and developments of this research project may be 
applied by the Indiana Department of Transportation in the following ways: 
 
1. Indot should consider formally adopting the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
for the State of Indiana from the routes studied, or variations of them. It is 
clear that the final set of Earthquake Emergency Routes adopted and 
maintained will be affected by issues and policies whose scope is outside 
those studied and reported in this research project. Policy decisions, budgetary 
constraints, and decisions related to new road projects, such as the projected 
south western continuation of I-69, will affect the formal adoption of the 
selected routes and will surely impose variations in the future. The 
methodology developed in this research project will provide valuable 





2. The study and adoption of mitigation strategies to implement in the future by 
Indot to update and maintain the Emergency Routes of Indiana can be made 
possible by performing simulations for different earthquake scenarios 
including earthquake ground motion defined in current AASHTO Standard 
Specifications, proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or other 
appropriate bridge specification. These simulations will provide 
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for the selected routes or alternative 
definitions.     
  
3. It is recommended that Indot expands the information contained in the 
Inspection and Maintenance Database to include information currently 
available only in the bridge drawings (see section 7.5). This will improve the 
vulnerability assessment of the bridges refining the mitigation policies to 
adopt in the future. This expansion of the database can be extended to other 
counties and districts not covered in this research project.  
 
4. It is recommendable that Indot adopt a program for assessing the liquefaction, 
soil spread, and embankment failure potential along the routes at locations 
different from just bridge sites by providing a consistent evaluation 
methodology based on the implementation developed in this research project. 
This implementation will require a soil exploration program to provide 
geotechnical properties of sites where no information exists or was performed 
many years ago with different objectives than liquefaction evaluation. In the 
reported research liquefaction evaluations were made using solely boring 
information contained in selected bridge drawings.  
  
5. It is recommended that FEMA HAZUS-MH software be adopted as the 
methodology for vulnerability assessment, mitigation decisions through the 
study of appropriate earthquake occurrence scenarios, and emergency 
response programs tuned to the study of these scenarios. Along with this 
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recommendation a key feature is the training of Indot personnel in the use of 
FEMA HAZUS-MH software. Engaging of the services of the Polis Center of 
Indiana University, an authorized HAZUS-MH earthquake and flood service 
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Introduction  
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the 
central Mississippi Valley has been known for 200 
years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Awareness 
of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has 
increased in the last decades. In the last two 
decades identification of an independent tectonic 
process occurring in the Wabash River Valley has 
implications for the seismic risk of the State of 
Indiana from what has recently been defined as the 
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a 
strong earthquake in these seismic zones or in 
Indiana or the neighboring states due to other not 
so well understood tectonic processes, as has 
occurred in the past, has serious implications for 
the State Transportation System. The definition of 
Earthquake Emergency Routes for the state is a 
priority for the Indiana Department of 
Transportation. The identification of Emergency 
Routes takes into account issues related to 
transportation including coverage of population and 
area and travel time along these routes.  
 
This study formulates a multicommodity maximal 
covering network design problem (MCNDP) for 
identifying critical routes, for earthquake response 
and to seismically retrofit bridges. The MCNDP 
seeks routes that minimize the total travel time over 
the selected routes and maximizes the total 
population covered, subject to a budget constraint 
on bridge retrofitting costs on the selected routes. 
The problem is formulated as a two-objective 
integer programming model and solved using the 
branch-and-cut module in the CPLEX optimizer. 
The model performance was analyzed using the 
transportation network of a seismically-prone 
region in southwest Indiana. Thereby, the search 
for the critical routes for an origin-destination (O-
D) pair is confined to a limited geographical region 
around it.  
 
A Geographical Information System (GIS) system 
was developed for evaluation of seismic 
vulnerability of the proposed Indiana Emergency 
Routes. The GIS based implementation of the 
technical information developed in this project 
through FEMA HAZUS-MH software was 
conducted in collaboration with the Polis Center in 
Indianapolis, nationally recognized and FEMA 
authorized HAZUS implementation facility. 
HAZUS software may be used for mitigation of 
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a strong 
earthquake in southwestern Indiana. It uses 
information from the Indiana Department of 
Transportation (INdot) maintenance database and 
selected structural and geotechnical information 
from the bridge drawings data base. Vulnerability 
assessment was performed using the general 
information from maintenance and final calibration 
was performed using a series of cases based on 
bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions 
contained in these drawings. 
Findings  
Computational experiments were conducted to 
investigate the effects of varying the budget and the 
relative weights of the two objectives. A set of 
critical routes was obtained. Seismic retrofit planning 
plays an important role in determining the 
effectiveness of the operational stage of earthquake 
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response management. At a strategic level, it is 
dependent on the routes critical for effective 
emergency response. However, past studies have not 
addressed the identification of critical routes under 
budget constraints. This is a very important practical 
problem for emergency response planners as it 
involves identifying effective transportation routes 
while accounting for bridge structural conditions and 
budget limitations. It implies the identification of 
bridges to retrofit under earthquake response 
planning. This study develops a network-level 
methodology to assist decision-makers in identifying 
an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of 
a network.  
 
This study formally defines the Multicommodity 
Maximal Covering Network Design Problem 
(MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge, 
it represents the first attempt to incorporate the 
coverage objective in a generic network model, 
leading to a new class of models with significant 
practical implications. Past work has used the 
coverage criterion in identifying a path, tree or 
tour on a network by considering either the 
routing or the fixed cost, while the proposed 
model simultaneously considers the routing and 
fixed costs subject to a budget constraint. That 
is, none of the existing models consider routing 
costs, fixed costs and coverage criterion in a 
single framework.   
 
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution 
of this study is its ability to address planning 
problems faced by emergency response agencies 
vis-à-vis disaster management. The specific 
problem addressed here relates to earthquake 
response management. Under budget constraints, 
there is a need to determine an effective retrofit 
plan for the bridges in a seismically-prone 
region. Most studies in the literature have 
adopted a local perspective to solving this 
problem, and do not consider the effect of 
potential bridge failures on the transportation 
system performance. The few methodologies 
that use a systems approach do not consider the 
influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of 
the associated routes vis-à-vis effective 
earthquake response. The proposed model fills 
this critical gap by considering the total travel 
time for the key O-D pairs in the network and 
the total population covered by them as the 
criteria for determining the critical routes. The 
budget limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs 
for the links constituting the critical routes is 
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence, 
this methodology simultaneously determines the 
set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and 
the routes that serve as focal points for 
earthquake response. 
 
The evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge 
design requirements contained in the AASHTO 
Specifications and the existence of a proposed 
draft seismic design specification being 
discussed have significant implications in the 
assessment of the existing vulnerability, its 
mitigation, and the design of new bridges along 
the Emergency Routes. Along with this 
development, the USGS assessment of the 
seismic risk of southwestern Indiana and a 
change of format of the definition of the 
earthquake design ground motion that is integral 
part of the proposed draft seismic design 
specification also has important implications on 
the assessment of the operational capabilities of 
the Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana. 
The effects of the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake 
that occurred in the State of Washington gave 
invaluable insight on the expected situation for 
the State of Indiana due to a comparable bridge 
inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel 
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both 
regions over the last decades.  
 
Using the information collected in this study, the 
GIS implementation through FEMA-HAZUS-
MH software may be used for mitigation of 
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a 
strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana. 
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels 
of ground acceleration in order to obtain 
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using 
these results, seismic behavior patterns were 
obtained for bridges located in southwestern 
Indiana included in the INdot Vincennes District 
maintenance data base. Soil amplification and 
liquefaction potential were evaluated for the 
cases having reported SPT measurements from 
borings. Based on this process, information 
critical for the identification of upgrade needs 
for the transportation structures part of the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes is made available 
to the INdot. 
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Implementation  
The findings and developments of this research 
project are presented next in the form of 
suggested implementation steps by the Indiana 
Department of Transportation. 
 
1. Formal adoption of the selected 
emergency routes or some variation of 
the same by the state is a necessary 
step. Such routes adopted and 
maintained by INdot will be affected by 
issues and policies outside the scope of 
those considered in this study. For 
instance, policy decisions, budgetary 
constraints, new projects, i.e. 
continuation of I-69, will likely affect 
the formal adoption of a set of 
emergency routes and will continue to 
impose changes in the future. The 
methodology developed in this study 
and the information implemented in 
HAZUS-MH should be of assistance to 
state decision makers in the future.  
 
2. Future implementation strategies can be 
studied through simulation studies 
using appropriately updated information 
for different earthquake scenarios 
including earthquake ground motion 
defined in current AASHTO Standard 
Specifications, proposed Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or 
other. These simulations will provide 
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for 
the proposed routes or alternative 
definitions.  
 
3. The information in the maintenance 
database should be periodically 
evaluated and should include 
information currently available only in 
the bridge drawings (see Section 7.5 of 
the final report). This will improve the 
vulnerability assessment of the bridges 
refining the mitigation policies to adopt 
in the future. This expansion of the 
maintenance database can be extended 
to other counties and districts not 
covered in this research project.  
 
4. Establish a program for assessing the 
liquefaction, soil spread, and 
embankment failure potential along the 
routes at locations other than bridge 
sites by providing a consistent 
evaluation methodology supported with 
the information developed in this study. 
This implementation will require a soil 
exploration program to obtain 
geotechnical properties of sites where 
no information exists or where such 
information was obtained years ago 
with different objectives than 
liquefaction evaluation. In the research 
conducted in this study, liquefaction 
evaluations were made using solely 
boring information contained in 
selected bridge drawings.  
 
5. To establish procedures for emergency 
response under different earthquake 
occurrence scenarios.  
 
6. INdot should consider the formal 
adoption of HAZUS-MH software for 
scenario management, mitigation and 
vulnerability studies and to train 
appropriate personnel. An important 
feature in this implementation step is 
the engagement of the Polis Center in 
the training of INdot personnel on the 
use of HAZUS-MH software. The Polis 
Center is a nationally recognized 
HAZUS implementation facility. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Earthquakes can significantly disrupt societal functioning, cause ecological damage, 
and lead to loss of human lives and property, warranting a coordinated and efficient 
response to mitigate their negative impacts. Past experience with earthquakes has 
demonstrated the vulnerability of the critical infrastructural lifelines and the need for 
mitigation strategies as well as emergency response planning. For example, the bridge 
failures under the 1989 Loma Prieta and the 1994 Northridge earthquakes resulted in 
substantial losses to the regional economies [Chang and Nojima, 2001].   
Highway transportation systems are vital to the normal functioning of a society and 
can be even more so under disasters. Under disasters, emergency response agencies need 
to transport various commodities, including food, clothing, medicine, medical supplies, 
machinery and personnel from different points of origin to different locations in the 
disaster areas in an efficient manner [Haghani and Sei-Chang, 1996]. Damage to the 
highway system can seriously affect emergency response, recovery operations and 
disrupt the regional economy; hence the functionality of these systems is critical for post-
disaster response. Gordon et al. [1998] estimate that twenty percent of the $6.5 billion in 
losses due to the Northridge earthquake resulted from damage to the transportation 
system. This highlights the need for countermeasures to mitigate the possible risk of 
damage to the highways and the associated consequences.    
Bridges typically represent the elements of a highway system that are most 
susceptible to failure under earthquakes. Hence, the seismic vulnerability of bridges has 
been extensively studied [Buckle et al. 1994]. As a consequence, seismic retrofitting of 
bridges has been the most preferred solution adopted in the pre-disaster strategic planning 
stage so as to minimize the risk of unacceptable damage to highways in earthquake-prone 
regions. Due to the significant effort and cost involved in strengthening existing bridges 
to seismic design standards it is not practical to retrofit every bridge in an earthquake-
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prone region, and even if it were possible, retrofitting cannot be done simultaneously 
across all bridges. Also, seismic risk can vary across bridges due to their physical 
characteristics, age, and current structural condition. Hence, a key problem faced by 
earthquake response planners is the identification of the set of bridges for seismic 
retrofitting. This implies prioritization given budget limitations and the effort involved.  
The bridge prioritization problem, that is, the selection of bridges for seismic 
retrofitting, can be viewed from structural and transportation domains vis-à-vis 
performance. From a structural perspective, the risk/vulnerability of a bridge to seismic 
failure is the predominant factor that influences prioritization. In the transportation 
context, the focus is on ensuring the survival of links (and the bridges on those links) that 
minimize emergency response times and maximize the population that can be reached, by 
retaining a network-level perspective. The existing literature predominantly addresses the 
prioritization problem from a structural perspective. The dominant approach is the use of 
multi-attribute utility theory [Nojima, 1999] to determine the risk for each bridge in the 
highway network. This is done by weighing the values of the various attributes to 
generate a measure of risk. For example, one study [Osaka Municipal Government 
Report, 1998] uses attributes on seismic capacity (or vulnerability) and importance (or 
criticality). Seismic capacity, an indicator of the structural sufficiency of a bridge with 
regard to an anticipated earthquake, is based on the bridge type, structural condition, 
service life, and geotechnical and seismic hazards. The importance criterion indicates the 
criticality of the bridge to post-disaster relief operations based on the traffic flow on the 
associated link, economic impacts due to its failure, and the connectivity with crossroads.  
While the seismic capacity criterion has been well-studied in the literature, the 
importance criterion has not been adequately addressed [Chang and Nojima, 2001]. This 
is because bridge importance is not readily quantifiable, implying subjectivity in its 
determination. The issue of accessibility across the transportation network vis-à-vis 
earthquake response can be influenced by political, social and economic factors in 
addition to the engineering solutions. Hence, only a few retrofitting schemes exist in 
practice, and are primarily based on engineering judgment [Buckle, 1994], indicating 
methodological gaps in the state of knowledge to address this problem. The intuitive 
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solution to the earthquake response planning problem is the retrofitting of every bridge in 
the shortest path between the selected origin-destination (O-D) pairs in the network. 
However, this is typically cost prohibitive. This implies the need for a network level 
perspective to address the problem which considers the interactions between the failure of 
a bridge and its influence on the network-level system performance [Werner et al., 1997, 
Chang and Nojima, 2001]. The Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering 
Research (MCEER) Bulletin (1994) suggests that the system performance considerations 
be addressed before performing the seismic capacity evaluation of bridges.   
Few studies consider network-level transportation system performance in determining 
prioritization schemes. Basoz and Kiremidjian [1994] develop a network-level procedure 
to quantify the importance of bridges. It determines the bridges that constitute minimal 
cuts in a transportation network and ranks the individual bridges within the set. The 
minimal cut for a given O-D node pair in a network is the minimum number of links 
whose failure disconnects the two nodes. Performance was tied to the connectivity 
between critical destinations under disasters. Wakabayashi [1997] performs an 
importance analysis of the Kobe highway network based on several network realizations. 
The travel time between Osaka and Kobe represented the performance criterion. The 
structural vulnerability of the links was not considered.     
Nojima [1999] proposed a performance based prioritization method for upgrading 
network components with limited resources. The performance measure was the reliability 
of system flow capacity, defined as the maximum flow between a specified O-D pair in 
the network. The study rank-orders links based on their ability to improve the reliability 
measure. Chang and Nojima [2001] develop performance measures based on the total 
length of the surviving network and the accessibility provided by it.  
The overview of the past work indicates that several studies exist that address the 
bridge seismic retrofit aspects of the earthquake response planning problem. Hence, the 
problem has been addressed primarily in the structural engineering domain. Different 
criteria have been used to evaluate the bridges in the network. Some of them are ad-hoc 
in nature and involve considerable subjectivity. Only a few studies exist that address the 
seismic retrofit problem from a transportation systems perspective. Among those, there 
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are very few studies that analyze the problem at a network-level. Those that do are 
primarily concerned with the effect of retrofit decisions on vehicular flow performance 
measures for the surviving network. Studies addressed from the perspective of earthquake 
response are sparse, and typically consider a single criterion such as connectivity between 
O-D node pairs, travel time for a single O-D pair, or accessibility to population. None of 
these studies explicitly consider budget constraints in the planning problem. This 
significantly increases the problem complexity due to the dependence of the surviving 
network under an earthquake on the budget investment decisions. This key gap, 
significant from a practical standpoint, motivates the development of a new class of 
models that can aid planners in developing an effective budget allocation scheme to 
prioritize retrofit decisions. The proposed research addresses this by developing the 
MCNDP model.            
  
1.2 Study Objectives  
The primary study objective is to develop a methodology to address the strategic 
planning problem at a network-level for earthquake response. This methodology enables 
the decision-makers to identify an effective seismic retrofit scheme vis-à-vis earthquake 
response for the bridges of a network. The proposed methodology is motivated by the 
need to consider the key factors for effective earthquake response in a single framework. 
This is done by first defining the concept of “critical routes”. The critical routes of a 
transportation network are the set of routes whose functionality is critical to the 
effectiveness of earthquake response. The associated problem is labeled the critical routes 
problem. The specific tasks to address the study objective are:  
1. Identification of criteria for selection of critical routes. These criteria are based on 
factors that directly affect the effectiveness of earthquake response.   
2. Formally define the critical routes problem. This involves the description of the 
problem context, its constraints and the criteria used to solve the problem.   
3. Development of a model to address the critical routes problem. A mathematical 
formulation is developed that seeks to optimize the response criteria under budget 
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limitations and other constraints. This generates the critical routes for the study region of 
interest.  
4. Application of the model to a case study. Sensitivity analyses are conducted with 
respect to the model parameters to derive insights that assist decision-makers. This is 
done primarily by identifying a non-inferior frontier, which provides an intuitive practical 
tool for decision-making. The region of interest in this study is the earthquake-prone 
southwest region of Indiana. Figure 1.1 depicts the seismic map of the region.  
 
1.3 Organization of the Report  
This report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature in network design and coverage. Chapter 3 defines the critical routes problem 
and formulates it. It further proves that the problem is NP-hard, and identifies valid 
inequalities to enhance solution efficiency. Chapter 4 discusses the application of the 
formulation to a case study in the southwest Indiana region, and provides the 
implementation details. Chapter 5 reports the results from experiments conducted and 
derives insights. Chapter 6 reports the results from experiments conducted after 
incorporating the recommendations of the Study Advisory Committee in terms of 
“required” routes as part of the critical routes subnetwork. Chapter 7 provides some 






















CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This chapter provides a brief review of the methodological approaches relevant to the 
problem addressed in this research. As the focus is on network-level transportation-
related planning for disaster response, especially under earthquakes, most of the relevant 
literature is in the urban operations research domain as applied to network models. For 
the sake of exposition, we first define the two types of link costs that are typically 
encountered in network design problems, namely fixed costs and routing costs. The fixed 
cost of a link is a one-time cost incurred with choosing that link for routing commodity 
flows and is independent of the quantity routed through it. The routing cost of a link is 
defined as the cost incurred in transporting a unit commodity across that link. For 
example, in an earthquake response planning context, bridge seismic retrofit costs would 
represent fixed costs for that link, and the time to traverse that link would correspond to 
the routing costs.    
   
2.1 Network Design 
A broad range of practical network optimization problems occur in the context of 
transportation, distribution planning, emergency response, telecommunications and 
computer networking. A specific class of these, labeled as network design problems, 
arises primarily in the capital investment phase of engineering problems. The network 
design problem generally seeks to determine a network configuration that minimizes the 
sum of the fixed costs of the links chosen and the cost of routing different commodities 
through the network defined by these links. Due to its usefulness in the aforementioned 
applications, the fixed charge network design problem has been well studied. Magnanti 
and Wong [1984] provide a comprehensive survey of integer programming-based 
methods to address network design problems. They develop a generic discrete choice 
network design formulation that unifies the different types of network design models. 
Well-known problems in combinatorial optimization, including the shortest path, 
 
 8
minimum spanning tree, Steiner tree and traveling salesman problem have been shown to 
be special cases of the generic network design model. However, these models have 
focused primarily on cost minimization and do not consider other important criteria like 
population coverage, environmental impacts and revenues.  
 
2.2 Network Coverage           
Current and Min [1986] emphasize the potential for multiple objectives in 
transportation planning problems and highlight the conflicting nature of such objectives 
in the context of public sector decision-making. For example, the shortest path network 
across O-D pairs may not maximize the accessibility to the population in the region. To 
overcome these limitations, Current et al. [1985] introduce the notion of coverage to the 
network design problem by formulating the maximum covering shortest path problem for 
a single O-D pair with two objectives: (i) to minimize the path cost for that O-D pair, and 
(ii) to maximize the total population covered by that path. They associate some fraction 
of the population with each node, which is labeled as the demand of that node. They 
define a demand node as covered if the path includes the node or passes through another 
node that is within a pre-specified distance from that node. They also formulate a 
variation of this problem for hazmat routing applications, called the minimum covering 
shortest path problem [Current at al., 1988], in which the demand covered is minimized.    
Hutson and Revelle [1989] extend the concept of coverage to tree networks by 
considering two types of coverages: direct and indirect. A demand node is directly 
covered if there is a link in the tree incident upon it. Indirect coverage is assumed if the 
demand node is within a prescribed distance from a link in the tree. The maximal direct 
covering tree problem seeks to minimize the cost of the subtree and maximize the total 
demand covered by it. Hutson and Revelle [1993] extend the approach to develop the 
maximal indirect covering tree problem. They suggest the use of these models for 
problems involving road network construction in sparsely populated areas under resource 
constraints.  
Kim et al. [1989] introduce the subtree r-cover problem which seeks a connected 
subgraph covering every demand node with minimum total length for a given network. A 
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cover radius is associated with each demand node. It is used to ensure that the distance 
between the demand node and the closest point in the subgraph does not exceed a 
threshold value. The formulation is applied to position troops in a war situation to ensure 
that troops protect/cover the various demand nodes within pre-specified threshold 
response times. Kim et al. [1990] consider a special case in which the given network is a 
tree.              
Current and Schilling [1989] adapt the coverage concept to the traveling salesman 
problem by formulating the covering salesman problem. The problem aims to identify a 
minimum cost subtour in a network such that every demand node is within a specified 
distance from a node on the subtour. They extend this model to develop the maximal 
covering tour problem [1994], in which the objectives are to minimize the total tour 
length and maximize the demand covered by the tour, subject to a requirement on the 
number of nodes in the subtour. Suggested application domains include rural health care 
and overnight delivery systems. Gendreau et al. [1997] solve a variant of the maximal 
covering tour problem in which a given set of nodes must always be present in a tour, and 
propose its application to the location of post boxes and the design of collection routes. 
They also propose classes of valid inequalities for use in a branch-and-cut algorithm to 
solve large problem instances in a reasonable amount of time.   
 
2.3 Discussion 
The overview of the literature indicates that the coverage criterion has been 
successfully applied to identify a path, tree or tour, all of which are special network 
structures. This research extends the coverage criterion to a network problem with 
multiple O-D pairs, labeled the multicommodity maximal covering network design 
problem (MCNDP). Its objectives are to minimize the routing costs over all O-D pairs 
and maximize the total demand covered, subject to a budget constraint based on the fixed 
costs incurred on the chosen links. To our knowledge, there exist no prior studies that 
consider budgetary limitations, routing costs and coverage criteria in a single model with 
multiple O-D pairs. Such a model is essential for strategic planners to make long-term 
budget allocation decisions that factor in system-wide impacts of budgetary decisions 
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over time vis-à-vis performance. Potential applications of the MCNDP other than the 
problem addressed in this study include the design of regional transit systems and the 
planning of truck shipment routes. With modifications, the MCNDP can be used to 
design electric power networks to build high voltage lines for new power plants or to 






CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter develops the methodology to address the critical routes problem using 
the MCNDP. Section 3.1 illustrates the applicability of the MCNDP to the “critical 
routes problem”. Section 3.2 states the MCNDP. Section 3.3 presents the mathematical 
model. Notation and parameters are introduced in Section 3.3.1, the decision variables are 
defined in Section 3.3.2, and the formulation is illustrated in Section 3.3.3. Section 3.4 
examines the computational complexity of the MCNDP. Section 3.5 presents valid 
inequalities for the formulation.  
 
3.1 The Critical Routes Problem  
Network-level disaster management planning is vital for effectively responding to 
natural calamities and security-related problems. For example, the availability of the 
transportation network is critical to emergency response [Haghani and Oh, 1996] under 
earthquakes. It entails the identification of “critical routes” in a planning context that 
remain functional following an earthquake, to enable the response operators to access as 
much population as possible in a minimum amount of time. This implies two objectives 
for the selection of the critical routes: (i) minimizing the total travel time on the routes 
between the O-D pairs, and (ii) maximizing the total population that can be covered by 
these routes. The functionality or survivability of a route, implying its availability under 
an earthquake, is governed significantly by its weakest elements, the bridges. The seismic 
retrofitting [Cooper et al., 2001] of bridges can enhance the survivability of the 
associated routes under earthquakes. However, as discussed earlier, due to the significant 
cost and effort involved in retrofitting, it is impractical to retrofit every bridge in an 
earthquake-prone region, especially with limited budgets. Hence, the budget serves as a 
constraint in the determination of the critical routes. Therefore, the critical routes problem 
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can be viewed as a budget-constrained covering network design problem which seeks low 
cost routes that cover the maximum population while satisfying budget constraints 
introduced by the need to retrofit bridges on the critical routes.  
  
3.2 Problem Statement  
We formulate the MCNDP generically here, and apply it to the critical routes 
problem in the next chapter. We are given the locations of demand centers of a region 
and its associated undirected network. The network links have a fixed cost for their usage 
and a routing cost. There is a budget constraint on the total fixed cost incurred. The 
MCNDP seeks to allocate a limited budget to links such that the total routing costs for a 
set of O-D pairs is minimized and the total demand covered by the routes connecting 
them is maximized. The demand of a center is covered if a link in one of the selected 
routes provides access to it. 
 
3.3 Mathematical Model  
This section first introduces the notation, parameters and decision variables, and then 
proposes an integer programming formulation for the MCNDP. 
 
3.3.1 Notation and Parameters 
Let G(N, E) denote an undirected network with node set N and link set E. The indices 
i and j denote a node in the network, i, j ∈ N and E ⊆ N×N, where [i, j] denotes an 
undirected link between nodes i and j with a nonnegative fixed cost fij. Let B to denote 
the available budget. Each O-D pair in the network is represented as a unique commodity 
type. Let k represent the commodity type index, k ∈ K, where K denotes the set of all 
commodities. One unit of flow of commodity k must be transported over the network 
from its origin O(k) to its destination D(k). To differentiate the direction of flow of a 
commodity, we consider two directed links (i, j) and (j, i) corresponding to each original 
undirected link [i, j]. Let A denote the set of the directed links; all links are uncapacitated. 
Let kijc  be the nonnegative routing cost for a unit of commodity k on link (i, j), and m 
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demand the demand center index, m ∈ M, the set of demand centers in the region. Let rm 
represent the demand associated with demand center m, and Em the set of links that are 
eligible to cover it. We treat the demand centers separately from the nodes in the 
network, whereas past studies assign demand centers to a node in the network which is a 
more restrictive approach.   
 
3.3.2 Decision Variables  
The formulation contains three types of variables: (i) the arc flow variables denoted 
by the vector x = { kijx }, which define the flow of different commodities in each of the 
selected links, (ii) the design variables denoted by the vector y = { ijy }, which define the 
links selected for the network design, and (iii) the coverage variables denoted by the 
vector z = { mz }, which define whether or not a demand center is covered. They are 
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3.3.3 The MCNDP Formulation   
The MCNDP formulation has two objectives: Z1, the total routing cost, and Z2, the 
total demand covered where, 
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The integer programming formulation for the MCNDP is expressed as follows:     
 MCNDP:  
                                             Minimize Z   =  [Z1, Z2]                                                        (1)      
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 subject to                  
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ij |Q|x                      ∀ k, Q ⊆ N, 2 ≤ |Q| ≤ |N|-2    (9)      
                                       kji
k
ij x,x  = 0 or 1                                  ∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E                (10) 
 
                                        yij   = 0 or 1                                       ∀ [i, j] ∈ E                     (11) 
 
                                       zm    = 0 or 1                                        ∀ m ∈ M                       (12) 
 
                                           x  ∈  S                                                                                   (13)  
In multiobjective programming, there may never exist a single solution that optimizes 
all the objectives. Thus, the notion of an optimal solution is not relevant here and is 
replaced by the concept of a noninferior solution set from which the decision-maker 
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selects the most preferred solution. A solution to the above formulation is said to be 
noninferior if there exists no other feasible solution that improves one objective without 
degrading the other. There are two popular solution approaches to multiobjective 
programming: preference based techniques and generating techniques [Cohon, 1978]. 
The latter approach, which has been commonly employed due to its simplicity, generates 
the entire noninferior solution set or an approximation of it. We adopt this approach. An 
approximation of the set can be obtained by using a single objective function formed by 
different convex combinations of the objective functions. Our objective function 
becomes:  
                                        Z(w1,w2) = w1Z1 + w2Z2                                                        (14) 
where w1 + w2 = 1, and w1, w2 ≥ 0.   
The use of the weight pair (w1,w2) reflects the explicit tradeoffs between the total 
routing cost and the demand that can be covered. Due to the discrete nature of the 
MCNDP solution set, the above weighting method is incapable of identifying noninferior 
solutions that lie in the duality gap of the convex hull of the set. Figure 3.1 illustrates an 
example of a noninferior frontier which is a discrete set of points. The boundary of its 
convex hull is obtained by joining its exterior points. However, there can be non-
dominated solutions that lie within the convex hull. For example, point B represents such 
an instance in the figure. Hence, point B is said to lie in the duality gap of the convex 
hull. Solving a constrained version to enable such identification entails a substantial 
increase in the computational effort. Also, the number of noninferior solutions is large, 
though finite, for even small-size discrete optimization problems and in the worst case 
increases exponentially with problem size. Hence, it is not practical to generate the entire 
noninferior set. Instead, it is appropriate to focus on generating an approximation to the 
noninferior solution set.   
Constraints 2 denote the network flow conservation constraints that require x to 
describe a simple path from the origin to the destination for all commodities. Constraints 
3 represent the coverage constraints, which imply that a demand center is covered only 
when at least one of the links providing accessibility to the center is in a flow path. 
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Constraint sets 4 and 5 are the forcing constraints; they state that no flow is allowed in 
either direction of link [i, j] unless the associated fixed cost is incurred. The MCNDP can 
be formulated in an alternative way by expressing the forcing constraints in an 
aggregated form:  
                                         






ij yKx ||                    ∀ [i, j] ∈ E                        (15) 






ji y|K|x                    ∀ [i, j] ∈ E                        (16) 
Using constraint sets 15 and 16 instead of 4 and 5, respectively, significantly reduces the 
number of constraints in the formulation, and consequently the problem size. However, 
past efforts suggest that the generic network design models with the less efficient 
disaggregate formulation perform computationally much better than the more efficient 
aggregate formulation [Magnanti and Wong, 1984]. This is because the disaggregate 
version of the forcing constraints better approximates the convex hull of the set of 
feasible integer solutions of the MCNDP, and hence, yields tighter lowerbounds for the 
linear programming (LP) relaxation of the formulation.   
Constraint 6 is the budget constraint; it states that the sum of the fixed costs of the 
links in any solution should not exceed B.  
Due to constraint set 3, any solution can entail looping paths of the kind C1 and C2, 
as shown in Figure 3.2, for one or more commodities as loops help to achieve extra 
population coverage. We seek loopless paths and this is enabled through constraint sets 7 
and 8. Constraints 7 state that the maximum flow of any commodity type exiting any 
node in the network should not exceed unity. Constraints 8 prevent the occurrence of 
loops at destination nodes (similar to C2), which is not precluded by 7.  
The coverage constraints can also lead to isolated subtours such as ST (as shown in 
Figure 3.2) that do not share any link with the corresponding commodity flow paths in 
the solution. These subtours are prevented by adding subtour elimination constraints 9, in  
which Q denotes the nodes in a subtour. Since, |Q| can potentially take several values 
between 2 and |N|-2, there are potentially an exponential number of such constraints.     
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Constraint sets 10, 11 and 12 restrict the flow, design, and coverage variables, 
respectively, to 0-1 values.  
Constraint 13 restricts the flow variables to the set S which represents a restricted 
solution domain S in which some flow variables are fixed a priori. As discussed in the 
next chapter, this is necessary to restrict the geographical region within which the search 
is performed to enable computational time savings. Presumably, the commodity paths to 
be determined would be confined to a subnetwork surrounding the O-D pair, and not 
circuitous. Hence, it models the topological restrictions upon the commodity flows in the 
network.  
The MCNDP is a linear integer program with (2|K||E|+|E|+|M|) integer variables and 
comprises of (|K||N|+|M|+2|K||E|+1+|N||K|+|K|) constraints and an exponential number 
(O(2|E|)) of subtour elimination constraints.  
 
3.4 Computational Complexity of MCNDP        
Lemma: The MCNDP is NP-hard.    
Proof: We prove it by restriction. Consider the instance MCNDPR of problem MCNDP:  
|M| = 0, that is, there are no demand centers and the objective function is just the total 
routing cost of the various commodities. The coverage constraints 3 cannot be imposed as 
there are no demand centers. Also, the constraints sets 7, 8 and 9 are redundant in the new 
formulation and can be ignored. Solving this instance, which has only one objective, is 
equivalent to solving a budget design problem which is known to be NP-hard [Johnson et 
al., 1978]. Therefore, the MCNDP generalizes the budget design problem. It follows that 
the MCNDP is NP-hard.  
Hence, the MCNDP is rather intractable, implying that the solution approach is 
typically an enumeration-type procedure.  
 
3.5 Valid Inequalities  
Typically, integer programming formulations are solved using branch-and-bound type 
methods that solve linear programs at the nodes of the branch-and-bound tree. The 
computational time for such procedures is dependent on the number of tree nodes 
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enumerated to obtain the solution, as well as the time required to solve the formulation at 
each enumerated node. The number of nodes to be enumerated is dependent on the 
quality of the bounds generated by associated LP relaxations. Valid inequalities, which 
are constraints based on the problem characteristics, are useful in this context. They are 
redundant in an integer programming formulation but can eliminate non-integer solutions 
that are optimal for the LP relaxations. Hence, they improve the lower bounds computed 
by the solution algorithms, thereby generating computational time savings. Valid 
inequalities can be appended to the MCNDP to enhance the formulation.  
Proposition 1. The constraint           




ij yxx ≤+                       ∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E                               (17) 
is a valid inequality for the MCNDP.  
Proof: In any feasible design, a link [i, j] is either chosen or not. Consider the case where 
link [i, j] is selected, which implies yij = 1. Then, the corresponding set of inequalities for 
that link in constraints 17 are its subtour elimination constraints for |Q| = 2. If that link is 
not selected, it implies yij = 0. Then, the forcing constraints imply that kijx = 0,∀ k, and the 
corresponding constraints in 17 are valid. This completes the proof.   
This valid inequality is a virtual constraint vis-à-vis the problem as it is not a direct 
representation of a physical reality or a logical characteristic. However, it can replace 
constraints 4 and 5, and part of constraints 9 (that is, for |Q| = 2). Hence, it can be used to 
generate some computational time savings by reducing the problem size. 
                                     
Proposition 2. The following constraints are valid for the MCNDP.                             
                                              mij zy ≤                         ∀ m, [i, j] ∈ Em                            (18) 
                                              m
k
ij zx ≤                         ∀ m, k, [i, j] ∈ Em                        (19)        




ij zxx ≤+                        ∀ m, k, [i, j] ∈ Em                         (20) 
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Proof:  If kijx  = 1 for some k and [i, j] ∈ Em then yij assumes the value 1, and the demand 
center m is covered implying zm = 1. If kijx = 0 ∀ k, [i, j] ∈ Em then no fixed cost is 
incurred for the ∀ [i, j] ∈ Em and the demand center m is not covered. This completes the 
proof of constraints 18. The proof of constraints 19 follows directly from the forcing 
constraints, and the result just proved. Constraint set 18 is redundant in the MCNDP 
formulation and directly follows from constraints 17 and 18.      
These valid inequalities imply that if a demand center m is not chosen, then links in 
Em do not appear in the solution. This simplifies the budget constraint and network flow 
conservation constraints, leading to potential computational efficiencies. 
 
Proposition 3. Let m1 and m2 be two demand centers such that Em1 ⊆ Em2, then the 
following relation holds. 
                                           2m1m zz ≤                                                                             (21) 
Proof: Suppose demand center m1 is covered by flow of some commodity k in arc (i, j), 
this flow also covers demand center m2. If demand center m1 is not covered, constraint 
21 reduces to the nonegativity constraint for the variable zm2. The proof is complete.  
This valid inequality can potentially reduce computations by exploiting the problem 
characteristic that if a demand center is covered by a link (i, j), it is redundant to search 
other links to cover this demand center. 
In summary, the MCNDP is a NP-hard integer programming formulation. It is 
exacerbated by the need for subtour and looping elimination constraints. In addition, 
valid inequalities can be proposed to increase computational efficiency by exploiting the 
problem structure. The next chapter discusses the application of the MCNDP to the 























































































This chapter discusses the application of the MCNDP formulation to the 
determination of critical routes for earthquake response in southwest Indiana. It first 
describes the details of the case study, followed by a summary of the solution procedure 
and its implementation. A problem reduction strategy is proposed to reduce 
computational times.  
 
4.1 Case Study  
The MCNDP is used to determine the critical routes under earthquakes for a network 
representing southwest Indiana, as shown in Figure 4.1. It consists of 184 nodes, 307 
links, and 93 population centers. The demand of a center is set equal to its population as 
obtained from the US Census 2000 Data [US Census Bureau, 2000]. Fifteen centers have 
a population greater than 5000 and are denoted as major population centers. The 
remaining 78 have a population between 3000-5000, and are labeled minor population 
centers. O-D node pairs, which represent the commodities (that is each O-D pair 
represents one commodity), are chosen so as to ensure connectivity between the major 
population centers. From Figure 4.1, the 15 major population centers can be viewed to lie 
in five different layers from top to bottom: 3 centers each in the first three levels, 2 in the 
fourth level, and 4 in the fifth level. To enable connectivity across the region it is 
reasonable to choose O-D node pairs that connect major population centers between 
adjacent layers, as also those within each layer. Note that the network topology 
constituted by any feasible set of critical routes is connected. This approach generated 33 
O-D node pairs. Using engineering judgment, the paths of 5 O-D pairs are pre-
determined. The fixed cost of a link is the total retrofit area of all the bridges on that link. 
The link routing costs are their free-flow travel times, implying that link capacity is 
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ignored. This is because the problem addresses the planning stage of earthquake 
emergency response. The link travel times are assumed to be symmetric. The links that 
can potentially cover a population center are those that are within some pre-specified 
threshold distance of it. They were identified by observing its location and the proximity 
of roads (interstates, US roads and state roads) to it using the geographical map of the 
region.    
 
4.2 Solving the MCNDP  
       
4.2.1 Solution Procedure 
The MCNDP is solved using the branch-and-cut algorithm in CPLEX [ILOG CPLEX 
7.1, 2001]. It is a search technique that uses the tree structure in which CPLEX 
dynamically adds cut constraints at the tree nodes to reduce the tree size. The solution 
procedure has two primary computational aspects. The first is the number of the tree 
nodes searched in the branch-and-cut method since each requires the solution of a linear 
program (that is, the LP relaxation of the MCNDP formulation). The LP relaxation 
represents the formulation obtained by allowing the integer decision variables to assume 
continuous values in the range within their upper and lower limits. The optimal value of 
this formulation provides a lower bound for the MCNDP formulation as it is less 
restrictive than the original formulation. Thereby, larger the number of tree nodes 
searched, the greater the computational time. This highlights the critical importance of 
the second computational aspect, the MCNDP formulation size, which depends on the 
number of constraints. In this context, computational savings can be generated by using 
valid inequalities, and/or by including or excluding the subtour elimination constraints. 
The solution procedure first excludes most of the subtour elimination constraints to make 
the problem computationally tractable. The only ones included are those for |Q|=2 
implying link subtours. This is because there are only a few constraints with |Q|=2, and 
preliminary analysis indicates that the associated subtours can occur frequently in the 
solution if they are not precluded. Next, the solution procedure identifies subtours in the 
solution obtained from CPLEX using this relaxed formulation. If subtours exist, it adds 
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the necessary subtour elimination constraint(s) and reoptimizes the new formulation. This 
step is repeated until no more subtours are encountered in the solution. 
The best-known integer solution, which is the upper bound to the optimal solution, is 
the final solution obtained from CPLEX. The lower bound to the optimal solution is the 
best objective function value across all LP relaxation solutions of the branch-and-cut 
nodes. They are used to determine the percentage optimality gap, which is a measure of 
the quality of the solution. The percentage optimality gap is defined as [(upper bound – 
lower bound)*100]/lower bound, where the bounds are obtained from CPLEX. It 
indicates how close the best-known integer solution is to the optimal solution. 
 
4.2.2 Implementation Details  
The computing environment consists of a Sun Ultra Enterprise server E6500 with 26 
400Mhz UltraSparc II processors under the multi-user Solaris 7 operating environment 
with 23GB RAM, 131GB swap space and 8MB cache. A C++ program was implemented 
to solve the problem and was compiled using GNU, g++ v2.95.3. It invokes subroutines 
from the CPLEX Callable Library version 7.1 to construct the formulation and solve it 
with the in-built mixed integer programming (MIP) optimizer that provides a customized 
branch-and-cut procedure. Experiments are performed by excluding and including the 
valid inequalities in the formulation.  
A preliminary analysis was performed to calibrate the CPLEX parameter settings for 
different experimental scenarios in terms of the budgets and the relative weights of the 
two objectives, and for different % optimality gaps. A trial and error approach was 
adopted in order to determine a good choice for the optimality tolerance level to solve an 
instance to the maximal permissible closeness to optimality as possible within a 
reasonable computational time. Our test runs indicated that for very low values w2 (≤ 
0.005), default settings yielded good computational performance. However, some 
analysis was required to arrive at a good setting for higher values of w2. It was based on 
aggressive probing, best estimate search for the node selection strategy, and variable 
branching using pseudo reduced costs. The CPLEX preprocessor was set to on, as it was 
able to achieve reduction in the MIP problem size leading to faster solution times. Also, 
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based on our preliminary analysis a priority order was assigned to the variables in which 
branching would be performed first on the x variables, then on the y variables and finally 
on the z variables. Each instance was solved under exactly identical parameter settings for 
the set of experiments with or without valid inequalities to compare the performance of 
the two cases.  
 
4.2.3 Problem Reduction Strategy  
The preliminary runs indicated the intractable nature of the MCNDP; an instance 
with budget B = 3.33 million sqft and weight pair (w1,w2) = (0.99,0.01) required over 5 
days to solve to a 1% optimality gap. To generate significant computational time savings, 
a strategy to reduce the search domain was incorporated based on the notion that the 
solution for an O-D pair would lie within some restricted geographical area around it. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the path for an O-D pair is confined to a 
subnetwork around it rather than including circuitous components that are geographically 
further away. This enables us to set the commodity flow variables to zero for the rest of 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS FROM COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS  
 
 
This chapter reports the results and derives insights from the computational 
experiments conducted using the case study. The primary objective of the experiments is 
to analyze model sensitivity for different budgets and relative weights for the two 
objectives. We make a few comments on the computational performance. Subsequently 
we seek to develop noninferior frontiers that illustrate the trade-offs between the 
conflicting objectives for different budgets to provide practical insights to decision-
makers.  
 
5.1 Model Sensitivity and Computational Performance 
An effective problem reduction strategy was sought to be identified based on 
computational efficiency of the test runs conducted. In the runs all the valid inequalities 
were included for computational efficiency. A strategy which sets 83.46% of the total 
number of flow variables to zero a priori, performed in a robust manner. Hence, further 
experiments were conducted using this strategy. The formulation was solved for the 
following weight pairs: (0.999,0.001), (0.99,0.01), (0.95,0.05) and (0.9,0.1) for the 
budget range 1.43 million sqft to 3.33 million sqft. The value 1.43 million sqft is the 
minimum budget required for a feasible solution to the formulation. Table 5.1 illustrates 
the total travel time and the total population covered for the instances solved. The 
computational times were higher for larger w2 values because of the need to search more 
routes due to the increased importance of population coverage in the objective function. 
When w2 is smaller, the problem approaches the budget design problem where the 
network structure can be favorably exploited to yield better computational performance. 
For low budgets, the problems are more difficult to solve due to interactions between 
commodities caused by the need to share links in the final solution. This was also 
observed by Dionne and Florian [1979]. In our experiments, subtours occur in the 
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intermediate solutions for all budgets with weight pairs (0.95,0.05) and (0.9,0.1), and 
only for two instances in (0.99,0.01). This is because a larger weight for population 
coverage leads to physically meaningless isolated subtours in an effort to improve the 
objective function value.  
 
5.2 Noninferior Frontiers: Travel Time-Population Coverage Trade-offs      
Figure 5.1 displays the noninferior solution set for the budget range 1.43 million sqft 
to 3.33 million sqft. In the figure, the solutions towards the left of the graph for any 
budget correspond to lower w2 values; for example, the leftmost points correspond to w2 
= 0.001. 
In general, for a budget, higher values of w2 lead to greater population coverage at the 
expense of increased system travel time. This plot provides flexibility [Hall, 1985] to the 
decision-maker by generating a range of solutions. Noninferior solution sets, like the ones 
shown here, can be very useful to the decision-maker as they highlight the tradeoffs 
between conflicting objectives. They also aid decision-makers to compare the additional 
benefits accrued in terms of system travel time savings and extra population coverage due 
to additional budget. For example, the marginal benefits that could be realized from a 
budget of 2 million sqft instead of 1.67 million sqft would be higher than those under 
2.33 million sqft instead of 2 million sqft.  
Figures 5.2a-g depict the critical routes for seven of the instances solved above. For 
the lowest budget, 1.43 million sqft., the subnetwork formed by the critical routes is 
sparse, but still covers approximately 90% of the total population of the region. For the 
critical route networks shown in these figures, the travel times and the population covered 
are higher as the weight for population is increased, keeping the budget fixed. This is 






























































 Figure 5.2d Critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2 million sqft 
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Table 5.1 Objective function values for the instances solved 
Budget  
(million sqft) (w1,w2) 




% of Total 
population covered 
(0.999,0.001) 1656.67 409572 89.46 
(0.99,0.01) 1670.96 412062 90.00 
(0.95,0.05) 1670.96 412062 90.00 1.43 
(0.9,0.1) 1686.42 412354 90.06 
     
(0.999,0.001) 1442.33 415148 90.68 
(0.99,0.01) 1510.70 430861 94.11 
(0.95,0.05) 1758.24 437885 95.64 1.67 
(0.9,0.1) 1766.11 438561 95.79 
     
(0.999,0.001) 1350.84 423192 92.44 
(0.99,0.01) 1454.16 441712 96.48 
(0.95,0.05) 1639.79 450129 98.32 2.00 
(0.9,0.1) 1903.84 449489 98.18 
     
(0.999,0.001) 1342.47 433975 94.79 
(0.99,0.01) 1428.82 448727 98.01 
(0.95,0.05) 1601.52 452715 98.88 2.33 
(0.9,0.1) 1809.39 455482 99.49 
     
(0.999,0.001) 1335.77 436682 95.38 
(0.99,0.01) 1407.88 450804 98.47 
(0.95,0.05) 1620.63 456039 99.61 2.67 
(0.9,0.1) 1786.13 455953 99.59 
      
(0.999,0.001) 1335.77 436682 95.38 
(0.99,0.01) 1409.15 452018 98.73 
(0.95,0.05) 1561.31 455904 99.581 3.00 
(0.9,0.1) 1713.74 457111 99.85 
      
(0.999,0.001) 1335.77 436682 95.38 
(0.99,0.01) 1409.15 452018 98.73 
(0.95,0.05) 1584.22 456184 99.64 3.33 
(0.9,0.1) 1635.3 456448 99.70 







CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ROUTES CONSISTENT WITH INDOT 
(SAC) NEEDS  
 
 
This chapter reports the results from the computational experiments conducted using 
the case study after incorporating the recommendations of the Study Advisory Committee 
based on the critical route subnetworks identified in Chapter 5. Section 6.1 states the 
recommendations briefly and discusses them. Section 6.2 discusses the critical routes 
obtained by incorporating the recommendations.  
 
6.1 Feedback from Study Advisory Committee and Emergency Response Operators 
Based on the feedback from the SAC, the following recommendations were proposed 
for the critical routes: 
1) Inclusion of the section of I-64 that passes through the study region.  
2) Provision of connectivity of the critical routes to adjacent states, namely, Illinois 
and Kentucky.         
The first recommendation attempts to address the omission of I-64 in the critical 
routes shown in Chapter 5. Since I-64 is a freeway, it would potentially provide an 
efficient critical route subnetwork component due to the superior structural and 
maintenance characteristics of freeways; that is, it would need minimal budgetary 
investments to ensure seismic tolerance. Hence, it would seem natural for it to be a part 
of at least some of the critical routes. To analyze the reasons for its omission in the 
critical route subnetworks suggested in Chapter 5, we revisit the model presented in 
chapter 3 that determines the critical routes. This model trades off three factors, namely 
total travel time, population covered and budget. Observing the figures (figures 5.2a-g) 
shown in Chapter 5, we note that the population centers close to I-64 that are not covered 
in most critical routes are Griffin, Elberfield and Lynnville. Their populations are 160, 
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636 and 781, respectively. Hence, together they constitute only 0.34% of the total 
population of the study region. Due to the budgetary constraints, the benefits of higher 
population coverage achievable through the routes other than I-64 are greater than the 
lower total travel time achieved due to its inclusion. Hence, the model excludes I-64 from 
the critical routes shown in Chapter 5. 
Routes that provide connectivity to adjacent states are important. They aid in the 
coordination of response plans with adjacent states and also enable the response operators 
in Indiana to utilize the assistance offered by their counterparts in the adjacent states in 
the event of an earthquake primarily causing damage in Indiana. This potentially 
increases response effectiveness.       
Both sets of recommendations were incorporated into the determination of the critical 
routes by adding the associated constraints into the original MCNDP formulation. This 
also means that the new formulation has a more restricted solution set compared to the 
original one. Therefore, the new objective function value (denoting the optimal solution 
for the more-constrained problem) incorporating these additional constraints can never be 
better than that of the original formulation corresponding to the results in Chapter 5. 
   
6.2 Characteristics of the Recommended Critical Routes      
After the addition of constraints to incorporate the SAC recommendations, the 
minimum budget required for a feasible solution increased to 1.67 million sqft. The 
critical routes were solved for budgets ranging from 1.67 million sqft. to 3.33 million 
sqft. Table 6.1 shows the total travel time and the total population covered for the various 
instances solved. Figure 6.1 depicts the noninferior solution frontier obtained. It 
illustrates that the marginal benefits realizable from a 2 million sqft. budget compared to 
the 1.67 million sqft. case are higher than those corresponding to the noninferior frontiers 
illustrated in Chapter 5 for the same budgets. The results (Figures 6.2a-f) suggest that the 
critical routes identified in Chapter 5 do not differ perceptibly from those computed here. 
For identical problem parameters, in most cases, the total travel time and the total 
population covered have worsened due to the recommendations. This is because the 
addition of new constraints leads to a more restricted solution set.  
 
 40
It may be noted that, in some instances, the results in Table 6.1 seem better than those 
shown in Table 5.1. This is not because the solution is inherently better in the restricted 
case. As just stated, the restricted optimal solution will always be worse. However, due 
the problem complexity (NP-hard problem) discussed in Chapter 3, neither of these two 
cases is solved to optimality, but only to a certain optimality tolerance level. Hence, when 
more variables are fixed (as is done in Chapter 6), the problem can in many instances be 
solved much closer to optimality though the problem is more constrained.  
Connectivity was provided at three sections with Illinois and two sections with 







































































































Table 6.1 Objective function values for the instances solved 
Budget  
(million sqft) (w1,w2) 




% of Total 
population covered 
(0.999,0.001) 1662.63 408422 89.21 
(0.99,0.01) 1685.59 410802 89.73 
(0.95,0.05) 1686.69 410802 89.73 1.67 
(0.9,0.1) 1715.19 411855 89.96 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1391.75 413091 90.23 
(0.99,0.01) 1466.27 429665 93.85 
(0.95,0.05) 1646.53 434609 94.93 2.00 
(0.9,0.1) 1755.28 434461 94.90 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1346.02 427829 93.45 
(0.99,0.01) 1398.75 445473 97.30 
(0.95,0.05) 1584.67 449826 98.25 2.33 
(0.9,0.1) 1778.19 450736 98.45 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1337.33 435301 95.08 
(0.99,0.01) 1425.29 450589 98.42 
(0.95,0.05) 1599.52 453614 99.08 2.67 
(0.9,0.1) 1695.34 455026 99.39 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1328.15 436562 95.36 
(0.99,0.01) 1411.76 451015 98.51 
(0.95,0.05) 1592.24 455519 99.50 3.00 
(0.9,0.1) 1689.16 456991 99.82 
       
(0.999,0.001) 1323.77 436682 95.38 
(0.99,0.01) 1407.76 452018 98.73 
(0.95,0.05) 1516.12 456048 99.61 3.33 
(0.9,0.1) 1614.49 457661 99.97 









CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
This chapter summarizes the study and highlights its contributions.     
 
7.1 Summary  
Seismic retrofit planning plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of 
the operational stage of earthquake response management. At a strategic level, it is 
dependent on the routes critical for effective emergency response. However, past studies 
have not addressed the identification of critical routes under budget constraints. This is a 
very important practical problem for emergency response planners as it involves 
identifying effective transportation routes while accounting for bridge structural 
conditions and budget limitations. It implies the identification of bridges to retrofit under 
earthquake response planning. This study develops a network-level methodology to assist 
decision-makers in identifying an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of a 
network. It introduces the MCNDP, which seeks routes that minimize the total routing 
costs over the selected routes and maximizes the total demand covered, subject to a 
budget constraint. An integer programming formulation of the problem is presented, and 
is shown to be NP-hard. The problem characteristics are exploited to develop some valid 
inequalities.  
In general, the MCNDP model is useful in addressing network-level disaster 
management planning. The MCNDP is applied to generate critical routes for earthquake 
response planning in southwest Indiana, which is part of a seismically active region that 
includes parts of Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri as well. The branch-and-cut procedure 
of the CPLEX MIP optimizer is used to solve the problem. A problem reduction strategy 
is proposed to reduce computational time while ensuring that the resulting solution is 
close to or equal to the optimal solution. Noninferior frontiers are generated using convex 
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combinations of the two objectives so as to provide practical insights for decision-
makers. These frontiers assist the decision-maker in analyzing the trade-offs among 
various objectives and making budget allocation decisions.  
A new set of critical routes were developed based on the SAC feedback for the first 
set of critical routes identified. The SAC recommendations were to include the section of 
I-64 passing through the study region, and to provide connectivity to the adjacent states 
(Illinois and Kentucky) to ensure seamless inter-state coordination and cooperation in the 
event of an actual earthquake. These recommendations were incorporated to generate a 
new set of critical routes through the addition of constraints to the MCNDP formulation. 
The updated critical routes do not differ perceptibly from those obtained from the 
experiments prior to the SAC recommendations.    
 
7.2 Contributions of the Study 
This study formally defines the Multicommodity Maximal Covering Network Design 
Problem (MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge, it represents the first attempt to 
incorporate the coverage objective in a generic network model, leading to a new class of 
models with significant practical implications. Past work has used the coverage criterion 
in identifying a path, tree or tour on a network by considering either the routing or the 
fixed cost, while the proposed model simultaneously considers the routing and fixed costs 
subject to a budget constraint. That is, none of the existing models consider routing costs, 
fixed costs and coverage criterion in a single framework.   
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution of this study is its ability to address 
planning problems faced by emergency response agencies vis-à-vis disaster management. 
The specific problem addressed here relates to earthquake response management. Under 
budget constraints, there is a need to determine an effective retrofit plan for the bridges in 
a seismically-prone region. Most studies in the literature have adopted a local perspective 
to solving this problem, and do not consider the effect of potential bridge failures on the 
transportation system performance. The few methodologies that use a systems approach 
do not consider the influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of the associated routes 
vis-à-vis effective earthquake response. The proposed model fills this critical gap by 
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considering the total travel time for the key O-D pairs in the network and the total 
population covered by them as the criteria for determining the critical routes. The budget 
limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs for the links constituting the critical routes is 
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence, this methodology simultaneously 
determines the set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and the routes that serve as 
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Introduction  
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the 
central Mississippi Valley has been known for 200 
years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Awareness 
of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has 
increased in the last decades. In the last two 
decades identification of an independent tectonic 
process occurring in the Wabash River Valley has 
implications for the seismic risk of the State of 
Indiana from what has recently been defined as the 
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a 
strong earthquake in these seismic zones or in 
Indiana or the neighboring states due to other not 
so well understood tectonic processes, as has 
occurred in the past, has serious implications for 
the State Transportation System. The definition of 
Earthquake Emergency Routes for the state is a 
priority for the Indiana Department of 
Transportation. The identification of Emergency 
Routes takes into account issues related to 
transportation including coverage of population and 
area and travel time along these routes.  
 
This study formulates a multicommodity maximal 
covering network design problem (MCNDP) for 
identifying critical routes, for earthquake response 
and to seismically retrofit bridges. The MCNDP 
seeks routes that minimize the total travel time over 
the selected routes and maximizes the total 
population covered, subject to a budget constraint 
on bridge retrofitting costs on the selected routes. 
The problem is formulated as a two-objective 
integer programming model and solved using the 
branch-and-cut module in the CPLEX optimizer. 
The model performance was analyzed using the 
transportation network of a seismically-prone 
region in southwest Indiana. Thereby, the search 
for the critical routes for an origin-destination (O-
D) pair is confined to a limited geographical region 
around it.  
 
A Geographical Information System (GIS) system 
was developed for evaluation of seismic 
vulnerability of the proposed Indiana Emergency 
Routes. The GIS based implementation of the 
technical information developed in this project 
through FEMA HAZUS-MH software was 
conducted in collaboration with the Polis Center in 
Indianapolis, nationally recognized and FEMA 
authorized HAZUS implementation facility. 
HAZUS software may be used for mitigation of 
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a strong 
earthquake in southwestern Indiana. It uses 
information from the Indiana Department of 
Transportation (INdot) maintenance database and 
selected structural and geotechnical information 
from the bridge drawings data base. Vulnerability 
assessment was performed using the general 
information from maintenance and final calibration 
was performed using a series of cases based on 
bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions 
contained in these drawings. 
Findings  
Computational experiments were conducted to 
investigate the effects of varying the budget and the 
relative weights of the two objectives. A set of 
critical routes was obtained. Seismic retrofit planning 
plays an important role in determining the 
effectiveness of the operational stage of earthquake 
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response management. At a strategic level, it is 
dependent on the routes critical for effective 
emergency response. However, past studies have not 
addressed the identification of critical routes under 
budget constraints. This is a very important practical 
problem for emergency response planners as it 
involves identifying effective transportation routes 
while accounting for bridge structural conditions and 
budget limitations. It implies the identification of 
bridges to retrofit under earthquake response 
planning. This study develops a network-level 
methodology to assist decision-makers in identifying 
an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of 
a network.  
 
This study formally defines the Multicommodity 
Maximal Covering Network Design Problem 
(MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge, 
it represents the first attempt to incorporate the 
coverage objective in a generic network model, 
leading to a new class of models with significant 
practical implications. Past work has used the 
coverage criterion in identifying a path, tree or 
tour on a network by considering either the 
routing or the fixed cost, while the proposed 
model simultaneously considers the routing and 
fixed costs subject to a budget constraint. That 
is, none of the existing models consider routing 
costs, fixed costs and coverage criterion in a 
single framework.   
 
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution 
of this study is its ability to address planning 
problems faced by emergency response agencies 
vis-à-vis disaster management. The specific 
problem addressed here relates to earthquake 
response management. Under budget constraints, 
there is a need to determine an effective retrofit 
plan for the bridges in a seismically-prone 
region. Most studies in the literature have 
adopted a local perspective to solving this 
problem, and do not consider the effect of 
potential bridge failures on the transportation 
system performance. The few methodologies 
that use a systems approach do not consider the 
influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of 
the associated routes vis-à-vis effective 
earthquake response. The proposed model fills 
this critical gap by considering the total travel 
time for the key O-D pairs in the network and 
the total population covered by them as the 
criteria for determining the critical routes. The 
budget limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs 
for the links constituting the critical routes is 
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence, 
this methodology simultaneously determines the 
set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and 
the routes that serve as focal points for 
earthquake response. 
 
The evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge 
design requirements contained in the AASHTO 
Specifications and the existence of a proposed 
draft seismic design specification being 
discussed have significant implications in the 
assessment of the existing vulnerability, its 
mitigation, and the design of new bridges along 
the Emergency Routes. Along with this 
development, the USGS assessment of the 
seismic risk of southwestern Indiana and a 
change of format of the definition of the 
earthquake design ground motion that is integral 
part of the proposed draft seismic design 
specification also has important implications on 
the assessment of the operational capabilities of 
the Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana. 
The effects of the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake 
that occurred in the State of Washington gave 
invaluable insight on the expected situation for 
the State of Indiana due to a comparable bridge 
inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel 
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both 
regions over the last decades.  
 
Using the information collected in this study, the 
GIS implementation through FEMA-HAZUS-
MH software may be used for mitigation of 
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a 
strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana. 
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels 
of ground acceleration in order to obtain 
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using 
these results, seismic behavior patterns were 
obtained for bridges located in southwestern 
Indiana included in the INdot Vincennes District 
maintenance data base. Soil amplification and 
liquefaction potential were evaluated for the 
cases having reported SPT measurements from 
borings. Based on this process, information 
critical for the identification of upgrade needs 
for the transportation structures part of the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes is made available 
to the INdot. 
12-3 08/05 JTRP-2003/22 INDOT Division of Research West Lafayette, IN 47906 
Implementation  
The findings and developments of this research 
project are presented next in the form of 
suggested implementation steps by the Indiana 
Department of Transportation. 
 
1. Formal adoption of the selected 
emergency routes or some variation of 
the same by the state is a necessary 
step. Such routes adopted and 
maintained by INdot will be affected by 
issues and policies outside the scope of 
those considered in this study. For 
instance, policy decisions, budgetary 
constraints, new projects, i.e. 
continuation of I-69, will likely affect 
the formal adoption of a set of 
emergency routes and will continue to 
impose changes in the future. The 
methodology developed in this study 
and the information implemented in 
HAZUS-MH should be of assistance to 
state decision makers in the future.  
 
2. Future implementation strategies can be 
studied through simulation studies 
using appropriately updated information 
for different earthquake scenarios 
including earthquake ground motion 
defined in current AASHTO Standard 
Specifications, proposed Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or 
other. These simulations will provide 
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for 
the proposed routes or alternative 
definitions.  
 
3. The information in the maintenance 
database should be periodically 
evaluated and should include 
information currently available only in 
the bridge drawings (see Section 7.5 of 
the final report). This will improve the 
vulnerability assessment of the bridges 
refining the mitigation policies to adopt 
in the future. This expansion of the 
maintenance database can be extended 
to other counties and districts not 
covered in this research project.  
 
4. Establish a program for assessing the 
liquefaction, soil spread, and 
embankment failure potential along the 
routes at locations other than bridge 
sites by providing a consistent 
evaluation methodology supported with 
the information developed in this study. 
This implementation will require a soil 
exploration program to obtain 
geotechnical properties of sites where 
no information exists or where such 
information was obtained years ago 
with different objectives than 
liquefaction evaluation. In the research 
conducted in this study, liquefaction 
evaluations were made using solely 
boring information contained in 
selected bridge drawings.  
 
5. To establish procedures for emergency 
response under different earthquake 
occurrence scenarios.  
 
6. INdot should consider the formal 
adoption of HAZUS-MH software for 
scenario management, mitigation and 
vulnerability studies and to train 
appropriate personnel. An important 
feature in this implementation step is 
the engagement of the Polis Center in 
the training of INdot personnel on the 
use of HAZUS-MH software. The Polis 
Center is a nationally recognized 
HAZUS implementation facility. 
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Awareness of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has increased in the last decades. 
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the central Mississippi Valley has been 
known for 200 years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. In the last two decades 
identification of an independent tectonic process occurring in the Wabash River Valley 
has implications for the seismic risk of the State of Indiana from what has recently been 
defined as the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a strong earthquake in 
these seismic zones, or in Indiana, or in the neighboring states due to other not so well 
understood tectonic processes as has occurred in the past, has serious implications for the 
State Transportation System. The definition of Earthquake Emergency Routes for the 
State of Indiana became a priority for the Indiana Department of Transportation. The 
definition of these Emergency Routes takes into account issues related to transportation 
including coverage of population and area and travel time along these routes, and issues 
related to structural and geotechnical seismic vulnerability of the transportation structures 
along these routes. The transportation related issues are presented in Part I of this Report, 
and the structural and geotechnical seismic related issues are presented in Part II. 
Previous experience in the United States and elsewhere in the world with bridge damage 
during strong earthquakes has influenced the bridge earthquake resistant specifications 
and mitigation procedures. The effects of the Nisqually Earthquake that occurred in the 
State of Washington in 2001 give insight on the expected situation for the State of 
Indiana due to a comparable bridge inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel 
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both regions over the last decades. The 
evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge design requirements contained in the 
AASHTO Specifications and the existence of a proposed draft seismic design 
specification being discussed have significant implications in the assessment of the 
existing vulnerability, its mitigation, and the design of new bridges along the Emergency 
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Routes. Along with this development, the USGS assessment of the seismic risk of 
southwestern Indiana and a change of format of the definition of the earthquake design 
ground motion that is an integral part of the proposed draft seismic design specification 
also has important implications on the assessment of the operativeness of the Earthquake 
Emergency Routes of Indiana.  
 
Vulnerability assessment was performed using the general information from 
inspection and maintenance, and final calibration was performed using a series of cases 
based on bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions contained in these drawings. 
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels of ground acceleration in order to obtain 
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using these results, seismic behavior patterns were 
obtained for bridges located in southwestern Indiana included in the Indot Vincennes 
District Inspection and Maintenance Database. Soil amplification and liquefaction 
potential were evaluated for the cases having reported SPT measurements from borings. 
Based on this process, information, upgrade needs for the transportation structures part of 
the Earthquake Emergency Routes were obtained. With this information, it is possible to 
perform simulations that will help Indot in devising mitigation policies, perform 
simulations for different earthquake occurrence scenarios, and establish, evaluate, and 
implement alternatives for response strategies using the Earthquake Emergency Routes.  
 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed HAZUS-MH, 
a GIS-based software tool that empowers communities with the ability to assess risk from 
earthquakes, flood, and wind related disasters.  While HAZUS-MH can be used to assess 
risk with the significant default inventory that it includes, it is possible to integrate local 
data into the HAZUS-MH analysis in order to produce more realistic loss estimates.   As 
a component of the research work conducted in this project and with the approval of the 
Study Advisory Committee, The Polis Center from Indianapolis was tasked with the 
integration of bridge and soils data into HAZUS-MH for the purpose of using that tool to 
conduct earthquake risk analysis.   The Polis Center is a FEMA authorized HAZUS-MH 
earthquake and flood service provider and is thus able to support the goals of INDOT in 
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this instance.  The GIS implementation through FEMA HAZUS-MH software conducted 
during this study uses information from the Indiana Department of Transportation (Indot) 
Inspection and Maintenance Database and structural and geotechnical information from 











The purpose of the project was to propose Earthquake Emergency Routes for the 
State of Indiana with emphasis in the southwestern part of the State, to review the 
selected routes for earthquake hazards identifying conditions related to the structures 
along those routes that may affect their functioning in case of occurrence of a strong 
earthquake in the region, and to propose procedures for mitigation, evaluation and 
maintenance of their status as emergency routes. 
 
1.2 Scope 
1. To recommend Earthquake Emergency Routes for the Vincennes District of the 
Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT), located in the southwestern 
corner of the State, based on travel times and scope of retrofit work necessary to 
implement these routes with the final decision of which routes to select resting 
with INDOT (see Part I of this report).  
2. To develop a tool based on geographical information systems technology (GIS) 
that INDOT engineering may use for identifying and maintaining the Earthquake 
Emergency Routes network of Indiana and for establishing policies for mitigation 
of earthquake hazard on these routes, to perform simulations for different 
earthquake scenarios, and to help in the response to an actual emergency caused 
by the occurrence of a strong earthquake in the region.  
3. To assess the seismic vulnerability of selected bridges belonging to the Vincennes 
INDOT District based on detailed information, and to correlate this vulnerability 
assessment with one obtained using just the information currently contained in the 
INDOT Inspection and Maintenance Database. To recommend items relevant to 
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the vulnerability of the routes to be added to the Inspection and Maintenance 
Database.  
4. To give guidance on how to prioritize the mitigation of the vulnerability of 
existing bridges according to the analyses performed and their importance in 
keeping the transportation network system functional with emphasis in the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes selected. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the project, the methodology used took 
advantage of the most advanced resources of each discipline. The methodology 
corresponding to each of the components is described in detail along this report at the 
pertinent locations, with Chapter 4 of this report presenting a summary of the 
vulnerability assessment methodology used.  
 
1.4 Participants 
Joint Transportation Research Program – JTRP  
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 S. Garrison  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
 J. R. Hill  (Indiana Geological Survey) 
 K. Hoernschemeyer  (Federal Highway Administration) 
 D. Leonard  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
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 L. Vaughan  (Indiana Department of Transportation) 
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Earthquake Engineering and Structural Engineering: 
Mete A. Sozen, Investigator, Kettelhut Distinguished Professor of Civil 
Engineering 
Julio A. Ramirez, Co-Principal Investigator, Professor of Civil 
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Luis E. Garcia, Research Engineer, Visiting Professor of Civil 
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Engineering 
Dimitri Loukidis, Graduate Research Assistant 
 
Transportation: 
Srinivas Peeta, Co-Principal Investigator, Associate Professor of Civil 
Engineering 
Kannan Viswanath, Graduate Research Assistant 
 
1.5 Organization of the report 
This report is presented in two volumes; the first one – Part I – deals with 
Transportation issues related to definition of the selected Earthquake Emergency Routes; 
this second volume – Part II – is organized in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 presents background on seismic vulnerability of transportation networks. It 
includes the reasons behind the need of defining earthquake emergency routes. Discusses 
the seismic vulnerability issues linked to transportation structures. A summary of the 
performance of transportation networks in past earthquakes is presented. Finally, it 
presents and discusses the development of the specifications that govern their design 
including associated geotechnical issues.  
Chapter 3 discusses the tectonic setting of the southwestern corner of Indiana and 
how it fits within the two main regional seismogenic structures – the New Madrid 
Seismic Zones and the Wabash River Faulting System – commenting on the earthquakes 
that have affected the region. The earthquake mean return period is presented and the 
importance of its definition for earthquake resistant design of structures is brought into 
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perspective by describing the values being used in current and proposed earthquake 
resistant bridge design specifications. The implications of adopting a draft seismic design 
specification by AASHTO are discussed.  
Chapter 4 presents the methodology for evaluation of seismic vulnerability of the 
selected Indiana Emergency Routes, the available information, the Geographical 
Information System (GIS) implementation and its use for mitigation of vulnerability, 
simulation, and response to a strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to geotechnical sources of vulnerability for transportation 
structures in general and, in particular, the approach used in defining and assessing these 
sources of vulnerability for the Earthquake Emergency Routes of the State of Indiana.  
Chapter 6 parallels the previous chapter, with the focus on bridges. The methodology 
used and its application is discussed in detail.  
Chapter 7 defines the upgrade needs for the transportation structures part of the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes.  
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study.  






CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter describes previous background information related to earthquake 
emergency routes and performance during earthquakes of highway systems, 
transportation facilities, and structures with special reference to the State of Indiana. This 
background information has been divided in information related to highway systems, 
bridges, and issues associated with geotechnical aspects. 
 
2.1 Transportation systems 
The Federal Response Plan (FRP) of the United States [FEMA, 2003] created under 
the auspices of the Robert T. Stafford Act, which is the enabling legislation for 
emergency response in the United States, provides the legal mandate, the resources, and 
the mechanisms for an integrated emergency response after the declaration of any disaster 
by the President. The Federal Response Plan establishes 12 Emergency Support 
Functions (ESF) to facilitate the implementation and coordination of a broad spectrum of 
integrated emergency response activities after natural and technological disasters. 
 ESF No. 1 is “Transportation” and is defined as access to the disaster area. It is based 
on the assumptions that the transportation infrastructure in the area will sustain damage, 
which will influence the means and accessibility of relief services and supplies to protect 
people and property. The disaster responses requiring transportation capacity will be 
difficult to coordinate effectively during the immediate post-disaster period. Clearing of 
debris and completion of repairs will be gradual, in spite of best efforts, disrupting access 
routes for a significant period. 
Transportation systems in the Central U.S. – including highways, bridges, railways, 
waterways, ports, and airports – are vulnerable to the effects of a damaging earthquake in 
the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) [CUSEC, 2000]. Furthermore, damages to 
transportation systems may extend to several states, which present transportation officials 
in government and the private sector with unique problems and challenges. 
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2.3.1 Ground motion amplification due to soil profile characteristics 
Association of earthquake damage with poor soil conditions have been known for 
many years. Early approach to the problem was manifest in seismic codes through a 
difference in seismic design forces associated with bearing capacity used in foundation 
design (see 2.2.2). With the increase deployment of strong ground motion accelerometers 
from the 1950’s on, instrumental evidence of the influence of the underlying soil profile 
permitted interpretations of earthquake damage in several events such as the 1957 San 
Francisco, California, Earthquake; the 1957 Mexico City Earthquake; the 1964 
Anchorage, Alaska, Earthquake; and the 1967 Caracas, Venezuela, Earthquake.  
From the mid 1970’s on, a clearer picture emerged and different approaches were 
adopted to account for the effect of amplification by the soil profile. For the first time in 
the 1974 SEAOC Blue Book Lateral Force Requirements for Buildings [SEAOC, 1974] 
included a coefficient S, called then Coefficient for Site-Structure Resonance having 
values between 1.0 and 1.5 depending on the ratio between the fundamental period of the 
structure, T, and a characteristic site period Ts. The 1974 SEAOC Requirements included 
an Appendix for obtaining a range of values for the soil deposit characteristic period. 
This procedure was adopted by the 1976 Uniform Building Code and was kept for several 
issues of this Code. 
Studies conducted for moderate magnitude events in the western U.S. [Seed et al., 
1976a] permitted grouping different soil profiles into broad categories [Seed et al., 
1976b]. This type of soil profiles and the corresponding amplifications were combined 
with studies of spectral shapes and were included in the ATC-3-06 project [ATC, 1978] 
for incorporation in model building earthquake resistant regulations. This classification 
comprised three types of soil profiles namely: Type 1 – Stiff soils and rock, Type 2 – 
Deep cohesionless or stiff clay soils, and Type 3 – Soft to medium clays and sands. As 
part of the requirements a soil coefficient, S, was introduced. This coefficient amplified 
the medium to long period part of the acceleration spectrum in rock to model the effects 
of the soil according to the soil profile type by factors of 1.0, 1.2, and 1.5 respectively. 
This is the same soil profile classification that was used in the seismic bridge design 
recommendation ATC-6 project [ATC, 1981].  
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The Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) is a nonprofit organization, 
funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is dedicated to reducing 
deaths, injuries, damage to property and economic losses resulting from earthquakes 
occurring in the Central United States. Its members are the seven states that are most 
vulnerable to earthquakes in this region: Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee. 
 
Fig. 2-1 – Map showing hypothetical maximum intensities for a magnitude 7.6 




The document [CUSEC, 2000] discusses the transportation system vulnerability and 
the earthquake risk in the Central United States taking into account the multi-state impact 
of future damaging earthquakes in the region including associated problems with 
earthquake induced hazards such as faulting, liquefaction, slope instability, dam or levee 
failure, and hazardous materials spills. The effects of earthquakes on the transportation 
system including: highway, railroad, waterway, and air transportation and liquid fuel 
transport; the steps that must be taken for mitigation of vulnerability of transportation 
systems in the region; and response and recovery policies are discussed in this important 
document. It assigns the following consequences of failure in a transportation system due 
to an earthquake or other natural disaster: 
• Direct loss of life due to collapse or structural failure of the lifeline. 
• Indirect loss of life due to an inability to respond to secondary catastrophes, 
such as fires, and/or provide emergency medical aid. 
• Delayed recovery operations. 
• Release of hazardous products (e.g., losses from tank cars derailed by track 
failure, gas leaks from ruptured utility lines) and environmental impacts. 
• Direct loss of property and utility service (e.g., the collapse of a bridge 
carrying utilities). 
• Losses due to interruption of access (e.g., export losses due to port damage). 
• Disruption of economic activity across the region and nation as well as in the 
community directly affected. 
The [CUSEC, 2000] document proposes a New Madrid Transportation Plan and 
Strategy, which would be the product of an intergovernmental-private sector planning 
process, aimed at addressing the following: 
1. Loss estimates and functionality assessments for selected earthquake scenarios. 
2. Common set of planning assumptions for federal, state, and local governments. 
3. Criteria for decisions on establishing field operations in a multi-state, multiple 
region disaster. 
4. Proper allocation of resources to multiple impacted areas. 
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5. State versus Federal roles in determining priorities and planning for infrastructure 
repair. 
6. Procedures and criteria for conflict resolution in meeting requests for resources. 
7. Pre-disaster determination of conditions that must be present before federal 
transportation support is withdrawn. 
Similar tasks have been studied in other regions of the U.S., but there has been none 
requiring such a broad coordination between different States and the Federal 
Government. The role played by CUSEC and the State Departments of Transportation in 
implementing this plan can not be underestimated. At present, CUSEC has compiled the 
Emergency Routes shown in Fig. 2-2.  
 
Fig. 2-2 – Earthquake Emergency Routes and staging facilities of the  




These routes are currently under study individually by each State. Detailed literature 
review on transportation issues is presented in Part I of this report. 
 
2.2 Bridges 
2.2.1 Bridge performance during earthquakes 
In general, the likelihood of bridge damage increases if the ground motion is 
particularly intense, the soils are soft, the bridge was constructed before modern codes 
were implemented, or the bridge configuration is irregular [Moehle and Eberhard, 2000]. 
Depending on theses conditions, bridge damage could be grouped in the following 
general categories: 
1. Unseating of the superstructure — Short seat lengths at span hinges or simple 
supports permit the partial or total collapse of the superstructure if the 
displacements caused by the ground motion exceed the support length. Curved 
bridges are especially vulnerable for this condition. Restrainers have been 
used for several years to mitigate this problem; although, there were cases in 
which they were not effective during the Northridge Earthquake [EERI, 
1995a]. 
2. Column failure — Lack of adequate confining transverse reinforcement leads 
to brittle modes of failure of reinforced concrete columns and piers. Short lap 
splices or inadequate embedment length of anchorage at the foundation of 
vertical reinforcement has led to numerous failures. For steel columns, local 
buckling may allow damage leading to collapse. 
3. Damage to abutments — The abutment is affected by the underlying soil 
conditions, the type of foundation, and the demands imposed by the 
superstructure movement. Usually, abutments are elements where it is 
difficult to provide ductility and toughness.  
4. Damage to bearings — Bearings used in bridges designed only for gravity 
effect are especially prone to failure under horizontal displacement of the 
superstructure transverse to the direction of thermal expansion.  
 
10 
5. Structural configuration — Unique complex structures with curved or 
significant skew geometry, or bridges having unique features or details, are 
more susceptible to damage induced by ground motion. 
6. Age, Modifications and Maintenance — Bridge design specifications have 
changed in recent years as a result of experience from earthquakes and 
structural research. The correlation between bad behavior and old bridges is 
high as observed in many recent earthquakes. Changes introduced after 
original construction sometimes affect behavior. Numerous cases in which 
protection barriers or walls reduce the clear height of columns have led to 
failures under earthquake ground motions. Deterioration of the bridge due to 
corrosion and other causes has had an influence in the observed behavior.  
7. Geotechnical conditions — Liquefaction, soil spread, slope instability, 
proximity to the fault, approach settlement, and other causes of distress 
influence the response, and damage of the bridge. 
The following publications describe extensively bridge behavior and damage during 
earthquakes [ACI, 1999], [Moehle and Eberhard, 2000], [Penzien, 2000], and [Priestley 
et al., 1996]. Reports from earthquakes were damage to bridges is specially described are: 
San Fernando, California, 1971 Earthquake [Lew et al., 1971]; Chile 1985 Earthquake 
[EERI, 1986]; Whittier Narrows, California, 1987 Earthquake [EERI, 1988]; Loma 
Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake [EERI, 1990] and [NRC, 1994]; Costa Rica 1991 
Earthquake [EERI, 1991]; Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake [EERI, 1995a] and 
[CRSI, 1994], the Kobe, Japan, 1995 Earthquake [EERI, 1995b]; the Turkish 
Earthquakes of 1999 [EERI, 2000]; the Taiwan Earthquake of 1999 [EERI, 2001], and 
the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake [Ranf et al., 2001], and [Nisqually EQ 
Clearinghouse Group, 2001]. Just a summary will be presented limiting it to cases of 
bridges designed using U.S. or comparable specifications. Direct reference is made to the 
relevant U.S. earthquakes. Even with these limitations, several things have to be kept in 
mind in translating this information for application in the State of Indiana. These issues 
will be discussed after the performance information is presented. 
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Although there is record of previous damage to bridges both in the U.S. and abroad, 
the February 9, 1971, San Fernando, California, Earthquake constitutes the first case on 
intense damage to bridges of modern design that belonged to the Interstate system [Lew 
et al., 1971]. The 1971 San Fernando Earthquake affected the greater Los Angeles area 
and specially the northern San Fernando Valley. Post-earthquake reports by the 
California State Highway Commission indicated that the earthquake damaged 
approximately 11 miles of multilane freeways and 6 miles of conventional state 
highways, in addition to numerous city and county streets. Approximately 1/5 of the total 
damage cost to transportation infrastructure was represented in damage to sixty bridges. 
Several of these bridges either collapsed or were severely damaged to the point of having 
to be replaced. Considerable disruption of traffic was caused by the bridge damage. The 
heavily traveled Interstate 5 was reopened to traffic using emergency detours within five 
days of the earthquake occurrence. Approximately 80% of the bridge damage cost was 
concentrated in 4 miles of highway at the intersection of I-5, I-210, and State Road 14. It 
is interesting to note that one of the collapsed curved bridges rebuilt after the San 
Fernando Earthquake collapsed during the Northridge 1994 Earthquake. 
 
 




The Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake [EERI, 1990] provided insight on the 
influence of geotechnical conditions on bridge behavior by the preponderance of damage 
in the perimeter of San Francisco Bay where relatively deep and soft soil deposits 
amplified the ground motion. The collapsed portions of the two-story Cypress Street 
viaduct (see Fig. 2-4) coincide with the soft soil sites. Soil conditions may have played a 




Fig. 2-4 – Collapse of the Cypress Street Viaduct during the  
Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake 
 
Loma Prieta Earthquake also highlighted the vulnerability of adjacent short and long 
spans imposing differential deformation demands and producing the collapse of the short 
span next to a large span (see Fig. 2-5). During this earthquake there were five bridge 
collapses (counting the extensive Cypress Viaduct as one) and four other bridges 





Fig. 2-5 – Collapse of a span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge  
during the Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake 
 
The Costa Rica 1991 Earthquake [EERI, 1991] confirmed the influence of soil 
conditions on bridge behavior especially in abutment failures, embankment settlement, 
and liquefaction. Collapses caused by unseating of skewed spans were also observed. 
The 1994 Northridge Earthquake, [EERI, 1995a] and [CRSI, 1994], produced high 
accelerations throughout the Los Angeles metropolitan area where the California 
Department of Transportation owns and maintains approximately 2,200 bridges. 
Approximately 1,200 were located in zones that experienced horizontal accelerations 
more than 0.25g and several hundred bridges were subjected to accelerations more than 
0.5g [ACI, 1999].  
Five bridges presented partial or complete collapse. All these structures were of 
reinforced and/or prestressed concrete, with construction completion dates ranging from 
1964 through 1976. Several had been retrofitted with hinge restrainers following the 1971 
San Fernando Earthquake. Collapse causes in all cases appear to involve column flexural 
or shear failures (see Fig. 2-6), or unseating at in-span or abutment hinges (see Fig. 2-7). 
Three reinforced and/or prestressed concrete bridges sustained major to moderate damage 
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to their columns but did not collapse. There was damage to bridge abutments throughout 
the epicentral region.  
 
 
Fig. 2-6 – Failure of flared column in the Route 118, Mission Gothic Undercrossing 
during the Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake 
 
The observed abutment damage included shear key cracking and failure, spalling or 
failure of abutment backwalls and wingwalls, approach settlement, and approach slab 
buckling. Damage in steel bridges comprised pounding damage between adjacent 
elements, buckling of cross bracing, bending of cross-brace gussets, bearing damage 
including anchor bolt and restrainer fractures, and damage to supporting abutments and 
pier walls.  
 
The epicentral region contained 132 bridges that had been retrofitted using post San 
Fernando, 1971, details (Caltrans Phase I), and 63 with post Loma Prieta retrofit details 
(Caltrans Phase II). Retrofit consisted in hinge restrainers and/or column jackets. Most of 
the retrofitted bridges performed adequately although, in some cases, hinge restrainers 
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presented problems. Column jackets, whether made of steel or fiberglass, performed well 
in all cases.  
 
 
Fig. 2-7 – Collapse of the Gavin Canyon Undercrossing during the  
Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake 
 
The Los Angeles County Department of Public Works reported serious damage in 
only four out of 1,500 bridges on the county system. The City of Los Angeles reported 
that 62 out of a total of 800 spans were damaged, and two required closure due to column 
damage in one case, and fill settlement in the other. Other damage to city bridges 
consisted of approach-fill settlement, pavement cracking, shear key damage, 
superstructure rotation, rocker bearing damage, and architectural damage. 
Several important observations were made regarding the performance of the 
transportation system [EERI, 1995a].  
• In this earthquake, all bridge collapses were associated with poor performance of 
older columns with inadequate transverse reinforcement and short seat widths, 
both of which have been identified as sources of vulnerability in previous 
earthquakes. The progress in knowledge and design practice was evident in the 
good performance of bridges constructed or retrofitted to current standards.  
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• Architectural column flares affected the pier behavior. Earlier design practice 
assumed that flares spalled off, whereas actually they act as an integral part of the 
column.  
• Current and older design procedures may not adequately represent the distribution 
of design forces in long, multiframe bridges. Failure and damage in end frames 
indicates that the stiffer end frames may attract larger forces than anticipated in 
design.  
• As with other construction forms, structural changes can occur during 
construction and maintenance that invalidate the design assumptions. It is 
important to verify that as-built conditions are consistent with design 
assumptions, and not just the design drawings. Improved documentation of design 
assumptions may be desirable.  
• Caltrans Phase I hinge restrainer retrofits had mixed performance. There were 
many examples of restrainer unit failure (cable fracture, fitting failure, and 
diaphragm punching).  
• Older bridges with 6-inch and 8-inch seats should be reevaluated, even if 
retrofitted with restrainers.  
• Caltrans Phase II retrofits appeared to perform well in all instances. (Its focus was 
on retrofitting columns in single-column bridges because of the perception that 
they were more vulnerable than multicolumn bridges.) 
• Several skewed bridges collapsed. An apparent cause was torsional response 
associated with skewed geometries. Methods are needed for improved design of 
skewed bridges, possibly including elimination of the skew where feasible, 
elimination of in-span hinges, and lengthening of seats.  
• Damage to abutments and approaches was widespread. Considering the extent of 
this damage for a moderate earthquake, it seems that the current design strategy to 
accept abutment damage should be reevaluated.  
• Major damage and collapse in multicolumn bridges indicates that the increased 
reliability associated with redundancy of multicolumn bents is not necessarily 
sufficient to avoid collapse. Retrofit priorities given to multicolumn bridges and 
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high-traffic-volume bridges may need to be reconsidered. Furthermore, damage 
and collapse required closure of bridges that usually carry heavy traffic volume.  
• Modern traffic management techniques were effective in managing traffic 
following the earthquake. Furthermore, emergency procedures, including strong 
incentive and disincentive clauses, were effective in achieving rapid 
reconstruction of the freeways.  
The February 28, 2001, Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake affected the Seattle, 
Tacoma, Olympia region [Ranf et al., 2001], and [Nisqually EQ Clearinghouse Group, 
2001]. No bridge collapses were observed during this earthquake. In total, 78 bridges 
were damaged. A total of 10 bridges sustained moderate damage, 16 had mild damage, 
and 52 bridges had minor damage. The event had a moment magnitude of 6.8 and a depth 
of focus of 52 km on the Juan de Fuca Plate. The distance from the hypocenter to Seattle 
was 78 km, 57 km to Tacoma, and 54 km to Olympia.  
 
Fig. 2-8 – Damage to the I-5 Holgate Street overpass, Seattle, during the  




The Nisqually Earthquake caused moderate ground motion throughout the Puget 
Sound region. Of the 31 stations for which preliminary information was available, only 
13 showed peak ground accelerations more than 10%g and only 2 stations recorded 
values more than 25%g. Several correlations of damage with bridge characteristics and 
ground motion intensity were made [Ranf et al., 2001]. For 72 bridges that were damaged 
(6 movable bridges were excluded because of their unusual characteristics) types of 
damage were: 48 with damage to concrete, 6 with damage to steel, 11 with damage to 
beams, restrainers or joints, and 7 with damage due to settlement.  
In order to help interpret the correlation of damage with age of the bridge, Figure 2-9 
shows the age of construction of the total bridge inventory in the region. The number of 
bridges built increased from the beginning of the 1950’s and then decreased at the 
beginning of the 1980’s coinciding with the construction of the interstate highway 
system. Figure 2-10 shows the correlation of age of construction with damage observed. 




Fig. 2-9 – Age of the total bridge inventory affected by the  
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake 
 
Figure 2-11 shows the spectral accelerations in percentage of g (T = 0.3 s) for each 
bridge site for the total bridge inventory in the area and Fig. 2-12 correlates the damage 
observed with the spectral acceleration. Correlation of spectral acceleration and bridge 




Fig. 2-10 – Percentage of damaged bridges by decade of construction for the  
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake 
 
 
Fig. 2-11 – Spectral acceleration (%g at T = 0.3 s) at the bridge site for  
the total bridge inventory affected by the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake 
 
 
Fig. 2-12 – Percentage of bridge damaged for different values of spectral acceleration 





The bridge behavior observed during the Nisqually Earthquake is relevant because it 
may be similar to what would be expected in southwestern Indiana for a large earthquake 
in the New Madrid zone. The accelerations expected are of the same order of magnitude 
of those recorded during Nisqually Earthquake. The bridge inventory has similar 
characteristic with respect to age and type of bridges. Awareness of the seismic risk in the 
Pacific Northwest evolved about the same time as that for awareness of the seismic risk 
in the Central U.S. Earthquake resistant design of new bridges started about the same 
time in Central U.S. and Pacific NW. 
 
2.2.2 Bridge seismic design criteria evolution 
The early days 
In 1931 the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) published 
the first edition of the Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges [AASHO, 1931]. 
These specifications were – and still are – for ordinary bridges having span lengths less 
than 500 feet. No reference to considering earthquake effects on bridges was made in the 
Standard Specifications until the fifth edition (1949) in which a statement requiring that 
earthquake effects should be considered was included without guidance on how to 
account for them. The same statement was kept in the sixth (1953) and seventh (1957) 
editions.  
The eighth edition (1961) of the Standard Specifications [AASHO, 1961] was the 
first to specify an earthquake loading for design (EQ) to be applied statically in any 
horizontal direction as part of Group VII load combination which included along with 
earthquake effects: dead loads, earth pressure, buoyancy, and stream flow effects. This 
load combination was to be used in the working stress design (WSD) procedure with a 1/3 
increase in allowable stress permitted for occasional loads. The earthquake load was 
defined using a seismic coefficient (C) that multiplied the dead load (D): 
 
 EQ C D= ⋅  (2-1) 
 
Values of C were 0.02 for structures supported on spread footings where the soil 
bearing capacity was rated to be greater than 4 t/ft2, 0.04 for structures supported on 
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spread footings where the soil bearing capacity was rated to be less than 4 t/ft2, and 0.06 
for structures founded on piles. No seismic zone factors or seismic zoning map was 
provided, leaving to the State Bridge Commissioner or the State Highway Department the 
decision of considering the State, or regions within the State, as seismic. These seismic 
provisions were an extension of the lateral force requirements for buildings developed 
prior to 1961 by the Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC). The 
seismic loading provisions of the eighth (1961) edition of the Standard Specifications 
were kept, without modification, in the ninth (1965), tenth (1969) and eleventh (1973) 
editions. 
 
The 1975 AASHTO Interim 
As a result of the 1971 San Fernando, California, Earthquake, during which many 
highway bridges were severely damaged and some even collapsed – as described 
previously – the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) issued, in 1973, a 
new seismic design procedure for bridges which formed the basis of the 1975 AASHTO 
Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges [AASHTO, 1975]. This document specified 
an equivalent static lateral force: 
 
 EQ C F W= ⋅ ⋅  (2-2) 
 
The procedure was restricted to bridges having supporting members of approximately 
equal lateral stiffness. The equivalent static lateral force was to be applied in any 
horizontal direction as part of the same Group VII load combination used in the eighth 
(1961) Standard Specifications edition in a working stress design procedure permitting a 
1/3 increase in allowable stress. In Eq. (2-2), W represents dead load, F is a framing 
factor assigned the values of 1.0 for single columns and 0.8 for moment resisting frames 
with the horizontal force acting along the frame, and C was a combined response 
coefficient expressed by: 
 A R SC
Z
⋅ ⋅




in which A denotes the maximum expected peak ground acceleration (PGA) associated 
with each seismic risk zone of the map of the United States shown in Fig. 2-13, R is a 
normalized (PGA = 1g) acceleration response spectral value for a rock site, S is a soil 
amplification factor, and Z is a force reduction factor depending upon structural-
component type which accounts for the allowance of inelastic deformations. 
The numerical values specified for A were 0.09g, 0.22g, and 0.50g in seismic zones 
numbered 1, 2, and 3 respectively in the map of Fig. 2-13. 
 
Fig. 2-13 – Seismic Risk Map contained in the 
 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges 
 
Numerical values for R, S, and Z were not provided in the 1975 AASHTO Interim 
Specifications for Highway Bridges; instead four plots of C as a function of period T were 
given for different values of A. Each of these plots represents a different depth range of 
alluvium to rock-like material. The ranges were 0-10 ft, 11-80 ft, 81-150 ft, and greater 
than 150 ft. Figure 2-14 shows the response coefficient C values as a function of period T 
for 81 to 150 ft depth of alluvium. Minimum values for C were set at 0.10 for values of A 




Fig. 2-14 – Response coefficient C for 81-150 ft depth of alluvium contained in the 
 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges 
 




=  (2-4) 
 
in which P was equal to the total uniform static load required to cause a 1-inch lateral 
deflection of the whole structure. For complex or irregular structures the 1975 Interim 
Specifications required use of the modal response spectrum analysis method to obtain 
design loads. For structures adjacent to active faults, sites with unusual geologic 
conditions, unusual structures, and structures having a fundamental period greater than 3 
seconds it required that the design should be made using current seismicity, soil response, 
and dynamic analysis techniques. The 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway 
Bridges also included a procedure for design of restraining features to limit the 
displacement of the superstructure including hinges, ties, and shear blocks. 
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The seismic design criteria contained in the 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications 
were kept in the twelfth (1977), thirteenth (1983), and fourteenth (1989) editions of 
AASHTO’s Standard Specifications. The only modification was to allow the use of load-
factor design (LFD) or ultimate strength design (USD). For WSD the same Group VII 
load combination was specified with a 1/3 allowable stress increase – see Eq. (2-5) –. 




Group VII (LFD) D E
D E B SF EQ
D E B SF EQγ β β
= + + + +
= ⋅ + ⋅ + + +
 (2-5) 
 
where D denotes dead load; E earth pressure; B buoyancy; and SF stream flow; γ = 1.3; 
βD = 0.75 when checking columns for minimum axial load and maximum moment or 
eccentricity, βD = 1.0 when checking columns for maximum axial load and minimum 
moment, and βD = 1.0 for flexure and tension members; and βE = 1.3 for lateral earth 
pressure and βE = 0.5 for positive moment in rigid frames. 
Although the introduction of these requirements for computing seismic forces and 
their use in design was an improvement with respect to previous practice, no 
corresponding changes were introduced in the detailing requirements for the structural 
materials within the Standard Specifications. Seen from a more recent perspective, the 
lack of requirements to introduce toughness to the structural elements as was being 
required at the same time for the earthquake resistant design of buildings [ACI, 1977] 
would turn later to be one of the major sources of seismic vulnerability for transportations 
structures designed and built during this era.  
 
The ATC 6 and Division I-A of AASHTO Standard Specifications 
In the aftermath of the February 9, 1971, San Fernando, California, Earthquake the 
Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC) established the Applied 
Technology Council (ATC), an independent, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation for the 
purpose of implementing current technological developments into active structural 
engineering practice. Their initial efforts were aimed at earthquake resistant design of 
buildings. In the late 1970’s with the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation and 
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the National Bureau of Standards the Applied Technology Council published document 
ATC-3-06 [ATC, 1978] devoted to building earthquake resistant design. This document 
was the draft of what was to become current Model Code seismic requirements in the 
United States and many countries. In 1981 ATC, with the sponsorship of the Federal 
Highway Administration, Department of Transportation, published document ATC-6 
Seismic Design Guidelines for Bridges [ATC, 1981]. These guidelines with minor 
revision made by the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER) in 
Buffalo, NY, under the sponsorship of the National Cooperative Highway Research 
Program (NCHRP), were adopted as the earthquake resistant design requirements for 
bridges in the fifteenth (1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications. These 
requirements were kept without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and in the current 
seventeenth (2002) edition [AASHTO, 2002] as Division I-A Seismic Design. 
Under the requirements of Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of 
the Standard Specifications the acceleration coefficient A for the bridge site must be 
obtained from the acceleration contour maps provided. The northern Midwest portion of 
the map of horizontal acceleration A (expressed as a percent of gravity) in rock with 90 
percent probability of not being exceeded in 50 years – mean return period 475 years – is 
shown in Fig. 2-15. This map was prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for 
the 1988 edition of the NEHRP Recommended Provisions for the Development of Seismic 
Regulations for New Buildings [NEHRP, 1988]. Although the values of A in this map do 
not differ in the order of magnitude from those contained in the original ATC-6 1981 
report for the same geographical regions, the 1988 map uses a finer resolution by 
assigning values of A in a county by county basis and presenting them in smaller 
acceleration increments. 
Once the acceleration coefficient is obtained, the bride structure must be classified as 
either “Essential” or “Other” in accordance with given guidelines. An importance 
classification (IC= I) shall be given to Essential bridges and (IC=II) shall be given to 
ordinary bridges. The classification of “Essential” must be given to all bridges located in 
zones where the value of A is greater than 0.29g and on the basis of social, survival, 
security, or defense requirements. Guidance is given in the commentary of ATC-6 for 
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including bridges in either importance group. The bridge also must be assigned to a 
Seismic Performance Category (SPC) A, B, C or D as a function of the acceleration 
coefficient A as defined in Table 2-1.  
 
 
Fig. 2-15 – Northern Midwest portion of the map of horizontal acceleration A (g) in rock 
with 90 percent probability of not being exceeded in 50 years (Division I-A Seismic 
Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications) 
 
Table 2-1 – Seismic Performance Categories (SPC) Division I-A Seismic Design  
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications 
Bridge Classification Acceleration Coefficient Essential Other 
A ≤ 0.09g A A 
0.09g < A ≤ 0.19g B B 
0.19g < A ≤ 0.29g C C 




The effects of site conditions on bridge response are determined from a Site 
Coefficient (S) based on soil profile types summarized in Fig. 2-16. 
 
Soil Profile Type I - S = 1.0 
  
Soil Profile Type II - S = 1.2 
 
Soil Profile Type III - S = 1.5 
 
Soil Profile Type IV - S = 2.0 
 
Fig. 2-16 – Soil Profile Types  
(Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications) 
 
No dynamic analysis is required in Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th 
Edition of the Standard Specifications for bridges having single spans, regardless of the 
value of the site acceleration coefficient A, and for all bridges in SPC A. All other 
bridges, regular or irregular, having two or more spans must be analyzed by at least one 
of two dynamic analysis procedures, namely, the single-mode spectral method (SMSM) 
or the multi-mode spectral method (MMSM). The SMSM is specified as minimum for 
More than 40 feet of soft 
clays or silts with shear wave 




More than 30 feet of soft 




More than 200 feet of stiff 




Less than 200 feet of stiff 
sand or gravel, or stiff clays< 200 ft
Rock 
Surface 
Rock with shear wave 






regular bridges in SPC B, C, and D; while the MMSM is specified as minimum for 
irregular bridges in these same categories. An "irregular" bridge is defined as one having 
abrupt or unusual changes in mass, stiffness, and/or geometry from abutment to 
abutment; a "regular" bridge is one not meeting the definition of an "irregular" bridge. 
The seismic input in any horizontal direction to be used in each of these minimum 
dynamic analysis procedures is specified in terms of an elastic seismic response 
coefficient, Cs, as expressed for the single-mode spectral SMSM method for a bridge 







=  (2-6) 
 
The value of Cs need not exceed 2.5⋅A. For sites with soil profile types III and IV in 
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Fig. 2-17 – Seismic response coefficient Cs for different soil profiles normalized with 
respect to acceleration coefficient A (Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th 
Edition of the Standard Specifications) 
 
For the multi-mode spectral method (MMSM) the same relationship for Cs is used 
and for each individual vibration mode “m” the mode period Tm must be used in Eq. (2-6) 
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as T. In this case a reduction of Cs is allowed for modes other than the fundamental and 
periods shorter than 0.3 sec, with the value of Cs tending to the value of A at a period 
equal to zero. For long periods greater than 4 sec a minimum value of Cs is required.  
Deformations in the nonlinear range of response of the bridge elements are expected 
to occur when subjected to the earthquake design ground motion prescribed in the 
Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications. 
Response modification factors (R) are prescribed for the cases listed in Table 2-2. 
 
Table 2-2 – Response Modification Factors (R) Division I-A Seismic Design of the 
current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications 
Substructure R Connections R 
Wall-Type Pier 2 Superstructure to abutment 0.8 
Reinforced concrete pile bents 
a. Vertical piles only 




Expansion joints within a 
span of the superstructure 
0.8 
Single columns 3 Columns, piers, or pile bents 
to cap beam or superstructure 
1.0 
Steel or composite & steel 
concrete pile bents 
a. Vertical piles only 





Columns or piers to 
foundation 
1.0 
Multiple-column bent 5   
 
In a great departure from the earthquake resistant design of buildings in which the 
response modification factor is assigned for the structure as a whole by dividing the 
design forces by R before performing the analysis; in the ATC-6 document the analysis, 
static or dynamic, is performed for the bridge without reducing the design forces by the 
response modification factor. Here it is used at the element level by dividing the design 
forces by R just when computing modified values (EQM) that replace values of (EQ) in 
Eq. (2-5). This form of use for the response modification factor in bridges has been kept 
up to Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard 
Specifications.  
Other major departure from previous bridge design practice introduced by the ACT-6 
document was to assign differential detailing requirements depending on the Seismic 
Performance Categories (SPC). This leads to increased structural toughness from 
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category A to D, with category A corresponding to the Standard Specifications 
requirements without any seismic provisions beyond using seismic forces in analysis and 
design and no special detailing. The reinforced concrete requirements for SPC B to D 
were based on corresponding requirements of the ACI 318 Code [ACI, 1977] for 
buildings. This may be considered a landmark in improved expected performance of 
transportations structures subjected to strong earthquake ground motion. 
Other significant improvement with respect to previous practice was the introduction 
of dimension of minimum support-width length to be used at expansion ends of girders in 
all bridges; regardless of seismic performance category and number of spans (see Fig. 2-
18). Prescribed minimum support lengths depend on angle of skew of the support, 
distance between expansion joints, pier height, and seismic performance category.  
 
 
Fig. 2-18 – Minimum support length definition (Division I-A Seismic Design  
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications) 
 
AASHTO LRFD 
Reinforced concrete design departed from the working-stress design (WSD) 
philosophy in the mid 1950’s and by the early 1970’s had moved completely into 
ultimate strength design (USD) philosophy. Other materials lagged but by the mid 1980’s 
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a push for probabilistic design methods coined a new term for USD as load and resistance 
factor design (LRFD) which was adopted especially by the steel industry and later by 
AASHTO. Between 1988 and 1993 with the sponsorship of the Federal Highway 
Administration under the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) 
developed and published in 1994 the first edition of AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design 
Specifications, reviewed later for a second edition in 1998 [AASHTO, 1998], and 
recently in a third edition in 2004 [AASHTO, 2004]. 
The AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications, First (1994), Second (1998), and 
Third (2004) Editions, requires that each bridge component and connection satisfy all 
limit states in accordance with the relation  
 
 ( )i i nQ Rη γ φ⋅ ≤ ⋅∑  (2-7) 
 
in which η is a factor related to a ductility factor ηD, a redundancy factor ηR, and an 
operational importance factor ηi in accordance with η = ηD⋅ηR⋅ηi; γi is a statistically-
based load factor applied to force effect Qi; and φ is a statistically-based resistance factor 
applied to the nominal resistance Rn. The numerical values to be used for these factors 
can be found in the LRFD Specifications (AASHTO LRFD, 1994, 1998, and 2004). 
The value of Qi for the value of i representing an extreme seismic event, designated 
EQ, is found using the same procedure described above for Standard Specifications, 
Fifteenth (1992), Sixteenth (1996), and seventeenth (2002) Editions. 
An additional bridge classification, "Critical," has been added to the LRFD 
Specifications; and the number of substructure response modification factors R, have 
been increased and made different in all three classifications, "Critical," "Essential," and 
"Other" as indicated in Table 2-3. The response modification factors for connections 
remained the same in the LRFD Specifications than in the Standard Specifications.  
Although, at first glance it may look that the impact of adoption of AASHTO LRFD 
Specification to replace the AASHTO Standard Specifications with respect to seismic 
design is minor because they are based on the same requirements, this is not true for 
bridges in the “Critical” and “Essential” categories where seismic design forces described 
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by EQM (EQ/R) increase by a factors ranging from 1.33 to 3.33 for “Critical” bridges and 
from 1.33 to 1.5 for “Essential” bridges. 
 
Table 2-3 – Response Modification Factors (R) in AASHTO LRFD Specifications 
 
Importance Category Substructure Critical Essential Other 
Wall-type piers-larger 
dimension 
1.5 1.5 2.0 
Reinforced concrete pile bents 
• Vertical piles only 










Single columns 1.5 2.0 3.0 
Steel or composite & steel 
concrete pile bents 
• Vertical piles only 













Multiple-column bent 1.5 3.5 5.0 
 
The presented material describes current AASHTO Specifications both Standard and 
LRFD. Notwithstanding, several important changes on seismic bridge specifications are 
being discussed in the corresponding drafting committees and it is important to be aware 
of their implications, if approved. These changes come basically from three sources:  
• the first one corresponds to changes in the California Department of 
Transportation (Caltrans) seismic design criteria,  
• the second one from changes in the way to define the design ground motion 
both in the description of the movement at rock by the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS) that is discussed in Chapter 3, and  
• the third in the way to assess the amplification caused by the soil profile by 
the Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC) as part of the National 
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) for incorporation in the 
NEHRP Recommended Provision for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings 
that is discussed in 2.3.1.  
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Some of these new trends have already been adopted as regulations in the corresponding 
earthquake resistant design requirements for new buildings. A brief description of these 
trends follows. 
 
Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria 
In the aftermath of the Loma Prieta Earthquake of 1989, the California Department of 
Transportation (Caltrans) decided to sponsor a project to conduct a critical review and to 
recommend changes where needed in the seismic design part of the Caltrans Bridge 
Design Specifications (BDS) also known as the California Seismic Design Criteria 
(SDC). The result of this project was presented in document ATC-32 [ATC, 1996] which 
provided a number of recommended improvements to seismic bridge design practice in 
California. The project focused on issues related to seismic loading, structural response 
analysis, and component design. Special attention was given to design issues related to 
reinforced concrete components, steel components, foundations, and conventional 
bearings. In addition, the specifications were revised to give a bigger role to the 
evaluation of displacement and to use it as a tool to define performance criteria. Although 
a new definition of the design ground motion was contained, the production of new 
seismic risk maps was considered then outside the scope of the project.  
The ATC-32 was, as the title indicated, a recommendation. It took some time for 
Caltrans to update the Caltrans SDC. In July 1999 Version 1.1 of the Caltrans SDC was 
published [Caltrans, 1999], with Version 1.2 in December of 2001 [Caltrans, 2001], and 
Version 1.3 in February 2004 [Caltrans, 2004].  
The Caltrans SDC adopts a performance-based approach specifying minimum levels 
of structural system performance, component performance, analysis, and design practices 
for ordinary standard bridges. For bridges with non-standard features or operational 
requirements above and beyond the ordinary standard bridge a greater degree of attention 
than specified by the SDC is required. Many of the methodologies contained in the SDC 
evolved from the seismic retrofit program and some of the procedures are major 
departures from previous practice while others are slight modifications to current 
practice. The most significant change in design philosophy for new bridges is a shift from 
 
34 
a force-based assessment of seismic demand to a displacement-based assessment of 
demand and capacity. The displacement approach is based on comparing the elastic 
displacement demand to the inelastic displacement capacity of the primary structural 
components while insuring a minimum level of inelastic capacity at all potential plastic 
hinge locations.  
The SDC document [Caltrans, 2004] warns about its applicability in places different 
from California: “This document is intended for use on bridges designed by and for the 
California Department of Transportation. It reflects the current state of practice at 
Caltrans. This document contains references specific and unique to Caltrans and may not 
be applicable to other parties either institutional or private.” One important aspect that 
makes its direct applicability elsewhere difficult is the way the earthquake design ground 
motion is defined. California has unique tectonic characteristics with a relatively thin 
earth’s crust producing predominantly shallow earthquakes. The fault mapping of 
California is comprehensive; leading to definition of design ground motion supported on 
relatively well-known faults that lend themselves to establish earthquake mean recurrence 
periods with somewhat less uncertainty than in other places in the U.S. (this will be 
discussed latter in Chapter 3 with respect to the implication for the State of Indiana). This 
means that the design ground motion proposed by Caltrans SDC is particular for the 
tectonic setting and the types of soil profiles common in California. Other important 
aspect is that the Caltrans SDC is focused on concrete bridges. The Caltrans SDC 
specifies target ductility demands, defined as the ratio of the estimated global frame 
displacement demand to the yield displacement of the subsystem from its initial position 
to the formation of plastic hinge, for different structural components. For instance, for 
multi-column bents a value of 5 is prescribed while for wall piers in the strong direction a 
value of unity (= 1) is given. The structure must be designed to resist the internal forces 
generated when the structure reaches its Collapse Limit State. The Collapse Limit State is 
defined as the condition when a sufficient number of plastic hinges have formed within 
the structure to create a local or global collapse mechanism.  
The local displacement capacity of a member is based on its rotation capacity (see 
Fig. 2-19 for cantilever column and Fig. 2-20 framed columns), which in turn is based on 
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its curvature capacity. The curvature capacity must be determined from a moment-
curvature (M-φ) analysis. Each ductile member shall have a minimum local displacement 
ductility capacity of 3 to ensure dependable rotational capacity in the plastic hinge 
regions regardless of the displacement demand imparted to that member. 
 
 
Fig. 2-19 – Local displacement capacity – cantilever column with fixed base  
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2004]) 
 
 
Fig. 2-20 – Local displacement capacity – framed column assumed as fixed-fixed  
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2004]) 
 
Caltrans SDC defines how the expected material properties can be obtained, how to 
compute the plastic moment capacity for ductile concrete members, how to perform the 
moment curvature (M-φ) analysis, and how to obtain the shear capacity of the 
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components. The designer is required to check that the nominal capacity of the 
superstructure longitudinally and of the bent cap transversely are sufficient to ensure that 
the columns respond in the nonlinear range prior to the superstructure or bent cap 
reaching its expected nominal strength. Caltrans SDC requires assessing the force and 
deformation demands and capacities on the structural system, and its individual 
components, using analysis. The document prescribes for ordinary standard bridges the 
use of equivalent static analysis and linear elastic dynamic analysis for estimating the 
displacement demands, and inelastic static analysis (push-over) for establishing the 
displacement capacities. The Caltrans SDC document gives guidance with respect to the 
use of appropriate cracked sections for each type of analysis. 
The geotechnical engineer is required to provide the following information relative to 
the bridge site: seismicity, fault distance, earthquake magnitude, peak rock acceleration, 
soil profile type, liquefaction potential, and foundation stiffness or the soil parameters 
necessary for determining the force deformation characteristics of the foundation. The 
document contains standard acceleration response spectra for preliminary design, but in 
general requires a site specific spectrum for design. The standard acceleration and 
displacement response spectra provided are function of soil profile type and design 
earthquake magnitude. Magnitude ranges from 6.5 to 8, and envisioned peak ground 
accelerations in rock as high as 0.7g are presented. Acceleration amplification caused by 
the soil profile follows latest BSSC and NEHRP recommendations (see 2.3.1). The 
foundation subsystem response must be evaluated based on the quality of the surrounding 
soil. Soils are classified as competent, poor, or marginal. 
In the Caltrans SDC the bridge designer is required to maintain the ratio of effective 
stiffness between any two bents within a frame or between any two columns within a 
bent within prescribed limits. Hinge seat width are prescribed to accommodate the 
anticipated thermal movement, prestress shortening, creep, shrinkage, and the relative 
longitudinal earthquake displacement demand between adjacent frames. As a rule 
adequate seat width must be provided to prevent unseating as a primary requirement. 
Hinge restrainers are considered secondary members to prevent unseating. Moment 
resisting connections between the superstructure and the column must be designed to 
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transmit the maximum forces produced when the column has reached its flexural and 
shear overstrength capacity. Caltrans SDC considers bearings as sacrificial elements for 
ordinary standard bridges. Typically bearings must be designed and detailed for service 
loads. However, bearings must be checked to insure their capacity and mode of failure 
are consistent with the assumptions made in the seismic analysis. The designer must 
detail bearings so they can be easily inspected for damage and replaced or repaired after 
an earthquake. Columns flares require special treatment to insure proper behavior of the 
column. At the foundation, the size and number of piles and the pile group layout must be 
designed to resist service level moments, shears, and axial loads and the moment demand 
induced by the column plastic hinging mechanism. The linear elastic demand analysis 
model must include an effective abutment stiffness that accounts for expansion gaps, and 
incorporates realistic values of the embankment fill response. Seat type abutments must 
be designed to resist elastically all transverse service load and moderate earthquake 
demands. 
 
Draft AASHTO LRFD Update 
The Caltrans SDC imposed a trend that was picked up by the National Cooperative 
Highway Research Program (NCHRP) for incorporation in an update of the AASHTO 
LRFD Specifications. A research project sponsored by AASHTO in cooperation with the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) produced a draft update of the AASHTO 
LRFD Specifications that is summarized and described in NCHRP Report 472 [NCHRP, 
2002] and presented in final form in four reports published by the Applied Technology 
Council: “Recommended LRFD guidelines for the seismic design of highway bridges – 
Part I: Specifications” [ATC/MCEER, 2003a], “Recommended LRFD guidelines for the 
seismic design of highway bridges – Part II: Commentary and Appendices” 
[ATC/MCEER, 2003b], “Liquefaction Study Report for Recommended LRFD guidelines 
for the seismic design of highway bridges” [ATC/MCEER, 2003c], and “Design 
Examples for Recommended LRFD guidelines for the seismic design of highway 
bridges” [ATC/MCEER, 2003d],. The research was performed by a joint venture of the 
Applied Technology Council (ATC) and the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake 
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Engineering Research (MCEER), Buffalo, NY. The project purpose was to develop new 
specifications for the seismic design of bridges, considering all aspects of the design 
process. These aspects include the following: (1) design philosophy and performance 
criteria, (2) seismic loads and site effects, (3) analysis and modeling, and (4) design 
requirements. The new specification should be nationally applicable with provisions for 
all seismic zones. The emphasis was on design of new bridges rather than on retrofit of 
existing ones. The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) contains a 
number of new concepts and additions, as well as some major modifications to existing 
provisions. These are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
The definition of the design earthquake has been moving away from the 10% 
probability of exceedance in a 50-year life span of the structure towards a definition of a 
maximum considered earthquake with a lower (3%) probability of exceedance and 
sometimes a longer life span (75 years). On the other hand, the use of effective peak 
ground acceleration as the mapped parameter to define the design ground motion has 
been substituted in the specifications for design of new buildings for a direct definition of 
the design response spectrum including the site effects. The USGS has developed maps 
for these new definitions as will be explained in Chapter 3 of this report. The Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) uses these new definitions and 
maps.  
The proposed provisions provide performance objectives and damage states for two 
design earthquakes with explicit design checks to ensure that the performance objectives 
are met (see Table 2-4). 
In Table 2-4 the upper-level event, termed the “rare” or Maximum Considered 
Earthquake (MCE), describes ground motion that, for most locations, is defined 
probabilistically and has a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (approximately 
2500-year mean return period). The frequent or expected earthquake has a probability of 
exceedance of 50% in 75 years (approximately 100-year mean return period). For the 
service level: “Immediate” means full access to normal traffic and the bridge must be 
available for traffic after an inspection, and “Significant Disruption” means limited 
access (reduced lanes, light emergency traffic) may be possible after shoring but the 
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bridge may need to be replaced. Detailed geometric constraints on service level are 
presented in the draft. For the damage levels: “None” means evidence of movement may 
be present but no notable damage; “Minimal” means some visible signs of damage 
produced by minor nonlinear response (narrow flexural cracking), no permanent 
deformations, and repair can be performed under non-emergency conditions, 
“Significant” means no collapse, but permanent offsets, cracking, reinforcement yielding, 
and major spalling of concrete may require closure for repairs. Partial or complete 
replacement of columns may be required in some cases.  
 
Table 2-4 – Design Earthquakes and Seismic Performance Objectives in the Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Performance level Probability of exceedance for 
design earthquake ground motion 
 
Life Safety Operational 
Service Significant Disruption Immediate Rare earthquake (MCE)  
3% in 75 years Damage Significant Disruption Minimal 
Service Immediate Immediate  Frequent or expected earthquake 
50% in 75 years 
 Damage Minimal Minimal to none 
 
The design ground motion in Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 
12-49) is described through a design response spectrum that can be obtained from the 
general procedure or from a site-specific study. The site-specific study is required if the 
bridge is considered a major or very important structure, when the site is located within 
10 km of an active fault, or when the site has a Type F soil profile (see 2.3.1) with peats 
or highly organic soils, high plasticity clays, or very thick deposits of soft to medium stiff 
clays.  
The general procedure defines response spectra for the rare MCE earthquake and for 
the frequent earthquake based on maps produced (or being produced in the case of the 
frequent earthquake) by the USGS. The acceleration spectrum for 5% of critical damping 
is obtained using a two point procedure. The spectral design acceleration at 0.2-second 
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period, SDS, and at 1-second period, SD1, are obtained from Equations (2-8) and (2-9) 
respectively. 
 DS a SS F S= ⋅  (2-8) 
 1 1D vS F S= ⋅  (2-9) 
 
where SS and S1 are the 0.2-second and 1-second period spectral accelerations on rock 
(Class B site, see 2.3.1) from ground motion maps and Fa and Fv are site coefficients 
associated with the site class and mapped acceleration value. The maps for the Maximum 
Considered Earthquake contained in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions 
(NCHRP 12-49) are the same maps produced by the USGS for BSSC to be included in 
the 1997 NEHRP recommendations for new buildings [NEHRP, 1997]. These maps are 
presented and discussed in Chapter 3. For the frequent earthquake there were no maps 
available when the draft was produced and the draft suggests obtaining them by 
interpolation from the hazard curves produced by the USGS compatible with the maps 
for the MCE. The design spectrum is obtained from the values given by Equations (2-8) 
and (2-9). Two control periods are given: Ts and T0 defined in Equations (2-10) and 






=  (2-10) 
 0 0.2 sT T= ⋅  (2-11) 
 
For periods less than or equal to T0, the design response spectral acceleration is 
defined by Eq. (2-12). Note that as T tends to T = 0 seconds, the resulting value of Sa is 







= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅  (2-12) 
 
For periods greater than or equal to T0 and less than or equal to Ts, the design 
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Fig. 2-21 – Design Response Spectrum – Probabilistic general procedure  
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)) 
 
When a site-specific response spectrum is used, a probabilistically based spectrum 
must be obtained using a characterization of the seismic sources and ground motion 
attenuation that includes current scientific interpretations, including uncertainties in 
seismic source and ground motion models and parameter values. If the spectrum obtained 
this way exceeds the limits shown in Fig. 2-22, a deterministic spectrum may be used. 
The deterministic design response spectrum may be used in regions having known 
active faults if the deterministic spectrum ordinates are less than those of the probabilistic 
spectrum. The deterministic spectrum must be the median-plus-standard-deviation 
spectrum calculated for characteristic maximum magnitude earthquakes on known active 
faults (the corresponding building requirements require 150% instead of the 184% for 
bridges), but must not be less than the spectrum shown in Fig. 2-22. If there is more than 
one active fault in the site region, the deterministic spectrum must be computed as the 
Period, T (sec) 
Sa 
 (g) 













T0 = 0.2 ⋅ Ts 
 
42 
envelope of spectra for the different faults. Alternatively a deterministic spectrum may be 
computed for each fault, and each spectrum, or the spectrum that govern bridge response, 
may be used for the analysis of the bridge. When the design response spectrum is 
determined from a site-specific study, the spectrum ordinates must not be less than 2/3 of 
the ordinates of the probabilistic spectrum obtained following the general procedure. The 
draft permits also the use of acceleration time histories instead of a design response 
spectrum and provides guidance on how to define them. Design for vertical acceleration 
effects are prescribed in detail for bridges located less than 50 km from an active fault.  
 
 
Fig. 2-22 – Minimum Deterministic Design Response Spectrum  
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)) 
 
The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) defines a Seismic 
Hazard Level (SHL) classification into four groups (I to IV). The bridge must be assigned 
in the larger SHL obtained from Table 2-5 or 2-6. 
Table 2-5 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FvS1  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Seismic Hazard Level Value of FvS1 
I Fv S1 ≤ 0.15g 
II 0.15g < FvS1 ≤ 0.25g 
III 0.25g < FvS1 ≤ 0.40g 
IV 0.40g < FvS1 
 
Period, T (sec) 
Sa = 1.5 ⋅ Fa 







Table 2-6 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FaSS  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Seismic Hazard Level Value of FaSS 
I FaSS ≤ 0.15g 
II 0.15g < FaSS ≤ 0.35g 
III 0.35g < FaSS ≤ 0.60g 
IV 0.60g < FaSS 
 
The Seismic Design Level is used, in turn, to define the Seismic Design and Analysis 
Procedure (SDAP) and the Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR). Table 2-7 defines the 
Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure. 
Table 2-7 – Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP)  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Seismic Hazard Level Life Safety Operational 
I A1 A2 
II A2 C/D/E 
III B/C/D/E C/D/E 
IV C/D/E C/D/E 
 
Brief description of the different Seismic Design and Analysis Procedures (SDAP): 
• SDAP A — Observance of minimum seat widths, checking of connection 
design forces for bearings, and use of minimum shear reinforcement in 
concrete piles are the only requirements. The horizontal connection design 
force in the restrained direction must be 10% of the vertical reaction for 
SDAP A1 and 25% for SDAP A2. No rigorous analysis is required instead 
these default values are used as design forces. 
• SDAP B — Does not require a seismic demand analysis. Capacity design 
principles and minimum design detailing are required. There are certain 
restrictions to use SDAP B associated with span length (maximum 80 feet), 
skewness of the bridge (maximum 30°), bent stiffness, and element cross-
section dimension and reinforcement, and other.  
• SDAP C — Requires the use of the capacity design spectrum approach. This 
procedure applies only to bridges that behave and can be modeled as a single-
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degree-of-freedom system. The procedure is also restricted to bridges with a 
very regular configuration, bridges not having more than six spans, spans not 
greater than 60 feet, maximum skewness of 30°, and other. 
• SDAP D — Requires the use of the elastic response spectrum method. 
Cracked sections are required. The procedure is divided into a single-mode 
equivalent lateral load procedure, and a multimode dynamic analysis 
procedure.  
• SDAP E — Consist in an elastic response spectrum analysis used for design 
plus a displacement capacity verification performed afterwards.  
Response modification factor, RB, to be used in SDAP D and E are presented in Table 
2-8 for the substructure. Response modification factor for connections are all R = 0.8 but 
are not intended for cases where the design of the connection is made using capacity 
design principles.  
Table 2-8 – Base Response Modification Factors, RB, for the substructure  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Performance Objective 








Wall pier – larger dimension 2 3 1 1.5 
Columns – Single and multiple 
Ductile detailing 4 6 1.5 2.5 
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles – 
above ground 4 6 1.5 2.5 
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles – 
2 diameters below ground level – no owner’s 
approval required 
1 1.5 1 1 
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles – 
in ground – owner’s approval required N/A 2.5 N/A 1.5 
Pile bents with batter piles N/A 2 N/A 1.5 
Seismically isolated structures 1.5 1.5 1 1.5 
Steel braced frame – ductile 3 4.5 1 1.5 
Steel braced frame – Nominally ductile 1.5 2 1 1 
All elements for frequent or expected 
earthquake 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.9 
 




 ( ) *1 1B B
TR R R
T
= + − ⋅ ≤  (2-15) 
 
where T* = 1.25 Ts and Ts is defined in Eq. (2-10). 
Table 2-9 defines the Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR) for each Seismic 
Hazard Level (SHL) and Table 2-10 defines the component detailing requirements for 
each SDR. 
Table 2-9 – Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR)  
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Seismic Hazard Level Life Safety Operational 
I 1 2 
II 2 3 
III 3 4 
IV 5 6 
 
Minimum seat width must not be less than 1.5 times the displacement of the 
superstructure at the seat including P-Δ effects, Δm, obtained using Eq. (2-16), but can not 
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Δ  = displacement demand from the seismic analysis 
Δm  = nonlinear displacement demand  
Rd  = displacement amplification factor 
L  = distance between joints in m 
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H  = height of the tallest pier between the joints in m 
B  = width of the superstructure in m 
α  = skew angle 
In Eq. (2-17) the ratio B/L need not be taken greater than 3/8. 
The proposed LRFD design provisions contain an incentive from a design and 
construction perspective for performing a more sophisticated “pushover analysis” 
[NCHRP, 2002]. The response modification factor (R) increases approximately 50 
percent when a pushover analysis is performed, primarily because the analysis results 
will provide a greater understanding of the demands on the seismic resisting elements. 
The analysis results are assessed using additional plastic rotation limits on the 
deformation of the substructure elements to ensure adequate performance. 
The proposed LRFD provisions provide a mechanism to permit the use of some 
seismic resisting systems and elements –– termed earthquake resisting systems (ERS) and 
earthquake resisting elements (ERE) –– that are not permitted in current AASHTO 
provisions. Selection of an appropriate ERS is fundamental to achieving adequate seismic 
performance. The classification of ERS and ERE into three categories: permissible, 
permissible with owner’s approval, and not recommended, is done to trigger due 
consideration of seismic performance that leads to the most desirable outcome. 
The state of the art in earthquake resistant bridge design has been presented. The 
more recent changes in mandatory and proposed specifications derive from behavior 
experiences during recent earthquakes; from the intensive seismic retrofit programs in 




Table 2-10 – Component Detailing Requirements for SDR’s — Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Component SDR 1 SDR 2 SDR 3 SDR 4 SDR 5 SDR 6 
Seat width Use Eq. (2-17) 
Conventional 0.10 ⋅ DL 0.25 ⋅ DL Capacity design procedure or elastic forces with R = 0.8 Bearing Isolation Detailed and tested for 1.1 times 5% in 75-years forces and displacements 
Flexure Non-seismic requirements 
SDAP B and C – non-seismic or minimum steel or P-Δ or 50% in 75-years 
forces for C. 
SDAP D and E – Moment demand divided by R or minimum steel or P-Δ Column 
Shear Non-seismic requirements 
Minimum shear 
reinforcement From capacity design procedures or elastic forces with R = 0.67 
Connection of column to 






Design forces from capacity design using over-strength ratios of 1.5 and 1.4 
for concrete and steel respectively 
Concrete N/A 
Piles top 3D 
minimum 
reinforcement 
Soil and pile 
aspects of 
foundation 





factor of 1.0 
Design forces from capacity design and overstrength 
factor of 1.5 and 1.4 for concrete and steel respectively. 
Minimum shear reinforcement apply 
Concrete N/A 
Min. shear reinf. 
down to 10D 
below surface Pile bents 
Steel N/A N/A 
Design forces from capacity design using over strength ratio of 1.5 and 1.4 
for concrete and steel respectively. Minimum shear reinforcement as per 
SDR 2. 
Abutments N/A N/A 
SDAP B and C – 
non-seismic req. 
SDAP D and E – 
Detailed req. 
Detailed requirements 
Liquefaction Only if requested by owner 
If Mw < 6 not 
required. If >6 
full procedure 
Full procedure 
ESR/ERE N/A N/A Use procedure System requiring owner’s approval not permitted 





The leader in seismic retrofit programs has been the State of California. There are 
more than 12,000 bridges in the California State Highway system, plus an additional 
12,000 city and county bridges. Since the 1971 San Fernando earthquake struck the Los 
Angeles area Caltrans has been engaged in an ongoing bridge retrofit program. Initially, 
Caltrans Seismic Retrofit program consisted of restraining sections of 1,262 bridges with 
steel cables. The Seismic Retrofit program now involves strengthening the columns of 
existing bridges by encircling certain columns with a steel casing or, in a few instances, 
an advanced woven fiber casing. In addition to the column casing, some of the bridge 
footings are made bigger and given more support by placing additional pilings in the 
ground or by using steel tie-down rods to better anchor the footings to the ground. In a 
few projects bridge abutments are made larger and the existing restrainer units are made 
stronger because encasing the columns make them stiffer and can change the way forces 
are transmitted within the bridge. Many Seismic Retrofits involve "hinge seat extensions" 
which enlarge the size of the hinges that connect sections of bridge decks and helps 
prevent them from separating during severe ground movement.  
The Seismic Retrofit program was divided into Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 included 
1,039 bridges identified for strengthening after the Loma Prieta quake. Phase 2 identified 
an additional 1,364 bridges for strengthening following the January 1994 Northridge 
earthquake. Currently the state's bridge earthquake strengthening program will involve 
approximately 2,200 additional structures, including the state's toll bridges. In addition a 
total of 1,114 city and county-owned bridges have been identified as candidates for 
seismic strengthening.  
Washington Sate has carried similar programs. Between 1999 and 2001 more than 
350 bridges were retrofitted statewide. After the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, 
Earthquake the scope of the retrofit program was expanded. 
Since 1983 the Federal Highway Administration has published three documents on 
seismic retrofit of highway bridges [FHWA, 1983, 1987, and 1995]. The latest, 1995 
document, is compatible with current Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard 
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Specifications [AASHTO, 2002]. This document covers procedures for preliminary 
screening of the bridges, detailed evaluation, and design of retrofit measures.  
 
 
Fig. 2-23 – Caltrans Seismic Retrofit Program Poster 
 
The preliminary screening – Chapter 2 – emphasizes the need of developing an 
inventory of bridge seismic information accompanied by a seismic rating system, and 
gives guidance for establishing them. Using the vulnerability rating a priority index of 
retrofit is computed.  
The detailed evaluation guidelines – Chapter 3 – define the different evaluation 
methods starting with the analysis procedures: analysis procedures for capacity/demand 
method, and analysis procedure for lateral strength method. Then, gives detailed 
requirements for performing a capacity/demand evaluation of the bridge, and establishes 
 
50 
the principles for applying the lateral strength method. Using the results of the two 
procedures an overall assessment of the bridge components is described including 
assessment of: bearings and expansion joints; columns, walls, and footings; abutments; 
and the possibility of liquefaction. Potential retrofit measures are discusses for each of the 
assessed components. 
The rest of the document [FHWA, 1995] is devoted to detailed retrofit measures for 
the assessed components including: Chapter 4 – discuses seismic retrofit strategies 
including conventional and innovative earthquake protective systems; Chapter 5 – deals 
with the retrofit of bearings, seats, and expansion joints; Chapter 6 – covers retrofit of 
columns, cap beams, and joints; Chapter 7 – discusses the retrofit measures for 
foundations including footings and abutments; Chapter 8 – covers retrofit measures for 
bridges on hazardous sites including bridges across or near active faults and bridges on 
liquefiable soils discussing potential remedial solutions for these cases ; and Chapter 9 – 
discusses protective measures using seismic isolation. The appendices cover: (A) detailed 
indication for obtaining capacity/demand ratios for bridge components, (B) the 
assessment of members strength and deformation capacity, and (C, D, and E) worked 
examples for two bridges and the use of cable restrainers. 
Although this document was developed a few years ago, it covers all the basic 
procedures. This document [FHWA, 1995] combined with some of the detailed concepts 
covered by the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 
2002] makes an excellent seismic bridge retrofit guide that is totally up-to-date. 
 
2.3 Geotechnical issues 
In the previous section when discussing the evolution of the bridge seismic design 
criteria the parameters associated with geotechnical issues were presented without 
explaining and discussing their background. The following sections present the 
corresponding background and relevant information that that will be needed for the 
assessment for geotechnical issues of the earthquake emergency routes of Indiana as 




During the 1985 Mexico City Earthquake very large soil amplifications were 
recorded. This brought the introduction of an additional soil profile type for deep soft 
clay deposits that was termed Type 4 and was assigned a soil coefficient S = 2. With this 
addition this corresponds to the soil profile classification used when the ATC-6 
requirements were modified to be adopted as Division I-A Seismic Design of the fifteenth 
(1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications. These requirements have been kept 
without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and in the current seventeenth (2002) edition 
[AASHTO, 2002] of the AASHTO Standard Specifications. The soil profile definition 
and soil factor, S, were shown previously in Fig. 2-16. 
Information mainly from the 1989 Loma Prieta, California, Earthquake, and the 1985 
Mexico City event, in addition to data from other cases in other parts of the world 
permitted in the early 1990’s to restudy the ground motion amplification due to soil 
profile characteristics and to propose a new classification of soil profile types and soil 
amplification factors [Whitman, 1992]. These new procedures take into account the level 
of shaking, rock stiffness, and soil type, and the stiffness and depth effect on the 
amplification of ground motions at short and long periods. These new soil profile types 
and soil amplification factors were incorporated into the 1994 NEHRP Provisions 
[NEHRP, 1994]. Among the more important changes are larger amplification factors for 
lower levels of acceleration caused by the soil responding in the linear range with less 
damping as compared with larger amplitude movement responding in the nonlinear range 
and inducing greater damping. Some adjustments were introduced in the 1997 NEHRP 
Provisions [NEHRP, 1997] with the change of the definition of the design ground motion 
introduced then, and were kept in the 2000 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 2000]. 
The soil site must be assigned into one of six soil profile classes labeled A to F. The 
definition of the soil profile is based on averaged soil properties for the upper 100 feet 
(30 m) of soil profile. The properties used for this definition are: average shear wave 
velocity ( sv ), average standard penetration resistance ( N ), average standard penetration 
resistance for the cohesionless soils only ( chN ), and average undrained shear strength in 
case of cohesive soils ( us ). These averages are weighted with respect to each layer 




Table 2-11 – Site Classification [NEHRP, 2000] 
 














2500 to 5000 ft/s 







Very dense soil or 
soft rock 
 
1200 to 2500 ft/s 
(360 to 760 m/s) 
 
> 50 
> 2000 psf 





600 to 1200 ft/s 
(180 to 360 m/s) 
 
 
15 to 50 
 
1000 to 2000 psf 
(50 to 100 kPa) 
 
 
< 600 ft/s 





< 1000 psf 





Any profile with more than 10 ft (3 m) of soil having 
• Plasticity Index PI > 20, 
• Moisture content ω ≥ 40%, and 






1. Soils vulnerable to potential failure or collapse (liquefiable, 
quick- or highly-sensitive clays, collapsible weakly 
cemented soils). 
2. More than 10 ft (3 m) of peat and/or highly organic clays. 
3. More than 25 ft (7.5 m) of very high plasticity clays  
(PI > 75). 
4. More than 120 ft (37 m) of soft to medium clays. 
 
 N/A =Not applicable. 
 
Figure 2-24 shows the values of the coefficient Fa as a function of the site class and the 
short period maximum considered earthquake spectral acceleration SS. Figure 2-25 shows 
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the values of the coefficient Fv as a function of the site class and the 1-second period 
maximum considered earthquake spectral acceleration S1. For sites class F a site-specific 
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Fig. 2-24 – Values of Fa [NEHRP, 2000] 
 
It is important to note that the reference accelerations for obtaining Fa and Fv, as 
shown in Figure 2-24 and 2-25, were changed in the 1997 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 
1997] from what was presented originally in the 1994 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 
1994]. In the 1994 Edition the abscissa of Figures 2-24 and 2-25 were mapped values of 
effective peak ground acceleration Aa (EPA) and acceleration Av derived from effective 
peak ground velocity (EPV), respectively, based on a 10% probability of being exceeded 
in a 50-year life span of the structure — 475 years mean return period —. In the 1997 
Edition the definition of the design ground motion was changed to the spectral values of 
the maximum considered earthquake — 2500 years mean return period — described 
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Fig. 2-25 – Values of Fv [NEHRP, 2000] 
 
Although this methodology for evaluation of site effects was originally introduced in 
documents for earthquake resistant building design, it is as well applicable to bridge 
design, as recognized in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
[NCHRP, 2002]. This last document requires a site-specific evaluation for Site Class F 
soils, when the bridge is considered a major or very important structure requiring a higher 
degree of confidence of meeting the seismic performance objectives, or when the site if 
within 10 km of an active fault. The Draft document includes Appendix 3A containing 
guidelines for conducting site-specific geotechnical investigations and dynamic response 
analyses. Appendix 3A gives guidance on the site-specific geotechnical investigation to 
be performed, the modeling of the soil profile, the selection of the ground motion at 




Liquefaction is a process caused by the earthquake ground motion vibration by which 
sediments below the water table temporarily lose strength and behave as a viscous liquid 
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rather than a solid. The type of sediments most susceptible are clay-free deposits of sand 
and silts; occasionally, gravel liquefies [Seed and Idriss, 1982]. Seismic waves, primarily 
shear waves, passing through saturated granular layers, distort the granular structure, and 
cause loosely packed groups of particles to readjust. This readjustment increases the 
pore-water pressure between particles if drainage cannot occur. It the pore-water pressure 
raises to a level approaching the weight of the overlying soil, the granular layer 
temporarily behaves as a viscous liquid producing what is called liquefaction of the soil. 
In the liquefied condition, soil may deform with little shear resistance. Deformations 
large enough to cause damage to structures are called ground failures. The ease with 
which a soil can be liquefied depends primarily on the looseness of the soil, the amount 
of cementing or clay between particles, and the amount of drainage restriction. The 
amount of soil deformation following liquefaction depends on the looseness of the 
material, the depth, thickness, and extension measured in area of the liquefied layer, the 
ground slope, and the distribution of loads applied by the structure. 
 
 
Fig. 2-26 – Damage due to liquefaction on Bridge 002/6s-w 
2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake 
 
Liquefaction is restricted to certain geologic and hydrologic environments primarily 
recent deposited sand and silt in areas with high ground water levels. Generally, the 
younger and looser the sediment and the higher the water table, the more susceptible the 
soil is to liquefaction. Sediments most susceptible to liquefaction include Holocene (less 
than 10,000-year-old) delta, river channel, flood plain, and aeolian deposit, and poorly 
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compacted fills. Liquefaction has been most abundant in areas where ground water lies 
close — generally within 30 ft — to the ground surface; few instances of liquefaction 
have occurred in areas with ground water deeper than 60 ft. Dense soils, including well-
compacted fills, have low susceptibility to liquefaction. 
Only when liquefaction is accompanied by some form of ground displacement or 
ground failure it is destructive to the built environment. For engineering purposes, it is 
not the occurrence of liquefaction that is of prime importance, but its severity or its 
capability to cause damage. Adverse effects of liquefaction can take many forms. These 
include: flow failures; lateral spreads; ground oscillations; lose of bearing strength; 
settlement; and increased pressure on retaining walls. 
Flow failures — Is evident by lateral displacement of large masses of soil. Flows may 
consist on completely liquefied soil or blocks of intact material riding on a layer of 
liquefied soil. It occurs on sites having loose saturated sands or silts lying on steep slopes. 
 
 
Fig. 2-27 – Turnagain Heights, Anchorage, a sector approximately 2,600 m by 270 m slid 
21 m toward Cook Inlet. Sand lenses liquefied and moved down slope. Slope failure 




Lateral spread — Lateral spreads involve lateral displacement of large, surficial 
blocks of soil as a result of liquefaction of a subsurface layer. Displacement occurs in 
response to the combination of gravitational forces and inertial forces generated by an 
earthquake. Lateral spreads generally develop on gentle slopes (most commonly less than 
3 degrees) and move toward a free face such as an incised river channel. Horizontal 
displacements commonly range up to several meters. The displaced ground usually 
breaks up internally, causing fissures, scarps, horsts, and grabens to form on the failure 
surface. Damage caused by lateral spreads is severely disruptive. For example, during the 
1964 Alaska Earthquake, more than 200 bridges were damaged or destroyed by spreading 
of floodplain deposits toward river channels. The spreading compressed the 
superstructures, buckled decks, thrust stringers over abutments, and shifted and tilted 
abutments and piers [NAS, 1973]. 
 
 
Fig. 2-28 – Damage caused by lateral spreading at Sunset Lake trailer park  
in Tumwater – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake 
 
Loss of Bearing Strength — When the soil supporting the structure liquefies and loses 
strength, large deformations can occur within the soil which may allow the structure to 
settle and tip. Conversely, buried tanks and piles may rise buoyantly through the liquefied 
soil. For example, many buildings settled and tipped during the 1964 Niigata, Japan, 
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Earthquake. The most spectacular bearing failures during that event were in an apartment 
complex where several four-story buildings tipped as much as 60 degrees. Apparently, 
liquefaction first developed in a sand layer several meters below ground surface and then 
propagated upward through overlying sand layers. The rising wave of liquefaction 
weakened the soil supporting the buildings and allowed the structures to slowly settle and 
tip. In many cases, the weight of a structure will not be great enough to cause the large 
settlements associated with soil bearing capacity failures. However, smaller settlements 
may occur as soil pore-water pressures dissipate and the soil consolidates after the 
earthquake. The eruption of sand boils (fountains of water and sediment emanating from 
the pressurized, liquefied sand) is a common manifestation of liquefaction that can also 
lead to localized differential settlements. 
 
 
Fig. 2-29 – Settlement of pile cap in liquefied soil beneath industrial building south of 
downtown Seattle – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake 
 
Increased Lateral Pressure on Retaining Walls — If the soil behind a retaining wall 
liquefies, the lateral pressures on the wall may greatly increase. As a result, retaining 
walls maybe laterally displaced, tilt, or structurally fail, as has been observed for 
waterfront walls retaining loose saturated sand in a number of earthquakes. 
Now we turn our attention to the evolution of the engineering procedures to evaluate 
the liquefaction potential. The number of variables that should be taken into account to 
properly evaluate the liquefaction potential can be grouped into three broad groups [Seed 
and Idriss, 1982]: soil properties (dynamic shear modulus, damping characteristics, unit 
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weight, grain characteristics, relative density, and soil structure), environmental factors 
(procedure of soil formation, seismic history, geologic history – aging, cementation –, 
lateral earth pressure coefficient, depth of water table, and effective confining pressure), 
and earthquake characteristics (intensity of ground shaking, and duration of ground 
shaking). A combination of in-situ test and laboratory tests of undisturbed samples may 
be used to obtain properties that can be used to define the liquefaction potential using 
engineering judgment to properly account for the large intrinsic variability of the 
measured properties — because of the difficulty of retrieving and testing really 
undisturbed samples — and unknown or difficult to estimate parameters, specially those 
associated with the earthquake ground motion.  
Because of the noted reasons, since the mid 1970’s a methodology termed the 
“simplified procedure” has evolved to be the accepted standard of practice for evaluating 
liquefaction resistance of soils. This procedure is based on regressions of data from field 
observations and laboratory measurements. Recently an update of the procedures 
involved was made by a panel of experts under the sponsorship of the National Center for 
Earthquake Engineering and the National Science Foundation [Youd and Idriss, 2001]. 
The proposed updated procedure constitutes the method of choice in which an all-
encompassing procedure is not employed.  
The procedure requires the computation of two variables that describe the seismic 
demand on a soil layer — cyclic stress ratio (CSR) — and the capacity of the soil layer to 
resist liquefaction — cyclic resistance ratio (CRR) — respectively. The factor of safety to 
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The cyclic stress ratio, CSR, is obtained from: 
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where amax = peak ground acceleration at the ground surface generated by the earthquake; 
g = acceleration of gravity; voσ  and voσ ′  are total and effective overburden stresses, 
respectively; τav = induced shear stress; and rd = stress reduction coefficient accounting 
for flexibility of the soil profile. 
For a depth below ground surface z in m, rd can be obtained from:  
 
 
1.0 0.00765 for 9.15m
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Four field tests are recommended for routine evaluation of liquefaction resistance 
CRR: the cone penetration test (CPT), the standard penetration test (SPT), shear-wave 
velocity (Vs) measurements, and for gravelly sites the Becker penetration test (BPT). 
Each test has its advantages and limitations with the CPT providing the most detailed soil 
stratigraphy and robust field-data based liquefaction resistance curves now available. 
CPT testing should always be accompanied by soil sampling for validation of soil type 
identification. The SPT has a longer record of application and provides disturbed soil 
samples from which fines content and other grain characteristics can be determined. 
Measured shear-wave velocities provide fundamental information on small-strain soil 
behavior that is useful beyond analyses of liquefaction resistance. Vs is also applicable at 
sites, such as landfills and gravelly sediments, where CPT and SPT soundings may not be 
possible or reliable. The BPT test is recommended only for gravelly sites and requires use 
of rough correlations between BPT and SPT, making the results less certain than other 
tests. Where possible, two or more test procedures should be applied to assure adequate 
definition of soil stratigraphy and a consistent evaluation of liquefaction resistance. 
When using the standard penetration test (SPT) the blow count must be normalized to 
take into account the overburden pressure and the hammer energy. This is done by 
adjusting the blow count values, N, to a normalized value termed (N1)60 that corresponds 
to an overburden pressure, Po, of approximately 100 kPa (2 kip/sq ft) and a hammer 
efficiency of 60%. The cyclic resistance ratio (CRR) is first defined for an ideal clean-
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Equation (2-21) is valid for (N1)60 values less than 30. For greater values clean 
granular soils are too dense to liquefy and are classified as non-liquefiable. A series of 
adjustments must be made to CRR7.5, as follows: 
Fines content adjustment — CRR increase with soil fines content (FC) by adjusting 
(N1)60 to an equivalent clean sand value (N1)60cs. This is performed using the following 
empirical equation: 
 
 ( ) ( )1 160 60csN Nα β= + ⋅  (2-22) 
 









































Other corrections to SPT — Several corrections in addition to the fines content 
influence SPT results. They are incorporated by: 
 




where Nm = measured SPT blows; CN = factor to take into account the overburden stress; 
CE = factor to take into account hammer energy ratio; CB = factor to take into account the 
borehole diameter; CR = factor to take into account the rod length; and CS = correction for 
samplers with or without liners. Table 2-12 lists the values for these corrections factors. 
 
Table 2-12 – Corrections to SPT [Youd and Idriss, 2001] 
 
Factor Equipment variable Term Correction 
Overburden pressure — CN ( )0.5/o voP σ ′  
Overburden pressure — CN  CN ≤ 1.7 
Energy ratio Donut hammer CE 0.5 – 1.0 
Energy ratio Safety hammer CE 0.7 – 1.2 
Energy ratio Automatic trip Donut CE 0.8 – 1.3 
Borehole diameter 65-115 mm CB 1.0 
Borehole diameter 150 mm CB 1.05 
Borehole diameter 200 mm CB 1.15 
Rod length < 3 m CR 0.75 
Rod length 3 – 4 m CR 0.8 
Rod length 4 – 6 m CR 0.85 
Rod length 6 – 10 m CR 0.95 
Rod length 10 – 30 m CR 1.0 
Sampling method Standard sampler CS 1.0 
Sampling method Sampler w/o liners CS 1.1 – 1.3 
 
The recommended procedure [Youd and Idriss, 2001] presents procedures to obtain 
CRR based on cone penetration test (CPT) and on shear wave velocity (Vs). They were 
not used in present research due to lack of CPT and Vs information for bridge sites in 
Indiana with few exceptions [Bobet et al., 2001]. The interested reader is referred to 
[Youd and Idriss, 2001]. 
Magnitude correction — An earthquake magnitude scaling factor (MSF) must also be 
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The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 
2002] requires a liquefaction potential evaluation, as indicated in Table 2-10, for the 
different component detailing requirements (SDR). For SDR 1 and 2 no evaluation is 
required unless requested by the owner. For SDR 3 to 6 its must be performed unless 
requested by the owner or one of the conditions in Table 2-13 are met. 
 
Table 2-13 – Cases for SDR 3 to 6 for which liquefaction potential evaluation need not be 
performed in Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) 
 
Magnitude for the 3% 
probability of exceedance 
75-year event 
Normalized SPT blow 
count, (N1)60 
Fa ⋅ SS 
Mw < 6.0 N/A N/A 
> 15 N/A 
> 10 0.375g > Fa ⋅ SS ≥ 0.25g 6.0 ≤ Mw < 6.4 
> 5 0.250g > Fa ⋅ SS 
 
Maps of mean earthquake magnitude are provided. These maps were prepared by the 
USGS using the maximum magnitude that can affect the site for all relevant seismic 
sources to produce the design ground motion with 3% of being exceeded in 75 years. If 
liquefaction potential must be evaluated, the procedures of Appendix 3B must be used. 
Appendix 3B is devoted to liquefaction and other geological hazards. It uses the same 
principles presented [Youd and Idriss, 2001], and gives guidance for making an in depth 
evaluation of liquefaction potential. The results of the liquefaction assessment are used to 
evaluate the potential severity of three liquefaction related hazards to the bridge: (1) flow 
failures involving large slope failures, (2) limited lateral spread, and (3) ground 
settlement. It permits to evaluate these hazards on the basis of safety factor for 
liquefaction. If the safety factor is less than 1.0 to 1.3 the potential related hazards must 
be evaluated following detailed guidelines for each one of them.  
In general the procedures included require improving the soil or locating the support 
foundation elements below the liquefiable layer and to design the bridge to meet the 
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performance objectives while being subjected to the settlements and/or lateral 
displacements imposed by the lateral spread. 
 
2.3.3 Fault rupture 
The morphology of rivers is associated with geological fault setting in many cases. 
The possibility of having a bridge located along the path of a geological fault is real. Two 
recent cases of bridge damage caused by the bridge crossing the fault path are shown in 
Figures 2-30 and 2-31. 
 
 
Fig. 2-30 – Collapse of Bei-Feng Bridge located on the earthquake causing fault  





Fig. 2-31 – Bolu Viaduct, crossed by the North Anatolian Fault 
November 12, 1999 Duzce, Turkey, Earthquake 
 
In many cases the fault existence and location is difficult to detect. The degree of 
activity of a fault is subjective and estimation the amount of displacements and 
recurrence period is difficult to forecast. There are very few acceleration records obtained 
very close to a fault and the expected ground motion is difficult to estimate. Design for 
theses circumstances is challenging and has a high degree of uncertainty in meeting any 
performance objective. The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 
12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] recommends avoiding bridge construction across faults. 
 
2.3.4 Embankment failure 
High embankments in bridge approaches may fail due to different type of problems. 
Liquefaction may cause lateral spread or settlement, leading to failure of the 
embankment. The ground motion, without liquefaction occurring, may cause the failure 
of the slopes. Techniques developed for embankment dams and slope stability may be 





Landslides present a significant hazard to roadways in seismically active areas and 
can pose a hazard for bridges. Damage can be in the form of ground movement either at 
the abutment or extending to the central piers of the bridge. Bridges located near steep 
slopes, or places with a history of rock falls, or avalanches. 
 
 
Fig. 2-32 – Landslide induced by the earthquake. A nearby bridge had major 
structural damage – Morgan Hill, California, Earthquake of April 24, 1984 
 
Design must include dynamic slope stability analysis or other procedures of stability 
assessment of nearby slopes, such as Newmark sliding block method. It is important to 






CHAPTER 3 SEISMIC RISK OF SOUTHWESTERN INDIANA 
 
 
3.1 Tectonic setting 
The great majority of the World’s seismic activity occurs at the tectonic plate 
boundaries. Continental U.S. is contained within the North American Plate with Indiana 
practically in the middle of it and far away from the plate boundaries. Notwithstanding, 
earthquakes have been felt in Indiana since colonization began by the French in 
Louisiana and from the east after the Louisiana Purchase. Intraplate earthquakes can be 
caused by a number of different kind of stresses — large scale glacial rebound (the slow 
flexure of the crust back up after a large sheet of ice is removed), for example, or the 
broad compresional stress caused within eastern North America by the compression 
forces from the mid-Atlantic spreading center. 
In recent decades, earth scientists have collected evidence that strong earthquakes in 
the central Mississippi Valley have occurred repeatedly in the geologic past. Small 
earthquakes happen in the region frequently. The area in which most of these quakes 
occur is referred to as the New Madrid seismic zone (NMSZ) which stretches from just 
west of Memphis, Tennessee, into southern Illinois. Several times in the past century, 
moderate earthquakes have been widely felt in southern Illinois and southwestern 
Indiana. In the last decade geologic evidence that the Wabash Valley faults, initially 
considered the northern portion of the New Madrid Seismic Zone, is a different system 
with its own tectonic setting has led to define it as an independent seismic zone that has 
been named the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ). 
The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) — Geologic structures related to earthquakes 
in the central Mississippi Valley region have been deeply buried over hundreds of 
millions of years by thick layers of sediment. Geophysical studies have revealed a major 
buried northeast-trending feature known as the Reelfoot Rift [Hildenbrand and 
Hendricks, 1995], which formed more than 500 million years ago by a process of 
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extension in the middle of the North American Plate. A rift structure is created when 
geologic forces begin to pull the Earth's crust apart. If this process continues long 
enough, the crust separates to form an ocean basin, as happened to form the Atlantic 
Ocean basin. The Reelfoot Rift is called a failed rift because the Earth's crust did not 
separate enough to create a new ocean basin. However, the crust was disturbed enough to 
form major faults that mark the axis and margins of the rift and now contribute to the 
occurrence of earthquakes in the NMSZ.  
 
 
Fig. 3-1 – The Reelfoot Rift in the New Madrid Region 
 
A sequence of powerful earthquakes struck the mid-Mississippi River Valley, central 
United States, in the winter of 1811-1812. The first one occurred December 16, 1811, 
Intermittent strong shaking continued through March 1812 and aftershocks strong enough 
to be felt occurred through the year 1817. The initial earthquake of December 16 was 
followed by two other principal shocks, one on January 23, 1812, and the other on 
February 7, 1812. Judging from newspaper accounts of damage to buildings, the 
February 7 earthquake was the biggest of the three. On the basis of the large area of 
damage (600,000 km2), the widespread area of perceptibility (5,000,000 km2), and the 
complex physiographic changes that occurred, the Mississippi River valley earthquakes 
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of 1811-1812 rank as some of the largest in the United States since its settlement by 
Europeans [Stover and Coffman, 1993]. The estimated magnitudes for these events vary 
considerably from different sources (7.2 to 8.8 depending on the parameters used to 
define the magnitude and the scale in which it is reported).  
 
 
Fig. 3-2 – Isoseismal map for the Arkansas earthquake of December 16, 1811, first of 
the 1811-1812 New Madrid series [Stover and Coffman, 1993] 
 
The association of the 1811-1812 earthquakes to a causing fault has been hindered by 
lack of information from a scarcely inhabited region at the time of occurrence. Since the 
early 1970´s a great amount of multidisciplinary research have been devoted to find and 
define characteristics of the events and the tectonic setting in order to understand the 
tectonic process taking place and validate seismic risk assessments for the region.  
From the information gathered from different sources it is accepted (with dissent) that 
the causing faults were those shown in Fig. 3-3. The USGS along with the Geological 
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Surveys of the CUSEC member States and several universities in the region have to a 
certain degree reached consensus on what is known with certainty and what needs more 
research to frame adequately the seismic risk assessment for the region. The primary 
types of evidence are geological — paleoseismological, stratigraphic, geomorphic, 




Fig. 3-3 – The New Madrid seismic zone showing the three faults that ruptured in 
1811-1812 and earthquakes recorded in recent years [Hough, 2002] 
 
Paleoliquefaction investigations have provided constraints on recurrence in the 
NMSZ and have been conducted at 44 sites. From these studies it is know that two pre-
1811 episodes of liquefaction comparable to that of 1811-1812 can be interpreted 
[Participants, 2000]. Best estimates of the dates of these events are 1450 and 900 (Fig. 
3-4), which leads to a median recurrence interval ranging between 267 and 644 years. 
The volume of sand mobilized at many of the liquefaction sites in the NMSZ implies they 
could not have been formed by local events of moderate magnitude. Further indication of 
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very strong shaking comes from geotechnical measurements at liquefaction sites in the 
NMSZ, which show the shallow sub-surface materials to be only moderately liquefiable. 
 
 
Fig. 3-4 – Estimated ages of paleoliquefaction features (vertical axis) arranged by site 
location, from north (left) to south (right), excluding the Current River sites. Vertical gray 
shaded segments indicate most probable ages, with brackets showing approximate two 
standard deviation uncertainties. Shaded horizontal bars indicate the inferred timing of 
paleoearthquakes. Dashed horizontal line is at 1811-1812. [Participants, 2000] 
 
The paleoliquefaction interpretations also suggest that recurrence rates for events with 
magnitude on the range of 5 and the largest earthquakes cannot be simply related. 
Magnitude regressions of the large events for the approximate periods of recurrence 
implied from the paleoliquefaction record indicate that the mean return period for the 
smaller magnitude events should be smaller (more frequent). Quoting from [Participants, 
2000]: “In short, the largest earthquakes occur much more frequently than the rate of 
smaller earthquakes would imply. Finally, the paleoliquefaction record suggests that the 
clustering of earthquakes that occurred in 1811-1812 also occurred in prior events. 
Multiple units of vented material are evident in many of the sandblows and have been 
interpreted as resulting from major events that occurred within weeks to months of each 
other. The lack of soil development, but evidence for bioturbation in materials between 
the units, constrains the timing between clustered events.”  
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The length of the active fault system and the lack of relative motion measured across 
the system make the use of models that work well for earthquakes occurring in plate-
boundary settings not appropriate. Models for intraplate tectonics have recently been 
proposed but their use is just being implemented in the NMSZ. Magnitude estimates of 
large New Madrid earthquakes rely on uncertain conversions of observations of their 
effects measured as Modified Mercalli intensities derived mainly from newspapers 
accounts. It is evident that the spread of intensity is much larger than for comparable 
events in the West Coast, as shown in Fig. 3-5. The magnitude conversion may be biased 
by different causes, but one that has been pointed out several times is that soil profile 
amplification may have increased the reported magnitudes because most towns at the 
time were settlements along rivers. 
 
Fig. 3-5 – Comparison of areas of damage from the New Madrid  
and San Francisco Earthquakes 
 
Slip rates for the known faults in the region estimated mainly using characteristics of 
secondary features show that three episodes of deformation are apparent in folded fluvial 
deposits overlying the Reelfoot fault with their ages close to the three major events 
evident in the paleoliquefaction record. The inferred rates of slip are compatible with the 
short recurrence interval for major earthquakes evident in the paleoseismic record. The 
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potential for currently classified as non-active faults within and beyond the NMSZ 
producing moderate-to-large earthquakes remains unknown, although Quaternary surface 
faulting has been documented on the periphery of the NMSZ [Participants, 2000]. 
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone — The Wabash Valley Fault System is about 90 km 
long and 50 km wide in southeastern Illinois, southwestern Indiana, and northwestern 
Kentucky near the deepest part of the Illinois Basin. The fault system consists of 
subparallel, high-angle normal faults that have vertical displacements as great as 150 m. 
The faults bound horsts and grabens, and commonly overlap one another. Major fault 
plains dip at angles ranging from 50 to 85 degrees. Individual fault blocks are only 
slightly tilted, and drag is generally absent or weakly expressed.  
 
 




In the past decade, there has been increasing awareness that the seismic hazard in this 
zone may be greater than the historical earthquake record would suggest. Numerous 
prehistoric large magnitude earthquakes have struck southern Indiana and Illinois; some 
may have been larger. Geologic evidence for these earthquakes in the form of sand-and-
gravel intrusions in river sediments has been discovered at more than 200 sites in the 
Wabash River Valley and along its tributaries in Indiana and Illinois. This information is 
the result of USGS studies done in cooperation with the Indiana Geological Survey, 
Indiana University, Illinois Department of Natural Resources-Illinois State Museum and 
the Illinois State Geological Survey. Clastic dikes filled with sand and gravel, interpreted 
to be the result of earthquake induced liquefaction, occur throughout much of southern 
Indiana and adjacent parts of Illinois. At least seven and probably eight prehistoric 
earthquakes have been documented during the Holocene, as well as, at least one during 
the latest Pleistocene (see Fig. 3-7) [Munson et al., 1997]. Nearly all of these liquefaction 
features originated from earthquakes centered in southern Indiana and Illinois, and not 
further south in the nearby source region of the great 1811-12 New Madrid earthquakes 
[Crone and Wheeler, 2000]. 
 
 
Fig. 3-7 – Map of southern two-thirds of Indiana showing sites where  
ancient sandblows have been found, and showing areas of liquefaction  
for six major prehistoric earthquakes. [Kirby, 2001] 
 
In the absence of well-determined data on the timing of paleoevents and the amount 
of tectonic slip associated with those events, it is impossible to estimate reliable or even 
meaningful Holocene or late Quaternary slip rates [Crone and Wheeler, 2000]. In 
summary the tectonics of the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone it not well understood at 
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present. No historical earthquakes in the Wabash Valley region have been strong enough 
to cause liquefaction. It is likely that numerous other magnitude 6 to 7 Holocene 
earthquakes have struck the region, but did not leave a record because of the lack of 
liquefiable deposits in large parts of the region. 
 
3.2 Earthquake history of Indiana 
Earthquakes originated within Indiana and from neighboring seismic zones have been 
felt in Indiana since the start of the colonization. Figure 3-8 shows the seismicity for the 
New Madrid and Wabash Valley Seismic Zones. The following description of the seismic 
history of Indiana was abridged from [Stover and Coffman, 1993]. 
 
 
Fig. 3-8 – Earthquakes in the New Madrid and Wabash Valley, red circles indicate 
earthquakes that occurred from 1974 to 2002 with magnitudes larger than 2.5, green 




The most damaging Indiana earthquake originating within the State occurred on 
September 27, 1909, near the Illinois border between Vincennes and Terre Haute. Some 
chimneys fell, several building walls were cracked, light connections were severed, and 
pictures were shaken off the walls. It was strong in Indianapolis and Oakland City. It was 
felt over an area of 80,000 km2 (see Fig. 3-9) including the southwestern half of Indiana, 




Fig. 3-9 – Isoseismal map for the Wabash River Valley, Indiana,  
Earthquake of September 27, 1909. 
 
The latest important earthquake originated within the State occurred June 18, 2002, 
with magnitude 4.6 (USGS, but mb = 5.0 according to other sources) near Evansville. 
There was very little damage. The location of the earthquake and its hypocentral depth 
(14-18 km) indicated ongoing deformation along reactivated Precambrian and Paleozoic 
basement structures, in a zone of recurring seismic activity, and in an area of possibly 
heightened neotectonic strain [Hamburger et al., 2002]. Figure 3-10 shows the intensity 
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Fig. 3-10 – Isoseismal map for the Evansville, Indiana,  
Earthquake of June 18, 2002 
 
Other damaging earthquakes originated in Indiana include the April 29, 1899, 
Earthquake with rated intensity VI to VII on the Modified Mercalli Scale. It was 
strongest at Jeffersonville and Shelbyville; at Vincennes, chimneys were thrown down 
and walls cracked. It was felt over an area of 110,000 km2.  
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In 1876, twin shocks fifteen minutes apart were felt over an area of 160,000 km2. A 
shock in 1887 centered near Vincennes was felt over 200,000 km2 and an 1891 shock 
damaged property and frightened people in church at Evansville.  
Indiana has also suffered from damage caused by earthquakes originating in 
neighboring States. The worst occurred on November 9, 1968, and centered near Dale in 
southern Illinois. The shock, a magnitude 5.3, was felt over 1,500,000 km2 and 23 States 
including all of Indiana. Intensity VII was reported from Cynthiana where chimneys were 
cracked, twisted, and toppled; at Fort Branch where groceries fell from shelves and a loud 
roaring noise was heard, and at Mount Vernon, New Harmony, Petersburg, Princeton, 
and Stewartsville, all of which had similar effects.  
Almost exactly ten years earlier on November 7, 1958, an earthquake originating near 
Mt. Carmel, Illinois, caused plaster to fall at Fort Branch. Roaring and whistling noises 
were heard at Central City and the residents of Evansville thought there had been an 
explosion or plane crash. It was felt over 90,000 km2 of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and 
Kentucky.  
On March 2, 1937, a shock centering near Anna, Ohio, threw objects from shelves at 
Fort Wayne and some plaster fell. Plaster was also cracked at Indianapolis. Six days later, 
another shock originating at Anna brought pictures crashing down and cracked plaster in 
Fort Wayne and was strongly felt at Lafayette.  
The great New Madrid earthquakes of 1811 and 1812 must have strongly affected the 
State, particularly the southwestern part, but there is little information available.  
 
3.3 Design earthquake return period 
For the foregoing discussion on the seismic risk of Indiana it is important to establish 
a common base for comparing the probability of exceedance of the design ground 
motion, the earthquake mean return period, and the lapse of exposure or life of the 
structure.  
The probability, q, of having ground motion that exceeds in one year a pre-fixed 




 ( , )oq P a a in one year= ≥   (3-1) 
 
The probability of not exceeding the value of ao in t years, under the assumption of 
statistical independence between events, is:  
 
  
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 2 3
tq q q q q
t
= − − − −
 (3-2)  
Then: 
 
  (1 )ttq q= −  (3-3)  
 
The probability, qo, of having at least one event with a value greater than ao in a time 
span of t years is:  
 
  1 1 (1 )to tq q q= − = − −  (3-4)  
 
The return period is defined as the mean time, in years, between events producing a 
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Then:  
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For example, if the design earthquake has been defined as an event that produces a 
value of the descriptive parameter having a probability of 3% of being exceeded in a 75 
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It follows that   1 1 0.999594 0.00040604
T
= − = , and the mean period of recurrence for 




 1 2463 years
0.00040604
T = =   
 
Table 3-1 – Design Ground Motion Mean Return period used in different documents 
 











AASHO Standard Specifications for 
Highway Bridges 5th Edition (1949) N/A N/A N/A 
AASHO Standard Specifications for 
Highway Bridges 8th Edition (1961) N/A N/A N/A 
AASHTO 1975 Interim Specifications 
for Highway Bridges [AASHTO, 
1975] 
N/A N/A N/A 
ATC-3-06 Recommendations for 
Buildings [ATC, 1978] 50 10% 475 
ATC-6 Design Guidelines for Bridges  
[ATC, 1981] 50 10% 475 
Division I-A of AASHTO Standard 
Specifications (15th to current 17th 
Edition) [AASHTO, 2002] 
50 10% 475 
AASHTO LRFD Specifications (1st,  
2nd, and 3rd Edition) [AASHTO, 1998] 50 10% 475 
Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria  
[Caltrans, 2001] N/A N/A N/A 
NEHRP Recommendations for New 
Buildings [NEHRP, 1997] – Maximum 
Considered Earthquake (see Note) 
50 2% 2475 
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic 
Provisions [NCHRP, 2002] – 
Maximum Considered Earthquake 
75 3% 2463 
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic 
Provisions [NCHRP, 2002] – Frequent 
Earthquake 
75 50% 109 
Note – In NEHRP 1997 the Design Ground Motion for buildings corresponds to 2/3 of the Maximum 
Considered Earthquake ground motion. This reduction is not used in the Draft AASHTO LRFD seismic 
provisions for bridges although the definition of the Maximum Considered Earthquake is practically the 
same. 
 
Figure 3-11 shows the sensitivity to the mean return period when changing the life 

































Fig. 3-11 – Mean return period as a function of the probability of  
exceedance and the life span of the structure in years 
 
3.4 Seismic risk assessment for bridge design in Indiana 
The awareness of the seismic risk associated with the New Madrid Seismic Zone and 
more recently the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone, as presented before, has been increasing 
in the last decades with the corresponding increase in the seismic forces and related 
requirements used in design of building structures and bridges. The following sections 
present the seismic risk parameters presented by the bridge specifications in the last 
decades in order to set a common frame of reference to be used in the vulnerability 
assessment of the transportation structures within the selected Earthquake Emergency 
Routes of Indiana.  
Figure 3-12 shows the 1949 revision of the seismic risk map developed by the U.S. 
Coast and Geodetic Survey [Housner, 1970]. Table 3-2 presents the peak ground 





Fig. 3-12 – U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Seismic Probability Map  
of the United States (Revised 1949)  
 
Table 3-2 – Maximum zonal acceleration to be used with  
map of Fig. 3-12 [Housner, 1970] 
 
 Maximum Acceleration  M 
Zone 3 (near a great fault) 0.50g 8.5 
Zone 3 (not near a great fault) 0.33g 7.0 
Zone 2 0.16g 5.75 
Zone 1 0.08g 4.75 
Zone 0 0.04g 4.25 
 
This map was developed before seismic zoning was introduced in the building or 
bridge design requirements. Although the map was referred as a seismic probability map 
it actually was based on Mercalli intensity and no guidance was given on the 
corresponding return period or probability of exceedance. Seen from a modern point of 
view this map contains features such a neighboring Zone 1 and 3 areas without a 
transition Zone 2 in between, and other that currently would be frowned at. 
Notwithstanding, the general location of the zones and envisioned peak ground 
acceleration do not differ much from more recent maps. In this map southwestern Indiana 
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is located in a Zone 2 corresponding to a maximum acceleration of 0.16g and a 
corresponding magnitude of 5.75 for the design event. The rest of Indiana, with the 
exception of a small Zone 2 bordering Ohio, was located in a Zone 1 (maximum expected 
acceleration of 0.08g and magnitude of 4.75 for the design event. No design response 
spectrum was defined. This map was never mandatory in Indiana for bridges or buildings. 
 
3.4.1 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges  
In Section 2.2.2 the 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975] were 
presented. Figure 3-13 shows the northern Midwest portion of the map including Indiana 
(the whole U.S. map is shown in Fig. 2-13). The seismic design criteria contained in the 
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications was included in the twelfth (1977), thirteenth 
(1983), and fourteenth (1989) editions of AASHTO’s Standard Specifications. 
 
 
Fig. 3-13 – Northern Midwest portion of the map included with the  
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975] 
 
No more detailed map was included with the 1975 Interim. The southwestern corner 
of Indiana containing Gibson, Posey and Vanderburgh counties was a Zone 3 with a peak 
ground acceleration A = 0.5g. A region south of an approximate line linking Terre Haute, 
Indianapolis and Fort Wayne was included in a Zone 2 (A = 0.22g PGA). The rest of the 








Table 3-3 – Maximum values for the Response Coefficient (C) in Indiana 
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975]  
 
Zone 1 (A = 0.09g) Zone 2 (A = 0.22g) Zone 3 (A = 0.50g) Depth of 
Alluvium C max T at peak C max T at peak C max T at peak 
0 – 10’ 0.060 - 0.072 0.30 s 0.163 0.30 s 
11’ – 80’ 0.066 0.40 s 0.120 0.35 s 0.203 0.30 s 
80’ – 150’ 0.080 0.60 s 0.110 0.55 s 0.155 0.50 s 
> 150’ 0.065 0.65 s 0.090 0.55 s 0.120 0.50 s 
 
3.4.2 ATC 6 and AASHTO Division I-A 
The ATC-6 [ATC, 1981] recommendations were modified to be incorporated in the 
fifteenth (1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications as Division I-A Seismic 
Design. These requirements were kept without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and 
in the current seventeenth (2002) edition [AASHTO, 2002]. The ATC-6 document used 
for peak ground acceleration in rock, A, the map of Av originally proposed for the ATC-3-
06 building requirements project.  
The ATC-3-06 requirements for buildings were taken over by the BSSC and became 
the NEHRP recommended provisions. By the time the ATC-6 proposed bridge 
requirements were incorporated into AASHTO Standard Specifications the maps had been 
updated in the 1988 NEHRP provisions [NEHRP, 1988] by the USGS [Algermissen et 
al., 1990]. The map included in the 15th Edition AASHTO Standard Specifications and 
still contained in the current 17th Edition correspond to the Av map as modified in 1988. 
Figure 3-14 shows the State of Indiana portion of this map. The values given correspond 
to peak ground acceleration in rock expressed as percentage of the acceleration of gravity 
for a probability of exceedance of 10 percent in 50 years, which is approximately equal to 
a 15 percent probability of exceedance in the 75-year design life now advocated for a 
typical highway bridge (see Fig. 3-11).  
The southwestern corner of Indiana is located within contours labeled for peak grouns 
acceleration of A = 0.075g and A = 0.10g; including totally (t) or partially (p) the 
following 20 counties: Brown (p), Clay (p), Daviess (t), Dubois (p), Gibson (t), Greene 
(t), Knox (t), Lawrence (p), Martin (t), Monroe (p), Morgan (p), Owen (t), Pike (t), Posey 
(t), Putnam (p), Spencer (p), Sullivan (t), Vanderburgh (t), Vigo (p), and Warrick (t).. 
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Section 3.2 of Division I-A Seismic Design indicates that “Local maxima (and minima) 
are given inside the highest (and lowest) contour for a particular region. Linear 
interpolation shall be used for sites located between contour lines and between a contour 
line and local maximum (or minimum).”  
The rest of the south half of the state is located within a contour line for peak ground 
acceleration A = 0.05g and local maxima labeled as A = 0.06g. This zone includes Terre 
Haute and Indianapolis. The northern half of the State, including the cities of Lafayette 
and Fort Wayne, located within the contour line for peak ground acceleration A = 0.05g 
and local maxima labeled as A = 0.04g.  
 
 
Fig. 3-14 – Values for peak ground acceleration for the State on Indiana in  
Division I-A Seismic Design of 17th Edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications 
[AASHTO, 2002] 
 
All editions of the AASHTO LRFD Specifications (1994, 1998, 2004) [AASHTO, 
2004] include the same map but contain variations in the design requirements that may 
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3.4.3 USGS 1996 Maps for the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions 
In 1993, the USGS embarked on a major project to prepare updated national 
earthquake ground motion maps. The result of that project was a set of probabilistic maps 
published in 1996 that cover several rock ground motion parameters (peak ground 
acceleration — PGA — and elastic response spectral accelerations for periods of 
vibration of 0.2, 0.3, and 1.0 sec) and three different probability levels or return periods 
(10% probability of exceedance in 50 years, 5% probability of exceedance in 50 years, 
and 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years – which is approximately equal to 3% 
probability of exceedance in 75 years). In addition to the maps, the ground motion values 
at any specified latitude and longitude can be obtained via the Internet.  
 
Fig. 3-15 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock  




These maps form the rock ground motion basis for seismic design using the Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002]. Figure 3-15 shows 
the 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock for a probability of exceedance 
of 10% in 50 years that although not used in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic 
Provisions, is given here for reference with previous requirements. 
 
Fig. 3-16 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock  
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in 50 years) 
 
The upper-level event, termed the “rare” or Maximum Considered Earthquake 
(MCE), describes ground motions that, for most locations, are defined probabilistically 
and have a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (mean return period 
approximately 2500 years). Figure 3-16 shows the 1996 USGS Map of peak ground 
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acceleration in rock for a probability of exceedance of 2% in 50 years (equivalent to 3% 
in 75 years as shown in Fig. 3-11) that although not used also in the Draft AASHTO 
LRFD Seismic Provisions, is given here for reference with previous requirements using a 
different return period. 
For locations close to highly active faults, the mapped Maximum Considered 
Earthquake ground motion was deterministically bounded so that the levels of ground 
motion did not become unreasonably high. Deterministic bounds on the ground motion 
were calculated by assuming the occurrence of maximum magnitude earthquakes on the 
highly active faults. It is equal to 150% of the median ground motion for the maximum 
magnitude earthquake, but not less than 1.5g for the short-period spectral acceleration 
plateau and 0.6g for 1.0-sec spectra acceleration (see Fig. 2-22). Deterministic bounds 
were applied in high-seismicity portions of the West Coast, Alaska, and Hawaii leading 
to a design ground motion lower than the ground motion for 3% probability of 
exceedance in 75 years. The Maximum Considered Earthquake governs the limits on the 
inelastic deformation in the substructures and the design displacements for the support of 
the superstructure. 
The lower level design event, termed the “expected” or “frequent” earthquake, 
defines a ground motion corresponding to 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years. 
This event ensures that essentially elastic response is achieved in the bridge substructure 
for the more frequent or expected earthquake. This design level is similar to the 100-year 
flood and has similar performance objectives. An explicit check on the strength capacity 
of the bridge substructure is required. Parameter studies made as part of the development 
of the draft provisions show that the lower level event will only impact the strength of 
columns in parts of the western United States. 
With respect to Indiana the USGS 1996 Maps used the then recently identified 
paleoearthquakes in southern Indiana and Illinois based on widespread paleoliquefaction 
features as described in 3.1. An areal zone with a higher Mmax of 7.5 to account for such 
large events was used. The Wabash Valley Mmax zone that was used in the maps was 






Fig. 3-17 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration SS in rock 
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in 
50 years) 
Fig. 3-18 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration S1 in rock 





The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions uses maps that define spectral 
ordinates at periods of 0.2 sec. (SS) and 1.0 sec. (S1) to be used as a two point procedure 
to obtain the design response spectrum (see Fig. 2-21). Figures 3-17 and 3-18 show the 
maps for SS and S1 in rock respectively for the Maximum Considered Earthquake having 
a 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years. 
No maps were developed by USGS for the expected frequent earthquake, defining a 
ground motion corresponding to 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years. The Draft 
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions suggests the values of SS and S1 for this earthquake 
may be obtained from interpolation from information provided by USGS either in the 
CD-ROM published with the maps or in the Internet by using latitude and longitude for 
the site or the ZIP code of the location. The web site to perform these operations is: 
http://eqint.cr.usgs.gov/eq/html/deaggint.html  
 
Fig. 3-19 – Results obtained for Vincennes, IN, for spectral acceleration SS  




Figure 3-19 show the results obtained for Vincennes for spectral acceleration SS in 
rock for 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years as required for the frequent 
earthquake. The values obtained were SS = 0.06g and S1 = 0.01g. 
 
3.4.4 2002 Update of the 1996 USGS Maps 
In 2002 changes were introduced by the USGS [Frankel et al., 2002] to the maps 
developed in 1996. Numerous changes were introduced with varying effects on the 
mapped values. Some of these changes affected the parameters used in the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone and the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. Among them the more important are 
changes in the mean recurrence time, the characteristic magnitude, and the spatial 
concentration of New Madrid sources of large earthquakes, and the incorporation of 
additional attenuation relations. Two versions of the maps exist one from January and the 
other from October. Only the later version maps are be presented here. 
The 2002 update uses a shorter mean recurrence time for characteristic earthquakes in 
New Madrid than was used in the 1996 maps, as well as a smaller median magnitude than 
that applied in 1996. The three equally weighted “fictitious sources” used in the 1996 
maps were substituted for three sources consisting in a fault trace matching recent micro-
earthquake activity and two adjacent sources that are situated near the borders of the 
Reelfoot Rift. It is important to note that the probabilistic ground motions for the 10% 
probability of exceedance level have increased markedly around the New Madrid area, 
compared to the 1996 maps. This is caused by the shorter mean return time of 500 years 
for characteristic earthquakes used in the 2002 maps. The Mmax 7.5 zone assigned to the 
Wabash Valley area was enlarged to include the most likely rupture zones from 
paleoearthquakes with magnitudes above about 7.0.  
Significant differences between the 1996 and 2002 maps are caused by the inclusion 
of additional attenuation relations in the 2002 maps. These changes affected mainly the 
Atlantic seaboard. There is little change for the probabilistic ground motions at 2% 
probability of exceedance in 50 years for most of the central U.S. During 2003, changes 






Fig. 3-20 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in 
rock with 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years 
Fig. 3-21 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in 






Fig. 3-22 – 2002 USGS Map for SS Spectral Acceleration in 
rock with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years (= to 2% in 
50 years) 
Fig. 3-23 – 2002 USGS Map for S1 Spectral Acceleration in 






In April 2004 the USGS included in their website the possibility of producing maps 
for latitude and magnitude pairs. The Indiana PGA map for 475-year return period is 
presented in Fig. 3-20 and for the 2500-year return period in Fig. 3-21, and the maps for 
SS and S1 for 2500-year return period in Figures 3-22 and 3-23 respectively. 
 
3.4.5 JTRP Project SPR 2812 – Analysis of Seismic Hazard Assessment for Indiana 
A Joint Transportation Research Program Project (SPR 2812) lead by Purdue 
Professors J. Haase and R. Nowack is currently working on an assessment of the seismic 
hazard in Indiana with specific application to transportation structures. The results of this 
research were not available to be used in the Emergency Routes Project but undoubtedly 
will have a large impact in the application of future bridge design specifications for the 
Indiana Department of Transportation and seismic rehabilitation policies to be used with 
existing bridges. Once the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) is 
adopted by AASHTO, and later by INDOT, the need for having an in-house State 
assessment of the seismic risk to be coordinated with the USGS will become very 
important. 
The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) includes in 
Commentary to Section 3.10.2.1 a clause that reads: “In lieu of using the national ground 
motion maps referenced in the Specification, ground motion response spectra may be 
constructed based on approved State ground motion maps. To be accepted the 
development of State maps should conform to the following: 
1. The definition of design ground motion should be the same as described in Article 
3.10.1.2 and Table 3.10.1-1. 
2. Ground motion maps should be based on a detailed analysis demonstrated to lead 
a quantification of ground motion at a regional scale that is as or more accurate 
than achieved at the scale of the national maps. The analysis should include: 
characterization of seismic sources and ground motion that incorporates current 
scientific knowledge; incorporation of uncertainty in seismic source and ground 
motion models and parameter values used in the analysis; detailed documentation 
of map development; detailed peer review. The peer review process should 
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preferably include one or mode individuals from the U.S. Geological Survey who 
participated in the development of the national maps.” 
 
3.4.6 Comments on the results from the different maps and bridge design requirements 
Mapped values for acceleration in rock in Bloomington, Evansville, Indianapolis, 
Jasper, New Albany, Terre Haute, and Vincennes (see Fig. 3-24 for location) are shown 






















Fig. 3-24 – Location where acceleration mapped values are compared for the different 
seismic risk map versions (see Table 3-4). Base map shows INDOT districts. 
 
In comparing the values shown in Table 3-4 is must be noticed that the values from 
the 1949 map developed by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey [Housner, 1970] and in 
the 1975 AASHTO Interim [AASHTO, 1975] are higher, as a rule, than the values for 
peak ground acceleration contained in Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th 
Edition of the AASHTO Standard Specifications AASHTO, 2002]. It may be argued than 
the values contained in Division I-A correspond to EPA (Effective Peak Ground 










the strong ground motion and are not directly comparable to the instrumental peak 
ground acceleration recoded in an accelerometer, in addition to the acceleration in the 
1949 and 1975 documents not being defined clearly with respect to mean return period.  
 
Table 3-4 – Seismic Zone definition and mapped values of acceleration for selected cities 






















































































2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1949  
USCGS  PGA 
 










0.22g 0.50g 0.22g 0.22g 0.22g 0.22g 0.22g 
AASHTO  
Div. I-A 
A (PGA)  
10% PE 50y 0.078g 0.085g 0.063g 0.075g 0.068g 0.070g 0.090g 
PGA  
10% PE 50y 0.045g 0.130g 0.032g 0.070g 0.039g 0.056g 0.110g 
PGA  
2% PE 50y 0.14g 0.49g 0.08g 0.20g 0.12g 0.08g 0.40g 
SS  





2% PE 50y 0.12g 0.30g 0.10g 0.16g 0.14g 0.14g 0.20g 
PGA  
10% PE 50y 0.046g 0.120g 0.034g 0.070g 0.043g 0.060g 0.100g 
PGA  
2% PE 50y 0.12g 0.40g 0.10g 0.20g 0.12g 0.16g 0.30g 
SS  





2% PE 50y 0.12g 0.20g 0.10g 0.16g 0.12g 0.12g 0.16g 
 
The maps in current bridge design requirements contained in Division I-A of the 
AASHTO Standard Specifications were developed by the USGS in the 1970’s and 
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updated in 1988 and they are comparable in respect of having the same mean return 
period with the 1996 and 2002 PGA USGS maps for 10% probability of exceedance in 
50 years (Figures 3-15 and 3-20). The impact of the knowledge that has been 
accumulated about the New Madrid and Wabash Valley Seismic Zones is evident in the 
more detailed acceleration values reported. The values of PGA for the same return period 
in the new 1996 and 2002 maps are lower for Bloomington, Indianapolis, Japer, New 
Albany and Terre Haute, and higher for Evansville and Vincennes. This is consistent with 
the reported new understanding of the tectonic process of the Wabash Valley Seismic 
Zone and if the new maps were made part of Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard 
Specification the impact on the design of new bridges in Indiana would be marginal if not 
less demanding in many cases.  
 In order to assess the impact of adopting the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic 
Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] as seen solely from the design acceleration 
point of view the following aspects come into play: (a) a change from a 475-year to a 
2500-year return period design earthquake, (b) a change from peak ground acceleration 
(effective or accelerographic reported) description of the design ground motion to be 
routinely converted into a design spectrum to a new direct definition of the design 
spectrum, (c) site effects that amplify design acceleration in a different way including 
now short period accelerations along with long period ones both of them specially 
affecting the low acceleration range where precisely Indiana sites are located, and (d) use 
of a “frequent” earthquake for serviceability assessment.  
The pertinent comments will follow in the same order listed. Although, the research 
presented in this report deals mainly with existing bridges — the reference for any bridge 
upgrade has been customarily related to current or in the process of being adopted 
requirements for new bridges — the approach adopted minimizes the dependence on the 
seismic risk assessment and focus on the expected behavior for increasingly severe 
ground motions without putting a tap on them. 
(a) Impact of change of design event return period — It is debatable that with a 
relatively short-timed documented record of events proper extrapolations can be 
performed. Extrapolation is common in other civil engineering disciplines with 
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acceptable results from the point of view of proper design parameters and public 
awareness of the problems involved in distinguishing between acceptable risk and 
forecast. Flood control is a good example of the differences involved and the 
acceptability of the design parameters involved. On the other hand, both extreme wind 
design and earthquake resistant design have come into public scrutiny because of the gap 
between code design parameters and reported measured values. This has brought a trend 
to define design parameters in the same order of magnitude of the reported measured 
values. The basis for this change is well documented in the related literature and the real 
impact on the design procedures has been moderate because the reference to actual 
behavior during catastrophic events is the judging parameter in most cases. The new 
seismic risk maps presented in the USGS 1996 and 2002 maps describe a Maximum 
Considered Earthquake (MCE) that is supposed to produce measurable parameters such 
as peak ground acceleration of the same order of magnitude of those that may be 
recorded in the occurrence of a catastrophic event. How these values are made 
compatible with acceptable design parameters — from the economic and code 
requirements perspectives — have been solved in different ways.  
The building design requirements were the first to adopt this approach [NEHRP, 
1997]. The MCE was accepted but the design ground motion was defined as 2/3 that 
produced by the MCE. The end result was design parameters that did not differ much 
from what was being used. The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions 
(NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] does not introduce the same reduction, although 
changes the accepted Response Modification Factors (R) to higher values that may bridge 
the difference (please compare values listed in Tables 2-3 and 2-8). Other subtle 
difference between the approach for buildings and for bridges is that in the case of site 
specific studies the building requirements require that the deterministic spectrum be 
obtained from 150% the mean of the spectra computed for characteristic maximum 
magnitude earthquakes while for bridges it requires the median-plus-one-standard-
deviation which leads to 184% of the mean spectrum. One important conclusion is that in 
the future the basic seismic risk design factors will be different for buildings and for 
bridges although based on the same seismic risk maps. 
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(b) Impact of change from PGA to spectral description — The description of the 
design ground motion through a response spectrum was formalized in the ATC 3-06 
project [ATC, 1978] based on the work of N. Newmark. The spectrum description was 
based on two parameters defined as Effective Peak Acceleration (EPA) and Effective 
Peak Velocity (EPV) that were related to the spectral ordinates as shown in Fig. 3-25 
with EPA made equal to parameter Aa and EPV proportional to Av. This procedure was 
the one adopted in ATC 6 for bridges and later in Division I-A of the Standard AASHTO 
Specification and is the basis of current 17th edition with the acceleration parameter A 
corresponding to the mapped value of Av of the 1988 maps[NEHRP, 1988] by the USGS 
[Algermissen et al., 1990]. 
 
Fig. 3-25 – EPA = Sa/2.5 and EPV = Sv/2.5 obtained from a response 
spectrum with 5% damping as prescribed by ATC 3-06 [ATC, 1978] 
  
The use of two different parameters to define the design response spectrum one based 
on acceleration and the other based on velocity was a wise decision because attenuation 
with distance for the two parameters is not the same. The 2.5 proportional constant was 
developed by Newmark based on the study of many accelerograms and their 
corresponding response spectrum and in general works well for most records but the 
commentary of the ATC-3-06 made it clear that effective peak acceleration and effective 
peak velocity were different from the peak acceleration in the accelerogram, and the peak 














The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions moves away from this 
definition of the design ground motion and directly states the design spectrum severing 
the link with the effective peak ground acceleration and velocity, although it states a way 
to obtain the peak ground acceleration as 0.4SDS as was shown in Fig. 2-21 thus 
apparently keeping the same 2.5 ratio. As shown in Table 3-4 for the seven Indiana sites, 
in the 2002 USGS maps the ratio between SS and PGA for the same return period reports 
ratios between 2 and 3 with a mean of 2.27. Although these ratios are not fixed and will 
probably change in the future as new versions of the maps appear, the impact of moving 
from a PGA definition to a directly defined spectrum as the description of the design 
ground motion is minor. 
Figures 3-26 and 3-27 show the combined impact of the change in return period and 
the spectral definition from the current Division I-A seismic design requirements response 
spectrum to the one required in the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements using 
the 2002 USGS maps. 
















Draft LRFD - Evansville
Draft LRFD - Jasper and Vincennes
Draft LRFD -  Bloomington




Fig. 3-26 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Bloomington, Evansville, Jasper, and 
Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements 
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Draft LRFD - New Albany
Draft LRFD - Terre Haute
Draft LRFD -  Indianapolis
 
Fig. 3-27 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Indianapolis, New Albany, and Terre Haute 
in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements 
 
Table 3-5 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana for the 






















































































(Essent./Other) A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A 
SHL II IV II III II III III 
SDAP 


















(Life S. /Oper.) 2/3 5/6 2/3 3/4 2/3 3/4 3/4 
 
Table 3-5 shows the implication from the point of view of the corresponding 
associated design analysis and detailing requirements presenting the Seismic 
Performance Category (SPC) (see Table 2-1) of the current requirements and for the 
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proposed Draft LRFD requirements the Seismic Hazard Level (SHL) (see Tables 2-5 and 
2-6), the Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP) (see Table 2-7), and Seismic 
Detailing Requirements (SDR) (see Tables 2-9 and 2-10). 
 (c) Impact of change of site effects evaluation procedure — The USGS 1996 and 
2002 maps are defined at the B-C soil profile type interface (see Table 2-11) which is the 
dividing line between rock and very dense soil or soft rock. The soil amplification factors 
are both Fa =1.0 and Fv = 1.0 for soil profiles type B. This is similar to the Soil Profile 
Type I of Division I-A of the current 17th Edition of the Standard AASHTO Specifications 
for which has a Site Coefficient S =1.0 (see Fig. 2-16). Up to this point the procedures are 
similar. When other soil profile types come into play, the difference is large because the 
proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] has 
soil amplification factors Fa that affects the short period part of the design spectrum. 
AASHTO current Standard Specifications does not have a comparable soil dependent 
factor. Both Fa and Fv are acceleration dependent with comparatively larger values for 
lower accelerations (see Figures 2-24 and 2-25). Just for comparison purposes a site, 
common in Indiana, with more than 30 ft of soft to medium stiff soil under current 
Division I-A requirements would be a Type III soil profile and would have a Site 
Coefficient S = 1.5 that amplify the medium to long period part of the design spectrum. 
The same soil would probably be classified as a Type D Stiff Soil when using the 
proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions. Table 3-6 shows the values obtained 
for the cases being use for comparison.  
 For the short period portion of the design spectrum under the proposed Draft Seismic 
Provisions the amplification caused by the soil profile would be 18% to 60% percent 
higher than the current requirements with no amplification required. For the medium to 
long period portion of the design spectrum the values under the proposed Draft Seismic 
Provisions the amplification caused by the soil profile would be 33% to 60% percent 
higher than the current requirements. The reason for this large impact is linked to Indiana 





Table 3-6 – Values of the site coefficient for a Type III soil profile under current Division 



















































































A (PGA)  
10% PE 50y 0.09g 0.09g 0.06g 0.09g 0.06g 0.06g 0.09g AASHTO  
Div. I-A Site Coefficient 
S 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
SS  
2% PE 50y 0.28g 0.80g 0.20g 0.60g 0.28g 0.36g 0.60g 
Soil Type D 
Factor Fa 
1.58 1.18 1.60 1.32 1.58 1.51 1.32 
S1  






Maps Soil Type D 
Factor Fv 
2.32 2.00 2.40 2.16 2.32 2.32 2.16 
 
Figures 3-28 and 3-29 show the combined impact of the change in return period, the 
spectral definition and the soil amplification requirements for a Type III soil profile from 
the current Division I-A seismic design requirements design spectrum to the one required 
in the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements for a Type D profile using the 2002 
USGS maps.  
Table 3-7 shows the implication from the point of view of the corresponding 
associated design analysis and detailing requirements presenting the Seismic 
Performance Category (SPC) (see Table 2-1) of the current requirements and for the 
proposed Draft LRFD requirements the Seismic Hazard Level (SHL) (see Tables 2-5 and 
2-6), the Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP) (see Table 2-7), and Seismic 





















Current Division I-A 
Bloomington, Evansville, 
Jasper, and Vincennes
Draft LRFD - Jasper and Vincennes
Draft LRFD - Evansville
Draft LRFD -  Bloomington
 
Fig. 3-28 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Bloomington, Evansville, Jasper, and 
Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements 













Current Division I-A 
Indianapolis, New Albany, 
and Terre Haute
Draft LRFD - New Albany
Draft LRFD - Terre Haute
Draft LRFD -  Indianapolis
 
Fig. 3-29 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Indianapolis, New Albany, and Terre Haute 




It is evident from the values presented for rock and for soil that the impact of the 
proposed Draft LRFD requirements is significant both for the design forces and for the 
analysis and detailing requirements. Under the current Division I-A requirements the 
analysis and detailing are the simplest (SPC-A) while for the proposed Draft LRFD the 
most strict covered (SHL-IV) are required for Evansville and Vincennes in both cases 
(rock and soil) studied and for Jasper in soil. In no case the simpler (SHL-I) is required. 
The implications from the point of view of complexity of design and cost of 
construction are significant. 
 
Table 3-7 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana for the 






















































































(Essent./Other) A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A A/A 
SHL III IV II IV III III IV 
SDAP 


















(Life S. /Oper.) 3/4 5/6 2/3 5/6 3/4 3/4 5/6 
 
(d) Impact of use of “frequent” earthquake — The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD 
Seismic Provisions introduces a frequent earthquake to be used in verification of 
serviceability of the bridge. Figure 3-19 shows the value 0.06g obtained for SS at 
Vincennes for this earthquake based on results of the 1996 USGS maps. The impact of 







CHAPTER 4  METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATION OF SEISMIC 
VULNERABILITY OF THE INDIANA EMERGENCY ROUTES 
 
 
4.1 Route Alternatives 
U.S. Congress and the Federal Administration through the FHWA have defined 
priority and critical routes in different instances. One such example is the National Truck 
Network established in 1982 by the Surface Transportation Assistance Act in order to 
designate a national network of highways that would allow the passage of trucks of 
specified minimum dimensions and weight. Figure 4-1 shows the National Truck 
Network in southwestern Indiana. 
 
 
Fig. 4-1 – National Truck Network in southwestern Indiana 
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Corridor Network connectors linking major military installations and other defense-
related facilities to the Strategic corridors. The fifth component are important arterial 
highways that serve interstate and interregional travel and that provide connections to 
major ports, airports, public transportation facilities, and other intermodal facilities. 
 
 
Fig. 4-3 – Congressional High Priority Corridors 
 
The National Highway System and its role in determining geometric design of 
highways is discussed in Section 40-1.03 (01) of Chapter 40 "Basic Design Controls" of 
the Indiana Department of Transportation’s Design Manual.  
Figure 4-4 shows the highways designated in Indiana as part of the National Highway 
System. It includes in the north-south direction: SR-69 from I-64 to Mount Vernon in the 
Kentucky border (Ohio River), US 41 from Terre Haute to Evansville and across the 
Ohio River to Kentucky, I-164 from I-64 to Evansville, SR-57 from the intersection with 




One more recent highway system definition is the National Highway System. The 
National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 selected 264,000 km of roadways as 
the National Highway System (NHS) including 4,750 km in Indiana. Figure 4-2 shows 
the whole National Highway System. 
 
 
Fig. 4-2 – National Highway System 
 
NHS consists of five parts. The first component is the Interstate Highway System, 
which accounts for almost 30 percent of NHS. The second component includes 21 
congressionally designated high-priority corridors (see Fig. 4-3), three of which include 
highways in Indiana as part of them. The third component is the non-interstate portion of 
the Strategic Highway Corridor Network identified by the Department of Defense in 
cooperation with the Department of Transportation. These corridors and the interstate 
highways are critical strategic links. The fourth component is major Strategic Highway 
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(Ohio River) south of Rockport, and SR-67 from Indianapolis to the intersection with SR-
57. In the east-west direction includes US-50 from the Ohio border to Vincennes in the 
Illinois border (Wabash River), I-64 for the Ohio border to Illinois border (Wabash 
River), SR-66 from Rockport on the Kentucky border (Ohio River) to Evansville, and 
SR-62 fro Evansville to Mount Vernon on the Kentucky border (Ohio River).  
 
 
Fig. 4-4 – Highways in Indiana designated as part of the National Highway System 
 
From the methodological point of view it is evident that the routes in southwestern 
Indiana contained in both the National Truck Network and the National Highway 




Part I of this report presents different alternatives for Earthquake Emergency Routes 
for the State of Indiana based on trade off of three parameters, namely total travel time, 
population covered, and number of square feet of bridge deck (as a parameter associated 
with eventual retrofit cost).  
The Indiana Department of Transportation provides maintenance within the State to 
Interstate Highways, U.S. Routes, and Indiana State Highways. County roads and city 
roads are excluded unless special agreements are in effect. The grid of routes presented in 
Fig. 4-5 corresponds to routes that belong to the National Truck Network, the National 
Highway System, and are within the domain of the Indiana Department of 




Fig. 4-5 – Selected grid of Earthquake Emergency Routes  




The grid of routes presented in Fig. 4-5 comprises the following: 
• US 41 from Terre Haute South to Evansville and the Kentucky border (Ohio 
River). 
• SR 67 from Freedom to SR 57 junction and SR 57 from SR 67 to I-64. 
• I-164 from I-64 to US 41. 
• US 231 from SR 54 at Bloomfield south to Rockport and to Kentucky border 
(Ohio River). 
• SR 37 from Bloomington south to SR 237 and SR 237 to Cannelton and the 
Kentucky border (Ohio River). 
• SR 154 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to US 41, and SR 54 from US 41 east 
to SR 45. 
• US 50 from Illinois border (Wabash River) at Vincennes east to SR 446 east of 
Bedford. 
• SR 64 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to Princeton to US 41. 
• I-64 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to SR 66 at Carefree. 
• SR 57 from US 41 past Evansville Airport to I-164. 
• SR 62 from Illinois border (Wabash River) thru Evansville to US 231 
• SR 66 from US 41 east to Rockport. 
 
4.2 Available Information 
The Indiana Department of Transportation has a very well organized data base where 
information for the purposes of present project was obtained. The information used was 
the following: 
• Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database – This database was modernized 
just before the initiation of the project. It consists in a MS Access database that 
contains records of all bridges being maintained by Indot. It follows Federal 
Highway Administration guidelines [FHWA, 1996] and contains additional 
information beyond the FHWA requirements. Only the portion related to bridges 
 
113 
in the Vincennes Indot District was used containing 827 bridges, distributed by 
Counties as shown in Table 4-1. See Fig. 4-6 for their location. 
 
Table 4-1 – Distribution by County of Vincennes District bridges  
contained in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database 
 























• Bridge Drawings – The bridge drawings at the Indot Vincennes District offices 
were consulted for bridges located on the selected Earthquake Emergency 
Routes. The drawings contain the original design plans, those corresponding to 
changes and modifications, and a description of the soil boring performed at the 
time of design of the bridge reporting SPT values in many cases. 
• GIS Information – Geographical Information System (GIS) related to the State of 
Indiana, and other information was supplied by Indot. This information can also 






Fig. 4-6 – Vincennes District bridges contained in Indot Inspection  
and Maintenance Database (those whose drawings were used in this  
research are marked as blue filled dots) 
 
4.3 GIS Implementation 
A two tier approach was developed for managing the information described in the 
previous section. The first stage consisted in developing tools for assessing the 
vulnerability condition of the studied Earthquake Emergency Routes. The second stage 
consisted in implementing the results in a dynamic database with Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS) capabilities. 
For the first stage a database was developed as a search-engine to allow the static and 
dynamic evaluation of the condition of the selected critical routes prior to and following 
an earthquake disaster. Several specialized software programs were developed to act as 
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independent units — all of them interacting with the database as needed — for evaluating 
the different sources of vulnerability along the Earthquake Emergency Routes.   
Three modules were developed, as shown in Fig. 4-7. The first module corresponds to 
a Data Management Module. This module handles the information related to the routes, 
and bridges. The information included is the one described in the previous section 










Fig. 4-7 – Organization of the GIS implementation 
 
The Pattern Recognition Module uses the information contained in the Data 
Management Module to process and obtain vulnerability assessment of bridge structures 
and geotechnical aspects of the bridges and routes and was used to feed information to 
the Scenario Management Module.  
The Scenario Management Module is implemented on the extraordinary capabilities 
of HAZUS software developed by the Federal Management Agency [FEMA, 2005] that 
is capable of accepting the feed-back of the results obtained from the Pattern Recognition 
Module. HAZUS is capable of obtaining vulnerability assessments for any case in 
particular for mitigation purposes, allows simulations for different earthquake occurrence 
scenarios, and will allow in the future to be used when online capabilities are 
implemented within Indot for monitoring response to an actual earthquake occurrence.  
FEMA
HAZUS





4.4 Vulnerability Assessment Approach 
The assessment of seismic vulnerability for a significant number of structures 
requires the use of identification of patterns of behavior of these structures to the 
envisioned earthquake ground motion. The approach used in comparable previous cases 
has been to define groups of structures having similar properties or configuration for 
which common behavior patterns can be defined. These behavior patterns have been 
referred in the literature as fragility curves relating probability of having a particular type 
of damage to a ground motion descriptor such as peak ground acceleration. 
For implementation in this project several shortcomings were identified in using this 
approach:  
• The inventory of bridges under study covers from bridges recently built to 
bridges built in the 1910’s and 1920’s. Figure 4-8 shows the year of construction 
of the Indot Vincennes District bridges. Establishing general fragility curves 
giving probability that a certain type of damage occurs for such a diverse 
inventory lead to many types of fragility curves and their use in establishing 
actual vulnerability may be questionable. 
• Many of the bridges have been rebuilt (except bridges built after 1990) at 
different moment. Figure 4-9 shows the percentage of the Vincennes District 
bridges that have been rebuilt, and the average year when the rebuilding took 
place. The influence of such a significant percentage of bridges having been 
rebuilt makes the fragility curve type of approach even more difficult to apply. 
• Associating the bridge vulnerability of a set value of seismic risk assessment as 
presented in a specific map, for example the one contained in Current 17th 
Edition of the Standard AASHTO Specifications, will require a new assessment 
if the map contained in the requirements changes. The adoption of new more 
modern specifications will surely take place in the near future, but the nature of 
the changes that will be introduced before adoption are unknown presently. The 
adoption of the proposed Draft LRFD Seismic Requirements has been voted 
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down by several states who have questioned the complexity and eventual 
unneeded extra cost that their adoption will bring.  
 







































Fig. 4-8 – Number of bridges built per decade (Vincennes District) 
 



































































Fig. 4-9 – Percentage of bridges rebuilt according to decade of construction and average 




Based on these limitations a different approach was implemented in this study. The 
approach used is based in selecting a number of bridges to study their seismic behavior 
under varying earthquake ground motion severity thus making the study independent of 
current requirements and making the results valid under mapped values having different 
return period or acceleration (peak ground or spectral) values. Using the results from the 
study of these bridges a procedure to extrapolate the results to the rest of the bridges in 
the Vincennes District was devised, requiring as information only that contained in the 
Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database. This establishes two levels of confidence on 
the vulnerability assessment. The first one is general and covers all bridges in the 
Inspection and Maintenance Database. The second one is more detailed because is based 
on the information contained in the bridge drawings. The advantage of this approach is 
that it permits to gage the vulnerability of the whole bridge inventory. It permits devising 
policies of general nature with respect to the selection, or variation in the future, of the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes. It also permits a more detailed assessment by supplying 
additional information to the GIS system data base, in case the detailed data is not already 
in the system. A detailed explanation of the procedure is given in Chapter 6. 
 
4.5 Mitigation and Simulation 
Vulnerability mitigation policies that cover the bridge inventory in southwestern 
Indiana are possible using the HAZUS GIS system. The assessment of the impact of a 
variation of the seismic risk maps or the simulation of occurrence of an earthquake with 
specific location and magnitude can be easily achieved by matching the new values to the 
already computed curves relating the bridge expected damage to the level of acceleration. 
If a bridge is retrofitted, the changes introduced to the bridge substructure or 










This chapter describes the methodology implemented for processing the geotechnical 
information available for the selected bridges and to be used, in the future, as the 
database is expanded by adding more information from drawings or from soil 
explorations. The Inspection and Maintenance Database does not contain geotechnical 
information; therefore, the approximate vulnerability assessment does not include 
evaluation of the geotechnical sources of vulnerability.  
Not all the studied bridge drawings contained soil exploration boring information. In 
the majority of cases studied the boring logs included in the drawings contained the soil 
description for each layer and reported the Standard Penetration Test (SPT) values at 
appropriate intervals. In rock sites many of the boring logs report the recovery percentage 
appropriately. In some instances the boring logs only report the soil classification for 
each layer without any SPT values. Textural description of the soil is the accepted 
practice for defining the soil classification in the field by the boring team to be reported 
in the boring log. In general, especially for older borings, the description is based on the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture textural classification chart [USDA, 1951] presented in 
Fig. 5-1. Percentages of sand, silt, and clay are established visually based only in the 
particle size. The soil classification description used corresponds to the one in the zone of 
the figure where the three percentage values meet. No laboratory procedures are involved 
in assigning the soil layer description. The AASHTO Soil Classification System or the 
Unified Soil Classification (ASTM D2487 — “Standard Classification of Soils for 
Engineering Purposes — Unified Soil Classification System”) require laboratory tests 





Fig. 5-1 – USDA Textural Soil Classification Chart [USDA, 1951] routinely  
used for soil classification by soil exploration boring teams 
 
The software implementation uses the soil exploration boring reports contained in the 
selected bridge drawings to study the geotechnical sources of vulnerability for each of the 
bridge sites. Other sites can be studied by adding information to the database in the 
future.  
Two evaluations are performed using the boring information: a soil profile 
amplification assessment and a liquefaction potential assessment. These evaluations are 
made for varying peak ground accelerations in rock to be consistent with the adopted 
approach in this research project of obtaining the vulnerability for different levels of 
ground motion at the site and not to depend on a unique description of ground motion as 
contained in a particular set of seismic risk maps. Soil profile amplification and 
liquefaction potential are acceleration dependent; therefore, the values obtained cover 
different seismic risk levels.  
The possibilities of evaluation are presented in the main screen of the software 




Fig. 5-2 – Main screen for the liquefaction evaluation module developed 
 
This module permits to enter, save, and retrieve boring information for any bridge site 
borings, and to process it to obtain the soil profile amplification potential, evaluate the 
liquefaction susceptibility, and to save to results for further analysis. 
 
5.2 Soil profile amplification 
The amplification potential of the soil profile is needed for the liquefaction evaluation 
and for the bridge vulnerability assessment; in the former case for estimating the ground 
motion acceleration at the surface and in the later case for defining the ground motion 
description for evaluation of the bridge. The methodology used is based on the procedure 
contained in the 2000 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 2000] as described in Section 2.3.1 
of this report.  
The first step is to define the site class (A to F) as presented in Table 2-11. The 
classification is made using average shear wave velocity ( sv ), average standard 
penetration resistance ( N ), average standard penetration resistance for the cohesionless 
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soils only ( chN ), and average undrained shear strength in case of cohesive soils ( us ). The 
software implementation is capable of using the more appropriate parameter from the soil 
exploration and laboratory reports. For the selected bridges because only Standard 
Penetration Test are reported the amplification potential is evaluated from the average 
standard penetration resistance ( N ) computed for the upper 100 ft (30 m) of the site 
profile using Eq. (5-1). Profiles containing distinctly different layers are subdivided into 




















where di is the thickness of any layer between 0 and 100 ft (30 m) and N is the Standard 
Penetration Resistance (SPT) not to exceed 100 blows/ft as directly measured in the field 
without corrections.  
Once the site is classified as being Class A to E (Class F requires a site specific 
evaluation) the curves presented in Figures 2-24 and 2-25 are used to obtain the 
amplification parameters Fa and Fv for the acceleration value under study. Spectral 
acceleration (Ss or S1) values are used directly to obtain Fa and Fv. If peak acceleration in 
rock is used (A) the value is multiplied by 2.5 to be used in Fig. 2-24 to obtain Fa and is 
used directly in Fig. 2-35 to obtain Fv.  
The values obtained were compared with results using the program SHAKE as 
described for several sites in Indiana in [Bobet et al., 2001] obtaining good correlations of 
the amplification levels obtained. 
Figure 5-3 shows the results obtained for a specific case. The figure reports that in 
this case (Bridge No. 41-42-04638) the bridge drawings included four borings. It also 
indicates that the procedure classified the soil profile in all borings as being Type E. The 
statistics shown in the screen indicate the number of borings that report a certain soil 
profile type. As opposed to buildings, where usually a single soil profile type is present, 
bridges by being extended structures may have different soil profile types under the 
abutments or at the bridge piers. This is specially true in alluvial plain sites, where many 
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of Indiana bridges are sited. Figure 5-3 also shows in graphic form the relationship 
between the horizontal acceleration in rock and the horizontal acceleration in surface for 
peak ground acceleration, or spectral ordinates (Ss and S1). 
 
 
Fig. 5-3 – Typical results for soil profile classification and amplification potential 
 
In total 182 bridge sites located on the defined Earthquake Emergency Routes were 
evaluated. This includes all the bridges located on the Emergency Routes whose 
drawings contained soil boring records shown as part of them. The information was used 
directly to define the soil profile type for each boring using the procedure described. 
When reporting the soil profile type that causes the maximum amplification the results 
shown in Fig. 5-4 are obtained indicating that for 159 bridges out of 182 (87%) the soil 
profile is classified as Type E (see Table 2-11 for description of the soil profiles). Soil 
profile Type D is obtained in 16 bridges (9%), soil profile types (B and C) just carry 7 
bridges (4%), and none are classified in soil profile Type A. These results are hardly 
surprising for the State of Indiana where very few rock type sites are found. 
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Notwithstanding, this situations has important implications from the point of view that 
mild earthquakes may produce moderate to high peak ground accelerations on surface 
due to the soil amplification caused by the intervening soil responding essentially in a 
elastic manner without the possibility of a decrease caused by the damping inherent in the 
nonlinear response of the soil ever occurring.   












Fig. 5-4 – Worse soil profile type at bridge site for 182 bridges  
on the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
 
5.3 Liquefaction 
The liquefaction potential is evaluated using the procedure described in Section 2.3.2 
of this report. The software implementation accepts information from field test in the 
form of cone penetration test (CPT), standard penetration test (SPT), or shear-wave 
velocity (Vs) measurements. The application of the procedure using the boring 
information available was restricted to evaluations using Standard Penetration Test 
values, but as more information is included in the database it is desirable to use more 
reliable field information such as CPT or shear wave velocity measurements for 
evaluations in the future.  
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For the selected bridge evaluation corrections, as described in Section 2.3.2, for fines 
content and earthquake magnitude were implemented. The corrections to SPT listed in 
Table 2-12 were implemented but not used (except overburden pressure and rod length 
corrections that were used in all cases) due to lack of information on the boring 
equipment and procedures as reported in the bridge drawings. As the database is 
expanded in the future the software implementation permits the use of these corrections if 
reported in the boring log.  
Fines content in a soil can have a significant influence in the liquefaction potential of 
a soil layer. The procedure to account for the presence of fines in the evaluation of the 
liquefaction potential is to adjust the value of the corrected blow count (N1)60 using Eq. 
(2-22) to an equivalent value for clean sand, (N1)60cs. The effect of the adjustment is an 
increase of the value of (N1)60 effectively used. It is considered [Youd and Idriss, 2001] 
that clean granular soils having a value of (N1)60 greater than 30 are too dense to liquefy 
and are classed as non-liquefiable. For most soil classification procedures, as shown in 
Fig. 5-5, fines are considered particles that can pass through a No. 200 sieve 
corresponding to a 0.08 mm size particle.  
 
 
Fig. 5-5 – Soil particle size according to several soil classification  




Boring reports as presented in bridge drawings do not include the results from the 
sieve analysis. In order to adjust the fine content of the soils as reported in the boring logs 
the percentage of silt and clay was determined from the soil classification reported in the 
borings using the chart presented in Fig. 5-1 or alternatively for some soil descriptions 
not contained there using the values suggested by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) classification as shown in Fig. 5-6. The implemented software permits editing the 
value of the fines content for any soil layer when needed.  
The influence of the fines content in the evaluation of the liquefaction potential 
cannot be underestimated and is recommendable that in the future, as more sites are 
included in the database, that fine content be reported from sieve analysis of the soil. 
 
Fig. 5-6 – FAA textural classification of soils [Winkerkorn and Fang, 1975] 
 
When evaluating liquefaction potential the expected number of cycles needed for the 
pore pressure increase development has been traditionally associated with the causing 
earthquake magnitude. The developers of the liquefaction evaluation procedure used the 
moment magnitude scale — Mw. Magnitude for the 1811-1812 New Madrid events has 
been estimated using different techniques, reporting values that range from a lower value 
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of 6 to an upper value of 9. The magnitude scale in which these values have been 
reported is uncertain and in some cases is not reported. 
The preference for moment magnitude is based on being the most consistent scale 
along a wide magnitude range, but it is the scale that requires more instrumental 
information to define its assigned value. Recent studies made by the USGS [Frankel et 
al., 2002] for the 2002 seismic risk maps update have set a maximum characteristic 
magnitude for the central and eastern U.S. for purposes of seismic risk assessment. The 
scale in which the characteristic magnitude is expressed is moment magnitude and has 
direct use in liquefaction potential evaluation.  
Figure 5-7 shows the maximum characteristic moment magnitude assessed for the 
central and eastern U.S. A value of Mw = 6.5 is given for all the state of Indiana, except 
the Wabash River Valley that is assigned a value Mw = 7.5. JTRP Project SPR 2812 on 
Analysis of Seismic Hazard Assessment for Indiana being currently conducted by Purdue 
Professors Haase and Nowack will surely give more insight on the values of Mw to be 
used and implemented in future liquefaction potential assessments. The software 
developed permits the variation of the magnitude to use. 
 




It is interesting to note that if the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD seismic 
requirements are adopted in Indiana, for the seven Indiana cities evaluated for 
comparison purposes in section 3.4.6 of this report any new bridge design would require 
liquefaction evaluation for the bridge site. Table 2-13 indicates the cases in which no 
liquefaction evaluation is needed for Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR) 3 to 6 that 
require in all cases magnitudes lower than 6.4. 
Typical results screens from the implemented software are shown in Figures 5-8 to 5-
10. In Fig. 5-8 the description of the boring is given reporting the soil layers and the 
Standard Penetration Test (SPT) values and the water table level. 
 
 




In Fig 5-9 the safety factor for liquefaction is given. The software first searches for 
the lowest surface ground acceleration that will produce liquefaction — in this case it is 
15% of the acceleration of gravity g — and reports the safety factor along the soil profile. 
In this case liquefaction occurs in a sand layer that reports a SPT value of 17 blows per 
foot at elevation 410. The peak ground acceleration in rock that produces the acceleration 
in surface leading to liquefaction corresponds in this case to 6% g. The soil profile 
reported by this boring is classified as being Type E and for a peak rock acceleration of 
6%g the amplification factor, Fa, has a value of 2.5 thus converting the 6% g acceleration 
in rock into 15% g acceleration in surface.  
 
 
Fig. 5-9 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for the lowest ground surface 
acceleration inducing liquefaction. In this case 15% g leads to a safety factor of 0.9 




Different peak ground accelerations in rock can be evaluated. Figure 5-10 shows the 
results in the liquefaction potential as described by the liquefaction safety factor for peak 
ground acceleration in rock of 4%g leading to a ground surface acceleration of 10%g the 
safety factor against liquefaction increases to a value of 1.4 thus reporting no 




Fig. 5-10 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for a different ground 
surface acceleration from the one shown in Fig. 5-9 not inducing liquefaction. In this case 
the lowest safety factor for 10% g surface acceleration is 1.4 
 
The factor of safety for liquefaction for a range of ground surface acceleration is 
stored in the database. This permits to handle different seismic risk scenarios without 
having to reprocess the boring information in each instance. 
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Bridge 050-42-06963 reported in the previous figures (Fig. 5-8 to Fig. 5-10) has 
description for four borings included in the drawings. Borings 1 and 3 are classified as 
being Soil Profile Type D while borings 2 and 4 are classified as Soil Profile Type E. The 
peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction obtained were 6% g for 
borings No. 1, 2, and 4 and 4% g for boring No. 3.   
The situation just described in present in many of the 182 bridges studied along the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes. The evaluation was performed for two values of Mw (Mw 
= 6.5 and Mw = 7.5). Table 5-1 presents a summary of the minimum peak ground 
acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction at bridge sites studied. The 
information is presented for the two moment magnitude studied.   
 
Table 5-1 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction 
on the 182 bridges sites studied along the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
 
No. of Bridges PGA rock (g) Mw=7.5 % Mw=6.5 % 
0.02 2 1.1%  0.0% 
0.03 27 14.8% 3 1.6% 
0.04 23 12.6% 18 9.9% 
0.05 10 5.5% 24 13.2% 
0.06 3 1.6% 10 5.5% 
0.07 2 1.1% 7 3.8% 
0.08 1 0.5% 2 1.1% 
0.09 4 2.2% 2 1.1% 
0.10 1 0.5% 1 0.5% 
0.11 2 1.1%  0.0% 
0.12 1 0.5% 1 0.5% 
0.13 1 0.5% 2 1.1% 
0.14  0.0% 2 1.1% 
0.15  0.0% 1 0.5% 
0.16  0.0%  0.0% 
0.17 1 0.5%  0.0% 
0.18 1 0.5% 2 1.1% 
0.28  0.0% 1 0.5% 
0.42  0.0% 1 0.5% 
0.48  0.0% 1 0.5% 
No liquefaction 103 56.6% 104 57.1% 




With the minimum peak ground acceleration in rock needed to produce liquefaction 
at the bridge site it is possible to have a general picture of the vulnerability caused by 
liquefaction for the bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes. This information is 
presented in Fig. 5-11. In this figure the percentage of bridge sites that may be affected 
by liquefaction when the peak ground acceleration in rock reaches a certain value may be 
obtained. At peak ground accelerations in rock of the order of 10% g the curve flattens, 
meaning that the number of bridges sites susceptible of liquefaction would remain 
essentially the same even for higher accelerations. At this level of acceleration in rock 
approximately 40% of the bridges located along the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
would have reported liquefaction. This acceleration is of the same order of magnitude of 
those contained in current Division I-A of AASHTO Standard Specifications. 























Fig. 5-11 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes that will not 
have liquefaction at the site for a given peak ground acceleration in rock computed using 
the minimum acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site 
 
Liquefaction potential was computed at all borings for each of the studied bridge 
sites. Only in few cases the minimum acceleration needed to produce liquefaction is the 
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same for all borings. If instead of reporting the minimum peak ground acceleration in 
rock the average acceleration for those borings reporting liquefaction is computed, the 
vulnerability situation changes. Figure 5-12 shows the information computed for the 
average peak ground acceleration in rock to produce liquefaction at the site. The curves 
shown flatten at a higher acceleration (15% g) but show a similar trend. Using the 
average peak ground acceleration in rock at the bridge site, the number of vulnerable 
bridges due to liquefaction at the level of acceleration of the current AASHTO Standard 
Specifications reduces to approximately 35% of the bridges on the Earthquake 
Emergency Routes. 























Fig. 5-12 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes that will not 
have liquefaction at the site for a given peak ground acceleration in rock computed using 
the average acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site 
 
The primary concern when interpreting the data just presented is related to the 
difference in peak ground acceleration in rock values for the same bridge site. If the 
difference between the minimum accelerations to produce liquefaction and the mean 
acceleration for the same bridge site is relatively large, it indicates significant variations 
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in the soil profile recorded in the soil exploration borings for the same bridge site. The 
ratio of mean to minimum peak ground acceleration producing liquefaction at the same 
bridge site has values that range from 1 to 6 with an average of the order of 1.4 for the 
bridge sites studied, indicating significant variations in the soil profiles.  
To emphasize the need for engineering judgment in interpreting the results presented, 
the following example brings out features found in many of the bridges located in the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes. Bridge 50-42-04625 on the Wabash River carries US 
Route 50 across the river to Illinois. The bridge drawings contain records of 24 soil 
borings made in 1960 all of them containing appropriate information (soil description and 
standard penetration test – SPT – logs) to evaluate the soil amplification potential and the 
liquefaction potential at each boring. The evaluation of the Soil Profile Type indicates 
that the profile at one boring would be Type B, at five borings Type D, and Type E at the 
remaining 18 borings. The general classification of the bridge site based on the softer 
profile would assign the bridge site as being Type E. The liquefaction evaluation for the 
borings report possibility of liquefaction in 11 out of the 24 borings for magnitude Mw = 
7.5. Table 5-2 presents the peak ground acceleration in rock required for producing 
liquefaction at each of the borings reporting liquefaction. In the same table the minimum 
and maximum peak ground acceleration obtained is reported as well as the mean and 
standard deviation for the acceleration. 
In order to interpret the liquefaction potential computation for the studied bridges 
besides the information presented, two other variables were studied: 
• Percentage of borings reporting liquefaction of the total number of borings. 
• Ratio of the range of peak ground acceleration in rock producing liquefaction 
to the mean peak ground acceleration. 
For Bridge 50-42-04625 the percentage of borings reporting liquefaction was 58% 
and the ratio of the range of peak ground acceleration in rock producing liquefaction to 
the mean peak ground acceleration was (0.36–0.05)/0.10 = 3.1. These values were 
computed for all bridges reporting liquefaction and based on the values obtained a 
recommendation was formulated dividing the bridges studied into four groups designated 
as: bridges having no liquefaction, bridges with a high probability of liquefaction, bridges 
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with an appreciable probability of liquefaction, and bridges having liquefaction but were 
a wide variability of the results is present that require additional soil exploration and a 
more in depth liquefaction study performed by geotechnical consultants.  
 
Table 5-2 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction 




Acceleration in Rock 
for liquefaction 
14 8% g 
15 8% g 
16 9% g 
17 7% g 
18 6% g 
19 6% g 
20 8% g 
21 36% g 
22 5% g 
23 7% g 
24 7% g 
Min. PGArock 5% g 
Max. PGArock 36% g 
Mean PGArock 10% g 
Standard Deviation 9% g 
 
Figure 5-13 presents the percentage of bridges studied that fall into the 
recommendation categories for the two moment magnitude studied.  
Other considerations that are beyond present study are related to issues related to 
variation of the soil profile as used in the evaluation that may have occurred during the 
years since the borings were performed. Other important consideration to take into 
account is related to the water table at the site. Liquefaction can only occur in relatively 
loose granular soils located under the water table. The potential for liquefaction studied 
and reported used the water table level reported in the borings. The possibility of 
variations of the water table level due to seasonal effect with respect to the moment the 
borings were performed can affect the results presented. This is specially important for 
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those cases not reporting liquefaction due to a depressed water table in cases were loose 


































Fig. 5-13 – Recommendation for bridges located along the Earthquake Emergency 
Routes  
 
Using has HAZUS-MH [FEMA, 2005] — a GIS-based software tool developed by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) — Indot bridge inventory was 
assessed for the liquefaction potential that was evaluated using the actual soil borings 
included in the bridge drawings, as described before.  The Indot bridge data base was 
integrated within HAZUS-MH and the GIS functions were activated. The liquefaction 
potential was evaluated using HAZUS-MH own liquefaction potential evaluation 
routines. This was performed for the Mw = 6.5 earthquake scenario obtaining comparable 
result.   
5.4 Soil spread 
For a soil spread situation to occur during earthquake liquefaction has to occur. The 
soil spread scenarios are difficult to state and requires analysis and studies beyond what 
 
137 
can be implemented in application software of the type implemented in this project. In a 
previous JTRP project [Bobet et al., 2001] soil spread scenarios and consequences were 
studied for several sites in southwestern Indiana indicating the possibility of their 
occurrence. The study also indicated that the Indiana Department of Transportation 
practice of using steel H piles and steel encased concrete (SEC) piles reduces 
significantly the potential damage to piles during earthquakes. This study recommends 
mitigation studies and implementations that should be adopted for all bridge structures 
located along the Indiana Emergency Routes. A warning should be issued when 
liquefaction may occur and the bridge is supported on footings. The same type of 
warning is given when possibility of liquefaction is identified bellow the tip of piles, 
situation that seldom occurs. 
 
5.5 Embankment stability 
The absence of information on embankment slope geometry and description of 
mechanical properties of the fill material both in the Inspection and Maintenance 
Database and the selected bridge drawings precludes the inclusion of test cases for the 
Earthquake Emergency Routes. Not withstanding, test cases studied for fill material 
commonly used in Indiana indicate that for embankments with slopes of 1 vertical to 2 
horizontal there is a low probability of instability in the embankment itself for ground 
accelerations up to the order of 15% g and embankment heights lower than 30 ft (10 m). 
The possibility of liquefaction or other type of ground failure under the embankment 
must be studied independently along the routes. Information on soil profile under the 
embankment and properties of the fill material probably would require soil exploration 










This chapter describes the methodology implemented for assessing the bridge seismic 
vulnerability by processing information available for all bridges located in the Vincennes 
District of the Indiana Department of Transportation and for selected bridges whose 
drawings were used. The information contained in the Indot Inspection and Maintenance 
Database was used directly for obtaining an approximate evaluation of the bridge seismic 
vulnerability. The drawings of selected bridges were used for obtaining a more reliable 
vulnerability assessment of each selected bridge. The results of the analysis of the bridges 
whose drawings were used to calibrate the approximate procedures based on the 
Inspection and Maintenance Database information.  
 
6.2 Information from the Inspection and Maintenance Database 
Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database is implemented in MS Access and 
contains information descriptive of the bridge that is relevant from the inspection and 
maintenance management point of view. Only part of the information contained in the 
database is related to structural information and although general in nature, lends itself to 
assign the bridge within broad seismic behavior categories.  
The information from the database that was used directly in the approximate 
vulnerability assessment can be grouped in the following general categories: for database 
indexing purposes, relative to location, road under or over the bridge, date of construction 
and repair, general bridge geometry, superstructure characteristics including deck 
information, substructure characteristics, and information on the approaches and 
abutments. Table 6-1 presents the database keys that were used for processing the 




Table 6-1 – Basic information from Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database  
that was included in the analysis 
 
Group Information 
Number of Records 
Total No. of Bridge Records Database 
Record No. 
National Bridge Inventory No. 









Road Number Over Road Data 
Road Number Under 
Year Built 
Structure Designation 
Year Reconstructed Age Data 
Sufficiency Rating 
Number of Intermediate Piers 




Minimum Vertical Clearance Over 
Minimum Vertical Clearance Under 
Total Horizontal Clearance Over 
Geometry Data 
Largest Vertical Distance 
Structure Type 
Length Maximum Span 
Number of Main Spans 
Deck Structure Type 
Deck Thickness 
Bearing Diaphragm 
Bridge Joint Type Interior 
Bridge Joint Type (N/E) 
Bridge Joint Type (S/W) 
Cross Bracing 
Hinge Pin Connection 
Intermediate Diaphragms 
Main Structure Type 
Number of Approach Spans 
Number of Beams 
Number of Floor Beams 
Number of Girders 
Number of Stringers 
Superstructure Data 
Redundancy Code 
Abutment Type (W/S) 
Abutment Type (E/N) 






6.3 Approximate vulnerability assessment methodology 
The approach to an approximate evaluation of vulnerability in many instances has 
been based just on the type of bridge. This methodological approach depends on general 
correlations for each bridge type, usually called fragility relationships, between 
probability of reaching a certain performance level (total collapse, partial collapse, 
reparable damage, or other) and expected ground acceleration at the bridge site. Results 
from this type of analysis are applicable, within the uncertainties inherent to this type of 
methodology, at a national or state level. As the size of the sample becomes smaller the 
results obtained are less reliable especially if diverse bridge types of varying age are 
present in the sample. In this research project it was considered that the information 
contained in the Inspection and Maintenance Database is appropriate to determine, in an 
approximate but more reliable manner, the relevant parameters that are needed to 
establish a vulnerability level. The relevant parameters considered are: 
• Mass of the bridge 
• Stiffness of the substructure 
• Toughness available for adequate nonlinear response 
• Strength of the lateral load resisting elements 
The Inspection and Maintenance Database contains information from which the 
values of the relevant parameters can be estimated as follows: 
The mass of the bridge is associated mainly with the mass of the superstructure and 
the deck is generally the main contributor. The Inspection and Maintenance Database 
lists the deck material, and deck width and thickness; thus permitting to obtain a good 
approximation of its mass. Allowances for wearing surface, barriers and, guard rails are 
also included. The number of girders, beams, and stringers; and the structural material is 
listed in the database. Their mass can be estimated as a function of a span dependent 
depth that is characteristic of each superstructure type. The contribution to mass of the 
diaphragms and bracing elements can also be estimated from the number and type as 
listed in the database. Having an estimative of the superstructure mass and geometry it is 
possible to establish minimum cross-sectional dimensions required to support the gravity 
effects for the bents based on the adjacent span lengths and structural type. Vertical 
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clearance indicates the height of the bents. Results from these estimates were compared 
with mass computed for the selected bridges whose drawings were used in the formal 
vulnerability assessment and with comparison of projects whose information was 
available in the literature. 
The lateral stiffness of the bridge depends on the substructure type whose minimum 
dimensions were established in the computation of mass. The Inspection and 
Maintenance Database does not describe if the bridge is supported on frame or wall type 
bents, thus the estimate of the lateral stiffness is approached from the low side. 
Adjustments are made to this estimate for live load allowance especially in short span 
bridges.  
Using the estimative of mass and lateral stiffness fundamental vibration periods for 
the transverse and longitudinal directions are computed taking into account the expansion 
joint and hinge pin connection descriptions contained in the database. Lateral force 
demand, longitudinal and transverse, is established for varying values of ground 
acceleration. Expected lateral deformation of the superstructure and base shear demand 
on the substructure is then estimated for each acceleration level. 
The level of toughness required for adequate nonlinear response of the substructure 
elements is associated directly with the date of construction of the bridge. Lateral load 
strength is associated directly with the estimated substructure dimensions.  
Bridge vulnerability is then established for each acceleration level based on excessive 
lateral deformations or lack of strength to resist the imposed base shear. For each 
acceleration level the bridge is red-tagged meaning vulnerable, yellow-tagged meaning 
marginal vulnerability, and green-tagged meaning not vulnerable. 
These computations are made for all bridges in the Vincennes district inventory. For 
selected bridges the results were compared to the results obtained using the actual 




6.4 Formal vulnerability assessment methodology 
The implemented software permits to include information from the bridge drawings 
in the vulnerability assessment database. This was performed for selected bridges as 
previously mentioned. The information covered is divided as shown in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6-2 – Basic information from bridge drawings needed for formal vulnerability 
assessment and included in the software implementation database 
 
Group Information Detail 
Database File management Same Information from Inspection and Maintenance Database 
Number of spans, bents, element types, units (US 
customary or metric SI) 
Number of vibration modes to use General Bridge Information 
Use of rigid zones in bents 
Deck width, thickness, additional mass,  
Span Information Deck and Span Information 
Deck expansion joints type and location 
Bridge 
Information 
Geotechnical Information Same as described in section 5.2 
Cross-section dimensions 
Material information Bent Column Information Modeling parameters (cracking, effective area, 
nonlinear characteristics) 
Cross-section dimensions 
Material information Bent Beam Information Modeling parameters (cracking, effective area, 
nonlinear characteristics) 





Piles dimensional properties Piles 
Piles material properties 
Footing Type 
Footing dimensional properties 
Footing material Properties Footings 
Piles geometrical distribution 
Abutment Type 
Abutment dimensional properties 




Piles geometrical distribution 
Geometry Bent Types Element type Bents 
Bent Location Location in bridge 
Spectrum From Bridge Specs 
Accelerogram From accelerogram database 
Spectrum computed from 
accelerogram 
Computation of spectrum from ground motion and 
smoothing possibilities Ground Motion 
Increasing ground motion 
definition 
Parameters to obtain performance patterns by 




The information gathering process for each bridge is initiated including the 
information contained in the Inspection and Maintenance Database. The rest of the data 
must be provided from information contained in the bridge drawings. 
Using this information several tasks were performed once a process is initiated. Some 
of these tasks are performed only once in the process — routine tasks — while others are 
performed repeatedly with each level of intensity of ground motion — ground motion 
intensity-dependent tasks—.  
 
6.4.1 Routine tasks 
Those processes that are not dependent on the ground motion intensity were 
performed first. They comprised the following tasks: 
• Computation of element section properties. 
• Computation of mass and stiffness properties for the superstructure and 
substructure elements. 
• Computation of transverse and longitudinal vibration periods and modal 
shapes.  
• Definition of strength in flexure and shear for all elements. For bent girders 
this was performed at sections where maximum stresses are expected under 
seismic effects. For bent piers and walls flexure-axial force interaction 
diagrams were computed. Reinforcement anchorage strength at joints was 
evaluated. 
• Collapse mechanisms were evaluated for all bents defining the maximum 
tributary base shear strength. Distinction was made between flexural and shear 
collapse mechanisms.  
• The lateral-load strength of bearings was evaluated. For bearings vulnerable to 
overturning or sliding under lateral load, the maximum transmitted shear 
before overturning or sliding was evaluated. Maximum available seat lengths 
were defined at non-fixed joints.  
• For abutments and foundation elements, stiffness and deformation properties 
were evaluated. Strength for shear and overturning were evaluated. 
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From the above computed information a path of least strength was defined. For 
example bent piers were evaluated for the possibility of reaching shear strength before 
flexural strength thus initiating a brittle failure mode. At pier-foundation or wall-
foundation joints the ability to transmit the forces developed when the pier reaches its 
maximum strength was evaluated, thus defining a weak link in the seismic load path. The 
maximum seismic ground-motion induced-forces that the structural system is capable of 
resisting were defined from the load path evaluation. These forces indicate the level of 
seismic base shear that may induce severe damage or collapse of the bridge.  
 
6.4.2 Ground motion intensity-dependent tasks 
The processes that depend on the ground motion intensity were performed for 
increasing levels of intensity of the ground motion. The ground motion intensity was 
defined in rock as peak ground acceleration, Aa. For a set value of peak ground 
acceleration in rock the following tasks (see Fig. 6-1) were performed in the order 
presented: 
1. From the geotechnical information the soil profile amplification was determined 
using the procedure described in Section 5.2. This permitted the computation of 
spectral ordinates that are comparable to those defined through parameters SS and 
S1 as described in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions. This fully 
described the response spectrum for which the rest of the vulnerability assessment 
for the set ground motion was made. 
2. The liquefaction potential was evaluated for the set acceleration value and 
reported. No further analysis on collateral potential of damage to the bridge 
caused by liquefaction was performed as explained in Section 5.4.  
3. Structural element internal forces were obtained using a linear modal spectral 
response procedure based on the vibration periods and modal shapes computed in 
the routine tasks and the response spectrum from Step 1. Strength demands were 
compared with the strength capacity levels obtained in the routine tasks. A similar 
comparison was performed for the displacement demand against the maximum 
allowable displacement obtained in the routine tasks. The bridge was deemed not 
vulnerable for the set intensity of seismic ground motion and green-tagged and no 
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further analysis was performed if: a) the strength demand in all the structural 
elements was not exceeded, b) the displacement demand was within the 
established tolerable limit, and c) displacements at the supports did not exceed the 
limits established previously in the routine tasks,. If any of the strength or 
displacements limits were exceeded tasks 4 to 7 were performed. 
4. If the shear strength level or the evaluation of reinforcement anchorage indicated 
possibility of a bond failure, the bridge was deemed vulnerable. The bridge was 
yellow-tagged or red-tagged depending on the level of expected damage and the 
spread of damage to the different elements.  
5. If the possibility of bearing element failure by overturning or excessive 
displacement at movable supports was detected, the bridge was deemed 
vulnerable. The bridge was yellow-tagged or red-tagged based on the amount of 
expected deformation and the magnitude of potential horizontal or vertical 
permanent displacements of the superstructure.  
6. The bridge was updated to red-tag if compound yellow-tagging was obtained both 
from the strength and the displacement checks. No further analysis was performed 
and the vulnerability level was reported for the set value of ground acceleration if 
steps 4, 5, or 6 yellow-tagged or red-tagged the bridge.  
7. If the flexural strength for any element was exceeded in the evaluation performed 
in step 3, a nonlinear response evaluation was made. A substitute-structure 
procedure [Shibata and Sozen, 1976] was performed by introducing damage 
ratios, μ, greater than unity to the elements where flexural strength was reached. 
A series of analyses were carried out for increasing values of the damage ratios to 
the elements until the base shear strength of the bridge as computed in the routine 
tasks was reached. The expected lateral displacement for the set value of ground 
motion intensity was the one obtained when the bridge reached the base shear 
strength. This procedure gives comparable results to those obtained by performing 
a push-over analysis. The stability of the structure was judged for the 
displacements obtained using displacement-based procedures. Based on these 
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Fig. 6-1 – Flow diagram for the formal vulnerability assessment implemented  
Set value of peak 
ground acceleration 
in rock, Aa 


















































The approach of developing and implementing a tool for studying the alternatives for 
defining the Indiana Earthquake Emergency Routes and the upgrade needs of the 
transportation structures along theses routes responds to the importance of two variables 
linked to the emergency routes selected, and the definition of the earthquake ground 
motion intensity for which the vulnerability of the current inventory of bridges should be 
gauged. The effect on the upgrade needs of these two variables is substantial. Variations 
of the road segments to be included within the emergency routes affect the travel times 
and the number of bridges that may need upgrading. Once a set of routes were defined, 
the envisioned earthquake ground motion intensity to be used in defining the 
vulnerability of the transportation structures affects directly the upgrade needs for these 
structures.  
7.2 Bridges studied 
Table 7-1 shows the distribution by bridge type of the inventory of bridges in the 
Indot Vincennes District. Currently there are 827 bridges that are located in the Interstate 
System, in US Routes, and in State Roads. The distribution by location in the different 
counties was presented in Table 4-1. A total of 230 of these bridges are located in the 
selected Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana, corresponding to 28% of the 
inventory. Table 7-1 also shows the distribution by bridge type of the 69 bridges that 
were studied in detail using the information contained in drawings. The sample was 
defined trying to maintain the bridge type percentages similar. 
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Table 7-1 – Distribution by bridge type in the Vincennes Indot District of the total bridge 
inventory, in the suggested emergency routes, and in the bridges studied in detail 
 
Bridge 





















































BT Bailey Truss 1 0.1%   
CCTB Continuous Concrete T - Beam 1 0.1% 1 0.4% 
CPCBB Continuous Prestressed Concrete Box Beam 23 2.8% 4 1.7% 
CPCIB Continuous Prestressed Concrete I - Beam 69 8.3% 22 9.6% 
CPCTB Continuous Prestressed Concrete T - Beam 5 0.6% 2 0.9% 
CRCB Continuous Reinforced Concrete Box 1 0.1%   
CRCG Continuous Reinforced Concrete Girder 27 3.3% 15 6.5% 
CRCRF Continuous Reinforced Concrete Rigid Frame 1 0.1% 1 0.4% 
CRCS Continuous Reinforced Concrete Slab 162 19.6% 53 23.0% 
CRPG Continuous Riveted Plate Girder 3 0.4% 2 0.9% 
CSB Continuous Steel Beam 89 10.8% 46 20.0% 
CSG Continuous Steel Girder 16 1.9% 10 4.3% 
CSTA Continuous Steel Tied Arch - Truss 2 0.2%   
KCSB Composite Continuous Steel Beam 51 6.2% 31 13.5% 
KCSBG Composite Continuous Steel Box Girder 1 0.1%   
KCSG Composite Continuous Steel Girder 56 6.8% 33 14.3% 
KSB Composite Steel Beam 10 1.2%   
KSG Composite Steel Girder 8 1.0%   
MPA Metal Pipe Arch 1 0.1%   
MPAUF Multi-Plate Arch - Underfill 23 2.8%   
PCAUF Precast Concrete Arch - Underfill 3 0.4%   
PCB Precast Concrete Beam 10 1.2% 2 0.9% 
PCBB Prestressed Concrete Box Beam 61 7.4% 2 0.9% 
PCIB Prestressed Concrete I - Beam 31 3.7% 1 0.4% 
PCS Precast Concrete Slab 1 0.1%   
PCSUF Precast Concrete Slab - Underfill 3 0.4%   
PTRCS Post-Tensioned Reinforced Concrete Slab 1 0.1%   
RCA Reinforced Concrete Arch 32 3.9%   
RCAOS Reinforced Concrete Arch - Open Spandrel 1 0.1%   
RCAUF Reinforced Concrete Arch - Underfill 17 2.1%   
RCBUF Reinforced Concrete Box - Underfill 16 1.9%   
RCG Reinforced Concrete Girder 51 6.2% 2 0.9% 
RCS Reinforced Concrete Slab 21 2.5% 1 0.4% 
RCSUF Reinforced Concrete Slab - Underfill 2 0.2%   
RPG Riveted Plate Girder 2 0.2%   
SB Steel Beam 6 0.7% 1 0.4% 
SPT Steel Pony Truss 6 0.7%   
STT Steel Thru Truss 9 1.1%   
UCA Unreinforced Concrete Arch 1 0.1%   
WSTG Welded Steel Thru Girder 3 0.4% 1 0.4% 




Figure 7-1 shows the distribution by bridge type on the Earthquake Emergency 
Routes. The most abundant type of bridge (23%) corresponds to Continuous Reinforced 
Concrete Slab bridge type both in the whole district and in the selected emergency routes. 
Continuous Steel Beam bridges (20%) and Composite Continuous Steel Girder (14.3%) 
correspond to the next largest groups. 
 






































Fig. 7-1 – Bridge type distribution on the Earthquake Emergency Routes  
 
 
7.3 Retrofit Needs 
The current inventory of bridges in the Vincennes Indot District was studied for 
varying degrees of earthquake ground motion intensity using an approximate 
vulnerability assessment methodology. The same approach of varying the intensity of the 
ground motion was performed for the selected bridges that were studied in detail.  
As expected, bridge vulnerability and liquefaction potential in some bridge sites 
increased with the ground acceleration level. The importance of the definition of the 
 
150 
ground motion intensity for which the vulnerability level is assessed is explained by the 
number of bridges that would be red-tagged — 7% of the total Vincennes District bridge 
inventory — when the envisioned design ground motion contained in current 17th Edition 
of the AASHTO Standard Specifications are used as compared with a 15% when the 
ground motion description contained in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Update.  
The vulnerability assessment indicates that the most frequent cause of concern is 
associated with unseating of the superstructure at supports (65% of bridges red-tagged) 
followed by shear failure of bent vertical elements (25% of bridges red-tagged). Other 
sources of vulnerability studied account for the rest of the red-tagged bridges. This figure 
is consistent for the whole inventory and for the selected bridges studies in detail. Bridge 
age correlates directly with vulnerability in the entire sample.   
Overturning of the widely used movable expansion support of the type shown in Fig. 
7-2 was found to be associated with many of the cases of unseating detected. In some 
instances peak ground accelerations in surface as low as 10%g would cause overturning. 
 





Liquefaction as a source of vulnerability was present in the sample studied using the 
bridge drawings that reported soil borings. 182 bridges out of 230 reported a geotechnical 
exploration that could be used for evaluating liquefaction with 43% of them reporting 
sand or sandy soil and a water table level above the material susceptible of liquefaction. 
Lowest peak ground acceleration in rock that would produce liquefaction was below 5% 
g in several sites. The average peak ground acceleration in rock to produce liquefaction 
for the 79 sites where potential for liquefaction was detected was found to be 
approximately 5% g for the Mw = 7.5 scenario and 8% g for the Mw = 6.5 scenario.  
The HAZUS-MH implementation produced comparable results indicating the 
approach of using the FEMA methodology is warranted.   
 
7.4 Improvement of the approximate vulnerability assessment 
The approximate seismic vulnerability assessment based on the information contained 
in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database can be improved in the future by including 
additional information in the database. This additional information already exists in each 
set of bridge drawings. Although the drawings are available in electronic form they were 
scanned from hard copies and this format is not amenable for automatic retrieval of the 
information thus requiring participation of an experienced engineer for collecting and 
adding the information to the vulnerability assessment database.  
There is a natural tradeoff between the effort of adding and maintaining this 
additional information and the degree of resolution sought in the approximate assessment 
procedure. The possibility of making a more detailed vulnerability analysis as 
implemented for selected bridges constitutes the upper limit of the additional information 
to be included. This may be unnecessary for a properly calibrated approximate procedure. 
The amount of additional information must be selected in a manner that maximizes the 
quality of the result and minimizes the data acquisition effort.  
Based on this, the minimum suggested set of additional information is the following: 
• Description of bent type and element dimension for all supports of the bridge. 




• Additional information on bearings more from the point of view of vulnerability 
to seismic effects.  
• Additional information on foundation types and soil profile. 
This additional information may be collected when the routine programmed 
inspections of the bridge are performed.  
The improvement in dependability on the approximate vulnerability analysis with just 











Different alternatives for Earthquake Emergency Routes for the Vincennes District of 
the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT), located in the southwestern corner of 
the State, were studied from the transportation point of view (Part I of this report) and the 
implications of seismic vulnerability of the transportation structures located in these 
roads were studied (Part II of this report). 
 
The Indot bridge inventory data and soils information were incorporated in a software 
tool based on geographical information systems technology (GIS) developed by FEMA  
(HAZUS-MH [FEMA, 2005]) for evaluation of the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
network of Indiana and for establishing policies for mitigation of earthquake hazard on 
these routes. This tool may be used to perform simulations for different earthquake 
scenarios, and to help in the response to an actual emergency caused by the occurrence of 
a strong earthquake in the region.   
 
The software tool is capable of performing a seismic vulnerability approximate 
assessment of the bridge inventory of the Vincennes Indot District using solely the 
information contained in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database. Using information 
from the bridge drawings the software tool developed allows performing a detailed 
seismic vulnerability assessment of selected bridges. The vulnerability assessment 
performed for the selected bridges was used to calibrate the approximate analysis 
procedure based only on Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database and to evaluate the 
vulnerability of the selected bridges for different levels of earthquake ground motion 




The reported research will help in the study and adoption of emergency response 
policies for different earthquake occurrence scenarios. These policies may be updated in 
the future as mitigation programs are implemented and their results incorporated in the 
bridge vulnerability assessment database.  
 
The reported comments on the current state of seismic risk evaluation for the 
southwestern region of Indiana will help the State of Indiana in making decisions related 
to the adoption of proposed bridge seismic design provisions or proposed seismic risk 





It is suggested that the findings and developments of this research project may be 
applied by the Indiana Department of Transportation in the following ways: 
 
1. Indot should consider formally adopting the Earthquake Emergency Routes 
for the State of Indiana from the routes studied, or variations of them. It is 
clear that the final set of Earthquake Emergency Routes adopted and 
maintained will be affected by issues and policies whose scope is outside 
those studied and reported in this research project. Policy decisions, budgetary 
constraints, and decisions related to new road projects, such as the projected 
south western continuation of I-69, will affect the formal adoption of the 
selected routes and will surely impose variations in the future. The 
methodology developed in this research project will provide valuable 





2. The study and adoption of mitigation strategies to implement in the future by 
Indot to update and maintain the Emergency Routes of Indiana can be made 
possible by performing simulations for different earthquake scenarios 
including earthquake ground motion defined in current AASHTO Standard 
Specifications, proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or other 
appropriate bridge specification. These simulations will provide 
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for the selected routes or alternative 
definitions.     
  
3. It is recommended that Indot expands the information contained in the 
Inspection and Maintenance Database to include information currently 
available only in the bridge drawings (see section 7.5). This will improve the 
vulnerability assessment of the bridges refining the mitigation policies to 
adopt in the future. This expansion of the database can be extended to other 
counties and districts not covered in this research project.  
 
4. It is recommendable that Indot adopt a program for assessing the liquefaction, 
soil spread, and embankment failure potential along the routes at locations 
different from just bridge sites by providing a consistent evaluation 
methodology based on the implementation developed in this research project. 
This implementation will require a soil exploration program to provide 
geotechnical properties of sites where no information exists or was performed 
many years ago with different objectives than liquefaction evaluation. In the 
reported research liquefaction evaluations were made using solely boring 
information contained in selected bridge drawings.  
  
5. It is recommended that FEMA HAZUS-MH software be adopted as the 
methodology for vulnerability assessment, mitigation decisions through the 
study of appropriate earthquake occurrence scenarios, and emergency 
response programs tuned to the study of these scenarios. Along with this 
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recommendation a key feature is the training of Indot personnel in the use of 
FEMA HAZUS-MH software. Engaging of the services of the Polis Center of 
Indiana University, an authorized HAZUS-MH earthquake and flood service 
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